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Abstract 
Prior to 1997 the research carried out on corporate governance around the world was 
minimal. However, after the crisis that swept the financial markets and economics of the 
major Asian countries in 1997, and the notorious collapse of Enron in 2001, the interest in 
corporate governance has increased. Therefore, corporate governance has attracted 
considerable attention in the area of academic research and on the agenda of public policy 
debates in both developed and less-developed countries. An improved corporate 
governance system is now viewed as an essential feature of companies, and it can serve as 
an incentive for investment and also strengthen the foundation of long-term economic 
performance. 
The principal aim of this study is to investigate and offer an initial understanding of 
corporate governance practice within a developing economy, the case of Libya. Therefore, 
studying with different stakeholders is more suitable to understand corporate governance 
patterns and relations within the Libyan context. The study also investigates how the 
various environmental factors affect corporate governance practice and inhibit the practice 
and development of corporate governance.   
 
Two main research methods were employed in this study, namely, interviews and 
questionnaires. Distributing 453 questionnaires to six groups of stakeholders, and ten semi-
structured interviews with policy-makers were chosen to achieve the objectives. 
 
The findings suggest that the corporate governance framework in Libya is less-developed, 
and Libya has lagged behind its neighbours. Also, the study revealed that the absence of 
principles of corporate governance has led to the weakness of accountability and 
responsibility processes. The influence of the opaque economic structure, out dated legal 
system, influences of culture and social norms, political interference, lack of accounting 
professionalism in the corporate governance framework were also evident. The weakness of 
the education system and the stakeholders' activism were other factors in the corporate 
governance framework.   
The participants also indicated that the stakeholder’s model of corporate governance is 
more acceptable in a Libyan context and the Board of Directors as main internal 
mechanism of corporate governance needs to be more responsible and needs to act on 
behalf of the stakeholders.       
In essence, the results demonstrate that a good corporate governance framework depends 
on effective internal and external factors such as a complete legal system, a developing 
economy, and effective board members, associated with supportive political and 
educational systems, and culture and social norms. Therefore, the vision of improving 
corporate governance can be fully realised only if all the related parties such as 
government, academia, external auditors, NGOs and universities work together to eliminate 
these obstacles to attain a good framework of corporate governance in the country.  
The research has contributed to the understanding of the concept of corporate governance 
in the context of a developing economy with particular economic and social attributes, 
whilst adding to the more general knowledge and understanding of corporate governance 
practices and empirical research. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
The Rationale and Purpose of the Study 
 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
Prior to 1997, the research carried out on corporate governance around the world was 
extremely minimal (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; O'Sullivan, 2000). However, the crisis that 
swept the financial markets and economies of the major Asian countries in 1997 and the 
failure of several famous names (e.g. Enron, World Com and Parmalat) that have occurred 
in the last 15 years led to questions over the importance and significance of good corporate 
governance practices. Therefore, interest in corporate governance has grown and attracted 
considerable attention in the area of academic research and public policy in both developed 
and less-developed countries (Mallin, 2004; Reed 2002; Solomon and Solomon, 2004; 
Sternberg, 2004; Weir and Laing, 2001).    
A number of theories have been used to explain the concept of corporate governance. These 
theories include agency theory, transaction cost theory, the finance model, the myopic 
market model, the abuse of executive power and the stakeholder model (Keasey, et al., 
1997). However, it is argued that the main theories which have affected the development of 
corporate governance are the agency theory, transaction cost economics and stakeholders 
theory (Mallin, 2004).  
Agency theory (shareholders’ perspective) is used to provide an explanation of the agency 
relationship between a company's managers and its owners. Agency theory links 
governance to implementing contracts and argues that agents run the company on behalf of 
their principals, who may impose sanctions whenever the agent fails to meet the contractual 
requirements. The role of agents in the company reflects the accountability relationship 
between principals and agents, since they are responsible for protecting the interests and 
rights of principals and minimising managerial expropriation and acting in favour of the 
principal.  
Transaction cost theory can be viewed as closely related to agency theory. The transaction 
cost theory views the company as a governance structure, whereas agency theory views the 
company as a nexus of contracts (Mallin, 2004). Solomon and Solomon (2004) argued that 
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transaction cost theory is based on the fact that companies have become so large and 
complex that price movements outside companies direct production and the markets 
coordinate transaction. In other words, the way in which companies are organized 
determines their control over transactions. 
The stakeholder theory emerged in the late twentieth century and it can be seen as contrary 
to the shareholder perspective (Keasey et al, 1997; Letza et al, 2004; Mallin, 2004: p14). 
The main stakeholder theory idea is that the objective function in the modern corporation is 
not merely more equitable but more socially efficient than concentrating on shareholders’ 
wealth (Keasey et al, 1997). The stakeholders’ theory of corporate governance argues that 
those responsible for the governance of the company have responsibilities to other parties 
than shareholders and any fiduciary obligations owed to shareholders to maximise profits 
might be subject to the constraint of respecting obligations owed to such wider stakeholders 
(Reed, 2002). Stakeholder theory views corporate governance as an instrument to examine 
a wider set of stakeholders’ relationships that consist of interactions between employees, 
customers, suppliers, creditors, society at large and other stakeholders. Therefore, 
stakeholder theory generally focuses on the interest of any group that may benefit from or 
be negatively impacted on by the company, including those with a non-financial interest, 
who have a right to be treated fairly, and have access to disclosure of a wide range of 
information, including environmental information (Gibson and O’Donovan, 2007).  
The development of corporate governance depends on the different theories which explain 
the nature of corporate governance mechanisms and the differences of practice regarding 
the legal, cultural, ownership and political systems which differ between countries. 
Solomon and Solomon (2004) argue that the acceptance of these theories’ views on what is 
wrong in the practice depends on the characteristics of the country where some theories 
may be more appropriate and relevant in some countries.  
The definition of the term corporate governance differs depending on which theory or 
model is applied. In the shareholders’ model (agency theory), corporate governance is 
defined as a relationship between agents (managers) and principals (owners or 
shareholders). 
This definition of corporate governance focuses on the relationships between the 
corporation and its shareholders, and refers to a company’s relationship with its 
shareholders to ensure that it acts in accordance with their interests. Keasey et al (1997: p4) 
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stated that corporate governance may be described as “a form of accountability of senior 
management to the shareholders”. 
In stakeholder theory, the concept of corporate governance refers to an organisation’s 
relationship with its shareholders and all other stakeholders who are affected by or affect 
the company's operations and decisions. Solomon and Solomon (2004: p14) defined 
corporate governance as “a system of checks and balances, both internal and external to 
companies, which ensures that companies discharge their accountability to all their 
stakeholders and act in a socially responsible way in all areas of their business activity”. 
The importance of corporate governance has changed remarkably and it is now viewed as 
an essential feature of companies (Hussain and Mallin, 2002), an incentive for investment 
and strengthen the long-term economic performance. 
Corporate governance also is seen as key to developing a market economy and civil society 
in transitioning economies (McCarthy and Puffer, 2003) where investors are uncertain 
about the protection of their property rights. For instance, a survey of international 
investors by McKinsey & Co in 2002 found that 85% consider corporate governance in 
Africa and Eastern Europe to be ‘equally, or more, important than financial issues in 
deciding which companies to invest in’ (Nganga et al, 2003).  
Most countries perceive that the collapse of companies can lead to an increase in the rate of 
unemployment and decrease of economic prosperity. Therefore, developed countries are 
paying attention to corporate governance in order to avoid economic problems, and 
numerous studies have been done in these countries to develop their corporate governance.1 
In developing countries, minimal research has been done and there is still a lacuna in the 
literature on corporate governance development (Okike, 2007; Tsamenyi et al, 2007; 
Okeahalam, 2004; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). For instance, the scarcity of information 
about corporate governance in Africa led an editorial writer of Business Week Magazine 
(19th May 2003) to observe that the worldwide movement to improve corporate governance 
is nothing less than a cultural revolution transforming the investment landscape in the US, 
Europe, and Asia. However, the current trend  in studies is misleading because the 
institutions of corporate governance lie at the heart of the greatest challenges that all 
                                                 
1 For example, the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) established Principles 
in 2004 to assist OECD and non-OECD members in their efforts to improve corporate governance practices. 
The OECD members are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.     
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developing economies now face: how to move successfully from institutions of economic 
and political governance that tend to be heavily relationship-based to institutions that are 
more effectively rules-based (Oman et al, 2003). 
Corporate governance comprises a set of mechanisms, processes, regulations and laws, 
customs, and policies that affect the system of a company. For instance, in developed 
economies such as the US, the problem typically lies in the disclosure practices, whereas in 
developing economies the problems have often emerged from maintaining minority 
shareholders' rights since the large shareholders exercise their influence to control the 
company. Finally, whatever the corporate governance system that a company adopts it will 
act to enhance the investments and improve the economic performance. 
 1.2 Justification of this Study  
Corporate governance differs substantially across countries due to the differences in 
economic, cultural, social, political and legal systems predominant in a country. Therefore, 
the mechanisms of corporate governance are prone to success if aligned with these systems, 
and failure if not. Berglöf and Claessens (2004) argue that the wholesale transfer of 
governance standards from developed market economies may discourage investors from 
taking controlling positions and thus undermine potent corporate governance mechanisms 
in less developed economies.  
The interest in corporate governance has increased and attracted considerable attention in 
the area of academic research and is on the agendas of public policy debates in both 
developed and less-developed countries (Mallin, 2004; Reed, 2002; Solomon and Solomon, 
2004; Sternberg 2004; Weir and Laing, 2001), and it has changed markedly, now being 
viewed as an essential feature of companies (Hussain and Mallin, 2002). Corporate 
governance is seen as key to developing a market economy and civil society in transitioning 
economies (McCarthy and Puffer, 2003). The literature review shows that the number of 
studies focusing on developing countries is limited (Camplell and Keys, 2002; Okike, 
2007; Tsamenyi et al, 2007).  
Libya as a transitional economy aims at benefiting from raw material and location in order 
to develop its economy and build a strong and attractive environment for investment. 
Therefore, adopting a new comprehensive policy in which corporate governance issues 
should be a major part is fundamental in order to compete in the international economy.  
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Therefore, this study is important because it is expected to make a major contribution to 
economic development in Libyan by investigating the state of corporate governance 
practice by using the views of stakeholders.  
Empirical evidence from different studies indicates that there are many factors that 
influence corporate governance practices in developed and developing countries’ 
economies (e.g. Bremer and Elias, 2007; Hanifa and Cooke, 2002; Yakasai, 2001; 
McCarthy and Puffer, 2003; Hussain and Mallin, 2002). These factors include legal, 
economic, social, cultural and political factors which influence the form and substance of 
corporate governance.  
Many of these studies (e.g. Okika, 1988, in Nigeria; Bremer and Elias, 2007, in Egypt; El 
Mehdi, 2007 in Tunisia; Ahunwan, 2002 in Nigeria; Claessens and Berglof, 2006 in 
developing countries; Hussain and Mallin, 2002 in Bahrain) concluded that each country 
has different factors that have an effect on the practice of corporate governance and which 
influence the structure of corporate governance mechanisms. Therefore, the differences in 
these factors between countries may explain the differences of corporate governance 
framework. This expectation gives the study its theoretical argument and leads to the 
assumption that the corporate governance in Libya cannot be explained by other 
frameworks.  Therefore, the research problem of this study is to investigate the corporate 
governance in the Libyan context. 
To the researcher’s knowledge, this study will be the first study that has focused on the 
corporate governance in Libya. The researcher hopes to open the door for more research in 
this area. Also, the researcher anticipates the study findings will be of interest to Libyan 
policy-makers and academic community and contribute to improvements in the corporate 
governance framework.  
Studying corporate governance practice in a Libyan context is motivated in part by the 
eagerness to explore the factors that could affect the practice of corporate governance. In 
addition, limited research on accounting in general and corporate governance in particular 
in Libya has motivated this study. This is due to differences, not only in economic systems 
but also in accounting, culture, political systems and social attributes. Therefore, this study 
aims to provide an understanding of corporate governance and the influence of societal, 
organisational and personal factors on this practice. 
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1.3 The Study Aims and Objectives: 
The principal aim of this study is to investigate and offer an initial understanding of 
corporate governance practice within a developing and transition economy, the case of 
Libya. Therefore, studying different stakeholders may be more suitable to understanding 
corporate governance patterns and relations within the Libyan context.  
Survey Six groups of stakeholders and ten semi-structured interviews with policy-makers 
were chosen to understand and explain the corporate governance framework. The aim was 
to understand their perspective about the practice of corporate governance.  
To achieve this aim, the following objectives were set for the study: 
1. Identify the current situation and developments concerning corporate governance in 
Libya.   
2. Identify the effect of the various environmental factors on the practice of corporate 
governance in Libya. 
3. Evaluate the perceptions of the various stakeholders concerning corporate 
governance.  
4. Identify and evaluate scenarios concerning future development of corporate 
governance in Libya. 
The objective of this thesis has been to undertake a comprehensive study of the nature of 
corporate governance in the Libyan context and explore how the various environmental 
factors affect corporate governance practice. The study will also reveal the main obstacles 
inhibiting the practice and development of the Libyan corporate governance framework. To 
achieve this objective, the study investigated: 
1. Who are the key stakeholders concerning corporate governance in Libya? 
2. What are these stakeholders’ views and attitudes on the practice of corporate 
governance in Libya? 
3. What types of corporate governance issues do different stakeholders think are 
important in Libya?  
4. What are the current rules and practice regulations concerning the governance of 
companies in Libya? 
5. What particular issues of governance, if any, does the Arabic and Islamic context 
raise concerning issues of corporate governance in Libya?  
6. How effective do stakeholders think existing arrangements are? And what changes 
do they think are needed?  
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1.4 Research Methodology  
 
In order to develop a fuller picture of stakeholders’ standpoints regarding the corporate 
governance in Libya, two methods were used, namely questionnaire and interview methods. 
The questionnaire aimed to determine how different groups of stakeholders perceived the 
concept of corporate governance in the Libyan context, with data being used to answer 
most of the research questions. The questionnaire survey has been considered an effective 
method in evaluation of corporate governance in order to investigate individuals’ views or 
current practices (Hussan and Mallin, 2002; Chahine and Safieddine, 2007). The five-point 
Likert scale questionnaire was divided into eight parts based on areas identified in the 
literature. The parts were the following: the first part relates to the general information 
about participants; the second part sought the respondents’ opinion about the concept of 
corporate governance; the third part focused on the rights of stakeholders; the fourth part 
was on the factors that affect corporate governance; the fifth part looked at the framework 
of corporate governance; the sixth part discussed the future plans for corporate governance; 
the seventh part examined the future introduction of corporate governance and, lastly, the 
eighth part highlighted additional questions posed to listed companies.  
The questionnaire was piloted by peer evaluation and among the supervisory team. Their 
comments and suggestions were incorporated in the final version of the questionnaire. The 
questionnaire was translated into the Arabic language by the researcher and passed on to a 
translation expert for affirmation.  
Interviews have also been considered an effective method for corporate governance studies 
(e.g. Liew, 2007; Edwards and Wolfe, 2007; Jamali et al, 2007; Solomon et al, 2002). 
Therefore, interviews were used in this study to collect specific information about the 
corporate governance from policy-makers. The interview participants were purposely 
selected because their influence on the practice and development of the corporate 
governance is high. The semi-structured interview with 10 interviewees allowed the 
researcher to get detailed information. 
The interviewees were offered freedom in responding to the questions, and in choosing 
place and time of the interview. Interview questions were informed by the literature review, 
discussions with supervisors and from the questionnaire responses. 
Great care was taken in the preparation and conducting of the interviews in order to 
minimise the impact of potential problems. To that end, the interviews were generally 
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arranged in advance. Prior to the interviews, the following steps were taken: interviewees 
were provided with appropriate information about the research and the broad content of the 
interview; careful thought and consideration was given to the opening of the interview and 
the wording of the questions; permission was obtained for recording of the interviews on 
the basis of strict confidentiality. 
During the study, the ethical considerations largely centred on protecting the confidentiality 
of individual respondents which was ensured through anonymity. Additional ethical 
considerations concern the consent, and ongoing willingness of individuals to participate.  
 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis   
To accomplish the above aims and objectives, data were collected by a questionnaire 
survey and semi-structured interviews. The thesis has been divided into following chapters. 
Chapter two focuses on the international debates over the nature of corporate governance 
by providing the definitions and theories related to corporate governance. Also, the chapter 
discusses differences between shareholders’ and stakeholders’ perspectives of the corporate 
governance framework. The chapter reviews the introduction of corporate governance in 
different systems, including the Anglo-American model (unitary system), the German 
model (dual system) and corporate governance in the Islamic perspective (Islamic system). 
The main aim and role of introducing corporate governance is explained and the differences 
between these systems explored. 
Chapter three focuses on the mechanisms of corporate governance that affect the practice. 
These mechanisms were in line with OECD (2004) Principles, which include the 
responsibilities of the Board of Directors, shareholders’ and stakeholders’ rights, disclosure 
and transparency. The chapter starts by broadly examining these factors and provides 
details about these factors in different corporate governance systems. The discussion in this 
chapter has revealed that internal factors have significant impact on the practice and 
framework of corporate governance.  
Chapter four focuses on the corporate governance between the international best practice 
and the local contingency. The debate concentrates on the social, cultural, legal, political, 
economic factors and the effect of globalisation on the corporate governance practice. The 
discussion concludes that in spite of a recent tendency toward convergence in corporate 
governance systems, every country’s corporate governance system reflects its unique 
social/cultural, legal/political and economic profile. The chapter also explains how 
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countries, especially developing countries, can find a balance between developing their 
economy by attracting foreign investment and at the same time maintaining their identity in 
the world. 
Chapter five focuses on the Libyan economy and its corporate governance framework. This 
chapter portrays the environment of business activity in Libya and explains the 
development of Libyan business activities, which have been related to the corporate 
governance system. The chapter starts by examining Libyan Economic Policy, including 
the legal system and the role of the Board of Directors. In examining the role of the legal 
system both the Commercial Code and Income Tax Law are presented and discussed.  
This chapter also discusses the responsibilities of the Board of Directors in Libya, the 
compensation of board members and the role of the watchdog committee as the only 
committee established by law in Libyan companies. This chapter discusses the rights of 
shareholders in the Libyan environment and what their rights are as protected by the legal 
system.   
Transparency and Disclosure within the Libyan economic system and the disclosure under 
the Libyan Stock Exchange regulation are discussed and investigated. Further, the 
discussion indicates that although the Libyan Stock Exchange has sought to improve the 
disclosure and transparency practices in Libya by requesting companies to improve their 
disclosure practice, the quality standards of accounting and audit profession affect the level 
of disclosure and transparency practices. Therefore, this chapter explains the role of 
establishing the Libyan Stock Exchange to enhance the disclosure practices. Moreover, we 
investigate the constraints on corporate governance reform. 
Chapter six focuses on the research methods used in the study to achieve the aims of the 
study. Also, the chapter explains the data collection methods, the questionnaire survey’s 
population, questionnaire design, pilot study, administration of the questionnaire survey 
and the interview survey method.  
Chapter seven presents the results of the questionnaire survey. Differences between the 
responses of selected groups are detailed. Also, during the analysis of questionnaires, links 
are drawn between the findings and the wider literature related to these findings. 
Chapter eight presents the second part of the analysis of data collected through semi-
structured interviews with policy-makers. The main aim of the interviews was to elicit more 
detailed information about the concept and operation of current corporate governance 
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practice and the future shape of practice on the horizon. These interviews help to shape and 
constitute a more complete picture of corporate governance in the Libyan context. 
Chapter nine synthesises the main findings of both questionnaire and interview survey. 
Chapter ten concludes with discussions of the implications of the corporate governance in 
Libya.     
1.6 Main Findings and Contribution  
 
On the basis of a review of the relevant literature, and in the light of the empirical study and 
researcher’s observation, the following are the study’s main findings:  
 Political stability and the aspiration for economic development are the main factors 
that can act as a catalyst in improving the practice of corporate governance. 
 The legal system that governs companies is considered as absent, ineffective or out 
of date. 
 Enforcement of the legal system will remain a major challenge to developing the 
framework of corporate governance in Libya.  
 The weakness of the accounting and auditing professions and the unstable 
managerial environment, in both the sector level and the secretariat level are the 
major impediments to practising corporate governance, especially in the case of 
accountability and responsibility. 
 
The following are the study’s main contributions: 
 The study contributes to the corporate governance literature which was considered 
to be limited in terms of detailed case studies in developing economies, especially in 
Africa. 
 Theoretically, the study contributes to knowledge by using stakeholder theory to 
evaluate the corporate governance framework, which complements previous studies 
in developing countries. 
 Empirically, the study reinforces the fact that the corporate governance is a part of 
the political system and a wider social and economic web. However, the degree of 
influence of these factors on the practices differs between countries. 
 Finally, the study provides a foundation for future research on corporate governance 
in Libya.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
International Debates over the Nature of Corporate Governance 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter presents current debates on the nature of corporate governance. The chapter is 
divided into two main sections. The first section introduces definitions of corporate 
governance, whereas the second section reviews theoretical aspects of corporate 
governance, including the main theories that explain the nature of corporate governance. 
Also, this chapter examines corporate governance from an Islamic perspective, since Libya 
is an Islamic country. 
The corporate governance debate has increased and attracted considerable attention from 
academic researchers and the public policy agendas in both developed and less-developed 
countries (Mallin, 2004; Reed, 2002; Solomon and Solomon, 2004; Sternberg, 2004; Weir 
and Laing, 2001). Corporate governance has also changed markedly to be an essential 
feature of companies (Hussain and Mallin, 2002), and a key to developing a market 
economy and civil society in transitional economies (McCarthy and Puffer, 2003). 
However, there is no real consensus on the definitions of corporate governance (Keasey et 
al, 1997; Solomon and Solomon, 2004). Solomon and Solomon (2004) argued that there are 
substantial differences in definitions of corporate governance according to which country is 
considered, and the viewpoint of the policy maker, practitioner, researcher or theorist. More 
precisely, the core of corporate governance depends on who controls the corporation and 
the extent of separation of ownership from control is the crucial issue (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). In the same perspective, the term of corporate governance is related to the term 
corporation, so to understand and evaluate corporate governance we need to know what 
corporation means. Monks and Minow (2004; p 9) define a corporation as: 
“A mechanism established to allow different parties to contribute capital, expertise and 
labour for the maximum benefit of all of them. The investor gets the chance to 
participate in the profits of the enterprise without taking responsibility for the 
operations. The management gets the chance to run the company without taking the 
responsibility of personally providing the funds.”  
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Many authors have discussed the role of the corporation in establishing a corporate 
governance framework. For example, Mallin (2004) discussed whether the corporation 
concentrates only on the shareholders’ value as its main objective or whether it focuses on 
the interest of diverse groups who have relationships with the corporation such as 
employees, providers of credit, suppliers, customers and the local community. In addition, 
the competitive environment between companies imposes on companies both material and 
ethical obligations to shareholders and others (stakeholders), requiring them to take into 
account its social responsibilities to the society within which it operates.  
There is a broad consensus that the underlying problem of corporate governance is related 
to the company’s growth and through the separation of management and ownership 
(Keasey et al, 1997; Solomon and Solomon, 2004; Mallin, 2004). This separation might 
lead to conflicts of interests between owners, whose interest is to maximise their profit, and 
the management, which usually focuses on finding a balance between the shareholders’ 
interest and maintaining the corporation especially, in the long-term. This situation allows 
corporate behaviour to diverge from the profit-maximising, cost-minimising ideal (Keasey 
et al, 1997). Therefore, corporate governance can be defined in two different and 
contrasting ways as follows: 
 
 2.1.1 Narrow Definition:- This definition of corporate governance focuses on the 
relationships between the corporation and its shareholders. Keasey et al (1997; p 2) stated 
that: 
“In its narrowest sense corporate governance may describe as a formal system of 
accountability of senior management to the shareholders”. 
 
The Cadbury Committee Report (1992) defined corporate governance in para (2.5) as 
     
“...the system by which companies are directed and controlled”. 
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p.737), defined corporate governance as the: 
 
“... ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a 
return on their investment.” 
 
These definitions indicate that corporate governance exists as a mechanism for 
management to act to maximise the wealth of the company’s shareholders. These 
definitions are typically used in Anglo-Saxon countries where the markets are more 
complete or perfect and the system of law is completely established (Allen, 2005). 
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However, Liu (2005) argued that the definition has encountered some criticisms, especially 
from stakeholders’ advocates since the company is not legally owned by shareholders.   
The concept of corporate governance has been changed towards a wider and inclusive 
meaning according to the changes in the company’s role and meaning even in Anglo-Saxon 
economies. Empirical research was conducted by Masaru Yoshimori in 1995 with 
managers and executives in a sample of major corporations in five countries (namely the 
US, UK, Germany, Japan and France), and the findings in this survey were as follows. In 
the UK, the response was approximately a 30 percent assumption that the large company 
was managed in the interest of all stakeholders, versus 70 percent who thought the large 
company should give the shareholders’ interest the first priority. In Germany, 82 percent 
thought the purpose of the company is for the interest of all stakeholders, versus 18 percent 
who thought that the purpose of the companies is only for the shareholders. The results in 
France and the US were for the interest of all stakeholders, 78 percent and 24 percent, and 
for only shareholders, 22 percent and 76 percent, respectively. However, in Japan, 97 
percent thought that the aim of the company is for the interest of stakeholders. The results 
indicate that there is a wide variation in the concept of a company and its responsibilities to 
wider groups around the corporation.2 Therefore, governance mechanisms have also had to 
change to take accounts of all these groups.   
 
2.1.2 Broader Definition-: The essential concept of the wider definition of corporate 
governance is to embrace a larger set of stakeholders’ relationships encompassing 
interactions between employees, customers, suppliers, creditors and society at large (Baker 
and Owsen, 2002). The OECD defined corporate governance in its Principles of Corporate 
Governance (2004) as: 
“Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance 
also provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the 
means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined”. 
 
 
Similarly to Solomon and Solomon (2004: p14) argue that: 
 
“Corporate governance is the system of checks and balances, both internal and external 
to companies, which ensures that companies discharge their accountability to all their 
stakeholders and act in a socially responsible way in all areas of their business activity”. 
                                                 
2 The result shows the increase of advocates in the UK and the US for the concept of a wider meaning.  
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According to these definitions of corporate governance, the accountability and 
responsibility of corporations does not stop at the shareholders but goes beyond them to all 
the stakeholders. Therefore, the corporation is responsible to the wider society and should 
be resolving the conflict of interest between the related groups. 
Broad definition advocates claim that corporations should take account of the next 
generation as future and potential stakeholders. For instance, they want corporations to act 
to keep the environment free from pollution despite the fact that these acts may reduce the 
shareholders’ and other stakeholders’ present benefit. This might confirm that the 
responsibility of the corporation is to act in a manner that reflects its social responsibility. 
Some studies have linked improving corporate governance with increasing the practice of 
corporate social responsibility. Solomon et al (2003) argued that if companies across the 
world wish to become internationally competitive and able to attract foreign capital, they 
need to show greater accountability of directors and management to shareholders and 
stakeholders and improve the transparency of financial reporting. Consequently, without 
inclusion of stakeholders, such as employees, suppliers, and customers, the effectiveness of 
a corporate governance system might face barriers especially in the long-term, where the 
success of a company requires harmonisation between all the parties related to a company.  
The proliferation of scandals and crises was a main reason for the attention on corporate 
governance. Also, the extension of the privatisation process in the world, especially in 
developing economies, has led companies to seek to attract capital. Therefore, companies 
need to increase international financial integration, and trade and investments flows, by 
removing restrictions on products and ownership. This situation might explain the need for 
effective corporate governance in these economies in order to achieve economic growth.   
In summary, corporate governance is a concept that seeks to protect shareholders rights and 
stakeholders' interests through finding a balance between economic development, social 
welfare and the objectives of the company. Therefore, corporate governance entails the 
pursuit of objectives that represent the interests of a company and its stakeholders.  
Consequently, corporate governance has changed at the micro level and macro level. At the 
micro-economic level, corporate governance now is viewed by most public companies as 
an essential feature for growth and, at the macro-economic level, it has been a part of the 
reform effort and widely claimed to be essential for the creation of a better and more 
attractive investment climate in developing countries.  
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To achieve the best corporate governance many countries have established codes for 
corporate governance practice. Good corporate governance needs a clear definition of 
responsibilities; therefore, many countries have established codes of practice. Table (2.1) 
shows some of these countries. 
Table 2.1 the dates of establishing corporate governance codes in various countries  
Date of Establishing 
the Code 
The name of Country 
Pre  2000 Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, 
South Africa, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, UK, USA.   
2000- 2003 Austria, China, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Pakistan, Russia, Taiwan.   
2004 Argentina, Bangladesh, Iceland 
2005 Egypt 
2006 Estonia, Lebanon  
Source; European Corporate Governance Institute   
 
2.2 Theoretical Aspects of Corporate Governance 
 
The problem of corporate governance arises from the separation of beneficial ownership 
and executive decision-making in the joint-stock company (Keasey et al, 1997). Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) proposed a theory of the firm based upon conflicts of interest between 
various contracting parties, namely, shareholders, corporate managers, and debt holders.  
There is no doubt that the current debates between the shareholder's perspective and 
stakeholder's perspective on corporate governance have led the advocates and supporters to 
attempt to justify these models (Letza et al, 2004). The main focus in this debate 
concentrates on whether a corporation's governance arrangements have implications which 
go beyond those of its shareholders (Keasey et al, 1997). Development of corporate 
governance relies on different theories that sought to explain the nature of the term, 
including as it does legal, cultural, ownership, and other structural differences. 
The acceptance of these theories depends on the characteristics of the country where some 
theories may be more appropriate and relevant to some countries (Solomon and Solomon, 
2004). Mallin (2004) explained that the main theories that have affected the development of 
corporate governance are agency theory, transaction cost economies and stakeholder 
theory.  
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2.2.1 Shareholders’ Perspective 
 
The use of the term shareholder has been of interest since corporate ownership opened up 
to the public through share ownership and the joint stock company emerged as a normal 
growth for small and family companies in the business world. This growth demonstrated a 
conflict of interests and set up two main groups in corporations; shareholders who have 
share(s) in the corporation (principals) and the managers who run the corporation (agents) 
(Keasey et al, 1997; Solomon and Solomon, 2004; Mallin, 2004). The relationship between 
these parties is called an agency relationship and is defined by Jenson and Meckling (1976) 
as a contract under which one or more persons {the principal(s)} engage another person 
(the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some 
decision making authority to the agent. 
Agency theory analyses the conflicts between principals and agents in the corporation. 
Jenson and Meckling (1976) stated that: 
“It is an impossible for the agent to represent the principals’ viewpoint in all                   
respects. Therefore, agency problems arise because of it being impossible for an 
agent to contract for every possible action whose outcome affects both his own 
welfare and the welfare of the principal.”(Jenson and Meckling, 1976, cited in 
Brennan, 1995) 
 
Grant (2003) argued that the main purpose of shareholders (principals) is to maximise their 
value (interest), whereas the management’s purpose is to expand and grow the corporation 
because it reflects the success of the management. The conflict of interests comes also from 
the lack of shareholders’ monitoring which has resulted from dispersed shareholders and a 
decrease in their incentive to monitor management; therefore, the managers of a company 
may pursue their own goals at the expense of shareholders (Hart, 1995). 
In agency theory, the management are accountable to shareholders for their stewardship of 
the assets of the company (Gamble and Kelly, 2001); and companies have a limited set of 
responsibilities, which primarily consist of obeying the law and maximising shareholder 
interests (Reed, 2002). The problem is the agents do not necessarily make decisions in the 
best interest of the principal, even if the primary objective for companies is shareholders’ 
wealth maximisation. The problem emerges when the agents endeavour to pursue their own 
personal interests, which sometimes override the achievement of the principals’ interests.3  
                                                 
3 It has become clear when managers focus on short-run profit where managers’ pay is related to this variable 
rather than long-term wealth ( Solomon and Solomon, 2004)  
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The principals depend on the management to make decisions on their behalf, since the 
management has a legal right and the chance to be far more knowledgeable about the 
company’s activities and financial situation than current or potential investors or principals 
(Solomon and Solomon, 2004; Mallin, 2004).    
Agency theory is overcoming the conflict of interests between the shareholders and 
management. The conflict is not restricted to these divergent interests but goes beyond to, 
for example, conflicts between the large investors and minority shareholders especially in 
developing economies. For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) stated that: 
“The more fundamental problem is that the large investors represent their own 
interests, which need not coincide with the interest of other investors in the firm, or 
with interests of employees and managers. In the process of using his control rights 
to maximize his welfare, the large investor can therefore redistribute wealth- in both 
efficient and inefficient ways- from others.”   
 
In the same way Hart (1995) stated that: 
“A large shareholder may use his (voting) power to improve his own position at the 
expense of other shareholders. For example the large shareholder might persuade 
management to divert profit to himself, e.g. by selling goods from a company the 
shareholder owns at a low price or by buying goods from a company the 
shareholders owns at a high price. Another possibility is that the shareholder would 
agree to leave management alone, in exchange for having his shares repurchased at 
the premium (the practice is known as greenmail in the United States). Finally, the 
large shareholder may simply become management, i.e. he may run the company 
himself”.    
 
Other ways to mitigate the agent problem in more complete markets is through takeover 
activity; divesting principals’ investments; or by governmental intervention. Direct ways 
may also exist when the shareholders can monitor company management and help to 
resolve agency conflict. As Solomon and Solomon (2004, p19) stated:  
“First, as owners of the company, shareholders have a right to influence the way in 
which the company is run, through voting at AGMs ... shareholders can influence 
the composition of the Board of Directors in their investee companies. Another way 
in which shareholders may attempt to align managers’ interests with their own is 
through the passing of shareholder resolutions, where a group of shareholders 
collectively lobby the company on issues with which they are dissatisfied”.  
 
In conclusion, in the developed countries such as the US and the UK the good market 
mechanism which is linked with a three-tier hierarchical governance structure, the active 
shareholders' general meeting, the responsible Board of Directors and expert executive 
managers, can operate to mitigate the principal-agent problem. However, in less-developed 
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economies, such as the Libyan economy, the conflict is still in existence even if more often 
it is associated with cultural and political influences. 
2.2.2 Transaction Cost Theory  
 
Transaction cost theory can be viewed as closely related to agency theory. The transaction 
cost theory views the company as a governance structure, whereas agency theory views the 
company as a nexus of contracts (Mallin, 2004). In a world of incomplete contracts, the 
governance structure has an important role. The governance structure can be seen as a 
mechanism for making decisions that have not been specified in the initial contract (Hart, 
1995). 
Solomon and Solomon (2004, pp.21-22) argue that transaction cost theory is based on the 
fact that: 
“Companies have become so large and complex that price movements outside    
companies direct production and the markets co-ordinate transaction. In other 
words, the way in which companies are organized determines their control over 
transaction”.    
 
         
Williamson (1996) defines transaction costs this way: 
“the ex-ante costs of drafting, negotiating and safeguarding an agreement and, more 
especially, the ex-post cost of mal-adaptation and adjustment that arise when 
contract execution is misaligned as a result of gaps, errors, omission, and 
unanticipated disturbances. Also it refers to the costs of running the economic 
system.” 
 
He suggests the following factors lead to the rise of transaction costs. The human factors 
include: bounded rationality, which means humans are unlikely to have the abilities or 
resources to consider every state-contingent outcome associated with a transaction that 
might arise, and the opportunism where humans work for their own self interests. 
The environmental factors are the uncertainty debasing the problems that arise from 
bounded rationality and opportunism, and the existence of a small number of investors 
opening the door for the possibilities of withdrawal and use of alternative investors in the 
market-place. Consequently, a party in a certain transaction may find difficulty in 
disciplining (controlling) the other party (ies) in the transaction, associated with the asset 
specificity: the party who has invested in the asset will incur a loss if the party who has not 
invested withdraws from the transaction. 
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Williamson further argues that three dimensions of a transaction affect the type of 
governance structure chosen for the transaction: asset specificity, uncertainty, and 
frequency. As asset specificity and uncertainty increase, the risk of opportunism increases. 
Thus, decision-makers are more likely to choose a hierarchical governance structure. As 
frequency increases, the comparative advantage of using market governance structures 
decreases, because the costs of hierarchical governance structures can be amortised across 
more instances of the transaction. 
Solomon and Solomon (2004) argue that transaction cost economies attempt to incorporate 
human behaviour in a more realistic way. In this concept, transaction cost economies make 
the assumption of bounded rationality and opportunism (opportunistic behaviour may have 
dire consequences for the investment in the company). Given the problems of bounded 
rationality and opportunism, managers organise transactions in their best interest and this 
activity needs to be controlled. 
 
2.2.3 Stakeholders’ Perspective 
 
The stakeholder perspective emerged in the late twentieth century and it can be seen as a 
contrast to the shareholder perspective (Keasey et al, 1997; Letza et al, 2004; Mallin, 2004). 
The term stakeholder refers to a broad spectrum of business constituents that must be 
considered in the decision-making process (Grant, 2003). In a similar vein, Freeman, (1984: 
p.32) defined stakeholders as group or groups who can affect or are affected by an 
organisation; however, extreme proponents of stakeholder theory suggest that the 
environment, animal spaces and future generation should also be included as stakeholders 
(Solomon and Solomon, 2004).  Also, a useful definition for the word stakeholder has been 
provided by Donaldson and Preston (1995) as: 
"Stakeholders are identified through the actual or potential harms and benefits that they 
experience or anticipate experiencing as a result of the firm’s actions or inactions”.     
 
The main purpose of the stakeholder model is that the objective function of the modern 
corporation is not merely more equitable but also more socially efficient than concentrating 
on shareholders’ wealth (Keasey et al, 1997). The stakeholder theory of corporate 
governance argues that those responsible for the governance of the company have 
responsibilities to other parties than shareholders. Any fiduciary obligations owed to 
shareholders to maximise profits might be subject to the constraint of respecting obligations 
owed to such stakeholders (Reed, 2002).  
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Burton and Dunn (1996), for example, argue that since the company can help stakeholders 
financially, giving its employees pay increases, paying tax to the government and by 
providing good financial value to customers, or through taking decisions that help 
stakeholders or at least prevent them from any harm, there is a relationship between a 
corporation and its stakeholders through their mutual interests.               
The benefits of a reputation for the ethical treatment of stakeholders' groups, and the 
success of the German and Japan economies which have rejected the shareholder model, 
has filled the development of the stakeholders' model (Keasey et al, 1997). Donaldson and 
Preston (1995) suggested three ways in which stakeholder theory could be applied (see 
Table 2.2). 
Table 2.2 the aspects of applied stakeholder theory 
Aspect Explanation
As descriptive/  
empirical 
As instrumental
As normative
In this case the theory has been used to describe:
-the nature of the corporation 
-how the managers think about managing
-how board members think about the interests of corporate 
constituencies
-how corporations are managed.
The theory is used to identify the connections, or lack of 
connections, between stakeholder management and the 
achievement of traditional corporate objective such as growth 
and profitability.
The theory is used to interpret the function of the corporation 
including the identification of moral or philosophical 
guidelines for the operation and management of corporations.
 
 
Stakeholder theory is developed through the pervasive impact of large corporations on 
society which forces corporations to discharge accountability to many more sectors of 
society rather than concentrate on their shareholders (Solomon and Solomon, 2004). 
The stakeholder model is related to corporate social responsibility. For instance, the Ethics 
Resource Centre (ERC) sees ethics and the struggle against corruption as the core concept 
in corporate governance and advises companies to go beyond the legislative and regulatory 
requirements in order to build effective programmes to communicate company ethical 
values. Hence, companies perceive that by being ethical they can recruit the best 
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workforces and foster positive long-term relationships with many stakeholder groups (Potts 
and Matus, 2004). Therefore, companies should behave in a socially responsible way, 
satisfying the interests of all of their stakeholders (Solomon and Solomon, 2004).   
According to the normative version of the theory, stakeholders also have the right to 
participate in corporate decisions that affect them. Managers also should have a fiduciary 
duty to serve the interests of all groups of stakeholders, and the objective of the company is 
to promote the interests of all stakeholders, not only those of shareholders (Iqbal and 
Mirakhor, 2004). 
Although stakeholder theory flourishes in the continental system of corporate governance, 
it has also been formally supported in the Anglo-Saxon system. For instance, Porter (1992) 
recommended that various stakeholder constituencies appoint representatives to a unitary 
board (cited in Turnbull, 1997). Also, the American Law Institute (1992) states ‘‘the 
modern corporation by its nature creates interdependences with a variety of groups with 
whom the corporation has a legitimate concern, such as employees, customers, suppliers, 
and members of the communities in which the corporation operates’’.  In the UK, the 
Corporate Report (ASSC, 1975) suggested that companies should be made accountable for 
their impact on a wide group of stakeholders. Furthermore, another reason for supporting 
stakeholder theory is that stakeholders are not only affected by companies but they in turn 
affect companies in some way when they supply the companies with "contributions" and, 
therefore, they expect their own interests to be satisfied via inducements (Solomon and 
Solomon, 2004).  
In contrast, stakeholder theory is criticised by others: for instance, Sternberg (1997) 
considered the theory to be fundamentally misguided and incapable of providing better 
corporate governance, business or business conduct. In her view, the theory rules out the 
maximising long-term owner value which is the aim of business. Also, it makes trusteeship 
equally impossible: the obligation to balance stakeholder benefits overrides the specific 
obligations that trustees have to their designated beneficiaries. Also it does not allow for the 
variety of organisations and organisational purposes and the only type of legitimate 
organisation is to balance stakeholder benefit. With regard to corporate governance, she 
argues that the theory explicitly denies that corporations should be accountable to their 
owners, but instead they should be accountable equally to all their stakeholders. Also, as 
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such, it hinders corporate governance because it requires managers to balance stakeholder 
interests, thus violating the prior obligations of managers to owners.4 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argued that the separation of ownership and control is the main 
issue of the corporate governance system, and each theory has prescribed mechanisms to 
reduce the issue. Despite the view of the conflict between these perspectives, which are 
sometimes described as polar opposites and also sometimes stakeholders' theory is seen as 
undermining accountability (see Shankman, 1999; Sternberg, 1997), in fact in the long-term 
and in a globalised competitive environment, stakeholder theory has become more 
acceptable when introducing a corporate governance system than shareholder theory. This 
consistency may suggest that the achievement of shareholders' interests eventually leads to 
taking into account all stakeholders' benefits.  
Finally, all of theories recognised that an important key to developing corporate governance 
theories and practices is that companies should take an appropriate approach by taking into 
account the interests of both the shareholders and stakeholders in their decisions and 
operations. 
2.3 Corporate Governance Systems  
 
Corporate governance systems differ between countries, reflecting contrasts of legal 
systems, cultural systems and economic environments. There is a consensus regarding the 
models as of corporate governance in the world. This consensus sees these models as 
divided into two types:  
 Outsider models (unitary system): - a good example is the US and other English 
language speaking countries, also called the Anglo-American or Anglo-Saxon 
model.  
 Insider models (dual system): - this system is applied on the European continent and 
the best example is the German model. 
2.3.1 Anglo-American Model (Unitary System- Outsider Model) 
 
In the Anglo-Saxon system, the “Corporation” concept is based on a fiduciary relationship 
between shareholders and management. Based on the concept of market capitalism, the 
                                                 
4 Turnbull (1997) criticised Stemberg’s views when he cited some empirical evidence which does not seem to 
support her:  Analytica (1992) found that in Japan it is common for companies to exchange small amounts of 
stock with lenders and business partners as a sign of goodwill; and Baums (1994) also found that in Germany 
some stakeholders, such as employees, become members of the company board.   
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Anglo-Saxon system is founded on the notion that self-interest and decentralised markets 
can function in a self-regulating, balanced manner (Cernat, 2004). The model is also 
concentrated on dispersal ownership across a large number of individual and institutional 
investors (Franks et al, 2005; Keasey et al, 1997; Solomon and Solomon, 2004; Franks and 
Mayer, 1997). For instance, in the UK, in only 16% of the largest 170 listed companies is 
there a single shareholder owning more than 25% of shares and in only 6% is there a single 
majority shareholder (Mayer, 2002). The corporate decision-making in this model is shaped 
by shareholders as in next figure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure (2.1) the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate decision-making.  
Source:  Cernat, 2004 
 
 
Nestor and Thompson (2000) argued that the outsider model is characterised by: 
 The recognised primacy of shareholder interests in the company law; 
 Strong emphasis on the protection of minority investors in securities law and 
regulation; 
 Relatively strong requirements for disclosure.  
The other strong mechanisms are the active takeover and the mergers and acquisitions 
activities in the Anglo-Saxon system, which play a significant role in the monitoring of 
management by shareholders. Solomon and Solomon (2004: p.150) noted that: 
“The term ‘outsider’ refers to systems of finance and corporate governance where most 
large firms are controlled by their managers but owned by outside shareholders, such as 
financial institutions or individual shareholders. This situation results in the notorious 
separation or divorce of ownership and control”.  
 
Since companies in the Anglo-Saxon model are controlled by their managers (Solomon and 
Solomon, 2004), shareholders elect the board members, who should comprise both 
executive and non-executive directors to monitor the executive directors’ actions. 
Shareholders 
Board of directors Managers 
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The chairman of the board is selected by the board members. The board has information 
about the company from the management, and works as a link between managers and 
investors (Mallin, 2004). At the same time, usually there is a separation between the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) who runs the company, and the chairman, who runs the Board. 
The role of the board according to the Combined Code (2003) is to provide entrepreneurial, 
prudent and effective controls to enable risk to be assessed and managed. In addition, the 
board should determine the company’s aims and its strategies, plans and policies (Mallin, 
2004). 
Therefore, appointments to the board are made on merit and on objective criteria. Members, 
particularly in the case of chairmanships, should have enough time available to dedicate to 
the job. Also, the compensation for managers should be linked to performance and the 
company's value, in the short-term and long-term, more than focusing on their self-interest. 
 
2.3.2 German Model (Dual System) 
The German model has been focused on by academics and researchers because of the 
success of the German economy, especially after the Second World War. The model is 
different from the Anglo-Saxon model since it considers not only the interests of 
shareholders but also inputs from relevant stakeholders (Cernat, 2004). Ownership in the 
German model is typically highly concentrated, and banks provide substantial long-term 
external corporate finance. Banks act as stable shareholders and protect companies against 
hostile takeovers. Therefore, far-reaching employee codetermination and a limited role for 
the stock market are features of the model (Keasey et al, 1997). The German legal system is 
explicit that a company does not have a sole duty to pursue the interests of shareholders but 
also others, which in the German model is characterised by focusing on the maximisation 
of stakeholder value rather than shareholder value (Allen, 2005; Goergen et al, 2008). 
The success of the model comes from developing a highly interdependent structure, based 
on co-operation and long-term stability associated with persevering capital, and employee 
voices being mutually reinforced with complementary institutions contributing to German 
industrial success (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Monks and Minow, 2004). Another reason for 
the success might be the downturn following the scandals that swept the Anglo-Saxon 
economies and affected investors’ trust to invest. 
Germany may be seen as a type of non-liberal corporate governance system due to the 
limitation placed on the role of markets as mediating mechanisms for both capital and 
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labour (Jackson, 2001). This may come from the high centralisation of ownership by large 
shareholders and banks which are closely linked to business through credit, large equity 
stakes, the exercise of proxy votes, and Supervisory Board representation (Edwards and 
Fischer, 1994). 
Therefore, this model of corporate governance has been characterised by a pyramidal 
ownership structure, with companies owning each other through a series of cross-
shareholding, extensive bank proxy voting and family ownership (Franks et al, 2005; 
Solomon and Solomon, 2004). German companies also evolved a two-tier board system 
that provides a good representation of the large shareholders to deal with the management 
to manage the company. Therefore, capital market regulations and accounting rules tend to 
weaken the position of minority shareholders and market mechanisms. For example, the 
German accounting rules are creditor-oriented and are considered to lack the same 
transparency as is found in International Accounting Standards (IAS) or the US General 
Accepted Accounting Standards (GAAP) (Jackson et al, 2005).  
Figure (2.2) indicates the structure of corporate governance in Germany companies. 
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Figure (2.2) - The structure of Corporate Governance in Germany 
Source: Jackson et al, 2005 
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The board in the German model comprises a two-tier management structure; the 
Management Board and Supervisory Board. The Management Board is appointed by the 
Supervisory Board and entrusted with the day-to-day running of the company (Keasey et al, 
1997). The Supervisory Board is elected by the shareholders in general meetings with co-
determination between shareholders and employees (Georgen et al, 2008; Mallin, 2004). 
In large companies with more than 2000 employees, employees make up half of the 
Supervisory Board but the chairman, who is a shareholder representative, has a casting vote 
in case of a stale-mate. Bankers are elected to the Supervisory Board. In small companies 
with more than 500 employees but less than 2000 employees, one third of the Supervisory 
Board has to consist of employee representatives (Goergen et al, 2008). Therefore, the 
system offers the separation of the supervisory function and the management functions into 
different bodies. The Supervisory Board is composed of non-executive board members, and 
the Management Board is composed of executive board members. The tasks are different 
between both boards. According to the German Corporate Governance Code (2006), the 
tasks of the Management Board are to: 
 Be responsible for independently managing the enterprise. In doing so, it is obliged 
to act in the enterprise's best interests and undertakes to increase the sustainable 
value of the enterprise.  
 Ensure that all provisions of law are abided by and works to achieve their 
compliance by group companies.  
 Ensure appropriate risk management and risk controlling in the enterprise.  
 Develops the enterprise's strategy, 
Whereas, the tasks of Supervisory Board are: 
 To advise and supervise the Management Board in the management of the 
enterprise and to be involved in fundamental decisions.  
 Appoints and dismisses the members of the Management Board.  
 Appoints members of the Management Board to a committee, which also 
determines the conditions of the employment contracts including compensation. 
On the other hand, both boards should; 
 Cooperate closely for the benefit of the corporation. 
 The management Board coordinates the enterprise’s strategic approach with the 
Supervisory Board at regular intervals. 
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 The Management Board should provide sufficient information to the Supervisory 
Board. 
 The Management Board informs the Supervisory Board regularly, without delay 
and comprehensively, of all issues important to the enterprise with regard to 
planning, business development, risk situation and risk management.  
 The Management Board should report to the Supervisory Board, through submitting  
documents required for decisions, in particular, the Annual Financial Statements, 
the Consolidated Financial Statements and the Auditors' Report in due time before 
the meeting 
 In the event of a takeover offer, both boards must submit a statement of their 
reasoned position so that the shareholders can make an informed decision on the 
offer.  
 
Labour plays an important role in the German system through the workers councils and the 
principle of co-determination. The workers councils are engaged in consultation and 
participation in the corporate decision-making process and stabilising core employment, 
while the trade union is concerned with wage bargaining and working conditions (Cernat, 
2004).  
The main disadvantage of the system is that the Supervisory Board relies on information is 
provided by the Management Board concerning the current state of affairs. Also, the 
possible weakness of monitoring the management exists since the average number of 
meetings is four times a year and sometimes only two (Keasey et al, 1997). 
Recently, there are indications of change in the continental system of corporate governance, 
which depends on internal mechanisms, towards an Anglo-Saxon system, which consists of 
external mechanisms, and a more complete legal system. However, the disclosure and 
transparency practice, stock market development and voting structures are still the 
fundamental differences. Table (2.3) summarises the main differences between the two 
models of corporate governance. 
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Table 2.3 Distinction between corporate governance models   
Source: Cernat, 2004 
 
2.3.3 Corporate Governance in the Islamic Perspective (Islamic System) 
 
In respect of the Islamic economy, the Islamic financial system developed in the Islamic 
world during the Middle Ages; however the last three decades have witnessed its rise in 
significance in the global economy. This revival is attributed mainly to the following 
reasons: 
1- The boost in the oil-related income following price increases during the 1970s of many 
Muslim Arab countries. 
2- The desire of Muslim populations is to develop financial products and financial 
services that are compatible with their religious beliefs. 
3- Dissatisfaction of some Muslims with the materialist ideologies of capitalism and with 
communism and the uneven performance of western financial markets (Grais and 
Pellegrini, 2006; Pervez, 1990). 
Islamic financial principles are promoted throughout the world by Islamic education 
institutions. Nowadays, there are more than 284 institutions offering Islamic financial 
Aspects  Anglo-Saxon          Continental  
Labour-related  
Co-operation between 
Social partners              
Labour organisations    
Labour market  
Employee influence   
Conflict or minimal 
contact 
Fragmented and weak 
Poor internal flexibility, 
high external flexibility 
Limited  
Extensive at national 
level 
Strong, centralised unions 
High internal flexibility, 
lower external flexibility 
Extensive through workers councils 
and co-determination 
Capital-related  
Ownership structure      
Role of banks  
Family-controlled 
firms  
Management Board   
Market for corporate 
control  
Role of stock 
exchange 
Widely dispersed 
ownership; dividends 
prioritized 
Banks play a minimal role 
in corporate ownership 
General separation of 
equity holding and 
management  
One-tier board  
Hostile takeovers are the 
correction mechanism for 
management failure 
Strong role in corporate 
finance 
Banks and other corporations are 
major shareholders; dividends less 
prioritized 
Important both in corporate finance 
and control  
Family ownership important only for 
small and medium sized enterprise 
Two-tier board; executive and 
supervisory responsibility separated  
Takeovers restricted 
Reduced  
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services, operating in 38 countries, both Muslim and non-Muslim (Grais and Pellegrini, 
2006). In the UK, for instance, there are more than 40 Muslim primary schools. Also the 
HSBC bank, among many others, offers Islamic home finance which is based on trade 
principles in contrast to the conventional interest-based mortgage (Er, 2008).  
Islam regulates and influences all fields of a Muslim’s life, including the governance and 
conduct of business and commerce. The Holy Qur’an in Surah An-Nur Verse 37 stated: 
 “Men whom neither trade nor sale (business) diverts from the Remembrance of Allah…”, 
and in Surah Al-Baqarah Verse 275 stated; 
        “… Allah has permitted trading and forbidden Riba (usury)…”  
Muslims have to conduct their business activities according to Islamic principles such as 
being fair and honest (Lewis, 2001).The influence of Islam regulation on the business 
activities is clear by prohibiting monopolies. The Holy Qur’an stated in Surah An-Nisa 
verse 29  
“O you who believe! Eat not up your property among yourselves unjustly except it be a 
trade amongst you, by mutual consent.” 
Also, Islam prohibits of the business activity during the time of Friday congregational 
prayer, The Holy Qur’an stated in Surah Al-Jumu’ah verse 9:  
“O you who believe (Muslims)! When the call is proclaimed for the salat (prayer) on Friday 
(jumu’ah prayer), come to the remembrance of Allah [Jumu’ah religious talk (khuthoh) and 
salat (prayer)] and leave off business (and every other thing) that is better for you if you did 
but know!” .Moreover, Islam imposes a duty of good faith in contracts and dealing: this is 
not merely the absence of bad faith but requires the contracting party to take positive steps 
to do the right thing, make full and honest disclosures and perform his obligations 
correctly.     
Islam takes into account human nature and provides universal values and promotes a happy 
way of life. It teaches its believers the morals to control any problematic behaviour 
resulting from unsatisfied needs and to inculcate loyalty towards fellow citizens and create 
a willingness to sacrifice self-interest to the common welfare. Muslims should become 
content, generous and kind and can have self esteem since they believe that everything in 
life belongs to Allah and they are just guardians of the resources.  
Er (2008) argued that neither education nor social background appears to determine the 
behaviour of a person. Therefore, eliminating acts of corruption can be achieved if a person 
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condemns such acts on moral grounds. On this point, these Islamic principles instil in 
people accountability, responsibility, fairness and good conduct.  
2.3.3.1 Business Principles in Islam 
 
The main rule in business activity in Islam is honesty and fair dealing, so the Muslim 
business person should have high moral values, and the market should be free. The Islamic 
economic system allows people to earn their living in a fair and profitable way without 
exploitation of others, and at the same time Islam emphasises the welfare of the society 
over individual rights (Lewis, 2001). In a similar manner, Islam prohibits transactions 
involving uncertainties, such as speculative investments. Therefore, people engaging in 
trade and business should behave equitably, and should not lie about weights and measures, 
and all investment and products should be useful to society. That is because the Holy 
Qur’an stated in Surat Al- Mutaffifin (verse1): 
“Woe to Al-Mutaffin (those who give less in measure and weight)”. 
 
Also, in Surah Ar-Rahman Verse 9 “And observe the weight with equity and do not make 
the balance deficient.”   
 
In order to conform to Islamic rules and norms, financing in Islam depends on the concept 
that the payment of interest is bad and is replaced during progressive Islamic 
transformation by co-operative instruments such as Mudarabah and Musharakah 
(Choudhury and Hoque, 2006). According to Lewis (2001): 
 Mudarabah partnership is formed whereby management is stipulated for one of the 
partners and other partner(s) are investors.   
 Musharakah partnership is formed whereby management and participation is 
stipulated for all partners, whether or nor all partners participate. 
Furthermore, there are two other principal categories of business in Islam:  
 Ijara (hire) is based on the capital hiring labour for a job and then fixing wages. In 
this case, the financier will receive all profits and at the same time is responsible for 
all losses. 
 Modern companies where investment can be made through the stock market but this 
trade has to involve halal commodities only. 
Regarding the corporate governance system, the Islamic perspective requires company 
directors, management and auditors to perform their professional duties with the objectives 
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of satisfying the needs of the shareholders, other stakeholders and Allah. Therefore, 
corporate governance in Islam aims to enhance accountability, transparency and 
trustworthiness where these values are paramount in Islam and these principles are 
introduced by Shari’a (the Islamic law) as follows. 
    
1- Accountability (hesab): Muslims believe that they will be made accountable for 
whatever they do (i.e. both bad and good actions). The word of accountability is repeated in 
the Holy Qur'an in different verses. For instance, Surah Al-Baqarah verse 284 says: 
" To Allah belongs all that is in the heavens and all that is on the earth, and whether you 
disclose what is in your ownselves or conceal it, Allah will call you to account for it". 
 
Surah Ibrahim verse 51 "That Allah may requite each person according to what he has 
earned. Truly, Allah is swift at reckoning". 
 
The generic sense of accountability in Islam is accountability to God (Allah) and to society 
for all activities that a Muslim has to carry out. Consequently, each individual is under a 
"self monitoring duty" that is an obligation to supervise adherence to his terms of reference 
and accountability to God and himself.  
Also in Islam where economic, political, religious and social affairs fall under the Islamic 
law (the Shari'a, which means the way to the source of life), accountability refers to a legal 
system in keeping with the code of behaviour called for by the Holy Qur'an and the hadith5 
(Lewis, 2006). 
Islam takes an extremely serious stance on accountability, not just for the present but for 
the future life, and asks followers to respect public property. For instance, Umar ibn 
'Abdu'l-'Aziz, extinguished a candle that was bought by using public funds if people came 
to see him for a private purpose. On the other hand, when he was writing to his family, or 
for a need he had concerning himself, he would request a candle from his own property (Er, 
2008).  
Corruption, and other unacceptable behaviour, has been prohibited by Islamic principles. 
For instance, in Sura Albaqra Verse 188, it states: 
“Do not eat up one another’s property unjustly nor bribe with it the judges in order that 
you may knowingly and wrongfully deprive others of their possessions”.  
Moreover, the Prophet Mohammed (PUH) once said:  
                                                 
5 Saying of the Prophet Mohamed (PBUH) 
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“If someone among you sees wrong he must right it by his hand if he can (deed, 
conduct, action). If he cannot, then by his tongue (speak up, verbally oppose); if he 
cannot, then by his gaze (silent expression of disapproval); and if he cannot, then in his 
heart. The last is the minimum expression of his conviction (faith, courage)”. (Er, 
2008). 
 
2- Transparency and disclosure: Islam also requires an obligation of good faith in contracts 
and dealings. This requires taking positive steps to do the right thing, making full and 
honest disclosures and performing his obligations correctly. In this way, Allah has 
encouraged in the following verses (ayat) transparency:     
‘O you who believe! When you contract a debt for a fixed period, write it down. Let a 
scribe write it down in justices between you’. (Al-Baqarah: 282) 
 
“ ... Now you have brought the truth ...” (Al-Baqarah: 71)  
“... and knows what you conceal and what you reveal” (Surah An-Naml: 25) 
 
3- Responsibility: the concept of trustworthiness is stated in Surah Al- Anfal (verse 27): 
“O you who believe! Betray not Allah and his Messenger, nor betray knowingly your 
Amanat (things entrusted to you and all the duties which Allah has ordained for you)”   
 
It is a highly regarded virtue in Islam that every individual within an organisation is 
required to subscribe to standards of ethical conduct while carrying out their commercial 
activities. Islam prescribes a system of Zakat6, and encourages its believers to give money 
to the poor only to purify himself, not in return for any favour done to him when in Sura 
Alail verse 17-21states that: 
“He who spends his wealth for increase in self-purification.  And who has (in mind) no 
favour from anyone to be paid back. Except to seek the Countenance of his Lord, the 
Most High. He surely will be pleased (when he enters Paradise)’’. 
 
Islam also punishes thieves by chopping off their hand without discrimination between 
people. The purpose of this is to purify the Islamic community and to deter future thieves 
and to maintain the property of people. Therefore, Islam requires high responsibilities and 
becomes more effective than the conventional punishment methods especially for 
executives who mislead investors in the developed world.   
                                                 
6 Zakat is a social obligation to pay wealth and resource tax on retained earnings which is given to the poor 
and the needy.  It is equal to 2.5 per cent of idle wealth and assets annually.    
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4- Fairness: Islam encourages its believers to collective decision-making, tolerance, civil 
and political liberty, and to resolve problems by fair means. Surat Al- Imran, verse 159 
says  
“… and consult them in the affairs. Then when you have taken a decision, put your trust in 
Allah…" 
Also, Islam is strict about independent justice. The Holy Qur'an in verse 58 in Surat An-
Nnisa stated: 
"Verily! Allah commands that you should render back the trust to those to whom they 
are due; and that when you judge between men, you judge with justice….." 
 
According to the above explanation of the Islamic perspective on corporate governance, 
Islam would be in favour of corporate social responsibility and the stakeholder approach 
rather than the shareholder approach. 
Islam also provides for a comprehensive code of moral and ethical behaviour in economic 
activities and a good corporate governance framework, through providing different 
mechanisms such as Shari'ah Supervisory Board7 with specialised jurists in commercial 
jurisprudence or experts of Islamic financial institutions. 
To run in mainstream economies, Islamic financial institutions need the power of the 
behavioural transformation of preferences in increasing awareness and implementation of 
participatory practices. Even in the hostile environment of competition and given the 
impossibility for Islamic corporations to enter into strategic alliances with conventional 
corporations. Islamic financial portfolios remained stable during the high points of the 
economic and financial crisis which hit Malaysia in 1990s (Choudhury and Hoque, 2006). 
Therefore, financial institutions becomes increasingly attractive to gain national support, 
especially from Muslims, to promote its operations based on transparency, business 
disclosure, absence of predatory competition and anti-trust consequences, coupled with 
sustainable productive performance with social benefits that will enhance trust. 
Corporate governance in the conventional (non-Islamic) economy is driven by the objective 
criterion of competition, conflict and shareholder wealth maximisation (Lazonic and 
O'Sullivan, 2000). In an Islamic perspective, corporate governance practice is undertaken 
by the board, management, employees and shareholders with the social wellbeing criterion 
                                                 
7 According to Lewis (2001), the aim of the Shari’ah Board is harmonising and converging concepts and their 
application amongst the supervisor boards of Islamic financial institutions. The objective is to avoid 
inconsistencies between the individual boards and assist with developing new products.   
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replacing the criterion of maximisation of shareholders wealth (Choudhury and Hoque, 
2006).  
Finally, a difference between the concept of corporate governance in the Islamic 
perspective and the mainstream economic perspective emerges from the different 
understanding of the nature of corporation. In the Islamic perspective, a corporation is a 
legal entity of shareholders with proportionate ownership of assets according to individual 
group equity and profit-sharing capabilities. Mudarabah and Musharakah contracts, and 
other ones that revolve around these principal development-financing instruments, establish 
the legal validity of the corporation. Absolute ownership within an Islamic corporation is 
thus replaced by proportionate ownership according to participation and in view of the 
extensive co-operative linkages established (Choudhury and Hoque, 2006).  
In contrast, the corporation in a mainstream (conventional) economy is “a mechanism 
established to allow different parties to contribute capital, expertise and labour for the 
maximum benefit of all of them. The investor gets the chance to participate in the profit of 
the enterprise without taking responsibility for the operations. The management gets the 
chance to run the company without taking the responsibility of personally providing the 
funds’’ (Monks and Minow, 2004; p9). So while western corporations have a separation of 
ownership and control, in the Islamic system corporations ownership, control and benefits 
are to be shared. 
2.4 Conclusion  
Corporate governance has generated an enormous debate in the last two decades. One main 
reason for this attention is the crisis that swept the financial markets and economies of the 
major Asian countries in 1997 and the failure of famous names such as Enron, which 
shocked investors about the governance of the company. The result was a growth in 
attention to corporate governance in both developed and developing countries. 
The best corporate governance requires understanding of the nature of the different factors 
that affect the practice. The most important issue which impacts on the concept of corporate 
governance is who controls the corporation, and therefore to whom the corporation is 
responsible.  
The most positive impact on the concept of corporate governance is the company. 
Therefore, whether the company should focus on the shareholders’ (owners) interests as a 
main objective or concentrate on the diverse groups' benefit is a key issue. These two 
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themes have increased in different economies regarding the nature of these economies, and 
the contrasts of legal systems, and cultural norms.    
Generally, there are two models of corporate governance: the outsider model and insider 
model. The outsider model has its focus on the interest of shareholders and uses external 
mechanisms to oversee the management. The insider model depends on internal 
mechanisms, reflecting on ownership structure that is concentrated where the financial 
institutions play a pivotal role and oversee the management.  
The Islamic perspective of corporate governance was analysed in this chapter to identify 
the main difference between the corporate governance mechanisms in Islam and non-
Islamic economies, since Libya is an Islamic country.    
In conclusion, corporate governance is a concept that should be recognised as a process 
rather than a one-shot operation. This process involves finding a balance to protect 
shareholders' rights and stakeholders' interests through exploration of possible factors that 
affect the practice, since it can help companies to generate and maximise value for intended 
beneficiaries by improving accountability and transparency processes.  
The next chapter examines the main mechanisms of corporate governance from different 
perspectives to understand these mechanisms and identify whether Libya should develop its 
framework on a shareholder or stakeholder basis. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Mechanisms of Corporate Governance 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents the background of the main mechanisms of corporate governance in 
order to understand and frame the effect of these factors on practice. Therefore, the 
procedures and devices used to deliver corporate governance are described and evaluated 
during this chapter. An important challenge facing any organisation for its existences and 
growth, in the light of high competitiveness and globalisation, is regaining the confidence 
of financiers and society. That confidence can be achieved through adherence to principles 
that help organisations to attract investment. Malpractice and collusion between top 
management and auditors and the Board of Directors was the main reason for Enron's 
bankruptcy. Therefore, the best method to create confidence between investors and an 
organisation is to ensure the best and clearest practices of management are evident to 
investors. This chapter addresses the following mechanisms: the responsibilities of the 
Board of Directors, shareholders' rights, disclosure and transparency practices and 
stakeholders' rights. 
3.2 Board of Directors and its Responsibility 
The Board of Directors plays a significant role in corporate governance practices. It is the 
heart of the company because of its role between shareholders and management, thereby 
monitoring management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Solomon and Solomon, 2004). 
The Board of Directors is considered the main internal governance mechanism that 
oversees management actions including the setting of top management pay and ensuring 
managerial behaviour and the quality of managerial decisions (Ezzamel and Watson, 1993; 
Kang et al, 2007). Weak boards and poor independent judgment lead to various problems in 
corporate governance (Luo, 2005). Further, the Board of Directors tends to be the 
instrument shareholders use to monitor top managers (Fama and Jenson, 1983; De Andres 
et al, 2005).   
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According to Mallin (2004), a major difference in corporate governance across the world is 
board structure. There are two kinds of boards of directors: the unitary board is 
predominant in the Anglo-Saxon countries and other developing countries8. This type of 
board is characterised by one single board comprising both executive and non-executive 
(outside) directors. Alternatively, the dual (two tier) board is predominant in Germany, the 
Netherlands and Denmark. This is characterised by the existence two separate boards, a 
Supervisory Board which oversees the direction of business and a Management Board 
responsible for the running of the business.  
 
3.2.1 Board Size 
Board size means the number of persons that sit on the board including both executive and 
non-executive directors.  
The ability of a board to monitor top managers can increase by adding more directors to the 
board (large board); in consequence the CEO will find it difficult to dominate the board 
(Kula, 2005). However, the large board may have some obstacles, such as a decreased 
ability of the board to control management, poorer communication and decision-making. 
Moreover, there is some evidence of an inverse relationship between company value and 
board size. On this point, Yermack (1996) found that a small Board of Directors is more 
effective, allowing companies to achieve a higher market value, whereas a large board 
suffers from problems of coordination, communication and effectiveness, which lead to 
excessive influence by the CEO.  
De Andres et al (2005) in their study also found a negative impact of board size on 
company performance. They researched 450 large non-financial companies from Belgium, 
Canada, France, German, Holland, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, the UK and the US and 
inferred that over-sized boards of directors have poorer performance in both unitary and 
dual boards.  
In practice, many countries recognised this issue and give advice on the board size without 
specifying the best size. In the UK, the codes do not specify the board size; however, they 
provide recommendations to companies to find an optimal composition. For instance, the 
Combined Code (2006) in Para A3 stated that:   
‘‘The board should not be so large as to be unwieldy. The board should be of sufficient 
size that the balance of skills and experience is appropriate for the requirements of the 
                                                 
8 Libya also implies this system of board structure where companies’ boards are unitary.   
 39 
 
business and that changes to the board’s composition can be managed without undue 
disruption’’ 
 
Similarly, the German Code of Corporate Governance (2006) stated in Para 4.2.1:   
“The Management Board shall be comprised of several persons and have a Chairman or 
Spokesman”,  
 
In Para 5.4.2 stated;  
 
“The Supervisory Board shall include what it considers an adequate number of independent 
members”. 
 
In the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region, where the unitary board system 
prevails, the Egyptian Code of Corporate Governance (2005), for instance, does not refer to 
the numbers of directors on the board but leaves this to the company policy. In Libya, the 
Commercial Code also does not mention the size of the company board, but it is left to the 
General Assembly. However, the Libyan Stock Market regulations (Corporate Governance 
Code) recommend that the number should be between three and eleven members with a 
majority of non-executives.   
Finally, although, the board size is affected by the company size (Li and Harrison, 2008 ) 
companies should seek balance between the size of the board and its effectiveness by using 
a mix of qualifications, age, race, and gender of the directors, more than concentrating on 
the size of the board. 
 
3.2.2 Board Diversity 
 
The gender, racial and cultural composition of the Board of Directors (board diversity) is 
the most debatable governance issue in the companies especially in developed economies. 
For instance, in North America, attention is increasingly paid to race, ethnicity and gender 
of corporate directors, while in Europe nationality appears to have become an important 
dimension of board diversity (Ruigrok et al, 2007). Furthermore, many corporate managers 
believe that a positive link exists between board diversity and shareholders’ value (Carter et 
al, 2003). This has led many to think about board composition and what are the advantages 
and disadvantages of board diversity.       
According to Kang et al (2007), board diversity means variety in the composition of the 
board of directors, which is affected by board size and the company industrial context. 
There are two categories of diversity: 
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 Observable diversity; that is readily detectable attributes such as gender, 
background, nationality, ethnic and age. 
 Less visible diversity such as educational, functional and occupational backgrounds 
and industry experience. 
Board diversity promotes a better understanding of an increasingly diverse marketplace, 
increasing creativity and innovation which leads to more effective problem-solving and 
improves the effectiveness of corporate leadership (Carter et al, 2003; Kang et al, 2007).  
Gender is the most debated diversity issue concerning the board of directors. Many 
countries, such as Norway, require companies to make a portion of their board women. 
This is partly because women may be more independent since they are not part of the 
“oldboys” network. Women also may have a better understanding of such things as 
consumer behaviour, the needs of customers, and opportunities for companies to meet those 
needs (Kang et al, 2007). Also, with women on the board of directors, corporate 
governance can be achieved which subsequently, may translate to competitive advantage 
and the company will have a competitive advantage (Bernardi et al., 2002). However, in 
practice, the Board of Directors still has men dominating in most companies in both the 
developed and developing worlds. For instance, in the UK, the number of women on the 
board of 350 large companies was less than 5 per cent in 1995 (Conyon and  Millan, 1997).  
In Canada, the results of several studies of board compositions indicate that about 4-5 per 
cent of board members are women (Burke, 1994). Burke offered the following reasons for 
the absence of women on Canadian corporate boards: the small number of vacancies on 
boards that require filling, reluctance of organisations to appoint constituent directors 
(women, minorities); the preference of male CEOs for the appointment of other male CEOs 
to their boards; the difficulty which boards report they experience in finding qualified and 
interested women; and the absence of any penalty for not having women on the corporate 
boards. 
In Australian companies, during 2003, 33 companies from a sample of 100 companies did 
not have a female director, while 51 companies had one female director and only 15 
companies had two or more female directors. Significantly, only 10.37 per cent of the total 
director positions in Australia’s top companies were occupied by a female (Kang et al, 
2007). 
The special life and the stress of board members have been suggested as causing women to 
be reluctant to stay on a board. For instance, Penny Hughes, President of Coca-Cola Great 
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Britain, left her board position to bring up young sons, and Brenda Barnes, CEO of Pepsi 
Co, left (again) because of managing her work and family life (Vinnicombe and Johnson, 
2001). 
Overall, the proportion of women on the board is still under-represented in most countries. 
In the UK, for example, the manner of selecting and appointing in large companies is far 
from clear and attitudes towards women in top positions impede their representation 
(Conyon and Millan, 1997). 
In developing countries, board diversity is still hindered by culture and the dominant 
attitudes towards women. For instance, the social environment in the Arabic world plays an 
influential role in community life and people's relationships with each other. Also, Arabic 
countries scored high in Hofstede’s (1980) masculinity dimension.9 Therefore, personal 
connections, nepotism, sectarian and ideological affiliations influence management 
procedures, often posing a barrier to female advantage in the world of business.  
       
3.2.3 The Role of the Board  
According to Kula (2005) and Brennan (2006), the roles of the board are: to control and 
monitor the managers to provide the CEO and other top managers advice; to form 
formulate strategies for the company; and to foster resource independence by facilitating 
the acquisition of resources. Brennan (2006) defined the role of the Board of Directors as 
being charged with the oversight of management on behalf of shareholders. To achieve this 
function, the board must assume an effective oversight function, which in turn is influenced 
by factors such as board composition, the quality, the size, the duality of CEO/Chairman 
positions, diversity, information asymmetries and board culture. Mallin (2004) explained 
the role of Board of Directors as: determining the company’s aims; monitoring the 
achievement of all aims; appointing a chief executive officer; having a regular meeting with 
                                                 
9 Consistent with Hofstede’s (1980) many studies found the negative attitude towards women in Arab 
Countries. For instance, Abd El-latif (1988) studied the Egyptain society’s attitudes towards working women. 
The study found a negative attitude towards women in top managerial and leadership position. Mostafa 
(2005) found that UAE students have significantly different attitudes towards women managers from those of 
the older generations. Also, the study predicts that modernity may diminish patriarchal attitudes towards 
women in the Arab world   
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an agenda and making the right decisions for any matters that are related with its 
responsibilities. 
To carry out its roles the board should have: access to the appropriate company 
information; a balance between executive and non-executive directors; appropriate sub-
committees; offer appropriate training for new directors to a listed company. Further, 
company board should act as monitors in disagreements that take place among internal 
managers and carry out tasks involving serious agency problems, such as setting executive 
remuneration and hiring and firing managers. In this point, the OECD (2004) made a 
suggestion to two key elements of the duty of the board of directors: 
“This principle states the two key elements of the fiduciary duty of board members: the 
duty of care and the duty of loyalty. The duty of care requires board members to act on 
a fully informed basis, in good faith, with due diligence and care. In some jurisdictions 
there is a standard of reference which is the behaviour that a reasonably prudent person 
would exercise in similar circumstances. ... The duty of loyalty is of central importance, 
since it underpins effective implementation of other principles in this document relating 
to, for example, the equitable treatment of shareholders, monitoring of related party 
transactions and the establishment of remuneration policy for key executives and board 
members. ... The duty of loyalty for a board member relates to the company and all its 
shareholders and not to the controlling company of the group.” 
 
The Combined Code (2006) states:  
“The board’s role is to provide entrepreneurial leadership of the company within a 
framework of prudent and effective controls which enables risk being assessed and 
managed. The board should set the company’s strategic aims, ensure that the 
necessary financial and human resources are in place for the company to meet its 
objectives and review management performance. The board should set the 
company’s values and standards and ensure that its obligations to its shareholders 
and others are understood and met.” 
 
In a dual system of boards, the board is divided into two categories, management and 
Supervisory Boards. The Management Board (composed entirely of executives) is 
responsible for independently managing the enterprise, developing the enterprise’s strategy, 
ensuring that all provisions of law are abided by and working to achieve their compliance 
as well as ensuring appropriate risk management and risk control in the enterprise (German 
Code, 2006 para 4.1). In contrast, the Supervisory Board (composed of non-executive board 
members) is responsible for supervising and advising the Management Board in the 
company, appointing and dismissing the members of Management Board and issuing terms 
of references (German Code, 2006 Para 5.1). 
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In Egypt, according to the Egyptian Code of corporate governance (2005) paragraphs 3.25 
and 3.26, the role of Board of Directors is generally to be responsible for the company’s 
risk management. It should submit an annual report to shareholders in the general assembly 
including: an overview of corporation’s activities and its financial position: an overview of 
the corporation’s next year’s activities: activities and results of the corporation’s 
subsidiaries, a briefing on the changes in the main capital structure of the corporation and 
with the code of corporate governance compliance.  
Overall, in all situations, theoretically, the main role of the Board of Directors is to reduce 
agency problems by monitoring the top management. In practice, board roles can be 
affected by the legal system and culture, so to improve the board performance board 
members should be qualified and avoid any factor that adversely affects their 
responsibilities. Also, the board should have regular meetings, with an agenda in order to 
make the right decisions.  
 
3.2.4 Board Composition  
Regardless of the system of board of directors, a board consists of two different types of 
directors: executive directors that are responsible for the day-to-day management, and non-
executive directors who are not involved with the company’s day-to-day operations.  
Board composition is defined as the proportion of outside (non-executive) directors to the 
total number of directors (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). 
The outside directors should offer the board more independence from the executives, 
especially the CEO, since inside directors have potentially less independence from 
management (Kula, 2005). Also, inside directors may not feel confident in contradicting the 
CEO, so outside directors are in a better position to monitor managerial activities. Board 
independence is expected to be associated with enhanced corporate performance and 
valuation (Choi et al, 2007). The Combined Code (2006) states: 
Except for smaller companies, at least half the board, excluding the chairman, 
should comprise non-executive directors determined by the board to be 
independent. A smaller company should have at least two independent non-
executive directors (para.A.3.2). 
 
In a dual board, such as is found in Germany the Supervisory Board includes employee 
representatives comprising between one third or one half of board members in companies 
having more than 500 or 2000 employees respectively (German Code 2006 para.1). 
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3.2.5 Appointment to the Board 
Most corporate governance codes (see, for example, the Combined Code, German Code 
and Egyptian Code) emphasise that appointments to the board should be focused on the 
ability and efficiency of the directors and electing them should be a transparent procedure. 
In the unitary board system, used in Anglo-Saxon countries and in most developing 
countries, shareholders elect board members in the Annual General Meeting (AGM). 
In the dual board system, which exists in most continental countries, the Supervisory Board 
are also elected by shareholders (this system is a little different in Germany, where 
employees may elect some Supervisory Board members). Then the Supervisory Board 
appoints the members of the Management Board (Mallin, 2004). 
 
3.2.6 Non-Executive Directors 
There has been increased discussion in the literature on corporate governance issues and the 
role of directors. Non-executive directors are an important element of a board’s 
composition because they control and act as a counterweight to executive directors, and 
contribute to the overall leadership and development of the company (Mallin, 2004).  
Non-executive directors also have an important role in making the executive directors 
accountable for their policies and activities, as well as having been heralded as important 
monitors of a company’s top management with the ability to prevent unbridled power being 
exercised by the CEO (Cheng and Firth, 2005; Pass, 2004), they also act as referees in 
conflicts between managers and shareholders (Fama and Jensen 1983). Amongst the aims 
of appointing independent non-executive directors to the board are the looking of the after 
the interests of outside shareholders, the deterrence of excessive top management pay, and 
the promotion of the use of performance related pay (Cadbury, 1992; OECD, 2004). 
Therefore, non-executives are expected to perform an important governance role by 
introducing independence and impartiality to board deliberations and ensuring that the 
interests of shareholders are taken into account in board decisions, since they are 
independence from the management. McNulty and Pettigrew (1996) identified the board 
functions into three perspectives. These perspectives are; the governance perspective, the 
resource perspective and the strategic perspective. The governance perspective treats the 
board as a mechanism for insuring the organisational actions are in accordance with the 
owners’ interest, since the board can mitigate the conflict of interest between management 
and owners, and resist management opportunism and the self-interested behaviour of 
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managers. The resource perspective emphasises that the role of the board is to help link the 
organisation its environment and secure critical resources.  The strategic perspective which 
is now being given more attention, acquires resources or represents stakeholder interests, it 
involves making important decisions that enable the organisation to change.10    
Increased attention to the role of non-executive directors has been taken consistently with 
the corporate governance development. In the UK, for instance, since the Cadbury report 
recommended that non-executive directors should be entirely independent of the board to 
ensure objectivity, the proportion of non-executives in UK corporate boards steadily 
increased, from 34 per cent in 1991 to 49 per cent in 2001(Liu, 2005), and they become 
increasingly involved in both the formulation and implementation of strategic decisions 
within their organisations (McNulty and, Pettigrew, 1999). 
Consistent, with the Cadbury report the Combined Code (2006) explained the factors that 
prohibited people from being non-executive directors. For example, if a person has been an 
employee of the company or group within the last five years, or has, or has had within the 
last three years, a material business relationship with the company either directly, or as a 
partner, shareholder, director or senior employee of a body that has such a relationship with 
the company (for more details please see the resource). 
Pettigrew and McNulty (1995) identified that non-executive members are able to mobilise 
power and exert influence in and around the boardroom. In 1996 McNulty and, Pettigrew 
found that non-executive directors influence mostly through persuasion and coalition 
formation. Also, they argued that non-executive directors rely less on their positional 
authority to exert influence, and more on their personal knowledge, experience and 
expertise, as well as their ability to form relationships with individuals. Therefore, non-
executive directors are expected to bring independent judgements, especially with respect 
to the corporation's strategy, and appointment of management. Therefore, non-executive 
members of the board should be independent of executive members. However, the literature 
expresses serious concern over the effectiveness of non-executive directors. The high 
proportion of non-executive directors on boards, as proposed by agency theory has 
                                                 
10 In a similar vein, OECD (2004) stated that; “Boards should consider assigning a sufficient number of non-
executive board members capable of exercising independent judgment to tasks where there is a potential for 
conflict of interest. Examples of such key responsibilities are ensuring the integrity of financial and non-
financial reporting, the review of related party transactions, nomination of board members and key executives, 
and board remuneration.”   
  
 
 46 
 
disadvantage such as the stifling of strategic actions (Goodstein, et al, 1994), excessive 
monitoring ( Baysinger and Butler, 1985), lack of business knowledge to be effective 
(Patton and Baker, 1987), and lack of real independence (Demb and Neubauer, 1992) (sited 
by Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). In terms of corporate disclosure, non-executive directors are 
an interesting variable to consider because more disclosure may be expected if they carry 
out their monitoring role rather than their perceived monitoring role (Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002). Further, non-executive directors may not be able to conduct full monitoring of the 
top management or be independent for several reasons. They may not have significant 
financial interest in the company; they may be busy and they probably have little time to 
think about the company's affairs, or to collect information about the company beyond that 
provided by management; they may become loyal to the management who proposed them, 
so that they can be re-elected; and, in the long term, non-executive directors on the same 
board may become less effective monitors because they may build up close relationships 
with other members on the board (Hart, 1995; Pass, 2004).  
McNulty and Pettigrew (1999) argued that non-executive members need power and 
influence to contribute to the exercise of board duties. Non-executive directors are a very 
important instrument that should be considered carefully in the process of establishing good 
corporate governance especially in a transition economy like Libya where the company can 
benefit from their experience and knowledge.  
The role of non-executive directors has been criticised. For instance, Treadwell (2006) 
argued that the title ''non-executive'' be dropped and replaced by the simple title, ''Director''. 
His belief is that business needs hardnosed, experienced and professional non-executive 
directors who have the time to give to the role. Also, Mace (1971) criticised the non-
executive directors in US companies as “ornaments on the corporate Christmas tree” when 
he found most Boards of Directors did not create objectives, corporate strategy and board 
policy.    
In the future, it could be supposed that non-executive directors are likely to play a 
significant role in the future of the corporate governance framework. Not only do many 
scholars believe that they can influence the corporate governance practice (O’Sullivan, 
2000), but also it is clear from recent reports and codes their role in improving the 
corporate governance framework is also emphasised. In the future, non-executive directors 
should not only be responsible for the policing of executives' actions and behaviours but 
also for the strategic direction. Therefore, non-executive directors should not just be seen as 
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ornaments which had been a view by some authors, but it would appear that their role 
should be integral part of the Board of Directors and respective committees on the board. 
This role should be related to the substantial amount of experience in relation to the 
working of the board. 
 
3.2.7 CEO and Chairman    
A key issue concerning the role of the CEO is that the CEO's benefits should be related to 
the company performance, and he/she should be rewarded if the company achieves good 
performance and punished for poor performance. Yet this reward should not give 
executives the right to excessively follow risk-taking that could potentially harm the 
stakeholders (Frye et al, 2006). Also, a combining of the roles of CEO and Chairman is 
symptomatic of wider problems relating to the shareholders' trust and the effect of non-
executive directors as monitors of management. Hence, the Cadbury Committee (1992) 
recommended that separation of the two roles would help to avoid concentration of power 
in one person. However, in some cases, the Chairman may become the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) if a board so decides. In this case, the board should consult major 
shareholders in advance and should set out its reasons at the time of the appointment and in 
the next annual report.  
 
3.2.8 Board Sub-Committees 
The sub-committee is an important mechanism for a board that aims to carry out its duties 
(Petra, 2005; O'Sullivan and Diacon, 1999). The main committees that many companies 
establish are audit, compensation and nominating committees. Cadbury (1992) and Hampel 
(1998), for instance, argue that the existence of audit and remuneration committees is 
expected to improve confidence in the overall system of governance, whereas the Audit 
Committee is expected to improve the quality of the external audit process where it serves 
as the principal point of contact between the statutory auditor and the company (O'Sullivan 
and Diacon, 1999).The establishing of these committees has increased, especially in 
developed economies. For instance, in Europe in 2003 only 3 percent of European 
companies do not use committees, whereas in 1999 this was 25 percent (Albert-Roulhac 
and Breen, 2005). 
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3.2.8.1 The Audit Committee 
The audit committee is arguably the most important committee in a company because it can 
strengthen the position of management by providing assurance that all possible steps have 
been taken to provide independent reviews of the management’s financial policies and 
operation (Vanasco, 1994). Also it provides a useful bridge between both internal and 
external auditors, and the board (Mallin, 2004; Al-twaijry et al, 2002).  
In addition, it can be a monitoring mechanism that improves the quality of information flow 
between company owners and managers, especially in the financial reporting environment 
thus improving the disclosure practice. Therefore, an audit committee is ideally associated 
with more reliable financial reporting and, in particular, fewer errors, fewer irregularities, 
and fewer illegal acts (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). 
Historically, the audit committee is not a new phenomenon, especially in Europe. For 
example, the UK had audit committees in 1872. However, the widespread adoption of the 
audit committee did not begin until the late 1980s (Vanasco, 1994). The Cadbury Report 
(1992) recommended that all listed companies should establish audit committees. In 2006, 
the Combined Code (2006) in Para C. 3.1) stated: 
“The board should establish an audit committee of at least three, or in the case 
of smaller companies, two members who should all be independent non-
executive directors. The board should satisfy itself that at least one member of 
the audit committee has recent and relevant financial experience”.  
 
In the USA, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) suggested in 1940 that all 
public companies should have an audit committee (Al-twaijry et al, 2002). In 1978, the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) required all listed companies to have audit committees 
composed solely of independent directors, and the 1987 report of the American Treadway 
Commission concluded that audit committees had a critical role to play in ensuring the 
integrity of US company financial reports (Cadbury Code, 1992: para 4.33). 
Establishing such a committee has become widespread in non-English speaking countries 
and most corporate governance codes have recommended establishing such a committee 
(Egyptian Code 2005; German Code 2006). Also, the OECD principles (2004) mentioned 
the importance of using committees as they may improve the overall work of the board.  
The Combined Code (2006 para C.3.2) explained the main aim of the audit committee as 
follows: 
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 to monitor the integrity of the financial statements of the company, and any formal 
announcements relating to the company’s financial performance, reviewing 
significant financial reporting judgements contained in them; 
 to review the company’s internal financial controls and, unless expressly addressed 
by a separate board risk committee composed of independent directors, or by the 
board itself, to review the company’s internal control and risk management systems; 
 to monitor and review the effectiveness of the company’s internal audit function; 
  to make recommendations to the board, for it to put to the shareholders for their 
approval in general meeting, in relation to the appointment, re-appointment and 
removal of the external auditor and to approve the remuneration and terms of 
engagement of the external auditor; 
  to review and monitor the external auditor’s independence and objectivity and the 
effectiveness of the audit process, taking into consideration relevant UK 
professional and regulatory requirements; 
 to develop and implement policy on the engagement of the external auditor to 
supply non-audit services, taking into account relevant ethical guidance regarding 
the provision of non-audit services by the external audit firm; and to report to the 
board, identifying any matters in respect of which it considers that action or 
improvement is needed and making recommendations as to the steps to be taken. 
 
In Egypt, the corporate governance Code in para (6.2) recommended the functions of the 
audit committee as the following: 
 Evaluate the efficiency of the financial manager and other major staff of the 
financial department. 
  Review the internal audit system and submit a report including its 
recommendations. 
 Review financial statements before submission to the board of directors, and 
include its recommendations in a report. 
 Review the accounting policies and give opinions and recommendations. 
 Review the audit plan with the external auditor and provide its recommendations. 
 Review the comments of the external auditor and follow up with corrective 
measures. 
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 Assess the qualifications, performance, and independence of the external auditor; 
nominate external auditor and determine his fees. 
 Approve assigning additional tasks to external auditor and decide his fees for 
additional tasks. 
 Review the plan of the internal audit department and assess its efficiency and 
capacity. 
 Review the reports of the internal audit department, the feedback of the 
management regarding these reports, and the corrective measures. 
 
To achieve these aims, there are two issues that might be notable: the composition and the 
independence of the committee. These issues have been focused in most corporate 
governance reforms. For instance, the Combined Code (2006) recommended that the audit 
committee should be independent and comprises non-executive directors and that one of 
them has financial experience. O’Sullivan (2000) stated that: 
“The existence of an audit committee with significant non-executive membership is 
expected to reduce the likelihood that the extent of auditor effort, as well as the 
auditors’ willingness to report any areas of non-compliance, are affected by the 
level of non-audit fees the company’s auditor could earn from the company”. 
 
In Egypt, the code of corporate governance (2005) in para (6.1) recommends establishing 
an audit committee with at least three non-executive members, and that at least one of its 
members should have financial and accounting expertise. However, if the number of non-
executives on the Board of Directors is less than three, one or more members may be 
appointed from outside the corporation. The reason for having a majority of non-executive 
directors in the committee is that the executive directors cannot fulfil an objective 
monitoring role because they are not independent from management. 
In Libya, the Libyan Stock Market (LSM) Code of good corporate governance practice 
recommends that a number of committees should be formed in each listed company which 
depends on the company needs, until the board achieves effectively its responsibilities.   
Finally, the audit committee has become more common, being established to achieve 
independent security of the company’s financial policies and providing expert advice about 
the current accounting practices and policies.     
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3.2.8.2 Remuneration Committee 
So long as the conflict of interest between investors and management has existed, 
remuneration policy has been a significant issue that has attracted a lot of attention from 
investors and others. Mallin (2004) argued that the debate over remuneration committees 
has focused on the following issues: 
 the overall level of directors’ remuneration and the role of share options;  
 the suitability of performance measures linking directors’ remuneration with 
performance;  
 the role of the remuneration committee in setting the directors’ remuneration; 
 the shareholders’ influence on the exercise of directors’ remuneration.                      
The main role of the committee is to determine executive remuneration packages to prevent 
any excesses in the remuneration of directors (Mallin, 2004). This is important to avoid 
directors rewarding themselves regardless of the company’s performance.  
The remuneration committee can monitor and review the remuneration that should be 
awarded to the directors. The Combined Code (2006) in para (B.2.1) recommended 
establishing a committee of at least three, or two in small companies, from independent 
non-executive directors. 
In Egypt, the code recommended companies to establish a remuneration committee, with a 
majority of non-executives. The aim is to propose executives' remuneration and negotiate 
with them in consultation with the chief executive officer. The final decision, though, 
should be left to non-executive members.  
The Libyan Stock Market Code recommends that each board establish a remuneration 
committee with the main role being to establish a clear policy for the board members’ and 
top management compensation and also to confirm the members' independence and 
examine the weak and strong points of the board and advice on a solution.  
The remuneration committee can be viewed as an extension of corporate governance that 
controls executive pay and acts on behalf of stakeholders. Therefore, most corporate 
governance codes recommended establishing the committee. The Cadbury Code in the UK 
recommended that 
“Boards should appoint remuneration committees, consisting wholly or mainly of non-
executive directors and chaired by a non-executive director, to recommend to the board 
the remuneration of the executive directors in all its forms. ...Executives should play no 
part in decisions on their own remuneration” (p. 31). 
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The UK Combined Code (2006) recommended that the remuneration committee consist of 
at least three, or two in the case of smaller companies, independent non-executive directors. 
Also the Code advises that the remuneration committee should also be responsible for 
appointing any consultants in respect of executive director remuneration.   
The Libyan Stock Market Code recommends that each board establishes a remuneration 
committee with the main role being to establish a clear policy for the board members and 
top management remuneration. Also, it confirms the members' independence and examines 
the weak and strong points of the board and offers advice on solution. Theoretically, the 
remuneration committee assumes a major role in crafting executive pay; therefore, the 
composition of the committee becomes of major importance in corporate governance 
debates. This leads to the argument that the committee should not be a tool of corporate 
governance, but an important aspect of corporate governance development. This will 
happen if the committee pays attention to the reform the remuneration scheme. To achieve 
its role the committee should consist of the majority of qualified, independent non-
executive directors and/ or institutional investors. However, the committee might work in 
the interests of management by enhancing their levels of pay, especially when the 
independence is in form not in core. According to Main et al (1993), the compensation 
committee has been to some extent captured by the incumbent management (cited by Main 
and Johnston, 1993). The global financial crisis has brought to public attention the 
difficulties associated with executive remuneration in the financial services sector. 
Therefore, establishing the remuneration committee undoubtedly seems to be no quick 
solution. The solution is that institutional shareholders have to appear to be responsible 
investors; therefore, they might be genuinely committed to ensuring good remuneration 
practices in investee companies. Governments also should now step in to change executive 
remuneration norms relying on extreme greed, by reconsidering how they formulate norms 
to ensure wider adoption.  
3.2.8.3 The Nomination Committee 
The third committee that has been recommended is the nomination committee. The main 
aim of the committee is recommending board appointments and being responsible for 
renewing and replacing board members. Therefore, it should have a majority of non-
executive directors. 
The Combined Code 2006 in para (A.4.2) stated: 
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“The nomination committee should evaluate the balance of skills, knowledge and 
experience on the board and, in the light of this evaluation, prepare a description of 
the role and capabilities required for a particular appointment”. 
 
Establishing sub- committees is not always a positive way to help and implement the role 
of the board of directors. These committees should have a positive effect on company 
performance, and give the stakeholders more confidence in the company. However, 
establishing these committees and ensuring they are effective may mislead stakeholders’ 
view of the efficiency of the board of directors.  
Finally, the responsibility for managing the company entirely belongs to the Board of 
Directors, despite establishing committees, because the main aim of these committees is 
only to help the board to achieve its responsibilities. Board committees are seen as assisting 
the board and its directors to discharge their duties and responsibilities; however the board 
retains its overall responsibility for those functions (Mallin, 2004). In this point, the OECD 
Principles (2004) sound a cautious note when they state: 
“While the use of committees may improve the work of the board they may also raise 
questions about the collective responsibility of the board and of individual board 
members. In order to evaluate the merits of board committees it is therefore important 
that the market receives a full and clear picture of their purpose, duties and 
composition. Such information is particularly important in the increasing number of 
jurisdictions where boards are establishing independent audit committees with powers 
to oversee the relationship with the external auditor and to act in many cases 
independently”. (Section VI, para. E.2) 
 
3.3 Shareholders’ Rights  
The ownership structure of the company has undergone an important debate as one of the 
key corporate governance issues in most economies. 
Shareholders are often referred to as the owners of the company, and can be divided into 
two groups: Large Shareholders and Small Shareholders; or Institutional Shareholders and 
Individual Shareholders. 
The importance of the company’s ownership as one of the major corporate governance 
issues that affect the efficiency of the company has arisen since Berle and Means (1932) 
warned that the growing dispersion of ownership of stocks was giving rise to a potentially 
value-reducing separation of ownership and control. Although the aim of dispersed of 
ownership sometimes is to attract more investments and encourage the minority or small 
investors, the legal protection of the investments is the main point of the encouragement. 
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For example, in the UK, dispersed ownership is associated with a high level of investor 
protection; whereas in developing countries the lack of legal protection finds a prevailing 
ownership structure. 
In this vein, we can distinguish between two systems: 
The Common law system which is prevalent in the UK and the US provides good 
protection for the rights of both majority and minority shareholders. In these countries, a 
public company has a large number of small shareholders (Hart, 1995; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997; La Porta et al, 1998). Shareholders are viewed as monitors of the company by virtue 
of constraints on managers through the following mechanisms: the board of directors, the 
threat of proxy fights, large shareholders, hostile takeovers and corporate financial 
structure (Hart, 1995). However, shareholders even with these mechanisms still sometimes 
face mismanagement of their shares by managers.11  
Civil law system, where is no separation of ownership and control, unlike the common law 
system. Government intervention in economic activity and the protection of private 
property is weaker than in the common law system (Zhao and Millet-Reyes, 2007). 
Shareholders typically consist of families, especially in countries with poor shareholder 
protection (La Porta et al, 1998; Ararat and Yurtoglu, 2006). Financial institutions and the 
government prevail in large companies (Zhao and Millet-Reyes 2007). For example, in 
Germany, large banks through proxy voting arrangements often control over a quarter of 
the votes in major companies, and these banks have smaller but significant cash flow stakes 
as direct shareholders or creditors.  
In contrast, in smaller companies, the norm is family control through majority ownership or 
pyramids, in which typically the owner controls 51 percent of a company, which in turn 
controls 51 percent of its subsidiaries and so on (Franks and Mayer, 1994, cited by Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997). The Regional Corporate Governance Working Group in the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) Region (RCGWG, 2003) found that the governance 
systems in the MENA region are insider systems that are characterised by majority or 
concentrated ownership by family companies and by states.  
Since ownership may take different forms (individual, family, state-owned, foreign), 
several studies have focused on the effect of ownership on the practice of corporate 
                                                 
11 The obvious example is the company scandals in these economies such as Enron (2001) and the existence 
of the financial crises which started in 2008 and saw the collapse of many corporations, especially financial 
ones.  
 55 
 
governance. For instance, Persons (2006) explained that, under a highly concentrated 
structure, minority shareholders had very limited influence on the company, which may 
discourage some governance mechanisms, such as a hostile takeover. In the UK, Conyon 
and Leech (1994) found that executive remuneration in companies with high concentration 
of external ownership is low. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) noted a positive relationship 
between ownership concentration and corporate disclosure in Malaysian companies. In 
addition, Barako et al (2006) found that the levels of institutional and foreign ownership 
have a significantly positive impact on voluntary disclosure by companies in Kenya and 
they suggested that the extent of voluntary disclosure is influenced by a firm’s corporate 
governance attributes, ownership structure and company characteristics.  
Ahunwan (2002) found that a conflict between managers and shareholders often arises in 
developing countries, and is affected by worsening, ill-functioning capital markets, 
information asymmetry and a lack of adequate infrastructure. Moreover, these countries’ 
corporate structures are characterised by a desire to maintain control over companies by the 
majority shareholder, and a reliance on debt finance. A similar result was found by La 
Porta et al (1999) who argued that, although the agency problem in developed countries is 
between managers and shareholders, in developing countries this also exists between 
majority and minority shareholders.  
The ownership structure characterised as dispersed by Berle and Means (1932) has 
evolved, and nowadays has become more concentrated (Solomon and Solomon, 2004). The 
concentration of ownership by institutional investors as organisations with millions of 
pounds invested in shares of listed companies (national or foreign companies), as well as in 
other forms of financial asset, has become common in the Anglo-Saxon system (Solomon 
and Solomon, 2004). In the UK, individual investors in 1963 owned 54 per cent of shares, 
but by 2002 the percentage had dropped to 14 per cent. At the same time, institutional 
investors (comprising mainly pension funds and insurance companies) had increased their 
shareholdings from 16 per cent in 1963 to approximately 36 per cent in 2002 (Mallin, 
2004). In the US, the pension funds grew from owing less than 9 per cent to nearly one-
third of the market between 1970 and 1993 (Mayer,1997). 
On the wave of the increase in institutional investors in business activities in the UK, the 
reform of corporate governance concentrated on institutional investors as the key 
shareholders. The Cadbury Code (1992) stated: “institutional shareholders now own the 
majority of shares of quoted companies”. 
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The Combined Code (2006) in para (D.1) stated that: “Institutional shareholders should 
enter into a dialogue with companies based on the mutual understanding of objectives” and 
Para (E.3) stated “institutional shareholders have a responsibility to make considered use of 
their votes”.  
As a result of increasing their influence in business activities, most corporate governance 
codes confirm that the importance of corporate governance is to maintain ownership rights, 
and achieve equitable treatment of all owners (see, for example, Combined Code 2006; 
German Code 2006; Egyptian Code 2005). In Libya for example, the stock market code of 
corporate governance focuses on owners’ fair treatment and rights in the distribution of 
profit and attendance at the annual meeting or any other meetings. Also, they have the right 
to obtain full and honest information. 
The OECD Principles (2004) in para (II) stated that the corporate governance should 
protect and facilitate the exercise of shareholders’ rights. In addition, these Principles 
suggest some of these rights as following:  
A- Shareholders’ rights should include the right to (1) secure methods of ownership 
registration; (2) convey or transfer shares; (3) obtain relevant and material 
information on the corporation on a timely and regular basis; (4) participate and 
vote in general shareholder meetings; (5) elect and remove members of the board; 
(6) share in the profits of the corporation. 
B- The right to participate in, and to be sufficiently informed on, decisions concerning   
fundamental corporate changes such as: (1) amendments to the statutes, or articles 
of incorporation or similar governing documents of the company; (2) the 
authorisation of additional shares; and (3) extraordinary transactions, including the 
transfer of all or substantially all assets, that in effect result in the sale of the 
company. 
C- The right to sufficient and timely information concerning the date, location and 
agenda of general meetings, as well as full and timely information regarding the 
issues to be decided at the meeting 
D- The opportunity to ask questions to the board, including questions relating to the 
annual external audit, to place items on the agenda of general meetings, and to 
propose resolutions, subject to reasonable limitations 
E- Effective participants in key corporate governance decisions, such as the 
nomination and election of board members, should be facilitated. Shareholders 
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should be able to make their views known on the remuneration policy for board 
members and key executives. The equity component of compensation schemes for 
board members and employees should be subject to shareholder approval. 
 
There are several notable points which help explain the effect different forms of ownership 
have on the management and control of companies.  
Firstly, the closer relations between investors in companies in Europe and Japan may 
encourage better informed investors.  
Secondly, the investors’ intervention may have different incentives in different countries. 
For instance, dispersed shareholdings in the UK and US systems may provide insufficient 
incentives for any one investor to monitor and control the performance of companies, 
whereas in the case of large dominant shareholders, the returns to active governance are 
greater. 
Thirdly, hostile takeovers, and other market controls, are less active in most countries than 
in the UK and the US where they are regarded as an important discipline on the behaviour 
of companies (Mayer, 1997). 
Large shareholders can be very effective in solving the agency problem; they may also 
inefficiently redistribute wealth from other investors to themselves (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). Millan (2004) pointed out that share ownership has concentrated on institutional 
investors who are much more concerned about the internal governance of the company and 
the company’s relationship with other stakeholder groups. However, the real owners of the 
shares have lost influence on the companies in which they invested since the institutional 
investors, not the beneficial owners, are voting.  
3.4 Disclosure and Transparency  
Transparency and disclosure are crucial points in the success of corporate governance 
frameworks because stakeholders rely on disclosure, especially in financial reports, to 
assess corporate performance and monitor management. This importance has spread 
worldwide after the fraudulent and opaque accounting and auditing function in Enron, one 
of the biggest companies in the strongest capital market where the highest standards of 
integrity and ethics and full disclosure should have existed. 
Healy and Palepu (2001) defined disclosure as: 
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“a whole array of different forms of information produced by companies such as the 
internal report which includes the director’s statement, the Operating and Financial 
Review (OFR), the profit and loss account, balance sheet, cash flow statement and 
other mandatory items. It also includes all forms of voluntary corporate 
communications, such as management forecasts, analysts’ presentations, the AGM, 
press releases, information placed on corporate websites and other corporate reports, 
such as stand-alone environmental or social reports (cited by Solomon and Solomon, 
2004: p, 120).  
 
Disclosure has become an important mechanism in the modern economy to reduce the 
information asymmetry which comes from the separation of ownership and management, 
where management is involved in the day-to-day running of the company’s operations and 
the owners are not (Millan, 2004; Markarian et al, 2007; Solomon and Solomon, 2004). 
Mitton (2002) studied approximately 400 companies in five East Asian countries and found 
that companies with greater disclosure performed better than other companies during the 
crisis period of 1997-1998.12  
The cornerstone of the information that companies have to disclose is the financial 
information. However, the disclosure process is influenced by a broad range of social 
systems, such as cultural, political, and economic factors and the prevailing corporate 
governance system (see, for example, Archambault and Archambault, 2003). 
Literature showed that in developed economies, the harmonisation of governance 
structures, especially in disclosure processes, has increased (see, for example, Payne, 2006; 
Markarian et al, 2007).13 The OECD Principles also encouraged the practice of disclosure 
as a principle of a good governance framework. In these principles, disclosure has become 
the most important mechanism to improve the practice of corporate governance when it is 
stated (in para V p.22): 
“The corporate governance should ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is 
made on all material matters regarding the corporation, including the financial 
situation, performance, ownership, and governance of the company.” 
 
Furthermore, Solomon and Solomon (2004) stated that an increase in corporate 
transparency is a major initiative of corporate governance reform in any country. The 
Cadbury Report (1992, para 4.48) stated; “The lifeblood of markets is information and 
barriers to the flow of relevant information represent imperfections in the market”.  
                                                 
12 The countries were Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. 
13 The basic cause of this convergence might be the increasing of institutional investors and the free mobility 
of the capital as a result of globalisation. 
 59 
 
The confidence of financial disclosure is affected by the auditor’s role and responsibilities 
as one of the key market mechanisms. Auditors’ malpractice can take many forms: for 
instance, Fisher and Lovell (2006: p. 302) argue that in the cases of Enron and WorldCom 
the auditors' complicity in the deceit was a factor, whilst in the cases of Maxwell 
Communication and BBC1 the causes were unclear due to the inadequacy of the auditors' 
performance.    
In contrast to the numerous studies on corporate governance in developed countries, 
minimal research has been done on developing countries. Studies are usually limited and 
available only on an individual country basis. Also, the focus on corporate governance has 
been increased with globalisation and the adoption of International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and World Bank economic reforms, coupled with financial scandals in the West (Tsamenyi 
et al, 2007). 
The OECD (2004, para,V. p 49) stated: 
“A strong disclosure regime that promotes real transparency is a pivotal feature of 
market-based monitoring of companies and is central to shareholders’ ability to 
exercise their ownership rights on an informed basis. Experience in countries with 
large and active equity markets shows that disclosure can also be a powerful tool for 
influencing the behaviour of companies and for protecting investors. A strong 
disclosure regime can help to attract capital and maintain confidence in the capital 
markets.” 
 
The rise of corporate governance reforms in developing countries is coupled with the desire 
to attract foreign investment and growing economies. In the MENA region, the laws and 
regulations obligate listed companies to disclose their financial and non-financial 
information annually or semi-annually. In other developing economies, the weakness of 
disclosure is predominant: for instance, Tsamenyi et al (2007) found that the disclosure 
levels of Ghanaian listed firms are generally low, and the ownership structure, dispersion of 
shareholding, and firm size (measured as total assets and market capitalisation) all have 
significant effect on disclosure in Ghana. 
Disclosure is important at both micro and macro-economic levels. For the macro level, a 
strong transparent disclosure regime is essential for market-based monitoring of companies 
and is central to shareholders’ ability to exercise ownership rights, attract capital and 
maintain confidence in the market. At the micro level, reliable and timely information 
increases the confidence within the company and enables it to make good business 
decisions. It encourages potential investors and lenders, helps improve public 
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understanding of a company’s activities, policies and performance and helps auditors to 
evaluate and ratify the company's annual reports.  
Disclosure practice does not develop in a vacuum, so there are many factors that affect the 
quality of overall disclosure. Environmental factors affecting disclosure noted in the 
literature include the legal system, culture, stage of economic development, political 
system, colonial background, education level, technological development, financial system, 
size and efficiency of capital market, inflation, corporate governance practice, ownership 
structure, demand for public accounting market, and the independence of auditors ( Ho and 
Wong, 2001; Archambault and Archambault, 2003). 
A strong and fair regulatory system helps to improve the disclosure and transparency 
practice by providing confidence to investors. Therefore, the corruption and failures of the 
regulatory system in terms of disclosure in the Philippines has led to structural economic 
decline and capital flight (Saidi, 2004). Also, a significant number of Ukrainian companies 
have failed to comply with the legal obligation of disclosure because the level of fines 
imposed by the Securities Commission in relation to these violations has been insufficient 
to encourage compliance (Mycyk et al, 2006).  
 Barako et al (2006) suggested that the extent of voluntary disclosure in Kenyan companies 
is influenced by a company’s corporate governance attributes, ownership structure and 
company characteristics. They also found that the levels of institutional and foreign 
ownership have a significantly positive impact on voluntary disclosure. 
Culture norms and belief systems influence the direction, practice and quality of corporate 
governance (Yakasai, 2001). Hence, since accounting is considered a socio-technical 
activity involving the interaction of both human and non-human resources, disclosure 
practice cannot be culture-free (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Corporate disclosure also is 
affected by the level of education, since the level of education may increase the amount of 
corporate disclosure (Archambault and Archambault, 2003). 
Disclosure practice is affected by shareholders’ and stakeholders’ different perspectives. 
In the shareholders’ view, a company's aim is to maximise the profit of shareholders and 
long-term stakeholders’ benefit, whereas in the stakeholders' perspective, a company 
should take note of the interest of all groups that may be influenced by the company's 
decisions. Hence, disclosure activity will be different according to these perspectives. In 
Germany, for instance, there is a high emphasis on providing financial information to the 
 61 
 
long-term stakeholders; whereas in the Anglo-Saxon countries financial information is 
provided more for the benefit of short-term investors.  
Disclosure is an important mechanism of good governance, and should be developed 
especially in developing countries to attract more investment and encourage rapid growth 
of the economy. Disclosure improves public understanding of a company’s structure, 
activities, policies and the performance of companies. Companies, especially international 
ones, should implement more disclosure practice to provide evidence of respect for the 
environmental and ethical standards and companies' relationships with the communities in 
which they operate. 
3.5 Rights of Stakeholders 
Although the literature of corporate governance has concentrated on shareholders’ benefits, 
stakeholders can also play an important role in the corporate governance since they are 
affected by companies and in turn affect companies in some way when they supply the 
companies with "contributions". Therefore, they expect their own interests to be satisfied 
via inducements (Solomon and Solomon, 2004). For instance, in the continental model of 
corporate governance, stakeholders have power to influence the company’s policies. 
However, stakeholders face many obstacles, including the neglect of their influence from 
researchers.14  
One reason for this might be ascribed to the vagueness of the definition of stakeholders and 
the opaqueness regarding their role (Millan, 2004). Also the complexity of stakeholders' 
benefit measurement might be another reason for the neglect by policy-makers and 
researchers. Grundfest (1990) argued that the main reason for neglecting stakeholders in the 
corporate governance debate could be that shareholders will not allow a challenge to their 
interests, and managers are unwilling to give other stakeholders the power to "impose on 
corporations binding obligations to workers, communities or other constitutions".  
Since the term corporate governance has been defined as a relationship between the 
company and its stakeholders, the role of stakeholders in corporate governance has 
increased and their rights have been identified in most Codes of good practice.15 For 
                                                 
14 This might be ascribed to the flourishing of the model of corporate governance in the Anglo-Saxon region 
where the focus of shareholders’ rights is dominant and the stakeholders’ benefits will be protected and 
increased with the shareholders’ interests on the long-term.      
15 OECD Principles defines the corporate governance as “… a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the 
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instance, in Japan and Germany, the interest of stakeholders is not ignored, employees’ and 
creditors’ representation in supervisory and management boards is provided. 
In the Anglo-Saxon system, stakeholders’ rights are protected by the legal system and 
market regulation. Brennan (2006) argued that under UK law, directors owe their duty to 
the company, not to the shareholders; whereas in the US the duty tends to be expressed as a 
duty to shareholders collectively, but this very much depends on individual circumstances. 
Further, Porter (1992) recommended to USA policy makers that they should encourage 
long-term employee ownership and encourage board representation of significant financial 
advisers, employees, customers, suppliers, and community representatives.   
The rising concern for social responsibility by companies has increased the concentration 
on a broad range of stakeholders. In the era of globalisation, companies have increased the 
shareholders’ interest and focused on the welfare of their employees, customers, the 
environment and the local community. John and Senbet (1998) suggest that managers who 
are conscious of the company’s influence on all stakeholders will decrease the potential for 
agency problems, since their interests and those of shareholders should be more closely 
aligned (cited by Frye et al, 2006). 
In the MENA region, the role of stakeholders in corporate governance is not as developed 
as in many other countries. Also, the definition of stakeholders in the region is confined to 
those who have direct and explicit legal rights such as employees, bondholders and other 
debtors (RCGWG, 2003).  
The OECD (2004) emphasised that the corporate governance should recognise the rights of 
stakeholders established by law or through mutual agreements, and in para (IV) explained 
the role of stakeholders as:  
o Stakeholders should have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for 
violation of their rights. 
o Performance-enhancing mechanisms for employee participation should be 
permitted to develop. 
o Stakeholders should have access to relevant, sufficient and reliable 
information on a timely and regular basis. 
o Stakeholders, including individual employees and their representative 
bodies, should be able to freely communicate their concerns about illegal or 
                                                                                                                                                    
structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and 
monitoring performance are determined. 
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unethical practices to the board and their rights should not be compromised 
for doing this. 
o Creditor rights should be protected by an effective, efficient insolvency 
framework and by effective enforcement. 
Freeman (1984) suggested that companies’ aims should not be concentrated on the 
maximisation of shareholders' welfare, but the company should be extended to include the 
maximisation of the welfare of other stakeholders such as employees, creditors, suppliers, 
customers, the environment, and the community. Finally, although depicted as external 
influences, stakeholders' influence on corporate governance is dependent upon the nature of 
the system.16 However, companies should not concentrate only on the interests of their 
shareholders, but also should have responsibilities to other stakeholders. They should seek 
a balance between wealth maximisation for shareholders and the interest of other 
stakeholders. In this point it would be beneficial for companies to determine their 
stakeholders and respect their interests.  
 3.6 Conclusion  
This chapter has reviewed and identified the differences between the systems of corporate 
governance regarding the internal aspects of the company.  
The issues analysed in detail were in line with the OECD principles which include the 
responsibilities of board of directors, shareholders' rights, disclosure and transparency 
practices and stakeholders' rights. Therefore, this chapter has provided many useful insights 
into the introduction of corporate governance by reviewing the differences of these 
mechanisms across corporate governance models (insider and outsider systems), through 
clarifying the main differences between the models of corporate governance.   
 The literature suggests that corporate governance depends upon the company’s 
predominant disposition towards either the shareholders’ or stakeholders’ viewpoints. 
However, the chapter revealed that developing continuous corporate governance is not 
isolated from other issues which frame the practice of corporate governance. The next 
chapter presents the external factors that impact the corporate governance, which shape and 
create the differences between the effect on the framework and practice of corporate 
governance.      
                                                 
16 For instance the level of disclosure practice might rely on the stakeholders’ level of satisfaction. Therefore, 
companies should look at stakeholders’ demands for disclosure. 
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CHAPTER FOUR  
Corporate Governance between the International Best Practice and the 
Local Contingency 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, there are two categories of issues concerning the 
practice of corporate governance. The last chapter discussed the internal mechanisms of the 
practice in line with the OECD (2004) Principles. This chapter provides a brief background 
to other factors affecting the practice of corporate governance and, therefore, the 
framework for the best model for a country. Also, this chapter presents and discusses 
whether globalisation means one-size fits all countries on corporate governance or whether 
the diversity with more harmonisation of these factors will improve the practice. These 
factors are: social/cultural influences, legal/political influences, economic influences and 
the effect of globalisation on the practice of corporate governance.  
4.2 Social/Cultural Influences 
The influence of environmental factors has become crucial in the practice of corporate 
governance, especially in transition and developing economies (see, for example, McCarthy 
and Puffer, 2003).  
Kluckhohn (1951) defined culture as consisting of “patterned ways of thinking, feeling and 
reacting, acquired and transmitted mainly by symbols, constituting the distinctive 
achievements of human groups, including their embodiments in artefacts; the essential core 
of culture consists of traditional (i.e. historically derived and selected) ideas and especially 
their attached values”.( cited in Hofstede, 2001: p 9). 
Hofstede (1980, p. 25) defines ‘culture’ as the collective programming of the mind, which 
distinguishes the members of one group or category of people, who share the same social 
and cultural environment, from another. Archambault and Archambault (2003) argued that 
culture influences how people perceive situations and organise institutions. 
Although there are two main systems of corporate governance structure, namely the outside 
and the inside system, in practice, there is no full symmetry in corporate governance 
systems in different countries. For example, Rabelo and Vasconcelos (2002) observe that 
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companies pass through significant transformations due to the combined forces of socio-
political changes, technological progress and economic trends toward globalisation. These 
elements, along with the structural characteristics of developing economies such as less 
developed capital markets and governmental interventionism, make the practice of 
corporate governance fundamentally different from the practices found in developed 
economies. 
Culture also has a social function by allowing an organisation to survive and adapt to the 
external environment since the corporation is an artificial entity which faces interactions 
between different groups. The values that guide the behaviour of stakeholders will impact 
on their actions in the company's activity. Haniffa and Cooke (2002), for example, found 
that the culture factor is significantly associated with the extent of voluntary disclosure in 
Malaysia. McCarthy and Puffer (2003) argued that Russians would be reluctant to accept 
corporate governance systems inconsistent with their cultural traditions since they would be 
seen as unfamiliar and uncertain. Also, Qu and Leung (2006) found that the transparency of 
corporate disclosure could hardly be achieved in the traditional Chinese cultural 
environment.  
 
Hofstede (2001) indicated that corporate governance is related to corporate financial goals, 
and these goals are not culture-free. He also provides a framework depending on four 
dimensions of societal values: large versus small power distance, individualism versus 
collectivism, strong avoidance versus weak uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity versus 
femininity. 
1- Power distance represents the extent to which people tolerate unequal 
distribution of power within society. 
2- Individualism refers to the extent to which people are independent as 
opposed to collectivism, in which people are organized into strong groups. 
3- Uncertainty avoidance represents the extent to which the people feel 
threatened by unknown situations. 
4- Masculine societies stress achievement, heroism, assertiveness, and material 
success, whereas feminine societies stress relationships, modesty, caring for 
the weak and quality of the life (Archambault and Archambault, 2003) 
 Culture has been employed to guide the formation of several accounting and reporting 
theories, which significantly enrich the explanations about the different accounting 
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practices and reporting systems among different countries (Qu and Leung, 2006). Gray 
(1988), for example, suggests that a link between societal values and accounting systems 
can be established and the influence of culture can be assessed. He provided four sub-
cultural accounting values namely: professionalism versus statutory control, uniformity 
versus flexibility, conservatism versus optimism and secrecy versus transparency. On these 
values, there is a reverse relationship between secrecy and public disclosure that when 
secrecy increases, the amount of public disclosure decreases. Also, secrecy increases with 
uncertainty avoidance and power distance and decrease with individualism and masculinity 
(Archambault and Archambault, 2003).     
A country’s history plays a significant role in its culture, values, and traditions: in Russia, 
for example, the pervasive power of the state over companies is likely to remain (McCarthy 
and Puffer, 2003). Haniffa and Cooke (2002) explained that the Malays have high 
uncertainty avoidance which may be attributed to their strong religion, which is reflected in 
their values of non-assertiveness, conflict avoidance and uneasiness in dealing with 
ambiguities and uncertainties. Also, they found that the Chinese are rated low on 
uncertainty avoidance, as evidenced by their greater acceptance of new challenges and 
willingness to take greater risk in terms of individualism. The Malays are rated lower on 
individualism, which is partly attributed to their religion (Islam) which encourages 
collectivism because under Islam, the preferred   social order is closer to collectivism and 
rights to private ownership are ultimately subordinate to Allah. In contrast, the Chinese are 
considered to be more individualistic at the national level which may partly be attributed to 
the presence of a communal ideology and the ethnic polarisation in the socioeconomic 
structures. Religious beliefs greatly influence the cultural fabric. For instance, Islamic 
tradition places ethical/ social activity ahead of individual profit maximisation, and 
speculative investment such as margins trading is not allowed since Islam prohibits 
transactions involving uncertainties, and, therefore, the majority of Muslims are reluctant to 
engage with these business activities.17  
However, the spread of education, especially business schools, and, the growth of 
globalisation will advance the precepts of good corporate governance practice, and at the 
                                                 
17 No Islamic organisations deal to these activities but adhere with the Islamic regulations by establishing the 
Sharia Committee. Therefore, such organisations have been increased in Islamic world and in Muslim 
communities in western countries.    
 67 
 
same time, cultural values, traditions, and ethics will continue to evolve in each country, 
with more convergence with similar standards.18   
Bonn and Fisher (2005) argued that an organisation’s approach to ethics must be addressed 
in its corporate governance framework. However, this is just the first step if the 
organisation is interested in more than simple compliance with corporate governance 
principles. Solomon and Solomon (2004) argued that companies should improve corporate 
governance and discharge accountability to all of their stakeholders, purely because it is 
ethical. Therefore, regardless of the predominant culture, ethical values can help companies 
develop long-term relationships with shareholders and other stakeholders. Furthermore, 
collaborations between global companies and host countries hold the promise of 
considerable development in the fight against corruption (Potts and Matuszewski, 2004). 
McCarthy and Puffer (2003) argued that establishing a system of corporate governance 
practice must be based on a foundation of ethical beliefs and behaviours, and any 
uncertainty about some ethical behaviour could lead to confusing and potentially 
unacceptable actions related to corporate governance.   
Corporate social responsibility is derived from ethical attitudes (Solomon and Solomon, 
2004). Potts and Matuszewski (2004), for example, argued that since the revenues of some 
companies began to exceed the GDP of many countries, companies will have functions 
traditionally handled by government such as setting standards of being responsible for the 
social well-being of stakeholders, in the areas of training and education, and assuming a 
degree of environmental stewardship. The OECD (2004) recognises that its Principles can 
be adapted to the specific circumstances of individual countries and regions according to 
the differences in culture, legal and economic circumstances.  
In summary, in spite of a recent tendency toward convergence in corporate governance 
systems, each country's corporate governance system reflects its unique social/cultural 
                                                 
18 Although there is no doubt that the business schools improved the accounting and management sciences in 
the world, business schools have been criticised in developed economies, especially in the UK and the US.  
For instance, Podolny (2009) argued that relying on quantitative methods and mathematical models instead of 
qualitative techniques and inductive approaches has created greater rigor in business schools, but the study of 
management challenges became fragmented. This has led to two unintended consequences. First, business 
schools have largely ignored the teaching of values and ethics because those are not subjects of inquiry for 
traditional business school academic disciplines. Second, those leadership and ethics courses that are taught 
are soft, in the sense of analysis.  Ghoshal (2005) also criticised the business schools education in terms of the 
principles of theories and ideas. He suggested that business schools do not need to create new courses, but 
they need to stop teaching some old ones.  
 .  
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profile (McCarthy and Puffer, 2003). Therefore, the challenge is how every country, 
especially developing ones, can find a balance between developing its economy by 
attracting foreign investment and at the same time maintaining its identity. 
4.3 Legal / Political Influences 
Another important factor in the development of good corporate governance are the legal 
and political systems. The legal and political trends, especially in the long term, reflect the 
values of the underlying business culture (McCarthy and Puffer, 2003; Saidi, 2004). In this 
way, the OECD Principles (2004 para I.) stated that: 
“The corporate governance should promote transparent and efficient markets, be 
consistent with the rule of law and clearly articulate the division of responsibilities 
among different supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities”. 
 
In the last two decades, many economies have retreated from the centrally planned model 
to an open-market system. This transformation imposed in these economies a need to enact 
laws, regulations and policies to pave the way for transition. In Russia, for example, since 
the 1980s, many laws were enacted to establish and improve the transition stage. In the 
later 1990s, a new Joint Stock Company Law aimed at strengthening shareholder rights was 
established, and the Law on the Securities Market strengthened corporate governance by 
offering some protection to minority shareholders. In 2000, tax reform laws set a lower flat 
tax rate for companies and individuals, encouraging a more honest approach to reporting 
corporate profits and personal income (McCarthy and Puffer, 2003).  
Egypt, in recent years, also has shown increased interest in upgrading legal structures and 
corporate governance practices to world standards. The Egyptian government is reviewing 
commercial law to develop a Unified Corporate Law, an Audit and Accounting Law and an 
Anti-trust Law (Nganga et al, 2003). In Libya, despite Commercial Law being established 
in 1953, trade was prohibited by government from 1977 to 1988. In the later 1990s, many 
laws, regulations and policies were enacted to adapt to the world economy.19  
Saidi (2004) distinguished between two models, the US model (Sarbanes-Oxley Act), based 
on the enforcement of rules, and the UK model (Cadbury Report) a less costly approach, 
which is based on compliance with principles. Further, he suggested that because the US 
                                                 
19 The most important laws and regulations enacted were: the foreign investment No 5/ 1997, the business 
activities laws 1988 and free zone law in 1999.    
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model needs a good set of regulators, and it is very costly to apply, especially for small 
companies, emerging market countries should follow the UK corporate governance model. 
However, a system of governance that is based on law may not be effective in developing 
economies, where social connections and political intervention have a high influence on the 
governance practice. Berglöf and Claessens (2006) argue that whether there is a regulation, 
law or voluntary code, enforcement is the key to creating an effective business environment 
and a good corporate governance system, especially in developing countries and transition 
economies.  
In the African continent, some countries like Kenya, Nigeria, Morocco, Ghana, Zimbabwe, 
Egypt, Mauritius, Botswana and Tunisia are reviewing or have recently amended their 
commercial laws to improve shareholder protection and accommodate corporate 
governance issues. However, in practice, the legal systems remain slow and inefficient and 
most investors are hesitant to use the courts due to the length of time it takes to obtain a 
satisfactory resolution (Nganga et al, 2003). 
A corporate governance system cannot be effective without political support, institutional 
reforms and an independent judiciary. For instance, Saidi (2004) argued that no effort to 
improve transparency and accountability in the MENA region will succeed until they are 
supported by better policies and stronger institutions.  
Foreign investors need to be assured that the system of corporate governance put in place is 
effective, in order to win their confidence to invest. For instance, the former US President, 
Bill Clinton, recognising the enormous investment potential in Nigeria, called on the 
government to put its house in order so as to attract prospective investors (Okike, 2007).  
In August 2006, the leader of the Libyan revolution, Muammer al-Gaddafi in a move to 
increase transparency requested Ministries and Chief Executive Officers to disclose the 
properties owned by themselves, their wives or their children (Libyan channel on 
1/9/2006].20  
Political and economic constraints, resulting from the intermingling of business and 
politics, often prevent improvements in the enforcement environment and the adoption and 
implementation of public laws (Berglöf and Claessens, 2006). A good example of the 
interplay between corporate governance and political factors is the trade sanctions 
                                                 
20 This calling might be because of the spread of corruption in the country, especially in public sectors and the 
state-owned companies. Also, it is confirmed by the global corruption report in 2007 where Libya ranked 131 
out of 179 
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prohibiting studying at US Universities which were imposed by the US government against 
Libya in 1981.21  
A further aspect of the impact of policies on corporate governance is by affecting the 
attractiveness to foreign investors. In most developing countries, like Libya, the economy 
still depends upon natural resources like oil and gas. Therefore, the country encourages 
foreign investment in these sectors more than others. This situation has seen significant 
strides in towards increasing foreign investment in raw materials. The above examples 
would support the Shleifer and Vishny’s (1997) arguments that:  
"Corporate governance mechanisms are economic and legal institutions that can be 
altered through political process. Therefore, corporate governance should be driven by 
cooperation between the private and public sectors and by broad-based political 
support’’. 
4.4 Economic Influences 
The economic framework is another important factor in corporate governance practice. The 
World Bank has demonstrated that good governance serves as one of the most important 
basic engines for economic growth, development and prosperity (Saidi, 2004). 
Consequently, in developing countries, good corporate governance becomes a part of the 
economic reform efforts. Also, good corporate governance practice is recognised as 
essential for the creation of a better and more attractive investment climate, and has become 
one driver of economic growth in these countries (RCGWG, 2003). In a similar light, the 
OECD principles (2004) stated:  
“Corporate governance is only part of the larger economic context in which firms 
operate that includes, for example, macroeconomic policies and the degree of 
competition in product and factor markets”. 
 
Most developed countries have benefited from globalisation and cooperation through 
international bodies such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) and World Bank, and achieved more convergence between corporate governance 
systems to attract international investment. However, in many developing economies, the 
transition to a market economy is still in the early stage, and governments retain a large 
ownership position in many sectors of the economy. For example, RCGWG (2003) found, 
in the Middle East and North Africa region, that despite most countries having privatised 
                                                 
21 After Lifting the sanction by the US government, the US companies returned to invest in Libya and also 
students got the chance of studying there.  
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state-owned companies, many of these companies still tend to have considerable state 
ownership and control. Reed (2002) argued that the poor economic performance and the 
resultant high international debt levels in developing countries have required the 
intervention of the World Bank which has frequently advocated increased focus on 
governance issues as a part of general reforms in these economies.  
The accounting and auditing profession is another factor affecting corporate governance 
through its role in preparing and testifying the companies’ annual reports. The OECD 
Principles (2004) stated that:  
“Information should be prepared and disclosed in accordance with high quality 
standards of accounting and financial and non-financial disclosure”. (Section V B) 
 
Accounting information is the cornerstone of monitoring a company's management and 
enables shareholders and other stakeholders to evaluate the performance of top 
management. With the importance of information in annual financial reports, the legal 
system in most countries has required an examination of companies' annual reports by 
external auditors to provide independent judgment on the reality of reports. Thereby, the 
external audit represents one of the most important corporate governance mechanisms used 
to monitor a company management's activities (Solomon and Solomon, 2004).  
External auditors are appointed by the general meeting of shareholders by the Supervisory 
Board in the two tier system or in others by the board itself. Having a company’s reports 
approved by qualified auditors is a point of legitimacy, and a highly positive evaluation of a 
company’s corporate governance. Although it is entirely management’s responsibility to 
prepare annual accounts, an external audit can significantly influence the amount of 
information disclosed in their normal course of duty (Barako et al, 2006).  
 The relationship between audit committees and external auditors is complex. The audit 
committee’s involvement in strengthening internal controls might lead the external auditor 
to reduce the assessed level of control risk, resulting in less substantive testing (Collier and 
Gregory, 1996). However, external auditors do not exert a significant influence on the level 
of voluntary disclosure by companies (see, for example, Barako et al, 2006). 
4.5 Globalisation and Corporate Governance Practice  
Corporate governance systems differ dramatically along a number of important dimensions 
such as the ownership structure, board composition, board size, and the legal, cultural and 
political factors. The 1990s saw a boom in institutional investor activity with large 
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institutional investors holding foreign equities in different countries.22 These demands, 
operated on a global basis, advocate good governance practices characterised by similar 
mechanisms of corporate governance such as independent boards, separation of the 
chairmanship and CEO roles and the presence of independent audit and remuneration 
committees and increasing disclosure norms (Markarian et al, 2007).  
Hence, international harmonisation of corporate governance has become more common 
through the growing integration of financial and product markets (Nestor and Thompson, 
2000). This convergence has been supported by rising international trade and international 
harmonisation in financial markets (Solomon and Solomon, 2004) as well as by the 
increasing competition between companies around the world (Gugler et al, 2004). 
Garrett (2004) highlights several drivers of convergence, mainly the market for corporate 
control, listing standards of exchanges, effects of international organisations (such as the 
OECD, IMF), and the effects of various political and regulatory factors. 
Nestor and Thompson (2000) argue in a similar current of thought, stating that the causes of 
convergence in governance practices include the globalisation of markets, where 
institutional investors insist on international norms of governance, especially in regard to 
transparency and the rights of minority shareholders.  
Globalisation entails a lifting of barriers to the mobility of capital, products, and labour, 
leading to an intensification of competition for these factors across borders by companies 
and countries (Khanna et al, 2002). On this point, Reed (2002) defined globalisation “as a 
process of structural change, which can be understood in terms of a series of interrelated 
changes involving three basic structures, methods of production, forms of state and the 
international economy”. Therefore, globalisation leads to increasing flows of finance, trade 
and human capital.     
With regard to governance-related disclosure practices, Markarian et al (2007) indicate that 
disclosure practices have been both evolving and converging, for Anglo-Saxon and non- 
Anglo-Saxon companies, towards more disclosure regarding governance matters. Increased 
disclosures are associated with market liquidity, reduced cost of capital, and greater overall 
transparency, and such increased disclosure in both governance regimes seems to be a step 
in the right direction.                            
                                                 
22  For example, institutional ownership of US  public companies shares  increased from 6 per cent in 1950 to 
47 per cent by the end of 1996 (Markarian et al, 2007) 
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Glison (2001) argued that an aspect of the convergence debate recognised the distinction 
between the following types functional and formal convergence:  
Functional convergence is likely to be the first response to competitive pressure. In this 
convergence, there are no predicted differences among the systems of monitoring 
management. For instance, the tenure of senior management in all systems is equally 
sensitive to poor performance, whether measured by stock market returns in Anglo-Saxon 
companies or accounting earnings in others.  
Formal convergence is a second form for which legislative action is required to alter the 
basic structure of existing governance institutions; however, there is no formal convergence 
because each system's governance institutions have sufficient flexibility to find a solution 
within their path dependent limits. Also, Glison argues that formal convergence of 
continental corporate governance to the U.S. model can be expected to be very difficult, 
especially when it comes to matters of corporate control. 
There is much debate between scholars on whether globalisation should pressurise 
companies to adopt a common set of the most effective corporate governance practices, 
while others maintain that such convergence will not occur because of a variety of forms of 
path-dependence. Moreover, advocates of the merits of globalisation argue that the freeing 
up of capital flows will lead to the more efficient allocation of capital by improving 
investors' access to investment opportunities and companies' access to financing. 
Consequently, we need globalised corporate governance approaches (O'Sullivan, 2000).  
Globalisation might have encouraged the adoption of some common corporate governance 
standards, but there is a little evidence that these standards have been implemented (Khanna 
et al, 2002). 
The convergence of corporate governance does not mean victory of one system over another. 
It should be seen as giving more choices to companies. The patterns of ownership and control 
should ultimately correspond more to the needs and characteristics of a particular company 
than to the prevalent system of corporate governance in the county. Companies should have 
the possibility to move from one regime to another as they grow and their needs and 
constituencies change (Nestor and Thompson, 2000).  
Convergence in corporate governance seems to be in standards more than on forms and 
mechanisms. So, the convergence should take advantage of each system. For instance, 
convergence of corporate governance should favour the Anglo-Saxon model in terms of the 
external mechanisms and favour the German model in terms of internal mechanisms. 
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4.6 Corporate Governance in Developing Countries  
Despite the underdeveloped and informal nature of the third world economy, the issues of 
corporate governance have been given attention by countries and international institutions 
such as the World Bank. Developing economies have become a fertile region to research 
regarding corporate governance, although these studies are still limited. In developing 
countries, also many conferences and workshops have been held alongside the World Bank 
and other international organisations to improve corporate governance practice. For 
instance, with an aim of providing Arab perspectives on OECD principles of corporate 
governance, the Global Corporate Governance Forum, the centre of International Private 
Enterprises, and local partners in Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan, organised a series 
of corporate governance meetings to evaluate the state of corporate governance practices in 
these countries and develop a set of recommendations to present to the OECD. The first 
meeting was held in Cairo in September 2003, and advanced a series of recommendations 
to the OECD on the principles. The second meeting was held in Beirut on June, 2004 and 
aimed to address practical implementations of corporate governance in the Arab World 
with a focus on improving transparency and disclosure (Saidi, 2004). 
In 2003, the Regional Corporate Governance Working Group in collaboration with the 
Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Trade studied the Corporate Governance in Morocco, Egypt, 
Lebanon, and Jordan countries of the MENA Region, and they concluded that:  
 Corporate governance has been promoted at different levels in the countries of the 
MENA region. However, the issue has been approached differently and with 
distinct depth depending on the sophistication of the country’s financial sector. 
 Corporate governance principles should be a vehicle for markets to grow rather than 
an impediment.  
Hussain and Mallin (2002) investigated the existing state of corporate governance in a 
country in the Middle East: Bahrain. They found that Bahraini companies have in place 
several of the features of international corporate governance best practice. They found that 
boards are dominated by non-executive directors, and there is separation of the roles of Chair 
and CEO. However, they argued that it is not clear how effective the nomination 
appointments process is and directors tend to be fairly entrenched. In 2003, they also 
examined the dynamics of corporate governance by analysing the board structures of 
companies in the country. They found non-executive directors dominated the board 
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composition, and key factors influencing the appointment of these directors were relevant 
skills and business experience and reputation. However, none of the companies had a 
nominations committee and, therefore, non-executive directors were generally nominated by 
the board as a whole, by major shareholders, or Chairmen/CEOs. 
In addition, non-executive directors appeared relatively independent as, in the majority of 
cases, the non-executive directors were not former executive board members or major 
shareholders. They concluded that:  
“Whilst Bahrain does not have a corporate governance code per se, the company law 
reforms contain some interesting provisions that will contribute to the corporate 
governance in Bahrain. Amongst these provisions is one that excludes directors from 
being on more than three boards. There are therefore some encouraging features and 
developments in corporate governance in Bahrain" (2003: p.249). 
 
Bremer and Elias (2007) investigated the challenges facing the progress of corporate 
governance in Egypt by using historical, empirical and interview data with a review of the 
development of stock markets and accounting and financial reporting standards. They 
analysed the structures of capital markets, the privatisation policy, board structure, the culture 
and the legal environment of corporate governance.  
They found that even though the challenges to improve corporate governance in Egypt 
appear daunting, recent developments indicate that momentum may be building for change. 
The Egyptian Institute of Directors have organised conferences and training programmes 
with the support of World Bank and the International Finance Corporation. They identified 
greater understanding of corporate governance by the accounting profession to improve the 
transparency and disclosure practice, and that the capital market authority had exerted some 
energy in getting compliance up to standards. However, they also found challenges to 
corporate governance in Egypt which derive primarily from the deficiencies of the 
macroeconomic and political environment, as evidenced by the index of economic freedom 
in 2007 that ranks Egypt 127th out of 157 countries.    
El Mehdi (2007) examined the relationships between corporate governance and corporate 
performance in Tunisia. He found a strong relationship between good governance and 
performance. He concluded that companies ought to look for ways to get rid of weak 
corporate governance in order to enhance performance levels. He concludes that corporate 
governance practice is weak in Tunisia because of the ownership concentration, the weak 
quality of regulation and the limited role of the legal texts. 
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Saidi (2004) explored the role of corporate governance in the MENA region in improving the 
transparency and disclosure practices and he found that:  
 The values of corporate governance- transparency, accountability and 
responsibility- offer the key for the modernisation of the countries of the region. 
 The private sector business community can play a leading role in economic, 
political and social reforms. 
 National institutions, laws, regulations and practice based on international norms 
and standards would enable the countries of the region to modernise their corporate 
sector, as well as to attract technology and foreign investment and become 
internationally competitive. 
 The process of designing and implementing the basics of corporate governance- 
transparency and regular reporting, independent auditing, removal of conflicts of 
interest, improved ethics, protection of minority shareholders' rights - provides a 
foundation for meaningful reform in the economic sector and elsewhere in society. 
 
Najib (2007) considered the current state of corporate governance in Arab Countries. His 
results showed that Arab Countries, especially Morocco, Jordan and Egypt, have legal and 
regulatory frameworks are largely compliant with the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance. However, practices are not. Another key finding was that corporate 
governance issues have not been ignored in public debates in the MENA region. 
Chahine and Safieddine (2008) studied the corporate governance and the external 
monitoring of banks in Lebanon. They found that, although the main role of banks is 
financing, Lebanese banks are both active monitors of and resource providers to their 
corporate clients. Their findings indicated that developing-country banks have a 
substitution role that allows them to act as channels for implementing good corporate 
governance practices. The greater involvement of banks with their larger corporate clients 
may ensure better oversight of the risks encountered by banks in their clients' operating 
activities. 
From the above discussion it may be concluded that many Arab countries (e. g. Egypt, 
Morocco, Bahrain, Tunisia and Lebanon) have been paying increasing attention to the 
corporate governance system and trying to install principles of good corporate governance. 
This is clear from reviewing the corporate governance literature in these countries. Some 
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studies have concentrated on the corporate governance model used in each country, others 
focused on issues of current practice. From these studies it can be concluded that Arab 
countries are concerned such as other developing countries about the corporate governance 
to develop their economy and improve the management practice. The studies investigated 
the weakness of the corporate governance mechanisms and the low enforcement of the 
legal system as the main reasons prohibiting the good practice of good governance. Also, 
the studies revealed that the development of financial and economic and the cultural norms 
affect the practice in the Arabic world.  
A significant amount of research, theoretical and empirical, has explored the phenomenon 
of corporate governance in the developing economies. Table 4.1 summarises some of these 
studies including the main findings. 
Table 4.1 Summary of Previous Studies in some Developing Countries:  
Author(s) Year 
of 
study 
Location Title of study Findings 
Yakasai 2001 
 
Nigeria Corporate 
Governance in a 
third world country 
with particular 
reference to 
Nigeria 
Providing the recipes that would 
ensure good corporate governance in 
the private sector, particularly in 
Nigerian banks. 
Haniffa,  
and 
Cooke 
2002 
 
Malaysia  
 
Culture, corporate 
governance and 
disclosure in 
Malaysian 
corporations 
1- There is a significant association 
(at the 5 per cent level) between two 
corporate governance variables (viz. 
chair who is a non-executive director 
and domination of family members 
on boards) and the extent of 
voluntary disclosure. 
2- The culture factor (proportion of 
Malay directors on the board) is 
significantly associated (at the 5 per 
cent level) with the extent of 
voluntary disclosure suggesting that 
governmental focus on culture may 
solicit a response to secrecy from 
those who feel threatened. 
Ahunwan 2002 Nigeria  Corporate 
Governance in 
Nigeria  
The success of corporate governance 
reforms is linked to broader 
governance reforms of the Nigerian 
state. One might argue that the 
international economic order sets the 
context in which states like Nigeria 
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have to compete in the global 
economy 
Solomon 
et al 
2003 Taiwan 
 
Corporate 
Governance in 
Taiwan: empirical 
evidence from 
Taiwanese 
company directors  
1- The Board of Directors constitutes 
the most important instrument in 
Taiwanese corporate governance. 
2- An important role is played by 
outside directors in the corporate 
governance system in Taiwan. 
3- Respondents endorsed the agency 
theory perspective on corporate 
governance as they considered the 
presence of outside directors’ 
improved corporate accountability to 
shareholders. 
4- Few companies had created 
remuneration and audit committees 
5- Directors displayed an awareness 
of accountability issues and a desire 
to improve accountability and 
transparency.   
Allen 
  
2005 
 
Emerging 
Economies 
 
Corporate 
Governance in  
Emerging 
Economies 
 
1-Pursuing the interest of all 
stakeholders may help overcome 
market failures. 
2- The mechanisms such as 
competition, trust and reputation 
may be preferable to legal measures 
to ensure good corporate governance 
Lin  
 
2005 Taiwan Corporate 
Governance, 
Leadership 
Structure and CEO 
Compensation: 
evidence from 
Taiwan  
  
.1- The paper supports the viewpoint 
of stewardship theory whereby the 
CEO acts as a steward of his/her 
company when he/she also holds the 
position of chairman of the 
company. 
2- The findings show that CEO 
compensation will be high when the 
board’s control is relatively 
ineffective.  
3- The shareholdings of the Board of 
Directors can reinforce the degree of 
control from the board. 
Ahmed 
and Yusuf 
 
2005 Bangladesh Corporate 
Governance: 
Bangladesh 
perspective 
This study provided a conceptual 
framework of corporate governance 
along with an analysis of corporate 
governance in Bangladesh.  
The study also found various factors 
including poor legal enforcement, 
discretionary powers of the corporate 
top management, overriding 
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regularity provisions, the lack of 
standard practice in financial 
reporting and auditing and the 
absence of strong pressure groups 
have caused the weakness of 
corporate governance in Bangladesh. 
Vaughn 
and Ryan 
2006 South 
Africa 
Corporate 
Governance in 
South Africa: a 
bellwether for the 
continent 
1- Corporate governance reform 
should be viewed as a dynamic, 
evolving process. 
2-The implementation of governance 
and legislation is an important start. 
The process should be continually 
assessed, progress measured and 
necessary changes enacted.   
3-South Africa has led the way in 
establishing sound corporate 
governance guidelines that can serve 
as bench-mark for other African 
countries. 
Haniffa 
and 
Hudaib 
2006 Malaysia Corporate 
Governance 
Structure and 
Performance of 
Malaysian 
companies 
1- Board size and top five substantial 
shareholdings are significantly 
associated with both market and 
accounting performance measures. 
2- There is a significant relationship 
between multiple directorships and 
market performance while role 
duality and managerial 
shareholdings are significantly 
associated with accounting 
performance.  
Berglöf 
and 
Claessens 
2006 Developing 
Countries 
Enforcement and 
Good Corporate 
Governance in 
Developing 
Countries and 
Transition 
Economies  
The study explained how we can 
improve corporate governance in 
weak enforcement environments. 
The limited empirical evidence 
suggests that private enforcement 
tools are often more effective than 
public tools. 
Concentrated ownership aligns 
incentives and encourages 
monitoring, but it weakens other 
corporate governance mechanisms 
and can impose significant costs. 
Political economy constraints, 
resulting from the intermingling of 
business and politics, often prevent 
improvements in the enforcement 
environment and the adoption and 
implementation of public laws. 
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Krambia-
Kapardis 
and 
Psaros 
 
2006 Cyprus 
 
The 
Implementation of 
Corporate 
Governance 
Principles in an 
Emerging 
Economy: a 
critique of the 
situation in Cyprus 
 
1- Only a small minority complied 
with all significant aspects of the 
Code, and the vast majority did not 
comply with any. 
2- Typical free market controls (e.g. 
low degree of concentration of 
ownership, reliable and timely 
information flows and opportunities 
for investor diversification) that 
facilitate international institutional 
investment did not exist in Cyprus. 
3- Cyprus was making serious 
endeavours to improve the corporate 
governance of its listed companies  
Okike 2007 Nigeria Corporate 
Governance in 
Nigeria: the status 
quo 
 
There is a case for adherence to 
global corporate governance 
standards: however, any Code of 
Best Practices adopted in Nigeria 
must reflect its peculiar socio-
political and economic environment, 
whilst at the same time providing the 
right assurances to prospective 
investors. 
Tsamenyi 
et al 
2007 Ghana  Disclosure and 
corporate 
governance in 
developing 
countries: evidence 
from Ghana 
 
The level of disclosure in Ghana is 
low. Ownership structure, dispersion 
of shareholding, and firm size 
(measured as total assets and market 
capitalisation) all have significant 
effect on disclosure. However, the 
correlation between disclosure and 
leverage is insignificant. 
 
The corporate governance literature is dominated by empirical studies in the industrialised 
countries of Western Europe, the USA and Australia. Even international comparative 
studies of corporate governance have focused on analyses of the differences and similarities 
of the practices in these countries only (e. g. Keasey and Wright 1993; Mallin, et al, 2005; 
Collett and Hrasky, 2005; Melis, 2000; and Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Attempting to 
generalise the findings of these studies to less developed economies can be dangerous since 
the stage of legal and economic development and social and cultural norms are likely to be 
important factors affecting the corporate governance framework. Differences in country, 
time period and explanatory variables also make generalisations questionable. Though 
some improvements have been made, corporate governance is at its first steps in most 
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developing countries. Few studies are available on corporate governance in the developing 
nations; except for the context of newly industrialised countries such as Malaysia, 
Singapore and South Africa. 
Table 3.1 revealed that the association between the corporate governance framework and 
the economic development, legal system and enforcement and cultural and social norms 
have been reported. Yakasai (2001); Ahunwan, (2002); Allen, (2005); Ahamed and Yusuf, 
(2005); Vaughn and Ryan, (2006); Berglof and Claessens, (2006); Okike, (2007) found a 
link between the corporate governance framework and the state of economic, legal and 
political systems. For instance, Allen (2005) found that the stakeholder model of corporate 
governance is more useful to developing countries, since pursuing their interest might help 
overcome the market failure in these economies.  
Tsamenyi et al (2007) and Haniffa and Cooke (2002) found evidence between the practice 
of corporate governance and level of disclosure. In this point Tsamenyi et al (2007) found 
evidence that corporate size, ownership structure and dispersion of shareholding have a 
significant influence the level of disclosure in Ghana. Concerning the relationship between 
corporate governance and the company directors, many studies carried out in developing 
countries explore the role of board members in practicing good corporate governance. 
Solomon et al (2003) found that the Board of Directors constitutes the most important 
instrument in Taiwanese companies. Also, they found that non-executive directors play an 
important role in corporate governance in Taiwan. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) also found the 
significant association between the chair who is a non-executive director and the voluntary 
disclosure in Malaysia. 
Finally it can be easily noted that developing countries are more aware of the importance of 
developing the corporate governance. This attention confirms that corporate governance 
has become a necessity for all countries, not a luxury for developed countries. Also, these 
studies explored the need for radical developments in developing countries in terms of legal 
system and economic policy to pursue the economic and managerial developments in other 
world. Further, studies revealed that developing countries can benefit from the developed 
countries’ frameworks and international organisations’ guidelines to develop their 
governance practice. 
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4.7 Conclusion   
This chapter has discussed the issues and factors which differ between economies in terms 
of the adopting of corporate governance. 
The discussion explained that there are two main models of corporate governance 
framework. Corporate governance practices differ dramatically across countries reflecting 
their own identity. The ownership structure, legal system, cultural and ethical norms, 
political and social factors are the main issues which influence the practice of corporate 
governance in a country.   
Globalisation and the growth of international companies have influenced the practice and 
encourage countries to modify their existing frameworks to become closer to international 
standards of best practice. However, the discussion revealed that the functional 
convergence of corporate governance is likely to be a first response to globalisation. Also, 
it revealed that there are no predicted differences among the systems of monitoring 
management in the different systems.    
In the same vein, the formal convergence still differs between countries because it requires 
alteration of the basic structure of existing governance institutions, which is very difficult to 
achieve in a short period.  
Significant numbers of studies have examined the subject of corporate governance in the 
context of developed and developing countries. All these countries have placed attention on 
corporate governance to increase their ability to adapt to international corporate governance 
standards and at the same time maintain their specific culture norms. 
In conclusion, these factors have been major influences on the practice of corporate 
governance that countries should take into account before establishing a framework.  
In the MENA region, many studies have concentrated on corporate governance; however, 
there is no evidence that this subject has been examined in Libya. Therefore, the next 
chapter will focus on the practice of corporate governance in the Libyan context and 
concentrate on the main factors that are likely to influence Libyan practice, such as the 
economic and accounting environment in Libya, the historical development of the 
accounting profession, and the principal constraints of the good practices.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The Corporate Governance Framework in Libya 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction  
Each country aspires to achieve the maximum economic prosperity and sustainable 
development. Therefore, governance reforms have become an important mechanism for 
economic growth and investors’ confidence.  
In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), governance reform has risen to the forefront 
of the development debate. In the 1990s, the MENA region experienced growth in the 
private sector which led to the reengineering of the business process by amending the 
complex, arcane legislation, regulations and procedures which had been imposed upon 
citizens (Middle East and North Africa governance News & Notes, 2007). This chapter will 
explore the environment of the Libyan economy and aspects of the current situation in 
Libya, especially the debate on development. The main themes of this chapter are selected 
in the light of the findings of previous chapters in terms of key influences on corporate 
governance practice and reform.  
Good corporate governance practices are country specific and depend heavily on the level 
of development of a country. In the transition from a relatively inward-oriented system of 
economic and political governance to a more open, market-oriented one, Libya is 
undergoing a process that most developing countries have already been through. In 
reforming its economy, Libya is seeking to attract international investment. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an introduction to the corporate governance in 
Libya. The chapter begins by examining broadly the theme of corporate governance 
including economic policy, legal system, shareholders' rights, the practice of disclosure and 
the role of the Libyan Stock Market in the development of the practice. In addition, details 
on the main limitation of the reforms of the corporate governance framework, including the 
ownership structure and the low enforcement of legal system, will be provided in this 
chapter. 
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5.2 Libyan Economic Policy 
Libya is a developing country located in North Africa with an area exceeding 1.75 million 
square kilometres and a population of 5.3 million in 2006 (www. gpco.gov.ly). The Libyan 
social environment is characterised by the extended family, clan, tribe, village and Islamic 
religion and about 97% of Libyans are Sunni Muslims. The economy of Libya is unique in 
many aspects, accompanied by the peculiar characteristics of its political regime (Ahmad 
and Gao, 2005).   
The development of the modern Libyan economy started with the independence of the 
country in 1952. Libyan economic development was extremely bleak until 1959 when it 
first discovered oil, and economic prospects changed dramatically (Bait El-mal et al, 1973).  
 During the period from independence to the Al-Fateh Revolution (1952-1969), the Libyan 
economic system was mostly capitalist. Private ownership existed with minimum 
governmental intervention. Public ownership was in activities that needed large scale 
investment. The government commenced a number of steps to promote and encourage 
competition and the establishment of private businesses. These included the enactment of 
import and export laws demanding that the importation of competitive overseas goods be 
subject to licence. Important steps included the establishment of the Industrial and Real 
Estate Bank of Libya to provide loans to Libyan entrepreneurs to build local industries, and 
the establishment of the Industrial Research Centre to help put into practice the country’s 
development plans by offering technical and economic services in both the public and 
private sectors (Bait El-Mal et al, 1973).    
On 1st of September 1969, Libya faced a big alteration to all aspects of life, when the 
monarchy was overthrown by the Al-Fateh Revolution. 
In 1972, a new political, administrative and legislative system was introduced as part of the 
People’s Revolution, which established a socialist state, to be governed only by the people. 
Col. Muammer al-Qaddafi created a system of government that rejects political parties and 
purports to establish a "third way", superior to both capitalism and communism. The 
country's governing ethos derives predominantly from Qaddafi's "Green Book," which calls 
for an almost total dismantling of traditional state organs (The U.S. Commercial Service, 
2004). After the Declaration of the People’s Authority in 1977, Libya became a ‘State of the 
Mass’ or a Jamahiriya, and only the people controlled the leadership, authority, wealth, and 
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arms so as to realize a “society of freedom” (Ahmad and Geo, 2005; The US Commercial 
Service, 2004).  
The declaration of the Principles of Authority of the People on March 2nd 1977 founded the 
completely new system of distribution of authority by adopting the following four points: 
1. The official name of Libya will be ‘‘The Socialist People’s Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya.’’  
2. The Holy Qur’an is the constitution of society in the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya  
3. The People’s direct democracy is the basis of the political system in the Socialist 
People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, where the authority is in the hands of the People 
alone. The people exercise their power through the People’s Congresses, People’s 
Committees, Syndicates, Unions, Professional Associations and the General 
People’s Congress. 
4. Defence of the homeland is the responsibility of every citizen, male and female, and 
by general military training, the people shall be trained and armed. The method of 
preparing the military institutions and general military training will be regulated by 
law. 
 
Laws are discussed through the People's Congresses and then issued by the General 
People's Congress.  
The economic environment changed as a result of several actions taken under the new 
political system, which emerged with the Al-Fateh Revolution. These events started with 
nationalising foreign companies that were operating in Libya, restructuring the economy 
with regard to new political, administrative and legislative principles through establishing 
public-owned companies and eliminating private and foreign companies. 
In the 1980s, the State owned and controlled most of the business activities. Businesses 
such as manufacturing activities, foreign and domestic retail trade, and banking and 
insurance services were all owned by the State and under its supremacy (Kilani, 1988).  
As result of its misgovernance, the inefficient state-owned sector continued to hinder 
Libyan’s economic growth and development. This situation forced Libya to relax controls 
on the non-state sector. Consequently, in early 1987, Libya’s economic system began 
gradually changing from a planned economy to a market economy with socialist features. 
Companies have undergone significant changes that focus on economic and management 
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reform. Subsequent laws allowed for the “practice of economic activity” and the creation of 
private banks (The US Commercial Service, 2004). 
During 1988, the economic liberalisation was encouraged by issuing the law No 8 /1988 
which allows private business in the retail trade, and small-scale industries. In 1992, the 
General People's Congress passed a Privatisation Law No 2/ 1992, permitting the sale of 
state property to non-governmental Libyan interests (The US Commercial Service, 2004). 
This provided more liberalisation of economic activities to help the country reduce the 
pressure on the government general budget which was suffering from the global oil price 
decline. Many sources point to the enactment of Law No 5/1997, the encouragement of 
Foreign Investment law, as a watershed event, setting out the terms under which foreigners 
could invest in Libya (The US Commercial Service, 2004). The Act encourages foreign 
investments in areas that would result in transferring modern technology, diversity of 
income resources, and contributing to the development of GDP so as to help Libya’s entry 
into the international markets. 
In 2004, General Secretary (Prime Minister) Dr Ghanem announced his intention to launch 
a massive privatisation effort, encompassing over 380 companies. In order to achieve the 
new strategic objectives Libya created by a new Act in 1999 so-called free zones (The US 
Commercial Service, 2004). Consequently, in the transition from a directed economy to a 
free market, Libya is undergoing a process that many developing countries have already 
been through. For instance, it attempted to attract international investment alongside 
development of the capital market and privatisation by converting state-owned companies 
into shareholding corporations.  
 
5.3 The Legal System in Libya and the Role of the Board of Directors  
 
According to the OCED Principles (2004), the foundation for any corporate governance is 
provided by the basic legal framework. Moreover, it recommended that the corporate 
governance should be consistent with the rule of law. La Porta et al (1997) examined the 
relationship in 49 countries between the legal system and the corporate governance system. 
The found that there are three forms of legal systems in relation to corporate governance 
system. The French legal system afforded the lowest level of investor protection, the 
English legal system afforded the highest level, while the German and Scandinavian legal 
systems lay somewhere between these two systems.  
 87 
 
The Libyan legal system is based on a combination of French Civil Law and Islamic legal 
principles. The formal sources of the law, as set down in the first Article of the Civil Code, 
include legislative provisions, Islamic principles, custom, and principles of natural law and 
rules of equity. In addition, judicial decisions and the thoughts and doctrines of eminent 
jurists serve as two informal sources of law that guide judicial decision-making.  
In 1971, this system was abolished and replaced with a single system integrating Islamic 
and secular principles. The major legal codifications include the Civil Code and Civil Code 
of Procedure of 1954, and the Commercial Code of 1953. All of these have undergone 
significant amendments since 1971(United Nations, 2004). 
 
 5.3.1 The Libyan Commercial Code 
The Libyan corporate governance movement started in 1953 with the establishment of the 
Commercial Code. In this law, many aspects of corporate governance were established. The 
law discriminated between different types of companies: the joint-liability companies, 
limited partnership companies, joint-stock companies, limited liability companies, and 
limited partnership by shares, particular partnership companies and co-operative 
companies. In addition, this law explained all the details needed for establishing registering, 
governing, managing, bankrupting and dissolving of all types of companies. Furthermore, 
sanctions have been established for any failure to fulfil any of those requirements. Article 
478 of the Libyan Commercial Law states that joint stock companies' liability is limited 
only to the full payment of their shares, whereas the 1970 amendment to Commercial Law 
in Articles 4 and 17 requires no less than 51 per cent of the capital of joint stock companies 
to be owned by Libyans.  
By statute, a journal and an inventory and balance sheet book must be kept. The journal 
should contain the company’s day-to-day business transactions and a monthly total of its 
expenditures. The inventory and balance sheet book is a combination of a number of books, 
accounts and statements that include the inventory statement, balance sheet and profit and 
loss account. The business organisation’s annual reports should be made available, within 
the company’s headquarters, to its shareholders at least fifteen days before the General 
Assembly meeting within which these reports are to be attested (Article 58). Article 570 
forced joint stock companies to maintain the following records: a register of members, a 
register of bondholders, a minute book of member’s meetings, a minute book of director’s 
meetings, a minute book of statutory auditors’ meetings, a minute book of executive 
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committee’s meetings (if there are such meetings), and a minute book of bondholders’ 
meetings. 
 
5.3.2 The Income Tax Law 
The first Libyan Tax Law was issued in 1968. The 1968 Tax Law was abolished when the 
Libyan Income Tax Law No 64/ 1973 was issued.  
Furthermore, in 2004, the Tax Law No 11/2004 was issued. According to this law, 
companies are required to provide tax statements within a month after ratification of the 
balance sheet or within seven months of the fiscal year end, to the tax authority with their 
balance sheet, trading account, profit and loss account, depreciation statement, and detailed 
statement(s) of the company's expenses that are included in the profit and loss account. In 
the case of making a loss, the law permits companies that have been closed with a loss 
within the year to deduct this loss from their profits before tax for the maximum of five 
years from the year of the loss. The law also determines companies' profit tax rates, as 
detailed in table 5.1. 
Table 5.1: Companies' profit tax rates 
Group Tax rate (%)
The first LD200,000 15
The following LD 300,000 20
The following LD 500,000 25
The following LD 500,000 30
The following LD 500,000 35
More than that 40
 
Source: The Libyan Income Tax Law No 11/ 2004.  
The law imposed on companies to pay 40% if their profits exceed two million Libyan Dinar 
as a tax. This high rate could contribute to malpractice of companies’ assets and tax 
evading. Therefore, the law should seek to make a balance between the tax rate and the 
state of the economy. 
 
5.4 Responsibilities of the Board of Directors  
The Commercial Law imposes upon the members of the Board of Directors to be sui juris; 
however, it does not specify the number of the board members which is left to a general 
Assembly in a company.  
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According to the law, Article 530, the General Assembly in each company is responsible 
for appointing the board members and, in the case of no appointment of the chairman of the 
board by the General Assembly, the board members have the right to authorise one of them 
to act as chairman of the Board. However, the Commercial Law does not explicitly detail 
any necessary qualifications. 
According to the law, the Board of Directors is responsible for managing a company and 
forming its general policy, which should be endorsed by the General Assembly. The 
company's managers should adhere to these policies for any decision they may take. The 
board, which has to be generally comprised from Libyan members as well headed by a 
Libyan, has to meet at least once every two months (Article 8 of the 1970 Commercial 
Law).   
 
 5.4.1 Directors’ Compensation   
The Commercial Law clarifies the methods of the board’s remuneration. The law permits 
members to have a salary, special benefits or attendance allowance for every session which 
is defined by the articles of incorporation. Moreover, it is permissible to combine one or 
more of these benefits. However, according to Article 11 of the 1970 Commercial Law, 
remuneration must not exceed 10% of the company’s net profit after elimination of all 
expenses, depreciations and any reserves that have been approved by the General 
Assembly. Article 12 of the 1970 Commercial Law stated that the board must report to the 
General Assembly by at least one week before the General Assembly meeting the 
following:  
 Full statement of the board’s remuneration during the financial year and any 
salaries or any other compensation that have been given to the board. Similarly, 
the statement should include any remuneration that has been given to board 
members in their work as employees or executives in the company or for any 
services or consultations they provided.  
 Full statement of the board’s remuneration during the financial year in the form 
of cars, houses, etc. 
 Full statement of any remuneration or percentage of net profit that the Board of 
Directors suggests to distribute to its members. 
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 Full statement of any remuneration that has been provided to current or former 
members such as salary or any remuneration.  
 Full statement of any transactions where the members of the board or any 
executives have a conflict of interest between the interest of company and 
interest of the member or members. 
  Donations with a full statement of all donors.  
Although the law in Libya specifies the duties and responsibilities which should be 
undertaken by the boards of directors, there is still ambiguity about the form of the board, 
and the qualifications and experience board members of directors should be required to 
have.23 
In addition, the law does not indicate how executive directors should be appointed, and 
whether or not the board should take into consideration the interests of all the shareholders 
and stakeholders. Furthermore, although the board is enabled to establish sub-committees, 
there is no indication about the special sub-committees except the Watchdog Committee 
(Article 547 of the Commercial Law).     
 
5.4.2 The Watchdog Committee 
This Committee consists of three to five working members and two non-working members 
(Article 547 of the Commercial Law). The Committee members are appointed usually by 
the General Assembly for three renewable years. Article 45 of the 1970 amended 
Commercial Law requires at least one of the Watchdog Committee members to have an 
accounting qualification. 
The main obligation of the Committee is to assure the company’s management’s adherence 
to the law. Furthermore, the Committee is responsible for making sure that the company's 
accounting system is kept in accordance with accounting rules and procedures as specified 
by law, and that its balance sheet and profit and loss account figures agree with the results 
enclosed in the company's records (Article 553 of the Commercial Law). Either all or one 
of its members should make expected and unexpected visits to the company they are 
attached to and check, investigate and audit their records. Article 555 of the Commercial 
Law required that members of the Watchdog Committee must attend the Board and the 
General Assembly meetings. 
                                                 
23Article 12 of the law No 65/1970 
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5.5 The Rights of Shareholders 
In the Commercial Law and bylaws, some shareholders’ rights are protected and they have 
equal opportunities. For example, shareholders have the right to attend the general meetings 
and vote (one share, one vote) to participate in decisions concerning fundamental corporate 
changes and to discuss any raised issues in the assembly schedule.  The law states that each 
share has the right to vote (Article 503). Also, shareholders can review financial statements 
at the company two weeks before the Annual General Meeting. 
According to Article (515), the General Assembly comprises a corporation’s shareholders. 
The tasks of the General Assembly according to Article (516) are:  
 Approve the budget and annual reports.  
 Elect and appoint the board of directors, auditors and the chairman of the Watchdog 
Committee.  
 Determine the remuneration for the board of directors, Watchdog Committee and 
the auditors if this is not indicated in the articles of association (the establishment 
contract).  
 Review and make decisions regarding all matters that concern the company and its 
responsibilities.  
 Any other issues that are raised by the board of directors, and any other issues 
regarding the top management’s duties or auditors’ responsibilities.  
The General Assembly holds two types of meetings: ordinary and extraordinary meetings 
(Article 515). Ordinary meetings should take place at least once a year and within the first 
four months of the business organisation’s fiscal year to discuss the Board of Directors’ 
annual report and the Watchdog Committee’s report, approve the company’s annual reports 
and decide upon dividends (Article 516). However, some decisions and issues have to be 
addressed in an extraordinary meeting of the General Assembly. These include an increase 
in the company’s capital, adjustments to the articles of association (the establishment 
contract) of the company and the appointment of any liquidation committee members 
(Article 517). 
 In addition, the Assembly may appoint a new head or new members to the board and the 
Watchdog Committee and decide their remuneration. 
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To protect the shareholders’ rights, the Board of Directors must immediately call a General 
Assembly if requested by shareholders who hold at least 20% of the company's capital, to 
discuss the issues that they explained in their request for a meeting (Article 519).  
To provide more opportunities to shareholders the law allows shareholders the right to 
represent others on their behalf in the General Meeting (Article 524). Further, a shareholder 
does not have the right to vote in any decisions that has direct or indirect self-interest to 
him or others or which are in conflict with the company’s interest. Furthermore, the board 
cannot participate in voting on Assembly decisions which relate to issues that may concern 
their responsibilities (Article 525). 
5.6 Transparency and Disclosure in the Libyan Economic System 
According to the OECD Principles (2004), the corporate governance should assure that 
timely and accurate disclosure is made of all material matters regarding the corporation, 
including the financial situation, performance, ownership, and the governance of the 
company. Disclosure should include, but not be limited to, material information on: (1) The 
financial and operating results of the company (2) Company objectives (3) Major share 
ownership and voting rights (4) Members of the board and key executives and their 
remuneration (5) Material foreseeable risk factors (6) Material issues regarding employees 
and other stakeholders, and (7) Governance structures and policies. 
In Libya, as mentioned earlier, economic policy relied on the state-owned sector from 1971. 
After 1987, the Libyan government gradually relaxed its role and allowed individuals to 
practise economic activities and permitted the creation of private business, such as banks, 
in 1992 (A Country Commercial Guide for U.S. Companies, 2006). Despite the creation of 
the private sector and following the policy of transfer of state-owned companies to the 
private sector, the government, as are many other governments in developing countries, is 
still as a major owner in many companies (see, for example, Rabelo and Vasconcelos, 
2002; Ahunwan, 2002 Yakasai, 2001; La Porta et al, 1999).  
Haifa and Cooke (2002) argue that, when the legal system which governs information 
disclosure is not enforced, companies are unlikely to disseminate high-quality information. 
Libyan disclosure requirements are low, and the companies are only required by law to 
provide a balance sheet, a profit and loss account together with the external auditor’s report 
and directors’ report (Article 572). Historically, the reason for this is the absence of 
accounting standards in Libya. Moreover, Saleh (2001) stated that British and American 
 93 
 
accounting practices, transferred to Libya through oil companies, have affected the 
country’s accounting practice in oil companies. This, in turn, has also influenced other 
business companies (non-oil companies) as employees move in and out of the oil sector. 
Thus, foreign influence through the oil sector seems to be encouraging more disclosure 
practice. 
Also, this absence of accounting standards has found a new culture of preparing the annual 
reports of most companies depending on a little disclosure information. Commercial 
information, such as selling prices, was disclosed more freely than financial information 
(Mashat, 2005). The nature of the economic system in Libya explains in part companies' 
disclosure practices. Since Libyan companies are either fully or partially state-owned 
companies, maximising their market value was not considered as the companies' main 
objective (Mashat, 2005). After expansion of the private sector, the need for more 
information about the company has increasingly been dominated by shareholders and other 
stakeholders during the General Assembly and through the Libyan Stock Market 
regulation; however, the absence of a basic infrastructure of disclosure processes is still an 
impediment to full disclosure.  
The absence of Libyan Accounting Standards and the weak adoption of the International 
Accounting Standards (IAS) affects full disclosure and results in a deficiency in the content 
of reports and statements. Thus, as a result, significant differences arise in the ways in 
which accounting principles, rules, methods and procedures are applied within different 
companies, even ones in the same industry, which causes enormous problems for 
accounting education (Ahmad and Gao, 2005). For instance, the main reasons for not 
disseminating the social responsibility information in Libyan companies are the lack of 
legal requirements and administrative difficulties (Mashat, 2005).  
An annual audit should be conducted by an independent auditor in order to provide an 
external and objective assurance on the way in which financial statements have been 
prepared and presented. Thereby, in Libya, the law forces companies to attest annual 
financial reports by an independent external auditor to provide confidence to stakeholders 
that the information distributed is fair, honest and reflects the company’s time situation. 
The Libyan Union of Accountants and Auditors was established to regulate and support the 
accounting profession and to increase accountants’ and auditors’ professional and 
educational efficiency. Also, it encourages participants to attend national and international 
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seminars and conferences and to follow up Libya the international developments in the 
accounting and auditing profession. 
Article 24 of Accounting Profession Law stipulates that admittance to membership requires 
the holding of at least a bachelor’s degree (or the equivalent) in accounting or a related 
discipline, and the undertaking of authorised practical experience to practise public 
accounting and auditing services. However, weaknesses in the disclosure practice and 
quality of information might be ascribed to the absence of a comprehensive framework for 
accounting and auditing standards, the weakness of the Libyan Union of Accountants and 
Auditors (LUAA)24, and the inappropriateness of the accounting curricula to the needs of 
the economy. In this way, El-Sharif (1980) revealed that Libyan accounting firms were 
generally engaged in auditing and bookkeeping services and tax and liquidation services, 
and he concluded that the need for professional accounting services in Libya exceeded their 
availability to the business community. 
 
5.6.1 The Role of the Libyan Stock Market in Improving the Disclosure Practices   
It is important for this study, as it investigates the corporate governance system in Libya, to 
examine the role of the Libyan Stock Market. Libya first regulated companies in 1953 by 
establishing its Commercial Law. However, it did not establish a Stock Market until 2001 
under the Act No 21/2001. 
The market has been pushed forward by forcing all Libyan companies having capital of 
more than 1,000,000 LD25 (state-owned or private) to list in the Stock Market.  
With the aim of improving the regulatory framework of the Market, the Market authority 
has issued corporate governance guidelines. The code is to be primarily implemented in 
joint-stock companies which are listed. The code addresses the following issues: the rights 
of shareholders: disclosure and transparency: the responsibilities of the board of directors; 
and the establishment of sub-committees on the Board of Directors such as the auditors 
committee, remuneration committee, nomination committee and watchdog committee.   
                                                 
24 The LUAA was established in 1975, following law No 116/1973 to organise and improve the accounting 
profession and to raise the standards of accountants and auditors professionally and academically as well as 
organising and encouraging the participation of its members in conferences and seminars related to 
accounting internally and externally and to keep in touch with new events, scientific periodicals, and lectures. 
However, it has failed to achieve these objectives since it is restricted to conferment of the permit of exercise 
of the profession. The reason for this failure might be ascribed to the Libyan economic policy which has 
affected the practice and regulation of the professional accounting services. 
 
25 US dollar = 1.30 Libyan dinner  
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In respect of disclosure and transparency, the Code recommended listed companies to have 
a written code to determine their policy and regulation. In addition, the code recommended 
all companies to disclose at the same time as the annual financial reports the following: 
1. What has been applied from the corporate governance Code?  
2. The names of any other companies where any of the Board of Director members is a 
member on its board.  
3. Full disclosure of the name of the chairman and other directors.   
4. Brief description of the responsibility of the sub-committees in the company as well 
as the names of the members, the name of the chairman and the time of meetings 
during the year.  
5.  The manifesto about all remunerations and bonuses to the chairman and other 
members as well as the top management and watchdog committee.  
6. Any commercial disputes, penalty, fines or obstruction suffered by the company. 
7. The annual review of results of evaluation of the procedures' efficiency of internal 
audit. 
Therefore, the Stock Market has advanced disclosure and transparency practices in listed 
companies, and has changed the ownership structure of listed companies which is one of 
the most important steps in the development of the economy. 
 
5.7 Limitations on Corporate Governance Reforms 
Libya, as in many other developing countries, faces many obstacles to reform its corporate 
governance framework. These obstacles can be summarised in the following sections.  
 
5.7.1 The System of Ownership Structure 
The Libyan economy is not highly developed and is still dominated by the government, 
businessmen and family shareholders. For instance, the Libyan government controls, 
directly or indirectly, the majority of assets and enterprises in Libya, through a substantial 
portfolio consisting of industries, financial institutions and real estate state-owned 
enterprises, which constitute the overwhelming majority of economic activities (Porter and 
Yergin, 2005).  
A privatisation programme is being seriously considered, which provides the economic 
changes for moving towards a more open economy. However, although the economic 
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policy allowed private business to compete and replace the state-owned sector, the 
privatisation practice was not able to help the economy because of the vagueness of this 
practice. Also, the sale of small and failing companies has led to the fear and, therefore, 
unwillingness of the public to encourage this policy, and allowed only those who have the 
power and money to buy companies.26  
 The law No 5/1997 was established to encourage foreign investors to improve the 
management performance and behaviour by allowing them to manage companies.27 
Moreover, Libya gives tax exemptions to investors in the first five years of their 
investments, and confirmation of no nationalisation without fair compensation. For the 
purpose of developing corporate governance in Libya, it may be necessary for the Libyan 
government to provide more flexibility to investors to encourage them to provide their 
experience to help the economy.  
Although there have been changes in the ownership structure since opening the door to 
investment and establishing the stock market, there is still vagueness around and limitation 
upon ownership polices. Ownership structures in Libya remain dominated by family, 
institutional and government investors, but this will not present a major problem in 
applying an effective corporate governance practice, because the system has already been 
successfully applied in developing countries with a similar structure of ownership, such as 
Malaysia and Korea, both of which have companies mostly owned by families, and 
Germany and Japan, which have companies owned by large shareholders. 
 
 5.7.2 The Weak Enforcement of the Legal System  
The legal system is an essential element of an effective corporate governance framework, 
because it defines the responsibilities of the parties and enables enforcement. Libya, like 
many developing countries, seeks to develop its economy through harmonisation with the 
global economy. This harmonisation requires the Libyan government to improve the 
economic environment by revising the legal system and improving its enforcement. A 
critical other factor that affects corporate governance practice is the enforcement of the 
legal system. According to Berglöf and Claessens (2004), enforcement is more than 
                                                 
26 Although Libya allowed company employees to buy the company, this policy faces problems of changing 
the management and the failure of attracting professional managers.     
27 In 2006, Libya sold 19% from the capital of Sharah Bank to BNP Paribas Bank, and in 2008 the Arabic 
Bank in Jordan bought 20% from Wahada Bank  and gave the investors the CEO position (for more details 
see www.cbl.gov.ly)  
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regulations, laws-on-the-books or voluntary codes, it is the key to effective corporate 
governance, at least in transition and developing countries. Hence, good corporate 
governance practice is related to fair and effective enforcement of the legal system to 
provide investors’ confidence.  
The enforcement problem exists in many developing economies. For insistence, Oyejibo 
and Soyibo (2001) suggested that, for Nigeria to reap the benefits of effective corporate 
governance there is a need to strengthen the enforcement mechanism of the regulatory 
institutions. In the MENA Region, the enforcement is consistently patchy, and the judiciary 
is not sufficiently developed to respond to the complaints of businessmen (RCGWG 2003).  
Libya is a part of the MENA Region and its business life is dominated by social 
relationships. Its legal enforcement is not perfect. In practice, this weak general 
environment of enforcement influences the efficiency of corporate governance 
mechanisms. Regarding the Libyan context, although the legal enforcement of commercial 
disputes is heard in courts, because of the limiting effects of The Libyan Centre for 
Reconciliation and Arbitration, the time-consuming processes are often more protracted 
than in developed economies. This might cause personal inconvenience to local and foreign 
investors. 
The Libyan social environment is characterised by the extended family, clan, tribe and 
Islamic religion. Therefore, the management process is influenced by personal connections 
and ideological affiliations. For instance, personal relations and family ties play a major 
role in choosing managers, rather than academic qualifications, and managers are more 
concerned about the creation of social relationships in the workplace than the job itself 
(Agnaia, 1997). Also, Libyan leaders have emphasised the importance of appointing 
individuals to key government positions on the basis of merit, rather than intercession or 
mediation (Porter and Yergin, 2005).  
The prevailing procedures for registering a new business take on average 100 days in 
Libya. This time-consuming process can cause personal inconvenience to investors, 
especially foreigners. This requirement could be used to people to start their own business 
and will force the employees to work with the government which has more than 840,000 
workers in public services (Porter and Yergin, 2005).  
Porter and Yergin (2005) found Libya lags behind its MENA peers by a substantial margin 
on all but one of six key governance indicators (see Figure 3). In particular, they found 
Libya ranks lower than the MENA average on control of corruption, regulatory quality, 
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governance effectiveness, rule of law and voice and accountability. Only on political 
stability does Libya rank better than the MENA average. 
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Figure (5.1) Macro, Political, social Environment Libya vs. Selected MENA countries 
Sources Porter and Yergin 2005 
 
Competitiveness in the financial sector is low and banks have failed to improve their 
products and services to clients. A brief look at the state of the sector reveals poor and 
inadequate modernisation and the sector still depends heavily on a paper-based system with 
consequent long delays in providing services, and an absence of ATMs. 
This situation has resulted in most transactions being done in cash, and this makes it more 
difficult to regulate and prevent corrupt practices. However, Libya has established new 
banking laws to reform its banking system which aims to:  
 Emphasise the independence of the Central Bank in line with international best 
practices; 
 Improve the capital adequacy ratio of commercial banks; 
 Strengthen the competitiveness of domestic banks, eventually leading to the 
participation of foreign banks in the domestic banking market; 
 Extend the domain of Central Bank supervision to include all banks;  
 Adoption of Basel II principles on effective banking supervision; and 
 Improve standards of, and requirements for, supervisory disclosure by the banks 
(Porter and Yergin, 2005).  
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There are increasing numbers of local and foreign investors in Libya. After lifting of UN 
sanctions in 2003, Libya received in 2004 more than USD 1.3Bn of FDI, 80% of which 
went to the energy sector and the remaining 20% to other sectors of the economy. The 
strategies and operations of Libyan companies are unsophisticated by international 
standards, across all sectors, public and private, including small and medium-sized 
enterprises. Policy instability and inefficient government bureaucracy currently rank as the 
top challenges to doing business in Libya, negatively impacting both foreign and local 
businesses (Porter and Yergin, 2005).  
In the light of developing corporate governance, the Libyan Stock Market (LSM) and the 
Central Bank of Libya are the main players in developing corporate governance practice by 
establishing principles of good corporate governance. However, the question is whether the 
initiatives are respected and implemented. 
5.8 Conclusion  
This chapter has provided an introduction to and brief background of the political and 
commercial environment of Libya and highlighted the development of accounting within 
this environment. It began by broadly examining the theme of corporate governance in 
Libya, including the governance structure and development of Libyan economy. The main 
factors affecting corporate governance and its effectiveness in Libya were also explored. 
The chapter also discussed the role of the Libyan Stock Market in the development of 
practice. 
Finally, there was discussion of factors that could place constraints on corporate 
governance reform and issues of ownership, and the weak enforcement of legal system was 
considered in detail. The next chapter details the research methodology to achieve the 
research objectives. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Research Methodology and Methods 
 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction  
Chapters two, three, four and five reviewed the relevant literature on corporate governance 
and its application in Libya. This chapter discusses the research design, and justifies the 
chosen methods for the collection of data. The chapter commences with summary of the 
research aims and objectives. The chapter discusses the methodology and methods used to 
collect the data through both quantitative and qualitative methods. 
Therefore, this chapter presents the research problem, research objectives, research 
questions, data collection methods, the questionnaire survey’s population, questionnaire 
design, pilot study, administration of the questionnaire survey, response rate, and interview 
survey method.  
This research has been structured as shown in Figure (4) below which provides an 
overview of the research process.     
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Figure (6.1): flow chart describing the research process  
 
 
 Identify knowledge gaps 
 Develop research problem 
 
Develop research methodology 
Build pre- understanding by reviewing literature of:  
 Identification of corporate governance practice in 
developed and developing economies. 
 Identification of external and internal factors 
affecting the practice of corporate governance. 
 Corporate governance practice in the Libyan 
context. 
 
      Data analysis 
        
       Findings  
The Quantitative Method  
 Study Population and Sample 
 Questionnaire design 
 Pilot study 
 Questionnaire survey 
   
The Qualitative Method 
 Semi-structured 
Interviews 
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6.2 Research Methodology 
Fisher (2007: pp. 33-34) argues that there is a difference between the terms methodology 
and methods. Methodology is the study of methods and it raises all sorts of philosophical 
questions about what it is possible for researchers to know and how valid their claims to 
knowledge might be. Methods are concerned with which data can be collected and what is 
the suitable way to do it. Also, Collis and Hussey (2003) distinguish between the two terms 
methodology and methods. Methodology refers to the overall approach to the research 
process, from the theoretical underpinning to the collection of the data, whereas methods 
refer to the various means by which data can be collected and / or analysed.  
Crotty (1998: p3) described methodology as: 
“The strategy, plan of action, process or design lying behind the choice and use of 
particular methods and linking the choice and use of methods to the desired outcomes”  
 
Therefore, a research method is concerned with: why you collected certain data, what data 
you collected and where you collected it, when you collected it, how you collected it and 
finally how you will analyse it (Collis and Hussey, 2003). 
Fisher (2007) explained that the most commonly used methods are: interviews, 
questionnaires, panels (including focus groups), observation (including participant 
observation), documents and databases. He also argued that adopting one or more of these 
techniques depends on, among other thi ngs, the research’s epistemological and 
methodological assumptions. These assumptions have led to the emergence of different 
approaches of social science (for example, positivism, interpretivism or realism).  
 
6.3 Overview of the Philosophical Assumption 
Epistemology is a crucial philosophical concept for social scientists, and it considers 
questions to do with the theory of knowledge (Henn et al, 2006: p.10). Crotty (1998: p.3) 
argued that “epistemology refers to the theory of knowledge embedded in the theoretical 
perspective and thereby in the methodology”.  From the epistemological perspective, there 
are three paradigms: positivism, interpretivism, and realism.  
A paradigm is ‘‘a cluster of beliefs and dictates which for scientists in a particular 
discipline influence what should be studied, how research should be done and how results 
should be interrupted’’ (Bryman, 1988).     
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6.3.1 The Positivist Approach 
The positivist paradigm is associated with quantitative research strategies (Henn et al, 
2006). Positivism holds that an accurate and value-free knowledge of things is possible, 
and as a result positivism produces general laws that can be used to predict behaviour, in 
terms of probability if not with absolute certainty (Fisher, 2007). In addition, positivism is 
based on the assumption that social reality is independent of the researcher; hence, the 
researcher should remain distant when conducting the research and not allow values and 
bias to alter their objective views (Collis and Hussey, 2003).  The crux of the approach is 
that precision, objectivity and rigour replace hunches, experience and intuition as the 
means of investigating research problems, and, therefore, social science is based on the 
approach used in the natural sciences (Collis and Hussey, 2003)          
 Henn (2006: p.13) stated that “the logic of a positivist research design is that:  
 We seek to identify cause and effect to explain phenomena, and to test theory; 
 Knowledge should be based on what can be tested by observation of tangible 
evidence; 
 Researchers should use the scientific methods which emphasises control, 
standardisation, and objectivity.”    
 
6.3.2 The Interpretivist Approach 
The interpretive paradigm is associated with unstructured qualitative methods (Henn et al, 
2006). The term subsumes the views that the subject matter of the social sciences is totally 
different from the natural sciences. Therefore, the social sciences require a different logic 
of research procedure which reflects the distinctiveness of humans as against the natural 
order (Bryman and Bell, 2007).  
The interpretive research design is to explore or build up the understanding of something 
that we have little or sometimes no knowledge of. Through piecing together such an 
understanding, we eventually build up a theory (Henn et al, 2006). However, the feature of 
interpretive research is that you cannot understand how others may make sense of things 
unless you have insightful knowledge of your own values and thinking processes (Fisher, 
2007). The differences between the positivist and interpretivist approaches are in Table 6.1 
below. 
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      Table 6.1 the positivist and interpretivist divide  
Positivist  Interpretivism  
1- Knowledge is based on a phenomenon 
that is directly observable 
(phenomenalism). 
 
2- The social world should be researched 
using the principles of social sciences 
(such as experiments). Such a shared 
approach is often referred to as the unity 
of scientific method. 
 
3- There is a stress on reliability and 
generalisability. 
 
4- Explanation is achieved through the 
formulation of causal laws or law-like 
generalisations (nomothetic approach). 
 
5-There is use of the hypothetico-
deductive method in which there is an 
emphasis on testing given theory. 
 
6- Methods imply researcher/ respondent 
detachment in the objective collection of 
data. 
 
7- Analysis is based on the statistical 
testing of given theories.           
1- Knowledge is based on understanding 
interpretations and meanings that are not 
directly observable. 
 
2- The social world should be studied in its 
natural state (using participant observation 
and in-depth interviews) to understand 
naturally occurring behaviour. 
  
 
3- There is a stress on validity. 
 
 
4- Explanation is achieved through 
descriptions of social meaning/ reasons and 
other dispositions to action (idiographic 
approach). 
5- There is use of the analytic-inductive 
method in which theory is generated from the 
data.  
 
6- Methods imply insider approach- 
participation in life and culture of respondent/ 
closeness of respondent and researcher in the 
joint construction of subjective data. 
7- Analysis is based on verbal, action, and 
situation description from which theory 
evolves. 
        Sources: Henn et al, 2006 : p 16  
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6.3.3 The Realist Approach    
The Realist approach believes that the natural and the social sciences can and should apply 
the same kind of approach to the collection of data and to explanation, and it is committed 
to the view that there is an external reality to which scientists direct their attention. In other 
words, there is a reality that is separate from our descriptions of it (Bryman and Bell, 
2007). Thus, the realist approach retains the ambitions of positivism but recognises, and 
comes to terms with, the subjective nature of the research and the inevitable role of values 
in it.  
Realism still aims to be scientific, but makes fewer claims to knowledge that perfectly 
mirrors the objects of study (Fisher, 2007). However, realism depends on assuming that the 
world cannot be known without interpretation; therefore, realism seeks to explain the 
observation in terms of underlying structural mechanisms (Thomas, 1996).  There are two 
forms of realism:   
1. Empirical realism- using appropriate methods can help reality to be understood. 
Empirical realism is 'superficial’ when it ‘fails to recognise that there are enduring 
structure and generative mechanism underlying and producing observable 
phenomena and events (Bryman and Bell, 2007). 
2. Critical realism- critical realism is specific forms of realism whose manifesto is to 
recognise the reality of the natural order and the events and discourses of the social 
world which imply there is a level of reality below the everyday level of events and 
our experiences of them (Bryman and Bell, 2007; Fisher, 2007). 
 
During the present research, the approach will be adopted which allows the researcher to 
collect large amounts of comparable data and compare the findings derived from the study 
with literature reviewed previously. Therefore, the research is realist using both 
quantitative and qualitative methods. Also, the researcher has considered the following 
general points before beginning to write the questions: 
 The main type of data collection instrument such as interviews, questionnaires, 
content analysis, observational techniques. 
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 The method of approach to respondents, including stated purpose of the research, 
length and duration of questionnaire, the type of questions to be used, 
confidentiality and anonymity.    
 The build-up of question sequences or modules within the questionnaire, and the 
ordering of questions and scales or other techniques within the general framework. 
6.4 Research Objectives 
The aim of the PhD is to investigate and explore the current state of corporate governance 
in Libya from a theoretical and practical perspective, using the views of stakeholders on 
corporate governance, and identify its development in Libya. To achieve this aim, 
subordinate aims will be pursued. These subordinate aims are: 
1. Identify the current situation and developments concerning corporate governance in 
Libya.   
2.  Identify the effect of the various environmental factors on the corporate governance 
in Libya. 
3. Evaluate the perceptions of the various stakeholders concerning the application of 
corporate governance in Libya. 
4. Identify and evaluate scenarios concerning future development of corporate 
governance in Libya.  
5. Review, evaluate and contribute to the policy debate on corporate governance in 
Libya.    
        
This study will aim to answer the following questions: 
1. Who are the key stakeholders concerning corporate governance in Libya? 
2. What are those stakeholders’ views on and attitudes to the practice of corporate 
governance in Libya? 
3. What types of corporate governance issues do different stakeholders think are 
important in Libya? For example, fraud, non-voting shares, over-powerful CEOs 
and excessive pay? 
4. What are the current rules and regulations concerning the corporate governance in 
Libya? 
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5. What particular issues of governance, if any, does the Arabic and Islamic context 
make for the issues of corporate governance in Libya?  
6. How effective do the stakeholders’ groups think existing arrangements are? And 
what changes do they think are needed? 
 
6.5 Research Methods  
As explained above, the methods are the various means by which data can be collected 
and/ or analysed. The present study’s main objective is to investigate the corporate 
governance from the stakeholders’ perspective in Libya. Therefore, two main methods 
have been employed in this study, namely, questionnaires and interviews. 
 
6.5.1 Questionnaire Survey 
A questionnaire is a list of carefully structured questions, chosen after considerable testing, 
with a view to eliciting reliable responses from a chosen sample (Collis and Hussey, 2003; 
p. 173). Since the questionnaire survey can be employed as an efficient data collection 
tool, it becomes the most appropriate data collection method in the social sciences 
(Oppenheim, 1992). The questionnaire can be used for descriptive or explanatory research. 
Descriptive research, such as research that uses attitude and opinion questionnaires, 
enables the researcher to identify and describe the variability in different phenomena. In 
contrast, explanatory research enables the researcher to examine and explain relationships 
between variables, in particular cause-and-effect relationships.  
Therefore, the questionnaire was designed with the aim of eliciting data to evaluate the 
current practice of corporate governance in Libya, since it is the most widely used 
technique in education research. However, it requires a careful, clear statement of the 
problem underlying the research; otherwise, ambiguity and misinterpretation will 
invalidate the findings.  
Fisher (2007) outlines the main general issues which should be considered before 
designing the questionnaire. These issues are: short questions, attractive design, logical and 
sequential structure (easily understood by respondents), dividing the questionnaire into 
parts related to various issues the questionnaire is asking about, ordering the questions 
from easy questions to hard ones and keeping personal questions to the last, and only 
include them if you can justify them. Also, he outlined the following steps which should be 
taken into account during the design of a questionnaire.  
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Firstly, on the type of questions, there are open and closed questions. Open questions 
mean the questionnaire has open questions and lots of white spaces for responses. 
Responses have to be written or recorded in full, thus the researcher has to provide plenty 
of space for the answers (Fisher, 2007; Oppenheim, 1992). The advantage of open 
questions is that they give the respondents freedom of thought. However, these questions 
are easy to ask, but difficult to answer, analyse and may be hard to read and be time-
consuming (Oppenheim, 1992; Henn et al, 2006).  
Closed questions, on the other hand, are easier and quicker to answer by respondents, and 
require little time and do not need extended writing. However, closed questions lose 
spontaneity and expressiveness and may irritate respondents (Oppenheim, 1992). 
Secondly, regarding the distribution, questionnaires can be administrated by post or mail, 
telephone, personally and in group and individual distribution (Collis and Hussey, 2003).  
1- Personally administered questionnaires, according to Sekaran (2003), are suitable when 
confined to a local area. The advantages of personally administered questionnaires can be 
summarised as follows:  
 The researcher(s) can collect all the completed responses within a short 
period of time. 
 The researcher can clarify any ambiguity and doubts that  the respondents 
may have about the questions. 
 The researcher has the opportunity to introduce the research topic and 
motivate the respondents to give their frank answers. 
 Distributing the questionnaires to a large number of respondents is less 
expensive and consumes less time than interviews. 
 It does not require as high skills as conducting interviews. 
   
2- Postal or mail questionnaires, use reasonably inexpensive methods, especially in a large 
sample (Collis and Hussey, 2003). The questionnaire is usually posted with a covering 
letter and a prepaid envelope for returning the completed questionnaire.  
According to Oppenheim (1992), the questionnaire survey has the following advantages: 
 Low cost of processing: the most obvious appeal of the mail questionnaire is the 
low cost.  
 109 
 
 Avoidance of interviewer bias error, because it gives respondents the opportunity to 
think freely or consult other people 
 Ability to reach respondents who live at widely dispersed addresses or abroad. 
 Greater anonymity: the mail questionnaire provides greater anonymity for 
respondents. Consequently, this questionnaire is suitable for sensitive issues.    
 However, the following points are the main disadvantages of a mail questionnaire: low 
response rate, and consequent bias through the returning sample’s interest in the topic; 
unsuitability for respondents of poor literacy, visually handicapped, the very old or for 
children; no opportunity to correct misunderstandings or offer explanations to participants; 
 
3- Regarding telephone questionnaires as the number of telephones has grown in most 
countries in the world; the telephone questionnaire survey has become more popular, 
especially in developed countries. Therefore, it can be used and it can be helpful with 
sensitive and complex questions. The advantage of the questionnaire is the high rate of 
responses; however, the bias through knowing the researcher's telephone number is the 
main disadvantage. 
 
4- In relation to group distribution is appropriate if the survey is being conducted in one or 
few locations, where the researcher is able to assemble the respondents in the same place 
and, therefore, is able to explain the questionnaire to them. This method is characterised by 
convenience, low costs and a high response rate (Collis and Hussey, 2003).    
6.5.1.1 Question Wording  
The fundamental part of designing the questionnaire that the researcher should pay 
attention to is the wording of questions and use of language, which must be clear, and 
unambiguous. Thus, in designing a questionnaire, the researcher should attempt to 
minimise any ambiguity, and avoid loaded questions, by following these basic rules during 
designing the questionnaire: avoid  lengthy questions, avoid “double-barrelled” questions; 
avoid proverbs; avoid double-negatives; use simple words and avoid acronyms, 
abbreviations, jargon and technical terms; beware of the dangers of alternative usage; 
beware of leading questions (Oppenheim,1992). In addition, the questionnaire should 
include an introduction providing a brief background to the study and its purpose, thereby 
encouraging respondents’ participation. 
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Taking into account the disadvantages of the mailed and personally administered 
questionnaires, a personally delivered questionnaire that was also personally collected 
from the study participants was used as a primary instrument for data gathering in this 
research. That is, the researcher personally distributed the questionnaire to the research 
participants and also collected it from them. In doing so, the researcher has the chance to 
introduce the research area, the aims of the survey and the reasons behind selecting each 
person or group of the research participants to be surveyed; has the opportunity to correct 
misinterpretation and illuminate any doubts or vagueness that the study participants might 
have with reference to the research topic or any question in the questionnaire; has the 
opportunity to motivate the study participants to reveal their honest response since there is 
a chance for him/her to initiate good communication with those responding to the survey; 
has a real chance to increase the return rate of questionnaires and, therefore ensuring 
accurate sampling. 
The designing and the writing of the questionnaire can significantly affect response rates. 
That is, in questionnaires that are poorly or badly designed and written, some questions 
might be biased and do not give the study participants the chance to choose amongst a full 
range of answers. Lengthy, complex or baffling questions can also be ignored and left 
unanswered. Therefore, in constructing this questionnaire survey, good questionnaire 
design principles were considered. Such principles related to the wording and language of 
questions, scaling these questions and coding after receiving the response, and the general 
appearance of the questionnaire. 
6.5.2 The Interview Method 
An interview is an action involving personal contact between the interviewer and the 
respondent, and it is a method of collecting data in which selected participants are asked 
questions in order to find out what they do, think or feel (Collis and Hussey, 2003). 
Using interviews to elicit what a respondent believes, thinks, knows and likes is 
accompanied with the following advantage (Oppenheim 1992): this is a good method 
where the researcher has to record verbatim the respondents’ answers. Interviews can 
improve the response rate; provide a prepared explanation of the purpose of the study; and 
allow the researcher to control the interview situation. The interviewer can probe for 
additional and detailed data and, finally, the interview is preferable when asking longer, 
difficult, and open-ended questions. However, it is usually more expensive than other 
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techniques and they permit the interviewer’s personal influence and bias to intrude and 
minimise the ability to maintain anonymity. 
The interview method has many forms such as the following.  
6.5.2.1 Face-to-Face Interview 
 Face-to-face interviews are designed to explore issues in detail using probes, prompts, and 
flexible questioning styles. In many respects, the face-to-face interview is conducted in the 
situation where the researcher’s intention is to share control for the data-gathering exercise 
with the respondent (Henn et al, 2006). 
In addition, the face-to-face interview’s character brings higher response rates which may 
be appropriate for long interviews with complex questions. The researcher can adapt the 
questions as necessary, and clarify doubts and can pick up nonverbal cues from the 
respondent. However, geographical limitations, and the lack of anonymity, are the main 
disadvantages of this type (Sekaran, 2003).      
6.5.2.2 Telephone Interviews  
 Telephone interviews provide the researcher access to respondents who would never find 
time for a face-to-face interview (Fisher, 2007). Also, it is advisable when the researcher 
and respondents are far away from each other, and can be achieved at any time convenient 
to respondent (Sekaran, 2003). However, the interview is not suitable for complex matters 
and in case of questions that require detailed or long answers (Fisher, 2007). In addition, 
with telephone interviews, the researcher will not be able to see the respondent and read 
the nonverbal communication (Sekaran, 2003).  
In addition, the interview could be divided into four types of personal interviews, namely, 
structured, semi- structured, unstructured and focus group interviews.  
6.5.2.3 The Structured Interview (Standardised Interview)  
Structured interviews mean the interviewer knows what information is needed. Also, the 
interviewer has a list of predetermined questions to ask the respondents (Sekaran, 2003). 
All interviewees are given the same context of questioning (Bryman and Bell, 2007).  Also, 
the structured interview is more objective and easier to analyse, but it is not flexible.  
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6.5.2.4 The Semi-Structured Interview 
The semi-structured interview refers to a context in which the interviewer has a series of 
questions that are in the general form of an interview schedule but he or she is able to vary 
the sequence of questions. The questions are more general than in a structured interview. In 
addition, the interviewer has some latitude to ask further questions in response to what are 
seen as significant replies (Bryman and Bell, 2007). The semi-structured interview is 
conducted in this study to permit the coverage of the general themes that have been 
identified in the literature of corporate governance while allowing flexibility to pursue any 
significant issue arising during the interview. Also, it enables the different stakeholders to 
provide their opinions and answer the questions.    
6.5.2.5 The Unstructured Interview  
The unstructured interview is dominated by the open-ended approach to interviewing. The 
interviewer does not enter the interview, setting with a planned sequence of questions, but 
uses flexible questions to explore issues in detail.  
During the unstructured interview the interviewer has a list of issues or topics, and the 
questions are informal and the phrasing and sequencing of questions will vary from 
interview to interview (Bryman and Bell, 2007). However, the interviewer can explore and 
elicit the details by bringing some preliminary issues to the surface with interviewees and 
then can determine what variables need further in-depth investigation. Sekaran (2003: 
p.225) stated:  
“The type and nature of the questions asked of the individuals might vary according 
to the job level and type of work done by respondents. For instance, top and middle-
level managers might be asked more direct questions about their perceptions of the 
problem and the situation. Employees at lower levels may have to be approached 
differently.” 
 
6.5.2.6 The Focus Group Interview  
According to Sekaran (1992: p.220): “Focus groups typically consist of eight to ten 
members with a moderator leading the discussions regarding a particular topic, concept, or 
product”. 
The focus group interview allows the interviewer to focus upon group norms and dynamics 
around issues to be investigated.  
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6.6 Data Collection 
This section summarises the process of data collection, including the two main data 
sources, namely, quantitative and qualitative research methods (questionnaires and semi-
structured interviews).  
 
6.6.1 The Population and Sample of the Present Study 
 
A population is any precisely defined set of people or collection of items which is under 
consideration, whereas, a sample is a subset of a population that should represent the main 
interest of the study (Collis and Hussey, 2003). Defining the population clearly is an 
essential stage in social research since a clearly defined population makes the selection of a 
representative sample more likely. Various groups from the Libyan stakeholders (such as 
academic staff, government officials, owners, employees) have to be involved as subjects in 
this study. However, it was deemed considerably ambitious to survey all of these 
stakeholders. That was mainly because of the professional and technical nature of the 
questions and the data collection instrument, and the cost matters that might be associated 
with this. 
To understand the situation of corporate governance you need to select appropriate and 
related groups. A key step in social research is to define the population of the study clearly 
which makes the selection of a representative sample more likely.   
According to Thomas (1996), before choosing the sample, it is necessary to clearly define 
the population being surveyed, also to ensure that the sample selected provides an accurate 
representation of the population. The main aim of this study is to investigate the 
stakeholders' perspective on corporate governance; therefore, various groups from the 
Libyan economic environment have to be involved as subjects in this survey. However, it 
would appear difficult to examine the perceptions and attitudes of a representative sample 
of the groups on these issues, due mainly to the high technical and professional nature of 
the questions to be examined and the cost factor involved in terms of money and time 
required. Accordingly, the population frame for this questionnaire survey embraces those 
who are thought to possess familiarity with Libyan economic development. These groups 
of respondents have also been surveyed in several studies in developing countries relating 
to a variety of aspects of accounting practices (see for example, Wallace (1988) and Naser 
et al (2003). Therefore, the population of the study consist of the following groups:  
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Academic Staff  
Academic staff were one of the stakeholder groups that had been chosen for the study 
because they influence accounting and the corporate governance framework. They are 
involved in improving the accounting education and accounting and auditing professions. 
Accounting academics might be deemed as holding objective attitudes as well as being 
aware and conscious of the real problems of the country. Further, most academic staff in 
Libyan universities achieved their degrees in western countries where the topic of corporate 
governance is given high attention, thus they might be able to provide fair and independent 
views regarding corporate governance.  
For this research, the academic accountants targeted are those who are working in the 
accounting departments in the main Libyan universities (Alfateh University; Garyounis 
University and Academy of Graduate Studies). All of these educational institutions have 
master’s degree programmes.28 
 
External Auditors  
External auditors can be viewed as judges of the integrity of annual reports and of the 
integrity of financial operations. Under Libyan law, the shareholders’ role in governance is 
to appoint the directors and external auditors in order to satisfy themselves, among other 
things that an appropriate governance structure is in place. External auditors may exercise 
considerable influence upon the company in terms of assessing the internal control systems, 
providing constructive advice, detecting fraud and irregularities and affecting the 
company’s disclosure decisions ( Firth, 1978).  
  
Investment Advisors of Banks 
Another group was chosen from among employees of credit departments in public banks. 
The main reason for selecting this group is their interested of good governance practice, to 
ensure that their banks' money and investments are not comprised by fraud or 
mismanagement.               
 
 
 
                                                 
28 The master degree is the highest degree provided in Libyan Universities in business schools, since there is 
no PhD programme.  
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Company Employees 
This includes those who might have the professional and technical ability in the accounting 
field and who are expected to be involved in one way or another in corporate governance 
practices in the company.  Also, they have a related interest in the good governance of the 
company and they may wish that good governance gives them a voice as a major 
stakeholder group   
 
Government Officials 
The employees of the Libyan Stock Market are a very important authority, who should 
compel listed companies to practise an effective corporate governance system and monitor 
its implementation. This will help such companies to possess a strong monitoring and 
management system which will help attract local and external investors. Also, their opinion 
will be useful for this study through making clear any difference between the practice and 
the requirements of the Libyan Stock Market.  
Investors  
To achieve the objectives of this study, the investors are one of the groups selected to 
answer the questionnaire. The questionnaires were distributed to both institutional and 
individual shareholders (banks and insurance companies and pension fund and Libyan 
businessmen board) to investigate their views about the good corporate governance that can 
maintain their investments and provide them more confidence to invest.  
 
 6.6.2 Pilot Study 
A pilot study is an important step in producing a good questionnaire. This step helps the 
researcher to improve the questionnaire through finding out any problems such as 
ambiguous and unnecessary questions and sometimes the shortcomings of the questionnaire 
design. Collis and Hussey (2003) argued that it is essential to pilot or test your 
questionnaire as fully as possible before distributing it. At the very least, one should use 
colleagues or friends to read through it and play the role of respondents, even if they know 
little about the subject. Oppenheim (1992) added that “questionnaires have to be composed 
and tried out, improved and then tried out again, often several times’’    
Therefore, in this study, there were a number of steps before final distribution of the 
questionnaires. In the first stage, a draft of the questionnaire was produced by writing 
down and grouping all questions and issues which had resulted from the literature review. 
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The first discussion of the questionnaire draft was with the supervisor’s team. In addition, 
a draft was then piloted among the PhD students at Nottingham Business School, 
Nottingham Trent University to elicit their comments on the comments on the wording and 
structure of the questionnaire.  
After that the questionnaire was translated from English into Arabic with, professional help 
to avoid any bias and to confirm the meaning in Arabic language. In addition, a draft of the 
questionnaire was checked for grammar and meaning in the Arabic language by a language 
specialist in Libya.  
 
6.6.3 Questionnaire Design 
 
Fisher (2007) suggested that questions should be easy to answer, and short and precise in 
order to help potential respondents fill out the questionnaire.  
In order to achieve the aims of the study, the questionnaires were distributed to different 
categories that represent different stakeholders to explore their views regarding the issues 
related to the corporate governance system. The designing of questionnaire was entirely 
depending on the OECD Principles and on the related literature. The groups were as 
follows; academic accounting staff, external auditors, investment advisors in government 
banks, company employees, government officials and investors. In all, 453 questionnaires 
were distributed, 195 questionnaires were returned, which means the rate of response was 
43%. 
 The questionnaire survey comprised 11 questions, which were divided into sub-questions. 
The questionnaire structure was designed to investigate corporate governance practice.29  
The questionnaire employed a Likert scale in which respondents were asked to tick the 
appropriate box from 1 to 5, where 1 represented strongly disagree or not important at all, 2 
represented disagree or not important, 3 represented uncertain, 4 represented agree or 
important and, finally, 5 referred to strongly agree or very important.  
These scales measure respondents’ extent of agreement with each statement. In order to 
give more options to participants, they were asked in the last page in the questionnaire to 
provide and list any comments, factors or ideas that could affect the practice of corporate 
governance in Libya. Out of a total of 195 returned questionnaires, the researcher received 
                                                 
29 Copies of the questionnaire and covering letter are in the Appendices ( Appendix 1.1 and 1.2)   
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some useful comments that the respondents felt to be important. These comments presented 
by respondents will be incorporated in the analysis in the proper place.  
 
6.6.4 Administration of the Questionnaire Survey 
 
The questionnaires were distributed in July and August 2007 to the selected samples in 
Libya. As mentioned earlier, the questionnaires were distributed to different groups of 
stakeholders to elicit their opinions. To minimise the problem of low response rates, 
questionnaires were delivered by hand to the sample. In addition, the questionnaire was 
accompanied by a covering letter which explained the aim of the study and identified the 
researcher. One was from the researcher asking for the questionnaire to be completed, 
explaining the nature and importance of the study, and assuring respondents their 
responses would be treated in confidence. A second letter supporting the research was 
provided by Elmergib University where the researcher is a lecturer, asking for respondents’ 
cooperation. Table 6.2 illustrates the number of questionnaires distributed, the number of 
returned questionnaires, the response rate for each group, and the overall response rate. 
Table 6.2 Groups of Respondents for the Questionnaire survey           
No Name of category Number distributed Number of  
responses 
Percentages 
of responses 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Academic staff 
External Auditors 
Investment advisors of banks 
Company employee 
Government officials 
Investors 
66 
110 
50 
66 
64 
97 
32 
43 
21 
35 
29 
35 
48 
39 
42 
53 
45 
36 
 Total  453 195 43% 
6.7 Types of Questions 
The questionnaire has been divided into the following parts: 
 
6.7.1 The Respondent Occupation 
 The first question was about the occupation of respondents. The respondents were divided 
into six groups which consisted of academic staff, external auditors, investment advisors of 
banks, listed company employees, government officials and investors. This question was 
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important because it was expected to provide the basic data needed for analysing and 
testing relationships with other variables in the study. 
 
6.7.2 The Concept of Corporate Governance 
This section of the questionnaire was designed to obtain respondents’ perception of the 
meaning of corporate governance in the Libyan context. The first question elicited 
respondents’ opinions regarding the definition of corporate governance by providing three 
definitions of corporate governance. The second question was to obtain respondents’ 
perceptions of the importance of corporate governance. The third question focused on the 
view of the significance of corporate governance in Libya to different groups of 
stakeholders. 
 
6.7.3 Rights of Stakeholders 
This section contained questions investigating the rights of stakeholders in the Libyan 
context. This section was important because it provided the respondents’ opinion on 
stakeholders’ and shareholders’ rights in the Libyan context.  
 
6.7.4 Factors Affect Corporate Governance  
This section of the questionnaire endeavoured to elicit more details on the possible factors 
that might affect on the corporate governance practice in Libya.    
 
6.7.5 The Framework of Corporate Governance 
This section of the questionnaire aimed to elicit respondents’ opinions regarding the 
development of corporate governance in Libyan companies.  
 
6.7.6 Future Plans of Corporate Governance 
This section elicited respondents’ perceptions regarding corporate governance’s future in 
Libya. Participants were asked their views about the future changes and their suggestions 
for amendments that need to be considered in future. The first question focused on the 
areas of disclosure and transparency practice in Libyan. The second investigated the role 
and responsibilities of the Board of Directors in any future Libyan corporate governance 
framework. The third question asked about other factors that could be introduced to 
improve the practice of corporate governance in Libya.  
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6.7.7 Future Introduction of Corporate Governance 
This section of the questionnaire purposed to draw out respondents' opinion regarding the 
future introduction of corporate governance in Libya. This section was important to help 
the researcher to explore the approach to developing the corporate governance in Libya.  
6.8 The Research Interview  
Semi-structured interviews were used beside the questionnaire to elicit more open and 
original opinions about corporate governance in Libya and the future scenarios for 
developing governance in Libyan companies. The purpose of the interviews was to explore 
in more depth the issues about corporate governance in the Libyan context with business 
policy-makers. The semi-structured interview was adopted, as it allows the researcher to 
have control over time, content and the sequence of the interview, while still giving the 
interviewer the opportunity to probe, and allowing the interviewee some scope in 
responding to the questions. Furthermore, interviews can also produce more spontaneous 
reactions if the interviewer can catch informants off guard.  
A semi-structured interview survey was used to collect data from 10 interviewees. 
Interview questions were developed from a review of the literature, developed in discussion 
with the supervisory team of this study. Interviewees were informed that interview results 
would be discussed in general, confidentially, and used for research purposes only. This 
assurance was necessary to encourage interviewees to participate in interviews and to 
improve the quality of participation. The interviews were conducted with different policy-
makers in important positions in Libya, which provides original support for this study.  
A pilot interview was undertaken prior to the main interviewing process with the director of 
studies. 
All ten interviews were conducted face-to-face and took between 40 and 60 minutes. The 
interviews followed this process: 
1-  All interviewees received a copy of a covering letter and the guidelines of the 
interview before the interview date 
2- The researcher came to the interviewees' offices to confirm the appointment and the 
place of the interview 
3- All interviewees were asked for permission to record the interviews with the 
interviewee having the right to stop the recording at any time 
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4- The researcher provided plenty of time for interviewees at the end of interview to 
talk and provide any suggestion or idea that they think would be useful to the study 
5- During all interviews, the researcher tried to make interviewees feel relaxed by 
allowing them to talk informally before and during the interview. 
 The researcher carefully recorded on an interview schedule the time and place of the 
interview and the name of the interviewee. The researcher got permission to record the 
interviews from five interviewees; two of whom spoke English. Moreover, the researcher 
proceeded to the next question only after each response had been accurately recorded. 
According to Denzin and Lincoln (2003: p52) the qualitative material data is a complex 
process in terms of the analysis and interpretation. Therefore, in this study the analysis of 
the data from interviews was to summarise and present the mass of data collected from 
interviewees using the systematic thematic analysis, which included the techniques of Miles 
and Huberman (1984). After listening to and reading the hard copy of all interviews, the 
researcher created a set of predetermined themes such as stakeholders, culture, 
shareholders, legal system, enforcement, economy, Board of Directors, disclosure, and 
external auditors. Any other themes or comments which emerged from interviewees were 
also analysed in relevant themes when necessary to illustrate the important points. To 
demonstrate all the participants’ views about corporate governance, different perceptions 
and perspectives which were not common were also quoted. The chosen quotations have 
been translated into the English language using the comments from those interviewees who 
spoke English. Also, any confusion was avoided by using the best English words to achieve 
the study aims. The next table shows the date of the interviews, the interviewees’ position 
and the time of the interviews.  
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Table 6.3 the list of interviewees and the interview time  
 
6.9 Ethical Consideration  
Particular emphasis is given to the ethical dimensions of the research. An important factor 
was to obtain informed consent, as researchers on the subject of corporate governance tend 
to find that creating solid communication grounds from the start can reduce attrition rates 
and increase the quality of data gathered 
In this respect, and after obtained the ethical clearance from the research ethics committee 
in the Nottingham Trent University, the participants were given a clear explanation of the 
nature of the research, using a covering letter for interviews. The interview guidelines 
explaining the aim of this research and the consent letter were given to all interviewees 
before the interview took place. As the research involved participants disclosing their 
perspectives on the current situation and the practice of corporate governance in Libya, 
privacy, confidentiality, and anonymity were promised to all participants, also keeping the 
recorded disks in a secure place, changing participants' names and eliminating his/her 
position or job place that could reveal the participant in the analysis of the data. Regarding 
the place and time, the researcher met them regarding their choice of time and place.  
Regarding the questionnaire, it was accompanied by a covering letter which explained the 
aim of the study and identified the researcher. One was from the researcher asking for the 
questionnaire to be completed, explaining the nature and importance of the study, and 
assuring respondents their responses would be treated in confidence. A second letter 
Date of 
Interview Interviewee Time
10/7
11/7
31/7
6/8
7/8
7/8
8/8
9/8
9/8
13/8
Chairman of the Economic Research Centre
Chairman of the Libyan Stock Exchange
Chairman of the Accountants and Auditors Association 
External Auditor
Chairman of the General Board of Ownership
Chairman of the Libyan Foreign Investment Board
Chairman of Libyan of Chamber of Commerce
CEO of Insurance Company
Secretary of National Planning Council
CEO of a Bank
11.00 -12.00 am
8.00  - 8.55    pm
4.45  - 5.30   pm
5.00 – 6.00    pm
10.00 -10.50   am
1.35 - 2.30   pm
6.30 - 7.30    pm
8.00 - 9.00     am
10.40   -11.30 am
1.00 -1.35    pm
Total       10 
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supporting the research was provided by Elmergib University where the researcher is a 
lecturer asking for respondents' cooperation. 
 
6.10 Interview Guides  
As the interview was semi-structured, all interviewees received the same set of questions 
in a similar manner. The researcher built the guidelines of the interviews with his 
supervisory team to elicit interviewees’ perceptions about corporate governance. In 
addition, the guidelines focused on questions which aimed to collect specific details on the 
corporate governance system with more emphasis on the future planning and the obstacles 
to good practice. Therefore, the guidelines’ instructions included the following elements: 
 The acceptable definition of corporate governance and its importance in Libya. 
 The corporate governance issues that are related to the Libyan economy. 
 The effect of the legal system, and social and cultural values on the framework, 
and the efforts of developing corporate governance in Libya.  
 Issues of disclosure practice and the Board of Directors’ responsibilities.  
 The role of external auditors and financial institutions in improving the practice 
of corporate governance in Libya. 
 The best way to introduce corporate governance in Libya.  
 
6.11 Reliability and Validity of the Research Methods  
   
The issue of reliability and validity concerns with both quantitative and qualitative 
methods. Reliability means the stability or consistency of the measurement (Bryman and 
Bell 2007; Fisher 2007). Reliability is concerned with the question of whether the results of 
a study are repeatable; therefore, it is particularly an issue in connection with quantitative 
research (Bryman and Bell 2007). Three factors should be considered when measuring the 
reliability of research which are: the stability of measure over time, the consistency of scale 
or index (internal reliability) and the inter-observer consistency (Bryman and Bell 2007). 
Reliability in quantitative methods can also be assessed by test-retest method, the split half 
method, and the alpha coefficient test (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). In this study the 
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Cronbach alpha test was used to test the reliability, and the results were within the 
acceptable range.30    
Quantitative validity refers to whether the indicators really measure the concept being 
investigated (Bryman and Bell 2007). Therefore, validity can be classified into: internal 
validity which relates to the issue of causality or the cause and effect relationship; and 
external validity which focuses on whether the sample reflects the population and whether 
the conclusion can be generalised to the whole population (Bryman and Bell 2007; Fisher 
2007). The research methods were designed to describe the perceptions of the respondents 
of the corporate governance practices in Libya. Although, the validity of quantitative 
findings depends on whether the sample reflects the population, the sample of stakeholders 
is not sufficiently large to be truly representative of the stakeholders. Nevertheless, the 
systematic manner in which the sample was selected and the questionnaire covering letter 
enabled me to have some confidence in concluding that the views and experiences 
represented in the data was likely to be indicative of those of the larger population. 
Moreover, the study is based on recent literature that strengthens the internal validity of the 
conceptual definition on corporate governance (e. g. OECD Principles) used in this study. 
This lack of ambiguity over the concept of corporate governance improved the validity of 
the research results. Moreover, validity was also indicated by conducting statistical 
significance tests. Pre-testing or a questionnaire pilot study was another step in ensuring its 
reliability and also validity of the data.31 
In terms of qualitative methods issues of both internal and external validity apply (Fisher 
2007). Internal validity refers to credibility of the data and defines how believable the 
interpretation and the findings are. Believability is improved by using a range of techniques 
to triangulate the findings. External validity refers to transferability of the data and 
emphasises the possibility of generalising the findings across social settings (Fisher 2007). 
In this study, the quality, relevance and usefulness of the qualitative data obtained were 
significantly enhanced by the manner in which the semi-structure interviews were 
conducted. The consent form, a copy of a covering letter and the guidelines of the interview 
were used to standardise and increases the consistency and the quality of interviews. Also, 
                                                 
30 The Cronbach alpha scores range between 0 and 1, and it should be at least 0.7, the minimum value for 
reliability (Bagozzi, 1994). 
31 Thomas (1996) argues that pilot study is the first step to ensuring the reliability and validity of 
questionnaires.  
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the commitment of interviewees enabled me to successfully develop the findings, since 
they were policy makers and experts, and their comments and answers equipped me with 
confidence to accurately interpret what they had to say. The archival resources such as laws 
and regulations and the results of the additional questionnaire to listed companies were 
used as a secondary data source and employed appropriately in discussion. Therefore the 
reliability and validity of the study are considered to be generally good because of the care 
taken in collecting and analysing the data. The agreement between the findings of the 
quantitative surveys and qualitative data suggest that the data was consistent since the 
finding from one method seemed to validate those from the other.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Questionnaire Survey Results 
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction  
This chapter outlines and discusses the findings of the questionnaire survey which was 
carried out during July and August 2007. 
The questionnaire was circulated to the following groups: academic accountant staff, 
external auditors, investment advisors in government banks, company employees, 
government officials and investors. In all, 453 questionnaires were distributed, and 195 
questionnaires were returned during that time, which mean the response, rate was 43%. The 
design and implementation of the questionnaire and interview survey were detailed in 
section 6.5.4. 
7.2 Justifying Using Statistical Analysis  
The main issue was to choose the appropriate statistical techniques for the data analysis. As 
the study focuses on respondents' perceptions of corporate governance in Libya, and 
whether different stakeholder groups hold different or similar views on corporate 
governance, it is appropriate to analyse their views using the mean to compare the opinions 
and perceptions of respondents on corporate governance practice. 
To examine differences between independent samples, the researcher carried out non-
parametric tests, which are appropriate for this study. In general, various advantages can be 
gained from using non-parametric tests. Siegel and Castellan, (1988: pp.35-36) have 
summarised these as follows: 
1- Non-parametric tests are suitable when the sample size is small. 
2- Non-parametric tests typically make fewer assumptions. 
3- Non-parametric tests are available to analyse data which are inherently in ranks and 
data whose seemingly numerical scores have the strength of ranks. 
4- Non-parametric tests are suitable for treating samples made up of observations from 
different populations.  
5- Non-parametric statistical tests are easer to apply and the interpretation is more 
direct than the interpretation of parametric tests.  
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The Kruskal-Wallis (KW) tests were carried out to test any differences between 
independent samples, which is appropriate with ordinal (ranked) data. The mean value that 
underscores respondents' behaviour with respect to the stated research question was 
computed for each appropriate variable.  The mean test response was used to investigate 
and explore where the difference between groups was significant. 
 
7.2.1 Kruskal-Wallis One-Way Analysis of Variance 
 
To compare between groups’ views, and because the data are ordinal, the Kruskal-Wallis 
test was employed. The Kruskal-Wallis test is the non-parametric version of the parametric 
ANOVA test for calculating differences in the population mean. Kruskal-Wallis One-Way 
Analysis of Variance tests the hypothesis that independent groups or samples are the same 
against the alternative hypothesis that one or more of the groups differ from the others, so it 
is used to test several independent samples. Thus, in the present study the Kruskal-Wallis 
test is used to establish any difference in average response across the six groups in their 
answers to each question.  
The Kruskal-Wallis test can be computed using the following formula: 
 
Where 
H = Kruskal-Wallis Test  
Rj = sum of the ranks of the jth group; 
nj = sample size of the jth group; 
N = combined sample sizes of all groups  
In line with most tests in the social sciences, the study was conducted at the 5% level of 
significance and 95% level of confidence (Curwin and Slater, 2002: p279; Silver, 
1992:p191). When the obtained value of Kruskal-Wallis is significant, it indicates that at 
least one of the groups is different from at least one of the others. The Kruskal-Wallis test 
does not tell which one is different and how many of the groups are different from each 
other (Siegel and Castellan, 1988). Therefore, the researcher will use the mean to explore 
variation in group behaviour and opinion on each question. 
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7.2.2 Mann-Whitney Test 
The Mann-Whitney test (MW) is a non-parametric equivalent to the t-test parametric test 
(Zikmund, 2003). This technique is used to test the difference between two independent 
groups which may be of different sizes (Curwin and Slater, 2002). Therefore, in this study, 
the MW test was used to verify which pairs of group averages were significantly different.  
If the two groups are the same size, the Mann-Whitney value is computed for the second of 
the two groups using the following formula:   
      
Where: 
S = the sum of the ranks; 
n1 = the total number of respondents in sample 1 
7.3 The Major Findings 
Questions 2, 3 and 4 of the survey sought to investigate general standpoints regarding the 
concept of corporate governance.  
 
7.3.1 The Concept of Corporate Governance 
  
In order to determine respondents’ attitude towards effective corporate governance in 
Libya, they were asked for their opinions on the definitions of corporate governance that 
are suitable for the Libyan context. 
Selected groups were invited and requested to indicate their opinion on a five-point scale 
ranging from strong disagreement to strong agreement (1=Strongly disagree; 2=disagree: 
3= Neutral; 4= Agree; 5= Strongly agree). 
The study participants were given a list of possible definitions of corporate governance, 
which were constructed from the contrasting theoretical standpoint of shareholder theory 
and stakeholder theory. To achieve fuller insights about corporate governance, the 
participants were offered three questions of which the first one concerned the shareholder 
model and the second and third questions were about the stakeholder model with 
differences in the definitions of stakeholders. A summary of the responses of the study 
participants is depicted in Table 7.1. 
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Table 7.1 Group means and Kruskal-Wallis Tests showing respondents’ views regarding the best definition of corporate governance in Libya   
 
Statement Group means Kruskal-Wallis Test 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 overall 
mean 
Rank P-value Result
Q2a-Corporate governance refers to an 
organisation’s relationship with its 
shareholders to ensure that it acts in 
accordance with the interests of them. 
2.67 2.69 3.05 2.61 3.10 3.62 2.94 3 
.000 
Significant٭ 
Q2b- Corporate governance refers to an 
organisation’s relationship with all 
stakeholders who are affected by or affect the 
company's operations and decisions. 
4.28 4.12 4.38 4.29 4.31 3.91 4.20 1 
.273 
Not-
significant 
Q2c- Corporate governance refers to an 
organisation’s relationship with all members 
of society, irrespective of whether they affect 
or are affected by the company's operations 
and decisions. 
3.25 3.05 3.40 3.26 3.31 3.18 3.22 2 
.668 
Not-
significant 
 
Groups are: 1 = academic staff, 2= external auditors, 3= investment advisors of banks, 4= company employees, 5= government officials, 6= 
investors.     
The KW test shows whether there are any differences in the means of responses given by the groups for each question.  
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Table 7.2 The Mann-Whitney probabilities: respondents’ views regarding the best definition of corporate governance in Libya   
 
 
Questions G(1-2) G(1-3) G(1-4) G(1-5) G(1-6) G(2-3) G(2-4) G(2-5) G(2-6) G(3-4) G(3-5) G(3-6) G(4-5) G(4-6) G(5-6) 
Q2a 0.935 0.178 0.740 0.114 0.000 0.194 0.690 0.116 0.000 0.117 0.859 0.049 0.069 0.000 0.063 
Q2b 0.686 0.119 0.909 0.698 0.230 0.081 0.606 0.446 0.439 0.135 0.298 0.052 0.768 0.195 0.163 
Q2c 0.257 0.567 1.000 0.804 0.869 0.125 0.230 0.225 0.349 0.557 0.760 0.497 0.805 0.872 0.687 
  
Groups are: 1 = academic staff, 2= external auditors, 3= investment advisors of banks, 4= company employees, 5= government officials, 6= 
investors.     
 The MW test explains which particular pairs of group means are significantly different from each other. 
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In this research a 95% level of confidence has been chosen to test the differences between 
groups. Therefore, when the level of significance is equal to or lower than the critical value 
0.05, it indicates that at least one of the groups is different from at least one of the others.  
As can be seen from Table 7.1, the definition which received most support was the second 
definition Q2b which described corporate governance in terms of an organisation’s 
relationship with all stakeholders who are affected by or affect the company's operations and 
decisions. This definition received strong agreement from all respondents with an overall mean 
score of 4.20. All the group means were more than neutral, which demonstrated the strong and 
clear support by respondents for the stakeholders’ perspective.  The mean score of groups 
varied between 3.91 and 4.38. 
 In Q2c, corporate governance is referred to as an organisation’s relationship with all members 
of society, irrespective of whether they affect or are affected by the company's operations and 
decisions, and this was supported with an overall mean response of 3.22, the mean of each 
group centralised between 3.05 and 3.40.  
The result is in line with the findings of Iqbal and Mirakhor (2004) when they argue that the 
governance model in an Islamic economic system is a stakeholder-oriented model where the 
governance structure and process at system and firm level protect the rights of stakeholders 
who are exposed to any risk as a result of the firm’s activities.  
In respect of Q2a, which defined corporate governance as an organisation’s relationship with 
its shareholders to ensure that it acts in accordance with their interests, this received less 
support with a mean score of 2.94. 
According to table 7.1, the respondents were divided into two categories. The first category 
consisted of academics, auditors and company employees who showed disagreement with this 
statement with mean scores of 2.67, 2.69, and 2.61 respectively, whereas bank investment 
advisors, government officials and investors groups were more supportive of this definition, 
with mean scores of 3.05, 3.10 and 3.62 respectively.    
In the first statement (definition), the Kruskal-Wallis test revealed a significant difference in 
the average perceptions amongst the groups involved in the survey at the 5 per cent level of 
significance. Investors most strongly supported this definition, with a mean of 3.62, while 
academic accountants, external auditors and company employees groups were less supportive 
with means of 2.67, 2.69, and 2.61 respectively.  
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The Mann-Whitney (MW) test was carried out to identify which group or groups’ view are 
statistically different. Table 7.2 showed that the investors group was present in four 
relationships which shared significant differences in group means (p=0.000).   
These results can be explained as follows; 
1. The difference between the group of investors and company employees reflects the 
conflict of interest between these groups, where the investors prefer companies to act 
primarily in their interests even if these interests are not the interests of other 
stakeholders. On the other hand, the employees perceived that their benefit might be in 
conflict with the shareholders’ interests.  
2. In respect of academics (G (1-6), p=0.000) and external auditors (G (2-6), p=0.000) 
along with investors, the reason for their support for the broad definition, the 
stakeholders’ perspective, might be ascribed to their higher education which may have 
given them more knowledge and insight into the benefits of pursuing the interests of the 
stakeholders which should eventually lead to the benefit of shareholders in the long 
term.   
3. A marginally significant result (G (3-6), p=0.049) contrasts attitudes of investors and 
investment advisors of banks.  
To summarise, the study participants perceived that the most appropriate definition of 
corporate governance in the Libyan context is the stakeholders’ perspective, since less support 
is given to the shareholders’ view. However, participants were concerned about the meaning of 
stakeholders, as all members of society, or only the groups who are affected by or affect the 
company's operation. Participants suggested that companies need to identify their stakeholders 
and take account of them as a part of their practice of corporate governance.  
The result supported the finding of Iqbal and Mirakhor (2004) when they argue that the 
governance model in an Islamic economic system is a stakeholder-oriented model where 
governance structure and process at system and firm level protect the rights of stakeholders 
who are exposed risks as a result of the firm’s activities. Also, Clarke (2005) suggested that 
corporate governance needs to go beyond the immediate mechanisms and institutions of 
corporate governance, to consider the bigger questions of how corporations allocate resources 
and returns, and how they contribute to economic development.  Moreover, these findings were 
in line with those of Allen (2005), whose study analysed corporate governance in emerging 
economies. His results showed that since markets are imperfect and incomplete in these 
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economies, the focus on all stakeholders, rather than shareholders, may lead to a better 
allocation of resources and equitable income distribution. 
 
7.3.1.2 The Importance of Corporate Governance in Libya 
 
Q3 explores the perceived purposes of corporate governance in Libya. The aim of this 
question is to determine respondents’ attitudes towards the importance of corporate 
governance: they were asked for their opinions on the benefit of introducing corporate 
governance to Libyan companies. The respondents were invited and requested to indicate 
their opinion on a five-point scale ranging from not at all important to very important (1=Not 
important at all, 2= Unimportant, 3= Uncertain, 4= Important, 5= Very important).  
Table 7.3 indicates that, in general, all the statements listed were viewed by respondents as 
important since no mean scores were less than 3.55. It shows that respondents in all groups 
believed, with no significant differences, that corporate governance would be useful for the 
Libyan economy. In addition, the statement received the highest support with a total mean of 
4.56 and the strongest support was from academic staff, with a mean of 4.69. Less support 
came from the investors group with a mean of 4.20. 
This result was in line with the suggestions by Judge et al (2003) when they said ‘’effective 
governance is critical to all economic transactions, especially in emerging and transitioning 
economies’’. Also, it is in line with McCarthy and Puffer’s (2003) finding when they stated 
“Corporate governance is a key to developing a market economy and civil society in 
transitioning economies like Russia’’. So, the study might reflect and demonstrate a strong 
relationship between good governance practice and the level of economic development.   
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Table 7.3 Group means and Kruskal-Wallis Tests showing respondents' views regarding the significance of corporate governance in Libya   
 
Statement Group means Kruskal-Wallis Test 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 All mean Rank P-value Result
Q3a- Useful for the Libyan economy 4.69 4.65 4.62 4.57 4.66 4.20 4.56 1 .072 Not-significant  
Q3b- Improve accountability mechanism  4.22 4.44 4.38 3.91 4.21 4.03 4.19 2 .103 Not-significant 
Q3c- Reduce the level of corruption 3.56 3.88 3.43 3.34 3.72 3.26 3.55 6 .125 Not-significant 
Q3d- Improve the investment climate 3.78 3.63 3.62 3.60 3.79 3.74 3.69 5 .951 Not-significant 
Q3e- Improve corporate social responsibility 
in Libya 
4.53 4.40 4.19 4.06 3.83 3.80 4.14 3 .000 Significant٭  
Q3f- Protect stakeholders’ rights 4.26 4.21 4.14 4.03 3.79 3.71 4.03 4 .017 Significant٭ 
 
 
Groups are: 1 = academic staff, 2= external auditors, 3= investment advisors of banks, 4= company employees, 5= government officials, 6= 
investors.     
The KW test shows whether there are any differences in the means of responses given by the groups for each question.  
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Table 7.4 The Mann-Whitney probabilities: respondents’ views regarding the significance of corporate governance in Libya   
 
Questions G(1-2) G(1-3) G(1-4) G(1-5) G(1-6) G(2-3) G(2-4) G(2-5) G(2-6) G(3-4) G(3-5) G(3-6) G(4-5) G(4-6) G(5-6) 
Q3a 0.743 0.788 0.416 0.790 0.011 0.993 0.582 0.972 0.013 0.675 0.971 0.055 0.597 0.060 0.024 
Q3b 0.190 0.453 0.159 0.968 0.532 0.720 0.005 0.192 0.070 0.049 0.445 0.232 0.187 0.524 0.570 
Q3c 0.110 0.969 0.550 0.246 0.244 0.298 0.046 0.953 0.009 0.697 0.495 0.510 0.150 0.684 0.067 
Q3d 0.546 0.846 0.412 0.932 0.878 0.822 0.828 0.511 0.665 0.694 0.794 0.894 0.388 0.527 0.825 
Q3e 0.296 0.102 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.332 0.019 0.002 0.002 0.443 0.127 0.122 0.285 0.249 0.913 
Q3f 0.694 0.900 0.123 0.012 0.011 0.694 0.184 0.015 0.011 0.278 0.079 0.071 0.250 0.157 0.749 
 
Groups are: 1 = academic staff, 2= external auditors, 3= investment advisors of banks, 4= company employees, 5= government officials, 6= 
investors.     
  
The MW test explains which particular pairs of group means are significantly different from each other 
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Good corporate governance improving the accountability mechanism was the second supported 
statement in the list with a mean score of 4.19. Strong support came from auditors, with a mean 
score of 4.44, and investment advisor, with a mean score of 4.38. 
The results support the finding reported by McKinsey (2000) that corporate governance was 
perceived as adding value to a company according to the widely cited investor opinion survey 
on corporate governance. Interestingly, although investors should be concerned with improving 
accountability mechanisms, the data analysis revealed that investors ranked as the fifth group 
in terms of support with a mean score (4.03).    
The third ranked statement concerned the relationship between the implementation of corporate 
governance and improving corporate social responsibility, with a mean score of 4.14, whereas 
protecting stakeholders’ rights was in fourth position, with a mean of 4.03.  
Improving the investment climate (Q3d) was ranked fifth with a mean score of 3.69. This 
finding might indicate that government officials and investors appreciate the problems of 
raising investment for companies since they are the ones more likely to be involved increasing 
capital for a company.  Academics might be being aware and conscious of the real problems of 
the country since they can understand the main obstacles of investment opportunities. The 
finding suggested that good corporate governance has positive impacts and can eliminate 
adverse effects which have a negative impact on stakeholders. This compares with Tam and 
Tan (2007) when they argued that with more effective governance arrangements, investor 
protection can be enforced, market mechanisms can function competitively and minority 
shareholders' interests are safeguarded.    
The lowest mean value concerned the reducing the level of corruption, with a mean of 3.55, 
which is not in favour of  Shen et al (2006) argument who argued that establishing a sound 
corporate governance policy benefits many levels of management and ownership, and can help 
companies avoid management-level corruption and enhance company values. The lower 
support for the statement that corporate governance reduces the level of corruption might 
reflect participants’ view that corporate governance is not a miracle drug to fight corruption. 
Fighting corruption needs enforcement of laws, changing bad culture and stimulating the moral 
and ethical behaviour of employees and management. 
The Kruskal-Wallis (KW) Test revealed significant differences between groups about Q3e and 
Q3f where the P value was 0.000 and 0.017 respectively. 
To investigate which group or groups were different regarding Q3e, Mann-Whitney Tests were 
carried out. Regarding table 7.4, there was a difference between the academics and auditors 
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groups and company employees, government officials and the investors groups. The academics 
and auditors strongly agreed with the statement that corporate governance is important to 
improve the corporate social responsibilities in the Libyan context, with mean scores of 4.53 
and 4.40 respectively; the company employees, government official and the investors groups 
were less supportive, with mean scores of 4.06, 3.83 and 3.80 respectively. The reason why 
participants support this statement may be their knowledge, especially for academics, as most 
of them graduated in western countries where the accounting science and the principles of 
corporate governance are more developed. This finding is consistent with the argument by 
Clarke (2007) when he said ‘’the effective integration of corporate social and environmental 
responsibilities could potentially release greater value for both shareholders and wider 
stakeholders’’. 
In respect of Q3f, which asked the groups’ opinion on the relationship between introducing 
good corporate governance and protection of stakeholders’ rights, the Mann-Whitney (MW) 
test revealed that there was a significant difference between the academics and auditors groups 
and government officials and investors groups. The academics and auditors groups most 
strongly agreed with the statement (with means of 4.26 and 4.21 respectively) which might 
reflect their analytical when looking at the interactions between companies and other parties, 
while the government officials and investors groups showed less support, with mean scores of 
3.79 and 3.71 respectively.  
This finding revealed that in Libya, as a developing country, stakeholders’ rights are thought to 
be less protected. The result was in line with Claessens (2003) when he stated:  
“Corporate governance can reinforce the better relationship with all stakeholders, which 
eventually helps to improve social and labour relationships and aspects such as 
environmental protection”.  
 
This finding also is in line with most studies carried out in developing countries. For instance, 
Tam and Tan (2007) found that corporate governance in Malaysia needs to be better able to 
scrutinise and restrain the power of large shareholders to protect the interests of minority 
shareholders. 
 
7.3.1.3 The Significance of Corporate Governance in Libya  
 
Question four endeavoured to determine the significance of applying good corporate 
governance to different groups of stakeholders. In order to achieve this objective, the 
 137 
 
participants were asked to give their opinions on the significance of corporate governance in 
Libya to all parties listed. Groups were requested to indicate their level of agreement.  
The results in Table 7.5 indicate that, in general, participants in principle agreed on the 
significance of corporate governance to all listed parties, since all items recorded overall mean 
scores of more than 3.74. The respondents ranked creditors and government agencies as first 
and second main beneficiaries of applying good corporate governance, with means of 4.70 and 
4.64, respectively. This result may be explained on the grounds that low commitment to good 
principles of corporate governance will erode the rights of stakeholders. Notably, creditors, 
such as banks, suppliers and other lenders, are suffering from poor practices of corporate 
governance and the government also suffers by losing tax revenue. 
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Table 7.5 Groups means and Kruskal-Wallis Tests showing the significance of corporate governance to different groups of stakeholders 
 
Statement Group means Kruskal-Wallis Test 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 All mean Rank P-value Result
Q4a- Shareholders 4.28 4.47 4.40 4.40 4.41 4.71 4.45 3 .017 Significant٭ 
Q4b- Creditors (suppliers, banks, others)    4.84 4.77 4.62 4.66 4.71 4.57 4.70 1 .223 Not-significant 
Q4c- Employees 4.38 4.37 4.43 4.43 4.28 4.15 4.34 4 .699        Not-significant 
Q4d- Government and its agencies  4.81 4.70 4.48 4.60 4.76 4.45 4.64 2 .036 Significant٭ 
Q4e – Auditors. 3.81 3.95 3.62 3.74 3.70 3.46 3.74 6 .107 Not-significant 
Q4f- Society at Large 4.47 4.42 4.15 4.26 4.41 3.90 4.28 5 .078 Not-significant 
Groups are: 1 = academic staff, 2= external auditors, 3= investment advisors of banks, 4= company employees, 5= government officials, 6= 
investors.  
    
The KW test shows whether there are any differences in the means of responses given by the groups for each question.  
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Table 7.6 The Mann-Whitney probabilities: respondents’ views about the significance of corporate governance to stakeholders 
 
 
Questions G(1-2) G(1-3) G(1-4) G(1-5) G(1-6) G(2-3) G(2-4) G(2-5) G(2-6) G(3-4) G(3-5) G(3-6) G(4-5) G(4-6) G(5-6) 
Q4a 0.095 0.379 0.310 0.281 0.000 0.545 0.470 0.565 0.056 1.000 0.924 0.023 0.912 0.009 0.016 
Q4b 0.417 0.065 0.082 0.229 0.026 0.219 0.285 0.617 0.101 0.775 0.486 0.827 0.631 0.567 0.317 
Q4c 1.000 0.759 0.829 0.631 0.250 0.748 0.819 0.611 0.220 0.884 0.480 0.191 0.470 0.145 0.547 
Q4d 0.340 0.011 0.089 0.611 0.010 0.072 0.394 0.685 0.063 0.322 0.042 0.960 0.245 0.320 0.039 
Q4e 0.352 0.395 0.668 0.474 0.058 0.127 0.148 0.118 0.007 0.549 0.767 0.502 0.694 0.088 0.234 
Q4f 0.787 0.163 0.254 1.000 0.010 0.216 0.345 0.818 0.013 0.651 0.230 0.446 0.330 0.141 0.026 
 
Groups are: 1 = academic staff, 2= external auditors, 3= investment advisors of banks, 4= company employees, 5= government officials, 6= 
investors. 
     
The MW test explains which particular pairs of group means are significantly different from each other.
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The third and forth ranks were shareholders and employees, with means 4.45 and 4.34 
respectively. The less important beneficiaries were viewed as society at large and auditors, 
with mean score 4.28 and 3.74, respectively. All findings can be explained on the grounds that 
corporate governance is important in developing the economy, and all parties could benefit 
since the mean score was high in all statements.    
Although all selected groups showed agreement with the significance of a corporate 
governance, the Kruskal-Wallis ( KW) test showed there were significant statistical differences 
between the six groups in respect of shareholders Q4a and government and its agencies Q4d    
(P-value= 0.017 and 0.036 respectively). However, according to the group means, the 
differences were in the level of agreement, not in disagreement.  
The Mann-Whitney (MW) test results (table 7.6) indicate that there were differences in 
response between the investors group and the academics, bank investment advisors, company 
employees and the government official groups, where the investors group strongly supported 
this statement with a mean score of 4.71, while the bank investment advisors, company 
employees and the government official groups supported this statement but with less force         
( group mean score were 4.28, 4.40, 4.40 and 4.41 respectively). 
The Kruskal-Wallis (KW) test of Q4d showed statistically significant differences between 
participants. The Mann-Whitney (MW) test results (table 7.6) identified statistically significant 
differences in responses between the academics and government officials groups and the bank 
investment advisors and investors groups. The academics and government officials strongly 
agreed on the statement, with mean scores of 4.81 and 4.76 respectively, whereas the bank 
investment advisors and investors groups also supported this statement but less than academics 
and government officials (mean scores of 4.48 and 4.45 respectively).           
The difference between groups might be due to the diversity of their interests or to their 
knowledge of the understanding of corporate governance. Furthermore, this finding can be 
explained on the grounds that the purpose of applying corporate governance in Libya is to 
protect the creditors group since they are affected by management deception, especially in the 
transition time of the economy. 
7.3.2 The Rights of Stakeholders    
 
Question five concentrated on the rights of stakeholders, including shareholders. In general, 
stakeholders (such as creditors and employees) play an important role in influencing a 
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corporate governance system. Therefore, stakeholders’ interests are often protected by law. In 
the same vein, the OECD principle (2004) stated that;  
“The corporate governance framework should recognise the rights of stakeholders 
established by law or through mutual agreements and encourage active co-operation 
between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the 
sustainability of financially sound enterprises” ( Para IV). 
 
Respondents from all groups involved in this study were asked to give their opinions on a list 
of statements relating to rights of stakeholders provided in this question.  With a five-point 
scale question, they were asked to indicate their levels of opinion about existing stakeholders’ 
rights in the Libyan context.  
Table 7.7 demonstrated that, in general, respondents in all groups agreed in principle with most 
of the statements listed to shareholders’ rights, since these statements recorded overall mean 
scores of 4.61 or above. Among the statements receiving the highest mean scores and ranking 
were that shareholders approve the annual accounts, distribution of profits and appoint external 
auditors with a mean score of 4.86 and shareholders have the right to participate, vote at the 
general meeting and be treated fairly with a mean score of 4.85. 
These results are in line with the findings and recommendations made by RCGWG (2003), 
when they argued that shareholders are explicitly given the right to vote and participate in the 
general assembly of the company, and with the OECD principle (2004) when it stated that a 
corporate governance should protect shareholders’ rights as well as ensuring that all 
shareholders are taking and practising their rights (OECD, 2004 Para. II). 
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Table 7.7 Groups means and Kruskal-Wallis Tests showing respondents' answers regarding the rights of stakeholders under current practice 
of corporate governance in Libya.   
 
Statement Group means Kruskal-Wallis Test 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 overall 
mean 
Rank P-value Result
Q5a- Shareholders approve the annual 
accounts, distribution of profits.  
4.81 4.77 4.81 5.00 4.97 4.83 4.86 1 0.025 Significant٭ 
Q5b-Shareholders have the right to 
participate, and vote at the general meeting.  
4.78 4.77 4.81 5.00 4.93 4.83 4.85 2 0.041 significant٭ 
Q5c- Shareholders have the right to be 
informed on decisions representing 
fundamental changes. 
4.59 4.60 4.62 4.71 4.52 4.60 4.61 3 0.889 Not-
significant 
Q5d- Stakeholders have legal access to 
relevant information by their interests. 
3.97 4.19 4.06 4.37 4.07 3.94 4.11 4 0.096 Not-
significant 
Q5e- Stakeholders’ rights are protected.  3.66 4.05 3.88 4.00 3.36 3.86 3.81 5 0.016 significant٭ 
Q5f-Stakeholders’ rights that are established 
by law are respected by companies. 
2.77 3.05 2.83 3.56 2.54 2.70 2.93 6 0.000 significant٭ 
Q5g- Companies act in a responsible manner 
and protect the rights of the society. 
2.48 2.85 2.72 3.55 2.54 2.82 2.85 7 0.000 significant٭ 
Groups are: 1 = academic staff, 2= external auditors, 3= investment advisors of banks, 4= company employees, 5= government officials, 6= 
investors.     
The KW test shows whether there are any differences in the means of responses given by the groups for each question.  
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Table 7.8 The Mann-Whitney probabilities: respondents’ views regarding the rights of stakeholders in Libya    
 
Questions G(1-2) G(1-3) G(1-4) G(1-5) G(1-6) G(2-3) G(2-4) G(2-5) G(2-6) G(3-4) G(3-5) G(3-6) G(4-5) G(4-6) G(5-6) 
Q5a 0.640 0.979 0.008 0.063 0.865 0.704 0.002 0.023 0.509 0.008 0.072 0.858 0.272 0.011 0.083 
Q5b 0.888 0.806 0.004 0.102 0.627 0.704 0.002 0.070 0.509 0.008 0.196 0.858 0.117 0.011 0.221 
Q5c 0.814 0.922 0.509 0.594 0.905 0.912 0.315 0.703 0.910 0.464 0.680 0.992 0.222 0.408 0.654 
Q5d 0.121 0.660 0.012 0.471 0.727 0.503 0.111 0.278 0.393 0.121 0.989 0.875 0.017 0.502 0.973 
Q5e 0.031 0.416 0.068 0.254 0.260 0.388 0.575 0.002 0.212 0.372 0.098 1.000 0.012 0.173 0.027 
Q5f 0.151 0.728 0.001 0.160 0.610 0.345 0.014 0.016 0.088 0.004 0.130 0.466 0.000 0.001 0.425 
Q5g 0.115 0.359 0.000 0.904 0.159 0.668 0.002 0.162 0.951 0.003 0.400 0.717 0.000 0.004 0.226 
 
 Groups are: 1 = academic staff, 2= external auditors, 3= investment advisors of banks, 4= company employees, 5= government officials, 6= 
investors. 
     
The MW test explains which particular pairs of group means are significantly different from each other. 
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The cornerstone of corporate governance arrangements for conventional businesses is the 
protection of shareholders’ rights (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006). In the MENA region, even 
though shareholders’ rights are clearly identified in the legal system, there is still a gap 
between the law and the practice (RCGWG, 2003).32  
Regarding Q5d, there was a satisfaction from participants when the mean score of all 
respondents was 4.11. The investors group was the weakest in its support for this issue with a 
mean score of 3.94, while the strongest agreement came from company employees (mean score 
of 4.37). There was also striking evidence that the academic staff also appear to believe that 
stakeholders have unsatisfactory legal access to relevant information, with the mean score of 
3.97.  
Question Q5e endeavoured to determine whether the stakeholders’ rights are robustly protected 
by the legal system. There were significant differences in the participants’ opinions towards 
this statement with generally low support (see Table 7.7). The result can be attributed to the 
commercial law in Libya which was promulgated in 1953 and, since that time, there have been 
many amendments to the law to coincide with fluctuating Libyan business policies. Thus, 
almost of participants were reluctant to agree with this statement, however, external auditors 
and companies’ employees were most supporting of the statement with mean scores of 4.05 
and 4.00 respectively. 
The Mann-Whitney (MW) test results (table 7.8) indicated the differences in the responses 
made by the groups to questions Q5e and Q5f. Question Q5e revealed a significant difference 
between the group of government officials and the groups of external auditors, company 
employees and investors. The reasons why the government group (Libyan Stock Market 
employees) supported this statement less may be their desire for more change in the laws and 
regulation which would eventually lead to developing the business activities and the financial 
market. This explanation is in line with the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) 
when they emphasise that good corporate governance is important in building market 
confidence and encouraging more stable, long term international investment flows. This 
statement revealed a notable separation of opinion between the academic staff and the external 
auditors when they scored means of 3.66 and 4.05 respectively. This can be explained on the 
grounds that most academic staff are more aware that in Libya, as in other developing 
                                                 
32 The RCGWG (2003) argued that shareholder participation is weak in the MENA Region which can be 
attributed to the lack of a particular culture and / or poor awareness by small investors.  
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countries, the protection of stakeholders’ rights is low. This result was in line with results 
reported by Nganga et al (2003) who stated: “Legal protection of investor rights is particularly 
important in emerging markets where investors are uncertain about the protection of their 
property rights”. Also, a survey of international investors by McKinsey & Co in 2002 found 
that 85% consider corporate governance in Africa and Eastern Europe to be ‘‘equally, or more, 
important than financial issues … in deciding which companies to invest in’’.  
La Porta et al (1998) have suggested that better investor protection increases the willingness of 
investors to provide financing and should be reflected in lower costs of access to external 
finance.  
Question Q5f asked if companies respect their stakeholders' rights. This question was in sixth 
rank out of seven, and with a mean of 2.93, indicating less support from a majority of the 
respondents. Company employees group showed a slight agreement with a mean score of 3.56, 
whereas external auditors group showed a neutral agreement with the statement when a mean 
score was 3.05. 
Although a company should make the interests of shareholders a priority, it should not 
overlook benefits for its other stakeholders. However, after analysing the responses to question 
five (Q5), it is notable that respondents thought the rights of stakeholders in the Libyan context 
may need more protection, as a basis for developing the climate of investment. Therefore, 
improved corporate governance is seen as important in the Libyan context to reinforce better 
relationships with all stakeholders.  
7.3.3 The Obstacles to Good Corporate Governance in the Libyan Context 
Question (Q6) attempted to determine the main obstacles to improving corporate governance 
practice in the Libyan context. In order to achieve this objective, respondents from all groups 
involved in this study were asked to give their opinions on points they perceived as obstacles 
for the practising of corporate governance, indicating their level of agreement with areas on a 
five-point scale, where 5 represented Strongly Agree and 1 reflected Strongly Disagree. 
The results are reported in Table 7.9, where respondents agreed in principle with the majority 
of the statements listed in this question representing impediments to good practice of corporate 
governance in Libya. 
Poor enforcement of the legal system, with an overall mean of 4.43, and the range of the mean 
scores for all groups were between 3.43 and 4.54, was seen as the greatest obstacle followed by 
the lack of legal and regulatory systems, with an overall mean of 4.38.    
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The third factor, with a mean of 4.05, was poor leadership within the company, while the 
fourth factor was government interference in business activities, with a mean score of 3.91. 
Respondents considered that the remaining statements have less effect on the corporate 
governance system in Libya, which included social connections (with a mean score of 3.75), 
the Libyan culture (with a mean score of 3.46) and the form of company ownership (with a 
mean score of 2.55).                                            
These findings can be explained on the grounds that the legal system in Libya is perceived as 
either not being adequate or as being outdated and needing, along with other laws and 
regulations that govern corporate governance, revision. This weakness might have appeared 
after the government mitigated its control on the business activities, moving forward to an open 
market. Therefore, more consideration should be given to systems and procedures of laws and 
regulation that govern company and business activities across all business activity.    
Regarding Q6a, the mean score was over 4.00, with the exception of academic staff who gave 
the weakest support, with a mean score of 3.43, while the strongest support came from the 
investors with a mean of 4.54. It was somewhat surprising that the academics group did not 
support Q6a (laws are not enforced), whereas all other groups supported this. This may reflect 
the reality that the groups who agreed are actively involved in business activities and directly 
experience the consequences of poor enforcement.  
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Table 7.9 Group means and Kruskal-Wallis Tests showing respondents' answers regarding the following factors which could affect the 
practice of corporate governance in Libya. 
 
Statement Group means Kruskal-Wallis Test 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 overall 
mean 
Rank P-value Result
Q6a- Poor enforcement of laws 3.43 4.51 4.29 4.43 4.38 4.54 4.43 1   .368 Not-significant 
Q6b- Lack of legal and regulatory system 
that govern companies’ activity  
4.75 4.33 4.14 4.34 4.34 4.31 4.38 2 .002 significant٭ 
Q6c- The Libyan culture 3.58 3.37 3.52 3.22 3.64 3.48 3.46 6 .284 Not-significant 
Q6d- Social connections (family, tribe and 
others). 
3.68 3.60 3.90 3.81 3.71 3.88 3.75 5 .573 Not-significant 
Q6e- Poor leadership within the company 4.31 4.07 4.00 3.50 4.24 4.17 4.05 3 .000 significant٭ 
Q6f- The form of company ownership 2.57 2.77 2.29 2.40 2.45 2.49 2.55 7 .101 Not-significant 
Q6g-The government interference in business 
activities (political interference) 
3.77 3.88 3.62 4.12 3.78 4.19 3.91 4 .010 significant٭ 
Groups are: 1 = academic staff, 2= external auditors, 3= investment advisors of banks, 4= company employees, 5= government officials, 6= 
investors.     
 
The KW test shows whether there are any differences in the means of responses given by the groups for each question.  
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Table 7.10 The Mann-Whitney probabilities: respondents’ answers regarding factors that could affect the practice of corporate governance in 
Libya. 
 
Questions G(1-2) G(1-3) G(1-4) G(1-5) G(1-6) G(2-3) G(2-4) G(2-5) G(2-6) G(3-4) G(3-5) G(3-6) G(4-5) G(4-6) G(5-6) 
Q6a 0.116 0.718 0.559 0.852 0.142 0.117 0.374 0.221 0.612 0.374 0.593 0.099 0.692 0.342 0.195 
Q6b 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.233 0.814 0.968 0.959 0.159 0.222 0.277 0.769 0.795 0.994 
Q6c 0.171 0.723 0.109 0.607 0.323 0.438 0.637 0.077 0.590 0.287 0.452 0.690 0.055 0.375 0.142 
Q6d 0.982 0.116 0.312 0.584 0.247 0.149 0.319 0.612 0.240 0.562 0.323 0.649 0.667 0.882 0.581 
Q6e 0.042 0.006 0.000 0.539 0.277 0.307 0.002 0.164 0.427 0.031 0.019 0.117 0.000 0.001 0.617 
Q6f 0.977 0.044 0.072 0.136 0.158 0.036 0.058 0.115 0.142 0.575 0.547 0.259 0.915 0.536 0.656 
Q6g 0.748 0.388 0.074 0.909 0.019 0.174 0.065 0.872 0.010 0.010 0.341 0.001 0.109 0.656 0.034 
 
Groups are: 1 = academic staff, 2= external auditors, 3= investment advisors of banks, 4= company employees, 5= government officials, 6= 
investors. 
 
The MW test explains which particular pairs of group means are significantly different from each other.      
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In respect of Q6b, table 7.9 shows that Libya suffers from a lack of legal and regulatory 
systems to organise business and govern companies’ activity. Group mean scores were more 
than 4.10 with most support coming from academics (4.75) and less support from bank 
investment advisors, with a mean score of 4.14. The support of the statement can be explained 
on the grounds that Libya, like many countries in the MENA region, faces many problems in 
lacking a legal system. For instance, only few countries in the region have bankruptcy 
procedures (RCGWS, 2003). Also, the result confirms the economic changes have not been 
followed by comprehensive review of the legal system33.  
 The Q6a and Q6b results support the views of these researchers who believe that most 
developing countries exhibit weaknesses in enforcement of legislation (see, for example, 
Berglöf and Claessens, 2004).  
Table 7.9 also suggests that all groups agreed that the effect of culture on the corporate 
governance system in the Libyan context was less significant as a barrier, with mean scores 
between 3.64 and 3.22 (the strongest support came from government officials and the weakest 
came from company employees). The result shows that although culture ranked as the fifth 
factor between the factors, the overall mean and group means scores were somewhat neutral, 
which can be explained on the grounds that companies are not separated from the cultural 
norms which influence the corporate governance framework. 
Comments on the last page of the questionnaire by respondents offered insights into this issue. 
These comments focused on the remedy for corruption by stimulating more carefully the 
privatisation of companies and creating a better environment of competitiveness, increasing the 
level of salaries and wages (compensation), which do not balance with the cost of living and 
may cause poor management in many companies. Also, important were nominating managers 
and employees according to a merit system rather than social and cultural connections, tackling 
the restricted levels of business education with a focus on business values and management 
behaviours and following the Islamic principles. This result is in line with the recommendation 
by Najib (2007: p32) when he said:  
“Introducing corporate governance as part of the culture of the country will constitute a 
good and practical solution for the problem of ownership management mix and it will 
allow for separate ownership from management, which is in the best interest of the 
company. Authorities in securities markets, whether government or private business, 
                                                 
33 The clear example for the lack of legal system is that although there is allowing of private sector and the law 
prohibits working with others by compensation.   
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should provide training opportunities for companies’ management and staff as well as 
other parties with a view to introducing new management techniques and risk 
assessment methods and strategies. Additionally, public governance and corporate 
governance have to be dealt with jointly and are of equal importance. Not only do many 
enterprises in the region still belong to the state, but also public governance had direct 
repercussions on corporate governance”.  
 
Social connections such as family and tribe were also perceived by participants; with a range of 
mean scores between 3.60 and 3.90 (the strongest support came from bank investment 
advisors, whereas the weakest support was from auditors). This result could be explained on 
the grounds that the differences between culture and social connection are complicated; 
therefore, the results were similar (see the table 7.9 Q6c and Q6d).34 
Question Q6e concentrated on poor leadership within companies as a possible barrier to good 
corporate governance practice in Libya. Unsurprisingly, company employees were the weakest 
supporters, with a mean score of 3.50, whereas stronger support came from academics, 
government officials and investors, with mean scores of 4.31, 4.24 and 4.17 respectively. 
Question Q6f of the survey asked respondents whether they thought that company ownership 
structure affects the practice of corporate governance in Libya. The issue received far weaker 
support with no significant differences among groups’ answers.  
Auditors and academics groups were the strongest supporters, with mean scores of 2.77 and 
2.57, and bank investment advisors showed least support with a mean score of 2.29. The 
argument might be ascribed to the aspiration of the bank investment advisors to improve the 
governance framework regardless of the ownership structure. Also, this confirms that 
academics and external auditors were more convinced that dispersal of ownership structure and 
effective institutional ownership can help to improve governance mechanisms and practice. 
Government interference in business activities within the company was ranked as the fourth 
strongest factor (mean = 3.91). As can be seen from Table 7.9, respondents were in general 
support of this statement, with mean scores over 3.60 in all groups. The stronger supporters 
were investors and government officials, with means of 4.19 and 4.12 respectively, while the 
least support came from bank investment advisors, with a mean score of 3.62. This finding 
reflects that all respondents believe that, during the last three decades government, interference 
in business activities were visible, and that even after reducing the government control in 
                                                 
34 Some comments on the last page argued that social connection is a part of Libyan culture.  
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business activities, the government still has considerable power and controls the business 
activities.35    
The Kruskal-Wallis test for question six showed that (at p<0.05) there were no significant 
differences in the groups’ answers in Q6a, Q6c, Q6d, and Q6f. However, there was a 
significant difference in groups’ answers in questions Q6b, Q6e and Q6g.  
The Mann-Whitney test was carried out to understand which groups were different. The result 
in table 7.10 identified significant differences between academics and all other groups. In 
question Q6e, the Mann-Whitney test identified significant differences between company 
employees group and all other groups. Table 7.10 showed also statistically significant 
differences between academic group and both external auditors and bank investment advisors 
groups, and between government official and investment advisors of banks. However, these 
differences were generally in the level of agreement. The results seem to confirm the fact that 
there are many factors which affect and are affected by the practice of corporate governance in 
Libya. The result also suggest the companies are not isolated from the environment in which 
they operates; economic, social, cultural and ethical factors are all seen as a part of this 
environment and therefore could influence the practice of corporate governance. In addition, 
these significant differences should be viewed as indicating the presence of diversity in 
agreement-disagreement responses as a result of different perceptions of different stakeholder 
groups.  
7.3.4 The Framework of Corporate Governance 
Question (Q7) sought to determine reasons that might prevent good corporate governance 
practice in Libyan companies. Participants from all groups involved in this study were asked to 
give their opinions on possible factors which might restrain good corporate governance in 
Libyan companies. The chosen groups were requested to indicate their level of agreement with 
listed statements on a five-point scale, where 5 represented Strongly Agree and 1 signified 
Strongly Disagree. Responses to this question are summarised in Table 7.11. 
 
                                                 
35 For more details of this point see the interviews analysis in chapter eight.  
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Table 7.11 Group means and Kruskal-Wallis Tests showing respondents' answers regarding the possible reasons that might have been 
prevented good corporate governance practice in Libya.  
 
Statement Group means Kruskal-Wallis Test 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 Overall 
mean 
Rank P-value Result
Q7a- Poor financial and non-financial 
disclosure 
4.66 4.65 4.52 4.74 4.72 4.77 4.69 1   .437 Not-significant 
Q7b- The companies’ tax rate prevents good 
practice of corporate governance. 
4.09 4.05 4.05 4.06 4.10 4.34 4.12 2 .077 Not-significant 
Q7c- Not adopting IAS and absence of the L 
AS leading to poor corporate governance. 
4.13 3.98 3.95 3.51 4.14 3.48 3.87 4 .000 Significant٭ 
Q7d- Good relationships between companies 
and external auditors 
2.37 1.88 2.81 2.24 2.52 2.61 2.35 9 .000 Significant٭ 
Q7e- Inappropriate composition of Board of 
Director in Libyan companies. 
3.81 4.02 3.71 3.86 3.66 3.61 3.80 5 .099 Not-significant 
Q7f- The powerful Chief Executive Officers 4.13 3.45 3.90 3.51 3.57 3.91 3.72 6 .001 significant٭ 
Q7g- Dual role played by same person as 
CEO and Chairman 
3.83 3.71 3.81 3.60 3.38 3.68 3.66 8 
.221 
Not-
significant 
Q7h- The state of the Libyan economy 
affects on the practice of corporate 
governance practice in Libya. 
4.07 3.74 4.00 3.89 3.76 3.90 3.88 3 
.057 
Not-
significant 
Q7i- Privatisation and creating stock 
exchange market have improved the practice 
of corporate governance in Libya.  
3.52 3.62 3.40 3.76 3.72 4.03 3.69 7 
.001 
Significant٭ 
Groups are: 1 = academic staff, 2= external auditors, 3= investment advisors of banks, 4= company employees, 5= government officials, 6= 
investors.     
The KW test shows whether there are any differences in the means of responses given by the groups for each question.  
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Table 7.12 The Mann-Whitney probabilities: respondents’ answers regarding possible reasons that might prevent good corporate governance 
practice in Libya.  
 
Questions G(1-2) G(1-3) G(1-4) G(1-5) G(1-6) G(2-3) G(2-4) G(2-5) G(2-6) G(3-4) G(3-5) G(3-6) G(4-5) G(4-6) G(5-6) 
Q7a 0.964 0.340 0.442 0.571 0.300 0.331 0.386 0.518 0.250 0.097 0.149 0.057 0.867 0.782 0.666 
Q7b 0.608 0.799 0.682 0.713 0.049 0.942 0.904 0.384 0.006 1.000 0.638 0.088 0.437 0.011 0.158 
Q7c 0.285 0.275 0.000 0.851 0.003 0.783 0.003 0.285 0.017 0.049 0.306 0.086 0.001 0.848 0.007 
Q7d 0.000 0.012 0.394 0.437 0.056 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.083 0.255 0.089 0.002 0.312 
Q7e 0.112 0.430 0.751 0.520 0.164 0.060 0.313 0.043 0.006 0.399 0.900 0.738 0.383 0.155 0.556 
Q7f 0.000 0.047 0.020 0.000 0.036 0.022 0.594 0.479 0.006 0.285 0.093 0.960 0.934 0.196 0.049 
Q7g 0.446 0.962 0.271 0.028 0.329 0.504 0.454 0.046 0.673 0.325 0.038 0.359 0.413 0.649 0.134 
Q7h 0.014 0.642 0.068 0.012 0.137 0.115 0.238 0.926 0.230 0.360 0.106 0.480 0.183 0.871 0.190 
Q7i 0.729 0.396 0.223 0.338 0.008 0.108 0.205 0.361 0.001 0.010 0.025 0.000 0.766 0.026 0.018 
Groups are: 1 = academic staff, 2= external auditors, 3= investment advisors of banks, 4= company employees, 5= government officials, 6= 
investors. 
     
The MW test explains which particular pairs of group means are significantly different from each other.
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Table 7.11 results indicate that, in general, respondents from all groups agreed in principle with 
most of the listed statements as factors inhibiting best practice of corporate governance in the 
Libyan context.  
Respondents ranked poor financial and non-financial disclosure and the companies’ tax rate as 
the first and second most important factors preventing good practice, with mean scores of 4.69 
and 4.12 respectively. This finding is in line with the result in Question six (Q6g) when the 
respondents showed agreement concerning government interference in business activities.  
Not adopting the International Accounting Standards (IAS) and the absence of Libyan 
Accounting Standards are thought to lead to poor disclosure practice. Stronger levels of 
agreement were present from academics, government officials, auditors and bank investment 
advisors, with mean scores of 4.13, 4.14, 3.98 and 3.95 respectively, whereas company 
employees and investors showed less strong agreement, with mean scores of 3.51 and 3.48 
respectively. However, even with generally high agreement with this statement, the Kruskal-
Wallis test revealed significant differences between the groups (p<.05). 
The Mann-Whitney test in table 7.12 reflected significant differences between the company 
employees and investors and the others. The differences were in level of agreement, and the 
study respondents were more in the line with international perspectives on auditor 
independence, especially after the Enron collapse where this became a focus of worldwide 
attention. 
An important aspect of corporate governance is the quality of financial disclosure. The 
statutory audit provides an external check on the way in which financial statements have been 
prepared and presented by company management (O'Sullivan and Diacon, 1999). Hence, the 
Cadbury Report (1992) in Para 5.1 suggests that the annual audit is ‘‘one of the cornerstones of 
corporate governance’’. However, a number of studies have questioned the objectivity and 
effectiveness of the audit process. For instance, O'Sullivan (1993) focused on the difficulties 
encountered by audit users in making auditors responsible for the accuracy of audited financial 
statements. Auditor independence has become the focus of much worldwide attention, 
especially following the Enron collapse (Ho, 2003). Two issues appear to be important to 
auditor independence: the length of the auditor's relationship with the company and the extent 
to which the auditing firm undertakes consultancy work for the company (O'Sullivan and 
Diacon, 1999). 
In order to obtain an insight into aspects of the auditor-client relationship, the questionnaire 
asked respondents to provide their opinion about the relationship between the external auditor 
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and the company. Question Q7d focused on the good relationship between companies and their 
external auditors. The results indicated that generally there was a strong disagreement from all 
groups about this statement, because the overall mean was 2.35. The additional questionnaire 
also revealed that Libyan all listed companies rotate the external auditor from time to time.  
Moreover, table 7.11 revealed that the groups’ mean scores of Q7d were significantly 
different. The auditor group, with a mean of 1.88, showed the most extreme view here, with 
lower support for the statement, whereas the highest value was from the bank investment 
advisors (2.81).  
The Kruskal-Wallis test highlighted statistically significant differences between groups’ 
responses to this statement at the level of 5% confidence. The Mann-Whitney (MW) test in 
table 7.12 revealed that the auditors’ perceptions significantly differed from all groups. Most 
respondents in auditor groups expressed strong disagreement with this statement. Moreover, 
there was disagreement between academics and company employees; whereas respondents 
among bank investment advisors expressed less disagreement compared with academics (the 
mean score was 2.81 for bank investment advisors and 2.37 for academics). In addition, the 
Mann-Whitney (MW) test in table 7.12 showed a statistically significant difference between 
investors, company employees and government officials. This difference may be due to the 
diversity of the groups or may be because this statement needed to go into more detail about 
this point and its possible effects on good governance. This finding may confirm that external 
auditors are the profession which plays an important role in the practice of good governance in 
a company. 
An important aspect of recent governance deliberations concerns the composition of the Board 
of Directors. On the basis of their participation in company management, directors are usually 
divided into insiders and outsiders and most authors believe that non-executive directors 
provide superior performance benefits to the company as a result of their independence from 
management (De Andres et al, 2005). The Board of Directors is charged with promoting the 
interests of company owners. The board has the legal authority to ratify and monitor 
managerial initiatives, evaluate the performance of top managers and reward or penalise that 
performance. The role of executive directors provides valuable information about the 
company's activities, while non-executive directors are expected to contribute expertise and 
objectivity in monitoring management decisions (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990). In the UK, 
for instance, Cadbury (1992) recommends that all boards should have a minimum number of 
non-executive members. Combined Code (Para, A.3) stressed that:  
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‘‘the board should include a balance of executive and non-executive directors (and, in 
particular, independent non-executive directors) such that no individual or small group of 
individuals can dominate the board’s decision taking.’’ 
 
This study asked respondents to give their opinion on whether the composition of the Board of 
Directors in Libyan companies is inappropriate. The result reported in table 7.11 indicated that, 
in general, respondents from all groups agreed in principle with Q7e since all groups recorded 
a mean score above 3.61. The Kruskal-Wallis (KW) test showed there were no significant 
differences in the answers between the groups (P= 0.099). With regard to the groups’ mean 
scores, table 7.11 revealed that strongest agreement came from the auditors group, with a mean 
score of 4.02, and the next strongest groups were company employees, with a mean score of 
3.86 and the academics, with a mean score of 3.81.   
The most pressing issue according to observers of corporate governance practice in developing 
countries is the power of Chief Executive Officers (CEO). Therefore, the present study was 
looking to elicit the respondents’ opinion about whether the CEO is too powerful in Libyan 
companies. The results in Table 7.11 indicated that, in general, participants from all groups in 
principle agreed on the power of the CEO as a reason to affect good corporate governance 
practice since the overall mean was 3.72. Most groups recorded mean scores between 3.45 and 
4.13, with stronger support from the academics group and weak support from the auditors.   
Question 7g focused on whether the CEO and Chairman roles should be held by the same 
person. The importance of this point in corporate governance has emerged after recent 
international corporate crises. Experts in mature markets recommended the separation between 
the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the duties of the Chairman (RCGWG, 2003)36.  In 
addition, bestowing the CEO’s and chairman’s duties on one individual makes it harder for a 
board to replace a poorly performing CEO, so the separation is at the core of shareholders’ 
interest (Khanchel, 2007).  
According to Table 7.11 and regarding Q7g, participants from all groups agreed with this 
statement since the overall mean was 3.66 and it ranked as the eighth factor affecting the 
corporate governance system in Libyan companies, with no statistically significant differences 
between the groups. In addition, the table indicates that respondents’ means ranged between 
3.38 and 3.83, with strongest support coming from academics, whereas the weakest support 
came from government officials. This finding can be explained on the grounds that Libya 
                                                 
36 For instance, in developed economies like the UK the Cadbury Committee (para. 4.9) emphasised that “if the 
two roles are combined in one person, it represents a considerable concentration of power”. 
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needs more clear separation between the CEO and the Chairman roles in most companies. 
Although the statement was supported by participants with mean score of 3.66, the additional 
questionnaire revealed a clear separation between the CEO and the chairman positions in listed 
companies.   
The last element affecting the practice of corporate governance is the state of the economy.  
Question Q7h sought to establish stakeholders’ perception as to whether or not the state of the 
Libyan economy has affected the practice of corporate governance. According to Table 7.11, 
the respondents generally strongly agreed with the statement since the mean of all groups was 
3.88 and without any statistically significant differences between the groups. The Kruskal-
Wallis (KW) test did not show any differences at p=0.57. 
 The pessimistic groups, according to their mean score, were the academics and the bank 
investment advisors, with means of 4.07 and 4.00 respectively. This result could be explained 
on the grounds that academics may have better knowledge and are involved in monitoring the 
development of the economy including the relationship between the state of economy and the 
corporate governance framework. This finding is in the line with the suggestion by RCGWG 
(2003) when they argued ''corporate governance is rightly seen as essential to attract 
investment, to access capital, and to develop risk management and competitiveness. Corporate 
governance implementation is the key to the MENA region continued participation in the 
world economy''.       
To gain further insights into attitudes concerning the state of the Libyan economy, the 
researcher asked the respondents to give their opinion on whether privatisation and creating the 
Stock Market improved the corporate governance framework.  Table 7.11 revealed that Q7i 
was ranked as the seventh highest out of nine, with a mean score of 3.69, and with agreement 
across the groups. In more detail, the investors and company employees groups seemed to be 
the most optimistic, with mean scores of 4.03 and 3.76 respectively, whereas the bank 
investment advisors and the academics groups were the less optimistic groups, with mean 
scores of 3.40 and 3.52 respectively. It was not surprising that investors’ groups supported the 
process of privatisation and establishing the stock market as a way of improving the Libyan 
economy and, therefore, develop the governance mechanism.  
According to the Kruskal-Wallis test, there were statistically significant differences (p= 0.001). 
To conduct more analysis and know which group or groups were different, the Mann-Whitney 
test was carried out. Table 7.12 indicated that there were differences in the responses made by 
the investors group and all other groups, with investors consistently more positive (the mean 
 158 
 
score of investors was the highest with 4.03); the bank investment advisors group was 
statistically different to both company employees and government officials. 
It can be clearly observed that, in general, there was support for all the statements listed in this 
question with the exception of the good relationship between companies and external auditors. 
Also, these findings reflect that the disclosure practice and the Board of Directors 
responsibilities are not sufficiently developed. Also the finding may confirm that the legal 
system that governs companies is out of date and therefore needs more development. 
7.3.5 Future Plans of Corporate Governance Framework 
To discover the stakeholders' perspective on good practice in corporate governance in the 
Libyan context, part six of the questionnaire contained three questions regarding how Libya 
should improve its corporate governance, mainly focusing on improving the disclosure and 
transparency practice and increasing the Board of Directors' responsibilities. 
 
7.3.5.1 The Disclosure and Transparency Practice 
Regarding the disclosure and transparency practice, all groups were asked to give their 
opinions on areas they perceived as important for improving the disclosure practice 
The statements in the question were consistent with the OECD Principles (2004) of corporate 
governance. The results reported in Table 7.13 indicate that, in general, respondents from all 
groups agreed in principle with all the statements listed regarding different areas of disclosure, 
since all statements recorded mean scores of 4.25 or above.  
The statement that achieved the highest mean score and ranked first is Q8a: companies should 
provide timely and accurate disclosure on the financial and operating results, with a mean score 
of 4.86. Table 7.13 also indicates that all groups demonstrated strong support for this statement 
and the investors group expressed the strongest agreement amongst the groups, with mean 
score of 4.94. This is not surprising as it clearly is in their interest.  
The Kruskal-Wallis (KW) test did not show any significant differences between the 
stakeholders’ groups (p= 0.285 > 0.05). Also, this result reflects the weakness and lack of 
disclosure practices which might reflect the state of the economy. The finding was in line with 
the OECD Principles of corporate governance which stated in para (V):  
“The corporate governance should ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is made on all 
material matters regarding the corporation, including the financial situation, performance, 
ownership, and governance of the company”. 
 
 159 
 
This support may not be surprising and the result was expected because most developing 
countries face the same problem. For instance, Qu and Leung (2006) argue that the reliability 
of financial disclosure is not expected to be high in developing countries unless legal 
disclosure standards are set.  The RCGWG (2003) demonstrated that public adherence to 
international auditing standards and financial disclosure requirements have demonstrated the 
important role of developing the capital markets in the MENA region.  
Q8b sought to determine if Libyan stakeholders believe that Libyan companies should disclose 
company objectives. According to Table 7.13, this question achieved a mean score of 4.48 and 
was ranked seventh among the statements listed in this question. Table 7.13 also indicated that 
the auditors' group articulated the strongest agreement amongst the respondents, whereas, 
somewhat surprising, the investors group showed less agreement (4.23). Although the extent of 
agreement was very high for all groups, the Kruskal-Wallis (KW) test revealed significant 
differences in the answers between the respondents. However, these differences were not in 
terms of agreement-disagreement, but represented variance in the level at agreement as some 
respondents agreed more strongly than others.  To investigate which group or groups were 
statistically different, the Mann-Whitney test was used. The Mann-Whitney tests in table 7.14 
revealed that both academics and external auditors were different to other groups, where they 
strongly supported this statement, with means of 4.69 and 4.74 respectively. A possible 
explanation for this difference may be the educational factor where both academics and 
external auditors might be more qualified than other groups in general.37   
Q8c focused on disclosure of foreseeable risks. Table 7.14 demonstrated the respondents 
strongly agree on the statement, with the mean score being 4.67. The strongest support came 
from bank investment advisors (mean = 4.86) while the weakest support was from auditors 
(4.51). This agreement reflects the absence of any requirement of reporting on market risk 
factors, and other foreseeable risk factors, and even external auditors are required to pay high 
regard to such risks in their investigation.  
  
 
 
                                                 
37 Users of financial information need information on reasonably foreseeable material risks which may include: 
risks that are specific to the industry or the geographical areas in which the company operates; dependence on 
commodities; financial market risks including interest rate or currency risk; risks related to derivatives and off-
balance sheet transactions; and risks related to environmental liabilities (OECD, 2004). 
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Table 7.13 Group means and Kruskal-Wallis Tests showing respondents' agreement / disagreement with possible statements  about whether 
Libyan companies should disclose 
 
Statement Group means Kruskal-Wallis Test 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 Overall 
mean 
Rank P-value Result
Q8a- The companies should provide timely and 
accurate disclosure. 
4.88 4.88 4.76 4.86 4.76 4.94 4.86 1 .285 Not-significant 
Q8b- The companies should disclose the 
company objectives. 
4.69 4.74 4.29 4.41 4.38 4.23 4.48 7 .000 Significant٭ 
Q8c- The companies should disclose the 
foreseeable risk factors. 
4.81 4.51 4.86 4.63 4.59 4.74 4.67 3 .033 Significant٭ 
Q8d- The companies should disclose all issues 
regarding employees and other stakeholders. 
4.63 4.42 4.76 4.65 4.62 4.32 4.54 6 .015 Significant٭ 
Q8e- The companies should disclose the impact 
of the company’s activities on the society and 
environment.   
4.91 4.58 4.86 4.77 4.55 4.48 4.68 2 
.001 
Significant٭ 
Q8f- The companies should disclose the 
ownership structure. 
4.66 4.33 4.14 4.11 4.14 4.63 4.35 8 .000 Significant٭ 
Q8g- The companies should disclose the 
remuneration policy. 
4.75 4.44 4.29 4.86 4.55 4.80 4.63 5 
.000 
Significant٭ 
Q8h- An annual audit should be conducted by an 
independent, competent and qualified auditor.  
4.78 4.79 4.43 4.51 4.76 4.45 4.65 4 .005 Significant٭ 
Q8i- Information should be prepared, audited and 
disclosed in accordance with international 
standards of accounting  
4.81 4.35 3.94 4.00 4.30 3.88 4.25 9 
.000 
Significant٭ 
Groups are: 1 = academic staff, 2= external auditors, 3= investment advisors of banks, 4= company employees, 5= government officials, 6= 
investors.     
The KW test shows whether there are any differences in the means of responses given by the groups for each question.   
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Table 7.14 The Mann-Whitney probabilities: respondents’ agreement / disagreement with possible statements about disclosure.  
 
Groups are: 1 = academic staff, 2= external auditors, 3= investment advisors of banks, 4= company employees, 5= government officials, 6= 
investors.     
The MW test explains which particular pairs of group means are significantly different from each other. 
Questions G(1-2) G(1-3) G(1-4) G(1-5) G(1-6) G(2-3) G(2-4) G(2-5) G(2-6) G(3-4) G(3-5) G(3-6) G(4-5) G(4-6) G(5-6) 
Q8a 0.909 0.288 0.832 0.242 0.335 0.211 0.729 0.165 0.367 0.372 0.979 0.049 0.319 0.235 0.036 
Q8b 0.591 0.009 0.026 0.017 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.441 0.593 0.648 0.795 0.139 0.241 
Q8c 0.012 0.675 0.098 0.055 0.498 0.012 0.368 0.614 0.054 0.069 0.041 0.317 0.732 0.307 0.187 
Q8d 0.079 0.301 0.853 0.973 0.035 0.010 0.048 0.095 0.541 0.375 0.296 0.006 0.830 0.021 0.044 
Q8e 0.002 0.585 0.140 0.002 0.001 0.029 0.079 0.804 0.498 0.439 0.024 0.010 0.064 0.025 0.697 
Q8f 0.008 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.815 0.179 0.113 0.163 0.012 0.892 0.979 0.001 0.866 0.000 0.001 
Q8g 0.008 0.001 0.272 0.106 0.626 0.233 0.000 0.364 0.001 0.000 0.064 0.000 0.007 0.529 0.034 
Q8h 0.922 0.009 0.024 0.835 0.042 0.004 0.010 0.750 0.020 0.538 0.019 0.412 0.046 0.812 0.076 
Q8i 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.012 0.027 0.869 0.002 0.780 0.059 0.699 0.104 0.509 0.022 
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Regarding Table 7.14, there was strong agreement among groups about this statement; 
however, the Kruskal-Wallis (KW) test showed significant differences in the answers between 
the groups (p= 0.033). Again these differences were in terms of degree of agreement; using the 
Mann-Whitney (MW) tests to investigate where the difference was, table 7.14 revealed 
statistical differences between both the external auditors group and the academics and bank 
investment advisors, with the academics and bank investment advisor groups producing higher 
means (4.81 and 4.86 respectively). At the same time, there was a difference between the bank 
investment advisors group and government officials group, where the first group was more 
supportive. This evidence might reflect the possibility that academics are concerned that 
disclosure practices should reveal any foreseeable risks which might be ascribed to their 
knowledge; bank investment advisors might owe their responsibilities towards their banks, and 
their benefits from the full disclosure practice. On the other hand, the external auditors group 
provided the lowest support, with a mean score of 4.51. This result, although still highly 
supportive, can be attributed to the requirement for them to extend their investigation to 
ratifying a company’s annual reports.     
The main theme of question eight was disclosure practice, including disclosure of all issues of 
interest to employees and other stakeholders (Q8d). The aim of the statement was to poll 
respondents’ perceptions regarding whether Libyan companies should provide more disclosure. 
In order to make it as comprehensible as possible, the question was accompanied by some 
examples clarifying what might be included in this question. 
As can be seen from Table 7.13, it is obvious that the six groups which participated in the 
survey believe that the companies should disclose all issues regarding employees and other 
stakeholders during the fiscal year. Even though this issue ranked sixth out of nine items, the 
overall mean was high, with a score of 4.54.  
Analysis of answers indicates that the bank investment advisors group gave the strongest, 
support with a mean score of 4.76, followed by company employees, with a mean score of 
4.65, whereas the least support was from the investors, with a mean of 4.32. Even with the high 
mean from the six groups the Kruskal-Wallis test showed statistically significant differences 
between the groups (p=0.015).  
Table 7.13 showed that these differences were in terms of level of agreement, not between 
agreement-disagreement, because the groups’ mean scores were never less than 4.32. The 
Mann-Whitney test (Table 7.16) picked up significant differences in average responses 
between the investors group and the academics, bank investment advisors, company employees 
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and government officials groups, and between the auditors group and bank investment advisors 
and company employees groups. This result may be explained if stakeholders require more 
information which Libyan companies do not disclose, yet the legal system does not require this 
information. This finding is in line with suggestions of the OECD (2004) Principles, para (V.A, 
8) that: 
“Disclosure should include, but not be limited to, material information on: issues 
regarding employees and other stakeholders”. 
 
Furthermore, it can be said that the background, roles, involvement and self-interests of the 
groups surveyed may have contributed to the significant differences in their perceptions 
concerning whether the companies should disclosure information related to stakeholders and 
employees.  
In order to determine stakeholders’ attitudes towards the different types of information Libyan 
companies should disclose and disseminate, they were asked to give their opinion about 
whether Libyan companies should fully disclose on issues regarding the impact of the 
company’s activities on the society and environment. This question aimed to elicit their 
perception of an issue that attracts considerable attention in the world these days, where global 
warming has become a big issue for all countries and many companies. Especially the energy 
sector is aiming to become more responsible regarding this issue. Concerning Table 7.14, it 
was surprising that this item ranked as the second highest, with a mean score of 4.68, and with 
high support from all participants. This can be attributed to the environment and pollution 
being considerable issues for all stakeholders, which may suggest they are concerned with 
changes in the climate, not least given Libya’s location in a particularly hot area where any 
increase in overall temperatures will have adverse effects upon them.  
The Kruskal-Wallis test revealed statistically significant differences between the participants 
(p= 0.001); however, these differences were in terms of agreement. The Mann-Whitney test 
results (Table 7.14) indicate that there were differences in the responses made by academics 
and bank investment advisors groups and external auditors, government officials and investors 
groups, with academics and bank investment advisors in strongest agreement with mean scores 
4.91 and 4.86 respectively. Also, the same table indicates differences between the company 
employees and investors groups with the company employees group strongest in favour, with a 
mean score of 4.77.  This result supported the result of question Q3e which concerned the 
relationship between introducing corporate governance and improved corporate social 
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responsibility in Libya, and with Q5g which asked about whether Libyan companies should act 
in a responsible manner and protect the rights of society. 
Q8f was about the disclosure of ownership structures, and table 7.13 showed that the statement 
was ranked relatively lower on the list with a mean score of 4.35, and with most support from 
academics and investors groups (mean scores of 4.66 and 4.63 respectively).  
The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test, however, point to significant differences in the 
respondents’ views on whether ownership structure information should be disclosed in the 
annual report (when p<0.001) and these differences were in terms of agreement since all 
groups’ mean scores were more than 4.11 and no statistical difference between the groups’ 
answers existed.   
The Mann-Whitney test (Table 7.14) demonstrated significant differences in the averages 
between the academics and investors groups and external auditors, bank investment advisors 
and government officials groups. The academics and investors groups scored highest with 
mean scores of 4.66 and 4.63 respectively. This result can be explained by the view that 
academics may support this due to their education and their hope to improve the disclosure and 
transparency practice in Libya. In respect to investors, this result is quite logical reflecting their 
wish for more disclosure and transparency practice to make their investments safer and 
decrease fraud opportunities for top management. 
Question (Q8g) sought to determine Libyan stakeholders’ opinion in respect of disclosure 
concerning the remuneration policy for members of the board and key executives. Table 7.13 
indicates that all participants showed their agreement with this statement, and the mean score 
was 4.63. The strongest support came from company employees and investors groups, whereas 
the lowest support was from the bank investment advisors with a mean score of 4.29. 
Although, there was high agreement from all groups in the study, the Kruskal-Wallis test in 
Table 7.13 revealed statistically significant differences between the groups. However, these 
differences were in the levels of agreement rather than agreement- disagreement levels.  The 
Mann-Whitney test identified this significant difference being between the academics, 
company employees and investors groups with external auditors and bank investment advisors 
groups, where the academics, company employees and investors groups revealing the highest 
levels of support, with means of 4.75, 4.86 and 4.80 respectively. Also, there was a significant 
difference between the company employees group and government officials group with the 
company employees group scoring higher support. This result could reflect the interests of full 
and complete disclosure and transparency practice regarding issues that face the company. 
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Moreover, this question revealed that Libyan stakeholders are consistent, or at least desire to be 
consistent, with the recommendations contained in the international codes such as the 
Combined Code in the UK and OECD Principles (2004). This result is confirmed by the 
Libyan Stock Market and Libyan central bank disclosure requirements when their voluntary 
Codes of corporate governance recommend more disclosure practice and come close to the 
OECD (2004) Principles. 
Q8h focused on this issue and Table 7.13 revealed strong support from all groups regarding 
this issue since the mean score of all groups was 4.65.  It is apparent from Table 7.13 that this 
statement received the highest mean score in the five-point scale of 4.79 from the external 
auditors group, as might be expected. Behind the external auditors group in the terms of 
agreement were the academics and government officials groups, with mean scores of 4.78 and 
4.76 respectively. Overall, there was also strong support from the remaining groups when their 
means were 4.43, 4.51 and 4.45 for the bank investment advisors, company employees and 
investors respectively. This was a clear manifestation of the study participants’ agreement with 
the importance of disclosure and transparency in the Libyan context. The additional 
questionnaire that was distributed on listed companies revealed that the external auditor does 
not provide any other service to company. Also, the additional questionnaire revealed that in 
all listed companies the external auditor attends the annual meeting.     
The main pillar of prepared, audited, disclosed and then disseminated company information is 
adherence with the international standards of accounting and auditing, when the unification of 
accounting standards is crucial for better disclosure and transparency (RCGWG, 2003). Also, 
La Porta et al (1998) and Dyck and Zingales (2004) consider the quality of disclosure standards 
as measured by the quality of accounting standards important. Therefore, the last statement of 
the question asked the participants to indicate their opinion about whether the information in 
Libyan companies should be prepared, audited and disclosed in accordance with international 
standards of accounting and auditors, in the absence of Libyan standards of the profession. 
The analysis of this question in Table 7.13, interestingly, reveals that even though there was a 
general consensus amongst the respondents on Q8i (with a mean score of 4.25), and the 
participants ranked this statement lowest among the provided statements.  
The table revealed that the groups of academics, external auditors and government officials 
were the strongest supporters, with mean scores 4.81, 4.35 and 4.30 respectively, whereas, the 
bank investment advisors, company employees and the investors groups gave less support, 
with means 3.94, 4.00 and 3.88 respectively. 
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The Kruskal-Wallis test revealed significant differences between the groups’ answers 
(p=0.001) which means there is at least one group difference. The Mann-Whitney test in Table 
7.14 reflected the academics group expressing higher support than all other groups, with a 
mean score of 4.81. Moreover, the test indicated also that the external auditors group provided 
strong support, which was significantly greater than the support from bank investment 
advisors, company employees and investors groups. The test identified significant differences 
between the government officials group and investors where the first group supported this 
statement more than the second group (the mean score was 4.30 for the government officials 
group and only 3.88 for the investors group). Also, the significant differences were between 
academic staff and all other groups since academics supported the statement more than others. 
External auditors were also different with other groups except the government officials group.  
This conclusion was expected, since there are no Libyan accounting standards and the 
weakness of Accountants and Auditors Association role in developing the profession. The 
analysis of this question revealed the weakness of disclosure practice in Libya where all listed 
statements related to disclosure practice received high agreement from participants. This result 
was in the line with that found by Habib (2008) who stated: 
“Financial transparency measure is higher in countries with low state ownership of 
companies, low risk of state expropriation of firms’ wealth and low state ownership of 
banks. This evidence suggests that corporate transparency, particularly financial 
disclosure transparency, is strongly influenced by a country’s institutional structure.” 
 
The agreement amongst the groups involved in this survey about the need for full disclosure 
practice might reflect the purpose of preparing the annual reports in Libya, which is only to 
provide information to the Tax Authorities rather than meet the needs of investors. However, 
after the economic liberalisation, stakeholders believe that more disclosure practice is needed. 
This conclusion was in the line with the findings of question two when the participants’ groups 
gave their strongest support to the definition of corporate governance as an organisation’s 
relationship with all stakeholders who are affected by or affect the company's operations and 
decisions.  
In summary, it was apparent that the participants favour wider disclosure.  The current limited 
disclosure practice may be because of the influence of other factors on disclosure practice such 
as the economy, capital markets, accounting and regulatory frameworks, enforcement 
mechanisms and culture (Cooke and Wallace, 1990). This study revealed that Libya has 
shortcomings in respect of disclosure practice; therefore, it is suggested improvements in the 
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quality and quantity of companies' annual reports can lead to full and appropriate disclosure 
awhile at the same time increasing the accountability process. The additional questionnaire 
revealed that 66% of listed companies (4 companies) have a web site to disclose and 
disseminate information to the public and Q17 revealed that four companies disclose their 
annual reports and the date and place of the general meeting.   
 
7.3.5.2 The Board of Directors Responsibilities  
 
The literature review highlighted the importance of the Board of Directors’ structure, including 
board size, the board composition and compensation, and the CEO’s role in the board’s 
decisions, in developing corporate governance mechanisms. Sternberg (2004) argues that the 
most obvious means by which corporations are controlled is through the powers and 
obligations of the Board of Directors.  
Since the separation of ownership and management, the Board of Directors has become one of 
the key internal governance mechanisms, to ensure the interests of shareholders, owners and 
managers are closely aligned, and to discipline or remove ineffective management teams (Kang 
et al 2007).  
There is a general consensus that when other corporate governance mechanisms are weakened, 
an inefficient board can be costly to companies and, in turn, to society. Therefore, in recent 
times, much debate around corporate governance has focused on the activities of the Board of 
Directors (De Andres et al, 2005).  
In Question nine, respondents were asked to express the extent of their agreement with 
statements regarding the Board of Director’s responsibilities. Table 7.15 showed that the 
respondents agreed that boards should have all nine of the responsibilities mentioned. 
Regarding this question, the researcher firstly sought to understand to what extent Libyan 
stakeholders are in agreement with the international views of board responsibilities.  These 
agreements were consistent with the recommendations in the OECD Principles (2004) and 
Cadbury Code (1992) of corporate governance best practice. The findings were not surprising 
because the Libyan stakeholders do not live in a vacuum.  
As seen in Table 7.15, the six groups surveyed presented strong support for the overall 
responsibilities suggested in this question. In Q9a, board members should act on a fully 
informed basis and in good faith: this received the highest mean score of 4.69 and ranked as 
the first statement between the listed statements. As depicted in Table 7.15, the academics and 
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auditors groups were the strongest supporter of the statement with mean scores of 4.88 and 
4.84 respectively, whereas investors and company employees groups were the lesser 
supporters, with mean scores of 4.44 and 4.49 respectively. The bank investment advisors and 
government officials groups equally supported this statement, with a mean score of 4.76.  
Although the study participants provide high support for the statement in Q9a, the Kruskal-
Wallis test in Table 7.15 showed statistically significant differences between the perceptions of 
respondents about this question (p= 0.000). However, the results did not represent significant 
differences between groups in terms of agreement-disagreement but in terms of the level of 
agreement where some respondents agreed more strongly with the statement than others. The 
Mann-Whitney test in Table 7.16 revealed that there were significant differences between 
company employees and investors groups with other groups, when they were weak supporters 
with mean scores of 4.49 and 4.44 respectively. The finding was even significant between 
groups which might reflect their different backgrounds and their varying involvement in 
business activities, confirming the importance of information availability to board members in 
order to achieve their responsibilities. 
Q9b endeavoured to elicit the respondents' opinion in terms of whether the board members 
should take into account the interests of shareholders and stakeholders when making decisions. 
This statement ranked as the third statement out of nine statements regarding the directors' 
responsibilities, with a mean score of 4.52. The strongest agreements were the government 
officials and investors groups, with mean scores 4.62 and 4.60 respectively, and the lowest 
agreement was the company employees group, with a mean score of 4.40. The finding might 
be ascribed that company employees group think they should be responsible for maintaining 
these interests. It possible that respondents consider that the maintenance of interests of 
shareholders with stakeholders to be part of the day-to-day management of company, and 
would see board achieve its main roles. 
The Kruskal-Wallis test did not reveal any statistically significant differences between groups 
(p=0.0553). A possible explanation for that result may be that a consensus exists among 
Libyan stakeholders that the role of organisations is to improve stakeholders' interests. In 
addition, this result was in the line with the finding from question one (Q1) that the 
respondents supported the wider definition of corporate governance. 
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Table 7.15 Group means and Kruskal-Wallis Tests showing respondents' answers regarding the possible responsibilities of the Board of 
Directors  
 
Statement Group means Kruskal-Wallis Test 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 Overall 
mean 
Rank P-value Result
Q9a- Board members should act on a fully 
informed basis and in good faith.  
4.88 4.84 4.76 4.49 4.76 4.44 4.69 1 .000 Significant٭ 
Q9b- Board members should take into 
account the interests of shareholders and 
stakeholders when making decisions. 
4.50 4.50 4.52 4.40 4.62 4.60 4.52 3 
.553 
Not-
significant 
Q9c- The board should exercise objective 
independent judgement on corporate affairs. 
4.84 4.70 4.38 3.91 4.00 3.69 4.26 4 .000 Significant٭ 
Q9d- Board members should improve the 
compliance with the law and relevant 
standards in the company. 
4.28 4.45 4.19 4.14 4.07 3.94 4.19 6 
.005 
Significant٭ 
Q9e- Board members should be required to 
disclose any material interests in transactions 
or matters affecting the company.    
4.44 4.53 3.90 4.26 3.86 4.06 4.22 5 
.000 
Significant٭ 
Q9f- Board members should have access to 
accurate, relevant and timely information. 
4.78 4.74 4.43 4.54 4.62 4.38 4.60 2 .003 Significant٭ 
Q9g- Board members should devote sufficient 
time to their responsibilities 
4.41 4.12 4.05 4.20 3.97 3.97 4.12 7 
.005 
Significant٭ 
Q9h- Board members should be responsible 
for monitoring key executives.  
4.81 4.10 3.95 3.89 3.69 3.79 4.05 8 .000 Significant٭ 
 
Groups are: 1 = academic staff, 2= external auditors, 3= investment advisors of banks, 4= company employees, 5= government officials, 6= 
investors.     
The KW test shows whether there are any differences in the means of responses given by the groups for each question.  
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Table 7.16 The Mann-Whitney probabilities: regarding responsibilities of the Board of Directors  
 
Questions G(1-2) G(1-3) G(1-4) G(1-5) G(1-6) G(2-3) G(2-4) G(2-5) G(2-6) G(3-4) G(3-5) G(3-6) G(4-5) G(4-6) G(5-6) 
Q9a 0.649 0.288 0.001 0.242 0.001 0.472 0.001 0.412 0.001 0.044 0.979 0.032 0.027 0.804 0.018 
Q9b 0.842 0.739 0.414 0.347 0.414 0.868 0.307 0.452 0.535 0.309 0.637 0.730 0.081 0.097 0.867 
Q9c 0.146 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.065 0.004 0.002 0.877 0.212 0.110 
Q9d 0.131 0.612 0.403 0.095 0.019 0.091 0.032 0.004 0.001 0.810 0.382 0.135 0.541 0.176 0.347 
Q9e 0.322 0.001 0.299 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.054 0.000 0.004 0.039 0.792 0.388 0.007 0.261 0.210 
Q9f 0.663 0.007 0.028 0.122 0.002 0.011 0.048 0.211 0.002 0.412 0.183 0.810 0.533 0.236 0.086 
Q9g 0.014 0.018 0.094 0.001 0.004 0.580 0.445 0.151 0.311 0.267 0.526 0.731 0.043 0.118 0.810 
Q9h 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.325 0.506 0.007 0.053 0.964 0.253 0.509 0.244 0.489 0.617 
 
Groups are: 1 = academic staff, 2= external auditors, 3= investment advisors of banks, 4= company employees, 5= government officials, 6= 
investors.     
The MW test explains which particular pairs of group means are significantly different from each other.
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Q9f asked the respondents if the board members should have access to accurate, relevant and 
timely information. With the second highest agreement between groups, the statement gathered 
a mean score of 4.60. The strongest supporters were from groups with high levels of 
qualifications: academics and auditors groups have mean scores of 4.78 and 4.74 respectively, 
and the investors group showed less support, with a mean of 4.38.  
The Kruskal-Wallis test revealed statistically significant differences (p=0.003). Again, though, 
variations were only in terms of level of positive support. 
The finding confirms the fact that since the board become as the main corporate governance, 
members should have access to the relevant information to can achieve their responsibilities. 
This finding was in the line with the United Nation guidance on good practice in corporate 
governance disclosure (2006) which suggests that almost all corporate governance codes 
describe the basic responsibility of the board as reviewing financial statements, approving 
them, and then submitting them to shareholders. Moreover, although question 23 in the 
additional questionnaires revealed that all board members have access to accurate, relevant and 
timely information, the possible explanation for this difference might be attributed to the 
weakness of understanding of the role and responsibilities of the Board of Directors in the 
Libyan context, where business activities and economic liberalisation is still in the first stage. 
Moreover, those who were likely to have higher professional qualifications (academics, 
auditors and government officials) were aware of the role of board members in overseeing top 
management on behalf of stakeholders; through having access to accurate, relevant and timely 
information.  
The Mann-Whitney test in Table 7.16 depicted significant differences between academics, 
external auditors and government officials groups, with bank investment advisors, company 
employees and investors groups. The significant differences were not in the level of 
agreement-disagreement but in level of agreement reflected greater support from the first three 
groups.                                                                          
Q9c attempted to elicit the respondents’ opinion on whether the board should exercise 
objective independent judgement on corporate affairs. Table 7.15 revealed agreements with 
this statement from all respondents, with a mean of 4.26, and ranked as the fourth statement out 
of nine. Almost all respondent groups supported this statement, with a mean over of 4.00; only 
two groups had mean scores below 4.00 (the company employees group was 3.91 and the 
investors group was 3.69). The strongest supporters were academics, with a mean score of 
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4.84, external auditors, with a mean score of 4.70 and bank investment advisors, with a mean 
score of 4.38.                                                                               
The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test (Table 7.15), interestingly, revealed that there was no 
general consensus amongst the respondents on this statement (p= 0.000). The results, however, 
did not represent significant differences between groups in terms of agreement-disagreement 
but depicted disparity in the agreement level as some respondents agreed more strongly with 
the item than others. This could be explained on the grounds that senior company employees 
and investors were least likely to accept the statement according to their interest since the 
fundamental decisions are taken by them. Other groups believed that judgement on corporate 
affairs, especially on the significant decisions, should be shared between Board members and 
others such as with management in their meetings and shareholders in the General Meeting                          
The Mann-Whitney test in Table 7.16 demonstrated that the respondents from groups of 
academics, external auditors and bank investment advisors seemed to be the stronger 
supporters of this statement compared to other groups. Once again, the differences between the 
groups could be due to the interests of the group.                                        
The fifth statement, Q9e, concentrated on whether board members should disclose any material 
interests in transactions or matters affecting the company. With a mean score of 4.22, the 
statement ranked as the fifth statement. Although it was supported strongly by respondents, the 
Kruskal-Wallis test in Table 7.15 revealed a statistically significantly difference between the 
groups. However, this difference was not between the agreement / disagreement but in the 
level of agreements.                                                     
The Mann-Whitney Test in table 7.16 indicated that the academics and external auditors 
groups’ perceptions significantly differed from those of bank investment advisors, government 
officials and investors groups, since respondents in the first two groups expressed stronger 
agreement. Also, there were significant differences in the perceptions among the company 
employees with those of the bank investment advisors and government officials where the 
majority of company employees articulated more agreement with the statement, with a mean 
score of 4.26. This difference in response is probably due to the fact that academics and 
external auditors in Libya are more likely to be aware of the importance of full disclosure 
practice.        
Based on Table 7.15, all six respondents groups agreed that it is advisable for board members 
to improve the compliance with the law and relevant standards in the company. The vast 
majority of respondents held this view, with a mean scored 4.19. The statement was ranked 
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sixth out of nine. However, overall groups do not share similar views on the statement. While 
investors showed weaker support, with a mean score of 3.94, other groups would like to see 
this responsibility being applied strongly in the Libyan context, since there is poor adherence to 
the law and that needs to improve. The lower support for this statement comes from investors 
group which might be attributed to their ambitious to achieving the compliance and 
enforcement of the legal system and regulation through a comprehensive system in the country.                   
The Kruskal-Wallis test in the same table revealed that there was a statistically significantly 
difference between groups’ perceptions (p = 0.005). Yet these differences should be viewed as 
indicating the presence of diversity in agreement level, not in agreement-disagreement. The 
Mann-Whitney test in Table 7.16 revealed that academics’ and external auditors’ perceptions 
significantly differed from those of the investors group. Most respondents in the first group 
expressed strong agreement, with a mean score of 4.28. Also, there was a significantly 
difference in the perceptions among the external auditors group from those of the company 
employees, government officials and investors, where the external auditors group articulated 
more support, with a score of 4.45.                                            
The statement in Q9g was about whether the board members should devote sufficient time to 
their responsibilities. Although it seems to be very important and a basic point for fulfilling 
their duty, the respondents presented relatively low support for this statement compared to the 
previous statements (a mean score of 4.12). The finding also revealed that all six respondent 
groups viewed the suggestion in a similar manner: that the board members should devote 
sufficient time to their responsibilities towards the company.              
The Kruskal-Wallis test revealed a statistically significantly difference between groups’ 
perceptions of this statement (p = 0.005), which implies that at least one group is different from 
the others.  Although these differences were in the terms of agreement level, the Mann-
Whitney test in Table 7.16 showed that the academics group expressed the strongest agreement 
amongst the respondents with the statement that the board members should devote sufficient 
time to their responsibilities. 
There was a significant difference between the company employees and government officials 
when the first group strongly supported the statement, with a mean score of 4.20, whereas the 
mean score of government officials was 3.97.                     
It would appear that the six groups supported the statement. The overwhelming majority of 
academics and company employees believed that the board members should devote sufficient 
time to their responsibilities in the company. This finding might reflect their higher educational 
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levels, beside their belief that the responsibilities of the board cannot be achieved unless 
members devote sufficient time, especially in the case of non-executives. Similarly, company 
employees understand that without sufficient time from board members, the top managers can 
mislead and pursue their personal interest instead of achieving the benefits of all stakeholders. 
Practically, regarding question Q21 in the additional questionnaire, the numbers of meetings of 
board member in listed companies was between 4 and 9 for normal meetings in the previous 
year (2006). However, the number of meetings may mean adequate time is devoted, and even 
if it did, the length of meeting might be still an issue for Libyan companies.                                                   
The lowest support for questions in this section was for Q9h, that board members should be 
responsible for monitoring key executives. The results reported in table 7.15 indicate that, in 
general, respondents from all groups agreed in principle with this statement (a mean score of 
4.05). The strongest supporters were academics and external auditors with means scores of 
4.81 and 4.10 respectively, while others held scores of less than 4.00 (bank investment 
advisors, company employees, government officials and investors groups scored 3.95, 3.89, 
3.69 and 3.79 respectively). These differences in mean score average might reflect that 
academics and external auditors are more widely educated and less directly involved and more 
detached from the business activities.  
The Kruskal-Wallis test revealed significant differences between the six groups at the 5% level 
(p=0.000). However, these significant differences indicate the presence of variety in the level 
of agreement responses, with most respondents from the academics and external auditors 
groups expressing stronger agreement with this statement. This finding could be explained on 
the grounds that these groups consider the board to be the best way to control management.    
The Mann-Whitney test in Table 7.16 confirmed the significant differences between the 
respondent groups. Mainly, the academics’ perceptions significantly differed from those of all 
other respondent groups’ perceptions; most respondents in the academic group expressed 
stronger agreement with this statement, whereas others were less supportive. In addition, there 
was a significant difference in the level of agreement among the external auditors group with 
government officials group, where the majority of the external auditors group expressed more 
agreement with the statement, with a mean score of 4.10, whereas the government officials 
group scored a mean of 3.69. This difference in responses is probably due to the fact that 
academics and external auditors are more likely to be aware that members should monitor top 
management and work in favour of stakeholders since they are a main mechanism of corporate 
governance in Libya and other developing countries. Therefore, the result of the table 
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regarding this issue was in the line with the result from Kang et al (2007) when they argued 
that the Board of Directors is one of a number of internal governance mechanisms that are 
intended to ensure that the interests of shareholders and managers are closely aligned, and to 
discipline or remove ineffective management teams. 
According to the analysis of question nine, it was evident that the six groups share similar 
perceptions towards all of the listed statements. Therefore, there is a clear consensus among the 
respondents about the responsibilities of the board. However, the Academic group is more 
concerned with the board's formal responsibilities, whereas the investors group seemed to be 
less familiar with the responsibilities or they think boards are quit so influential, possibly 
because they were not closely involved with working of board. Also Q18 of the additional 
questionnaire showed that members of a company board vary between 5 and10 members.38 
Questions 19 and 20 indicated that all members were elected by shareholders. Interestingly, 
question 22 revealed that there were no female members of the board in listed companies. This 
may be explained on the grounds of a cultural effect more than the lack of qualified women 
since the society is still conservative and dominated by men.  It is, therefore, fair to say that in 
the Libyan context the problem might be in the practice of these responsibilities rather than the 
legislation.   
7.3.5.3 The Importance of Other Aspects in Introducing Corporate Governance  
 
To elicit more details about the future of corporate governance in the Libyan context, question 
ten in the questionnaire (part six) aimed to investigate the respondents’ opinions about several 
aspects that influence the implementation of a good corporate governance framework. The 
analysis of responses regarding this question helps to illustrate the whole range of obstacles to 
the implementation of corporate governance in Libya. Therefore, this question undertook to 
determine some other factors that might inhibit the effective practice of corporate governance 
framework.                                          
Again, respondents from all groups involved in this study were asked to provide their opinions 
on factors they perceived as important in introducing an effective corporate governance in 
Libya, indicating their level of agreement to areas on a five-point scale, where 5 represented 
very important and 1 reflected not important at all. 
                                                 
38 The size might reflect the size of listed companies.  
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Table 7.17 revealed, in general, that respondents across all groups showed agreement that all 
the listed statements in this question were important, since all statements recorded mean scores 
of 3.98 or higher.  
Question 10b, (the chairman and CEO positions should be separate) was ranked as 
controversial. Surprisingly, the separation between the role of CEO and Chairman achieved the 
highest mean score as shown in the table (mean score = 4.58); whereas, Q7g (the dual role 
played by same person as CEO and Chairman) did not receive as much shared support, being 
ranked as eighth out of nine statements with a mean score of 3.66.  
Concerning 10b, while there was high agreement across all groups, the strongest agreement 
was the government officials group with 4.76, whereas the lowest supporter was the investors 
group with a mean score of 4.34. The result was in the line with Cadbury Report (1992) when 
it stated in para 4.9 that "if the two roles are combined in one person, it represents a 
considerable concentration of power". Furthermore, additional questionnaire questions 26, 27 
and 28 revealed that five companies out of six separated the roles of CEO and chairman. 
Further, all listed companies in the Libyan Stock market have an internal audit department, and 
it sends its reports to the chairman of the Board.   
The rotation of the external auditor (Q10d) ranked as a second most important statement in 
respect to improving the corporate governance in Libya. 
The Cadbury Report (1992) in para (5.1) suggests that the annual audit is ‘‘one of the 
cornerstones of corporate governance’’. The literature review demonstrated that considerable 
research has explored the effect of the length of the auditor-client tenure on audit quality 
(Jackson et al, 2008). Also, the objectivity and effectiveness of the audit process also has been 
questioned in recent years. For example, a number of studies have highlighted audit users' lack 
of confidence with the audit process, and the difficulties encountered by audit users in making 
auditors responsible for the accuracy of audited financial statements (O'Sullivan, 1993; 
Humphrey et al, 1993). The case of Enron revealed that the close involvement of the external 
auditor with the top management and the conflict of interest in receiving extensive consulting 
and auditing fees were one of the failings in corporate governance (Clarke, 2005). Therefore, in 
order to ensure the independence of the external auditors, both the auditors and the auditing 
firm should be changed periodically (Hilb, 2005).  
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Table 7.17 Group means and Kruskal-Wallis Test showing respondents' answers regarding the following factors introducing a corporate 
governance in Libyan context.  
  
Statement Group means Kruskal-Wallis Test 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 Overall 
mean 
Rank P-value Result 
Q10a- Increase the number of non-executive 
directors. 
4.03 4.28 3.95 4.16 4.21 3.81 4.09 4 .013 Significant٭ 
Q10b- Clearer separation  between the role of  
CEO and Chairman 
4.72 4.65 4.48 4.54 4.76 4.34 4.58 1 .019 Significant٭ 
Q10c- Establish board committees on the         
Board Of Directors.  
3.97 3.95 3.62 3.91 4.66 3.08 3.98 5 .000 Significant٭ 
Q10d- Rotate the External auditor from time to
time with definition of his responsibilities. 
4.28 4.26 3.90 4.29 4.50 3.85 4.20 2 .000 Significant٭ 
Q10e- Improve management behaviour 
through external control.  
4.44 4.12 4.10 3.97 4.21 4.07 4.15 3 .052 Not-significant 
 
Groups are: 1 = academic staff, 2= external auditors, 3= investment advisors of banks, 4= company employees, 5= government officials, 6= 
investors.     
 The KW test shows whether there are any differences in the means of responses given by the groups for each question.  
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Table 7.18 The Mann-Whitney probabilities regarding factors in introducing corporate governance in Libyan context. 
 
Questions G(1-2) G(1-3) G(1-4) G(1-5) G(1-6) G(2-3) G(2-4) G(2-5) G(2-6) G(3-4) G(3-5) G(3-6) G(4-5) G(4-6) G(5-6) 
Q10a 0.088 0.651 0.424 0.279 0.161 0.033 0.318 0.616 0.001 0.195 0.130 0.382 0.689 0.017 0.011 
Q10b 0.538 0.078 0.190 0.726 0.007 0.184 0.423 0.335 0.019 0.566 0.042 0.451 0.108 0.145 0.003 
Q0c 0.887 0.022 0.640 0.000 0.037 0.035 0.752 0.000 0.062 0.071 0.000 0.619 0.000 0.127 0.000 
Q10d 0.860 0.021 0.913 0.085 0.002 0.025 0.776 0.051 0.003 0.023 0.001 0.783 0.114 0.003 0.000 
Q10e 0.023 0.860 0.002 0.154 0.030 0.923 0.271 0.532 0.777 0.440 0.562 0.887 0.118 0.516 0.437 
 
Groups are: 1 = academic staff, 2= external auditors, 3= investment advisors of banks, 4= company employees, 5= government officials, 6= 
investors.     
 The MW test explains which particular pairs of group means are significantly different from each other.  
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Table 7.17 indicated that the six groups which participated in the survey believe that the 
rotation of the external auditor and clear definition of his responsibilities should be used to 
improve and become part of the corporate governance in Libya. Respondents agreed that this 
statement should be prominent in introducing and improving corporate governance in Libya 
(the mean score was 4.20).                                                
The strongest supporters were government officials, company employees, academics and 
external auditors groups, with mean scores of 4.50, 4.29, 4.28, and 4.26 respectively. The 
lowest supporters were investors and bank investment advisors groups, with mean scores of 
3.85, 3.90 respectively.  
The additional questionnaire elicited more details about the relationship between a company 
and its external auditor in questions 12, 13, 14 and 15. These questions revealed that all listed 
companies rotate their external auditor. Also, the external auditor is always in attendance at the 
annual meeting to explain his/her report about the company's financial annual reports. External 
auditor does not provide other advice to companies. This finding can be explained on the 
grounds that the role of auditors in Libya is still only for approval the financial reports, and 
other roles such as providing advice on the investment and other consultancy services may be 
absent in the Libyan context.39 
The findings, based on the Kruskal-Wallis test (see Table 7.17), also showed that the 
respondents do not share the same perceptions towards the statement as the test revealed 
statistically significant differences between the six groups at the 5% level (p=0.000). This 
difference, however, was not between the important / not important at all but between the 
levels of importance, revealing there was at least one group difference from others in the level 
of agreement.                                                              
The Mann-Whitney test in Table 7.18 indicated that the bank investment advisors’ and 
investors’ groups perceptions significantly differed from those of other groups; respondents in 
the first two groups expressed lower agreement with this statement, when their mean scores 
were 3.90 and 3.85 respectively. This difference in response is probably due to the fact that the 
bank investment advisors and investors groups are less likely to be interested in this statement, 
whereas other groups might be interested and, therefore, they understand the effect of this 
factor on introducing a good sound, corporate governance in Libya. This finding could be 
explained on the grounds that the rotation of auditors will improve the competition between the 
                                                 
39 Question 13 in the additional questionnaire was answered NO from all listed companies in the Libyan Stock 
Market. 
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auditors to win the tender and distinguish themselves in terms of service and improving the 
audit quality.                                                                                  
In terms of Libyan laws and regulations, auditors are appointed by shareholders; however, 
managers may exert an influence over auditor appointments. For instance, auditors could be 
dismissed by managers without consulting shareholders, with the shareholders merely voting 
on whether to accept their recommendation regarding the appointment of a new auditor or the 
re-appointment of the current auditors. Thus, this statement may reflect the need to improve 
Libyan legislation. Also, the periodic rotation of lead audit partners is now obligatory under 
much legal system in the world, in Libya currently there is no legal requirement for external 
auditor rotation.     
The statement in Q10e concerned whether improvement of management behaviour through 
external control could lead to introducing better corporate governance in Libya. Management 
behaviour seems to be very important for improving the corporate governance; the respondents 
expressed their high agreement with this statement (a mean score of 4.15).      
As depicted in Table 7.17, the Kruskal-Wallis test showed that the six groups share similar 
perceptions towards the statement since there was no statistically significant difference in the 
respondents’ views concerning this point. Thus, the stakeholders in Libya tend to favour the 
improvement of management behaviour through external control as a factor leading to 
improving corporate governance system. The responses demonstrated that all groups were very 
conscious about the effect of external control on management behaviour.40 On last page some 
respondents suggested that the institutional investors and the government should be the best 
means of external control of management behaviour in Libya along with (NGOs) such as the 
Businessmen Board.                                    
Another factor that may help to improve the corporate governance system is non-executive 
directors. The main objective of the next question is to determine the importance of non-
executive directors in Libyan companies. According to Q10a, in table 7.17, respondents from 
all groups agreed in principle with the importance of non-executive directors in introducing 
good corporate governance, with a mean score of 4.09 and ranked as the fourth statement. 
Regarding the same table, the most supportive groups seemed to be the auditors, government 
officials and company employees, with mean scores of 4.28, 4.21, and 4.16 respectively. On 
the same hand, bank investment advisors and investors produced a mean of less than 4 (3.95 
                                                 
40 Interviewees in the next chapter pointed out some of the preferred external controls that should monitor 
management behavior in Libyan companies.   
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and 3.81 respectively). It was not surprising for these groups to support this statement; 
however, the surprising point is that the academics ranked as the fourth supporter, where was 
supposed to support this statement. A possible interpretation of this finding is that the key point 
is not to increase the number of non-executive directors but their influence on the corporate 
decision.  
The Kruskal-Wallis test revealed statistically significant differences in answers between 
respondents (p=0.013). The results, however, did not represent significant dispersions between 
responses in terms of agreement-disagreement, but represented variance in the agreement level 
with some respondents agreeing more strongly than others.  
Regarding the additional questionnaire (questions 24 and 25), the non-executive directors in 
listed companies represent approximately 40% of the board members, and their remuneration 
policy is by attendance session compensation or by salary.                                                               
Moreover, Table 7.17 indicated statistically significant differences of opinions of the 
statement, since the p-value was less than 5% (p=0.013). The Mann-Whitney test in Table 7.18 
indicated that there was a significant difference between the investors and both of external 
auditors, company employees and government official when the investors mean score of this 
group was 3.81. The test also revealed significant differences between the external auditors 
group and bank investment advisors group with the first group providing more support, with a 
resultant mean of 4.28, whereas the second group's mean score was 3.95.   
An important aspect of recent governance discussions relates to the role and composition of 
board sub-committees (O'Sullivan and Diacon, 1999), because the use of committees by the 
board is expected to have a positive effect on company performance (Kula, 2005), since the 
role of these committees is to carry out various activities that the board delegates (Mallin, 
2004). Therefore, in the UK, the Cadbury Report (1992) and Hampel Report (1998) argue that 
the existence of audit and remuneration committees is expected to result in improved 
confidence in the overall system of governance. The Libyan Stock Market (LSM) requirement 
is in the line with most corporate governance codes in terms of requiring the establishment of 
these sub-committees, such as audit, remuneration and nomination committees.       
Surprisingly, answers to the statement related to establishing board committees received lower 
support amongst all the ranked factors, since the mean score of Q10c was 3.98. Table 7.17 
shows respondents’ opinions about this statement. The strongest supporters were the 
governmental officials group, with a mean score of 4.66, whereas, academics and external 
auditors groups seemed to share similar levels of support, with mean scores of 3.97 and 3.95 
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respectively. This finding can be explained on the grounds that the Libyan legal system does 
not require Libyan companies to establish these committees, except for the “dogwatch” 
committee.  
7.3.6 Approaches that can be used as a basis to Introduce Corporate Governance 
An important part of corporate governance is the approaches to the introduction of the good 
corporate governance system. Question eleven endeavoured to elicit the participants’ opinions 
about the approach that should be used to introduce a corporate governance system in Libya. 
Three different possible approaches were given to the respondents: namely by quasi-laws41 
beside existing laws and regulations (Q11a); through adjusting international codes 
requirements (Q11b); or through new laws and regulations (Q11c).                     
The perception of the respondents was considerably different between these methods. Q11a 
and Q11b reflect a voluntary introduction of corporate governance, whereas Q11c suggests 
introducing corporate governance by law.                                                    
The present study endeavoured to elicit if Libyan stakeholders think Libya should following 
the applicable international regulation of corporate governance.                         
Table 7.19 illustrates that the study participants appear to have a propensity to agree with 
statements two and three (Q11b and Q11c). However, they tend most strongly to support the 
law as a key source of introducing corporate governance in Libya since Q11c was ranked first 
amongst the statements, with a mean score of 4.54. The six groups, therefore, seem to believe 
that legislation would offer the preferable means by which corporate governance can be 
introduced since their mean scores were located between 4.66 and 4.46 (the academics’ mean 
score was 4.66 and investors’ 4.64). The Kruskal-Wallis test showed there were no significant 
differences in the respondents’ opinions reported by the test.                  
The statement in Q11b, which was about introducing corporate governance through adjusting 
international codes requirements, received the second highest agreement with a mean score of 
4.14. The strong support came from academics, government officials and investment advisors 
of banks groups (their mean scores were 4.41, 4.31 and 4.29 respectively), whereas the least 
support came from companies’ employees (mean score = 3.80). 
                                                 
41 The quasi-legal rights and responsibilities are those enshrined in codes of conduct, statements from authoritative 
bodies to whom the companies subscribe, plus other 'semi-binding agreements'-possibly from the organisations 
themselves or national strategies. 
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The Kruskal-Wallis test revealed statistically significant differences in the answer between 
respondents (p=0.005). However, the differences were in terms of level of agreement, as some 
respondents more agreed strongly than others.  
The Mann-Whitney test in Table 7.20 revealed significant differences between the academics 
and both the company employees and investors groups where they were less supportive, with 
mean scores of 3.80 and 4.03 respectively, compared to the academics’ mean of 4.41. Also, the 
table indicates a statistically significant difference between company employees and both the 
bank investment advisors and government officials groups since the group of company 
employees seemed to be less optimistic about this statement (mean = 3.80). 
A possible explanation for this difference may be the background and educational level of the 
groups surveyed and their awareness of international standards which may have contributed to 
the significant differences in their perceptions concerning whether adjusting international 
codes requirements could provide a good introduction of corporate governance.  
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Table 7.19 Group means and Kruskal-Wallis Tests regarding the approaches to establishing Corporate Governance  
 
Statement Group means Kruskal-Wallis Test 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 Overall 
mean 
Rank P-value Result
Q11a- By quasi-laws beside existing laws and 
regulations 
2.63 2.56 3.48 3.06 2.86 2.45 2.79 3 .002 Significant٭ 
Q11b- Through adjusting International Codes 
requirements 
4.41 4.12 4.29 3.80 4.31 4.03 4.14 2 .005 Significant٭  
Q11c- By new laws and regulations 4.66 4.47 4.52 4.46 4.52 4.64 4.54 1 .453 Not-significant 
  
 
Groups are: 1 = academic staff, 2= external auditors, 3= investment advisors of banks, 4= company employees, 5= government officials, 6= 
investors.     
 
The KW test shows whether there are any differences in the means of responses given by the groups for each question.  
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Table 7.20 The Mann-Whitney probabilities regarding approaches to establishing the Corporate Governance system  
 
Questions G(1-2) G(1-3) G(1-4) G(1-5) G(1-6) G(2-3) G(2-4) G(2-5) G(2-6) G(3-4) G(3-5) G(3-6) G(4-5) G(4-6) G(5-6) 
Q11a 0.773 0.002 0.050 0.248 0.576 0.001 0.019 0.137 0.723 0.095 0.018 0.002 0.379 0.028 0.147 
Q11b 0.059 0.410 0.001 0.584 0.007 0.347 0.086 0.217 0.500 0.015 0.790 0.082 0.007 0.233 0.050 
Q11c 0.102 0.340 0.142 0.274 0.868 0.662 0.963 0.666 0.140 0.713 0.964 0.416 0.722 0.187 0.347 
 
Groups are: 1 = academic staff, 2= external auditors, 3= investment advisors of banks, 4= company employees, 5= government officials, 6= 
investors.     
 
The MW test explains which particular pairs of group means are significantly different from each other.   
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The statement concerning introducing corporate governance through quasi-laws beside 
existing laws and regulations found general disagreement across all groups, except the bank 
investment advisors group, who supported it but with less than strong agreement (mean 
score = 3.48).   
The results reported in Table 7.19 indicate that, in general, respondents from all groups 
disagreed in principle with the statement since the mean score was 2.79 and, therefore, it 
ranked lower than the other two approaches. The bank investment advisors group was the 
highest supporter of the statement, with a mean score of 3.48, and with an almost neutral 
result (3.06), the company employees appeared to be split fairly evenly over this statement. 
The rest of groups were in disagreement with this statement, with the strongest 
disagreement coming from investors group, with a mean score of 2.45. 
The perceptions of respondents are consistent with the fact that the legal system in Libya 
needs more development. Therefore, it might be difficult to develop the corporate 
governance system with only quasi-laws.  
The Kruskal-Wallis test revealed that there is a significant difference between the groups at 
the 5% level, (p= 0.002), which reflected that at least one group differed from the others.   
The Mann-Whitney test indicated that the bank investment advisors’ responses were 
significantly different from those of all other groups except the company employees. The 
test also indicated that the company employees group were relatively supportive, whereas 
the external auditors and investors groups were less enthusiastic about the statement.        
Finally, this finding was expected because the legal system in Libya needs more 
development to become consistent with international requirements and so that Libya can 
join the WTO. Also, the results support the finding of question six (Q6b), when 
respondents strongly agreed with the statement that a lack of legal and regulation systems 
to govern companies' activities is an important factor which might affect the practice of 
corporate governance in Libya. On the other hand, results statistically revealed significant 
differences among groups' responses regarding the possible approaches that can be used as 
a basis to introduce and improve corporate governance in the Libya regarding to the quasi-
laws and adjusting international codes. However, introducing corporate governance through 
improving the legal system did not face any significant between groups, which might 
reflect the weakness of the system in Libya.  
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7.4 Conclusion  
The questionnaire survey was carried out in order to explore the views and perceptions 
amongst different groups of Libyan stakeholders regarding corporate governance in Libya. 
The groups were academics, external auditors, investment advisors of banks, company 
employees, government officials and investors.  
The data were analysed by using the SPSS package, and the Kruskal-Wallis (KW) test to 
identify any significant differences between groups, with the also Mann-Whitney (MW) 
test to identify which of the differences were statistically significant.            
The questionnaire was divided into seven related sections where each section consisted of 
one or more questions. In general, most questions in the questionnaire were supported by 
respondents. However, this varied between agreement and strong agreement. The main 
results of this part of the study indicate that most Libyan stakeholders believe that 
strengthening the corporate governance system will benefit both Libyan companies and the 
Libyan economy.                                   
The first part of the questionnaire concerned understanding of the term of corporate 
governance and its importance. This question sought to examine whether respondents 
consider corporate governance to be focussed on the interest of shareholders or 
stakeholders. Generally, the respondents agreed with the stakeholders’ perspective when 
most of them defined corporate governance as an organisation’s relationship with its 
shareholders and all other stakeholders who are affected by or affect the company's 
operations and decisions. However, this finding highlighted the need to clarify the term 
stakeholders in the Libyan context since respondents were split between those who thought 
corporate governance is a relationship between the organisation and its stakeholders who 
are affected by or affect the company's operations and decisions, and those who believe it is 
a relationship between the organisation and all members of society, regardless of whether 
they affect or are affected by the organisation’s operations and decisions.                         
Respondents agreed with the statements presented in the questionnaire which were related 
to the possible purposes of implementing corporate governance in Libya. However, their 
level of agreement was different and some statements produced significant differences 
between the groups. In addition, the study revealed that, in general, the Libyan stakeholders 
are in consensus that corporate governance is significant to all listed groups of stakeholders 
mentioned in question four in the questionnaire.              
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Regarding stakeholders’ rights, the results suggested that, in general, respondents believed 
that not all of the rights in the questionnaire survey exist in Libya. Also, they considered 
that companies do not act in a responsible manner and protect the rights of society (when 
respondents were less supportive of this issue in the question five).    
In terms of factors that might affect the practice of corporate governance, the results 
suggested that all of the listed factors in part three (question six) were considered as 
important except the form of company ownership, since respondents disagreed with this 
statement (mean= 2.55). This might reflect that Libyan stakeholders consider corporate 
governance is not affected by ownership and, therefore, must apply in all companies 
regardless of the form of ownership42.         
For the current practice of corporate governance in the Libyan context, respondents were 
asked to give their opinion about possible reasons that might prevent good corporate 
governance practice in Libyan companies. In general, respondents showed strong 
agreement with almost all of the listed reasons.43  
Part six of the questionnaire was about disclosure and transparency practices in Libya. The 
results suggested that, in general, all of the listed statements relating to disclosure and 
transparency practice which respondents were asked gained high support since the mean 
scores were not less than 4.25. This result may reflect the low practice of disclosure and 
transparency. This result supported the transparency organisation reports in 2007 and 2008 
when it ranked Libya at the bottom of the transparency list.  The statement that companies 
should provide timely and accurate disclosure on the financial and operating results of the 
company was considered as an important statement, whereas preparing, auditing and 
disclosing the information according to international standards of accounting was 
considered as the least supported statement in this question.           
In the same part, respondents were asked to give their perceptions about the Board of 
Directors’ responsibilities. Generally, all responsibilities listed in question eight seem to be 
viewed as important, since each mean score was 4.05 or higher. This question reflected 
significant differences among groups, but these differences were in the level of agreement, 
not between agreement and disagreement.                      
                                                 
42 Respondents argued that introducing corporate governance should be in both state-owned and private 
companies, to achieve the best benefits. 
43 Except for the good relationship between external auditor and a company where it received less than a 
neutral level of agreement (mean score 2.35).  
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Question ten in part six endeavoured to elicit the selected groups’ opinions about other 
factors that might affect the improvement corporate governance in Libya. Results indicated 
that the majority of respondents agreed with the listed factors since the mean scores were 
all 3.98 or over. This question indicated that, although there was a considerable agreement, 
there were statistically significant differences between groups in terms of agreement level. 
There was strong support for a clear separation between the role of CEO and Chairman 
since the mean score was 4.58. The additional questionnaire revealed that almost all listed 
companies do separate the roles of CEO and Chairman. In addition, the statement about 
establishing sub-committees on the board ranked as the least supported of five statements in 
this question, which is attributed to the weakness of the understanding and the absence of 
legal requirements to establish committees.               
In part seven, Q11 was about how corporate governance should be introduced. The results 
indicated that, in general, respondents strongly supported introducing corporate governance 
by new laws and regulations (legal system) as that statement ranked as highest with no 
statistically significant differences between respondents and with a mean score of 4.54.   
The other statement also supported was introducing corporate governance by adjusting 
international codes requirements of corporate governance practice. The existing law and 
regulations and quasi-laws was not supported (the mean score was under the neutral level at 
2.79). This result might reflect the weakness of the legal system to govern the companies.  
The question exposed the effect of the background and interest of groups, since differing 
and interesting views emerged. For instance, in Q11b, there were significant differences 
between the groups in agreement, which possibly reflected knowledge and education.      
During the analysis of data, generally most statements did not reveal any statistically 
significant differences between the respondents’ answer; however, some statements 
revealed significant differences in their answers. This means that there is at least one group 
different. The next table summarises which group or groups differed significantly in the 
respondents’ answers. It can be seen that both academic staff and investors revealed 
significant differences in their views compared with others regarding the listed statements. 
These differences might be ascribed to their interests and they are more concerned for the 
development of the practice or because they are not involved in the business activities and 
therefore do not know how complicated the realty of business practice is. 
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Table (7.21) the summary of the groups’ trends of answers 
The question 
number 
Strong agreement
4.5-5 
Agreement
3.5- 4.5 
Neutral
2.5- 3.5  
Disagreement
1.5- 2.5
Strong
disagreement
1-1.5
Q2a 6 1-2-3-4-5  
Q3e 1 2-3-4-5-6
Q3f 1-2-3-4-5-6
Q4a 6 1-2-3-4-5
Q4d 1-2-4-5 3-6
Q5a 1-2-3-4-5-6
Q5b 1-2-3-4-5-6
Q5e 1-2-3-4-6 5
Q5f 4 1-2-3-5-6
Q5g 4 1-2-3-5-6
Q6b 1 2-3-4-5-6
Q6e 1-2-3-4-5-6
Q6g 1-2-3-4-5-6
Q7c 1-2-3-4-5 6
Q7d 3-5-6 1-2-4 
Q7f 1-3-4-5-6 2
Q7i 1-2-4-5-6 3
Q8b 1-2 3-4-5-6
Q8c 1-2-3-4-5-6
Q8d 1-2-3-4-5 6
Q8e 1-2-3-4-5 6
Q8f 1-6 2-3-4-5
Q8g 1-4-5-6 2-3
Q8h 1-2-4-5 3-6
Q8i 1 2-3-4-5-6 
Q9a 1-2-3-5 4-6
Q9c 1-2 3-4-5-6
Q9d 1-2-3-4-5-6
Q9e 2 1-3-4-5-6
Q9f 1-2-4-5 3-6
Q9g 1-2-3-4-5-6
Q9h 1 2-3-4-5-6
Q10a 1-2-3-45-6
Q10b 1-2-4-5 3-6
Q10c 5 1-2-3-4 6
Q10d 5 1-2-3-4-6
Q11a 1-2-3-4-5 6
Q11b 1-2-3-4-5-6
 
1= academic staff; 2= external auditors; 3= investment advisors of banks; 4= company 
employees; 5= government officials; 6= investors.        
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
.        
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Analysis of the Interviews 
 
 
8.1 Introduction  
To complement discussions in the previous chapter, this chapter focuses on the analysis of 
semi-structured interviews which were carried out in Libya during July and August 2007 
(the sample of interviewees was explained in section 6.8). The interviews aimed to 
investigate the extent to which Libyan stakeholders, especially policy-makers, perceived 
the framework, the current corporate governance practice and changes on the horizon. 
Therefore, these interviews will help to shape and build a more complete picture of 
corporate governance in the Libyan context.   
In order to achieve the research aims, the researcher endeavoured to prepare and conduct 
interviews at a convenient time for the interviewees through sending a copy of the covering 
letter, supervisor letter and a copy of the interview questions to every interviewee, then 
arranging the interview time with those who had agreed to participate in this study.  
Moreover, to conduct the interviews smoothly the researcher followed the wishes of 
interviewees on the place and time of the interviews. 
As mentioned, the main aim of the study is to investigate the corporate governance. 
Therefore, the guidelines’ instruction of the interviews was seeking to explore the 
following elements: 
 The acceptable definition of the term corporate governance and its importance 
in the Libyan context. 
  The corporate governance issues that are related to the Libyan transitional 
economy. 
  The effect of the legal system and social and cultural values on the current 
practice and the efforts to develop governance practice in Libya.  
  The states of disclosure and transparency practice in the Libyan context which 
includes information that requires more disclosure. 
 The performance of current Boards of Directors in Libyan companies  
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 The role of the external auditors and financial institutions in improving the 
practice of corporate governance in Libya. 
 The best way to introduce corporate governance in Libya.  
8.2 The Concept and the Importance of Corporate Governance 
 
8.2.1 Definition of Corporate Governance  
This question seeks to examine whether respondents understand corporate governance as 
being focussed on the interests of only shareholders or on those of all stakeholders.  
Generally, it can be said that the results of the interviews, on balance, confirmed the 
questionnaire survey result when almost all interviewees defined corporate governance as a 
system of accountability and responsibility to all stakeholders. For instance, one of the 
interviewees stated that: 
“Corporate governance for me is the proper practices that should exist within a 
company, according to or derived from its standard operating procedures, the laws that 
govern conduct in the employees in the company. But most importantly this should be 
verified by regular checks the aim of which is to make sure that the practice and the 
behaviours of those responsible for decision making across the country comply with 
those rules that sort out compatibility between practices the legal structure in the 
country.”  (A1) 
 
Another interviewee defined the term of corporate governance as:   
 
“Corporate governance in my opinion is the package of procedures and practices, 
instruments which aim to achieve the companies’ adherences to the laws and 
regulations, and which in the end deliver in the interest of both shareholders and all 
other stakeholders that is those who have contact with the company and this means any 
one affected by or who affects the company's operations and decisions.” (A5) 
 
A further interviewee said that: 
 
“I think the term is new and old at the same time, old in terms of content (meaning) and 
new in terms of terminology which confirms that research tends to generate and 
improve the existing terms in business sciences. According to the meaning of corporate 
governance it consists of elements which eventually tend to reduce the malpractice of 
top management and pursues the interests of managers and shareholders. Corporate 
governance in my opinion is the last resort of companies to exist and grow in the 
globalisation era where companies should provide evidence that they are working 
according to the ethics and for the benefit of all stakeholders in the long term. This does 
not mean it should not pursue the interests of shareholders, those who provided the 
finance for the company and therefore should get a return on their investment.”  (A3) 
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Others concluded that corporate governance is a set of mechanisms that exist to protect 
shareholders and other stakeholders who affect or are affected by the company against top 
management expropriation. The definitions suggested by the interviewees focused on the 
following aspects of corporate governance: Corporate governance is the system by which 
companies are controlled to make benefits for all its stakeholders, through improving the 
internal and external mechanisms to give companies chances to exist and growth by 
providing confidence to investors that the company is a good place for investment and deal 
with. 
 
Regarding whether the interviewees were aware of any occasions when a failure of 
corporate governance practice had led to problems, it was notable that almost all of them 
highlighted the case of the Enron Company as the most infamous company regarding 
corporate governance practice in developed economies.  In this direction, one interviewee 
said: 
“The corporate governance has become more important and has received 
increased attention after the financial crises swept the Far East economy during 
1997 and particularly following high-profile financial scandals and corporate 
failures such as Enron and WorldCom in the United States.”  (A3) 
 
For instance, one interviewee (A4) said 
“In the case of the Enron collapse I have spoken to the member of SEC who 
investigated the problem in the company and he told me the biggest issue with 
the company was the weakness of the corporate governance practice where there 
was trickery, fraud and vagueness of the responsibilities lines between the 
managers. Therefore, now the World Bank is working to prepare to establish a 
law of corporate governance and there are many groups working with the bank. 
For instance, in Arabic countries, there are six countries working with the bank 
to prepare this law not just a Code which means international organisations will 
recognise corporate governance practice.” (A4) 
 
It can be concluded that all interviewees thought that corporate governance is a mechanism 
to achieve the benefit of stakeholders beyond the interests of shareholders. Also, they are 
aware that most companies which collapse did so because of the weakness of corporate 
governance practices. This result was in line with the findings provided by Allen (2005), 
whose study analysed corporate governance in emerging economies. His results showed 
that, because markets are more imperfect and incomplete in these economies, the focus on 
all stakeholders rather than just shareholders may lead to a fairer allocation of resources 
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than if the company just focused on the interest of shareholders and equitable income 
distribution. 
In respect of the importance of corporate governance to companies and macro-economics, 
the interviews sought to investigate the interviewees’ views about the underlying 
importance of corporate governance in the Libyan context. 
All interviewees openly recognised that corporate governance is important in the Libyan 
economy at this stage where the Libyan economy is in first stage of opening up to the 
world. For instance, one interviewee stated that: 
“The importance of corporate governance can be outlined as improvement of the 
investors’ confidence, attraction of foreign investment, reduction of capital escaping 
abroad and as a useful mechanism of fighting corruption. Corporate governance is the 
best mechanism to improve the competitiveness between companies and recovery of the 
economy.” (A5) 
 
In addition, interviewees believed that the importance of corporate governance is to help 
Libya to integrate into the global market, join the WTO and improve transparency, as Libya 
was at the bottom of the transparency ranking in 2007 (International Transparency Report 
2007), and improve disclosure practices. A number of interviewees suggested that applying 
effective corporate governance would strengthen internal control and management systems 
in Libyan companies and will help an external auditor to provide an honest report of the 
company’s activities. This was in line with Solomon and Solomon (2004) when they 
argued that without an effective system of internal control, companies can undergo 
substantial financial losses as result of unanticipated disasters. The Enron collapse has been 
attributed in part to a failure of the company’s system of internal control.  
During the interviews, one of the interviewees made an interesting remark about the 
importance of corporate governance when he said that:  
“Good corporate governance helps the economy to secure growth by improving and 
attracting more investment in the globalisation era where the competitiveness is 
fierce.” (A6) 
 
In the same vein, one interviewee emphasised that:  
“Because good corporate governance will ensure the company’s survival for a long 
time, the related parties should adopt a positive role to improve the practice especially 
the board of directors, top management, shareholders and other stakeholders.”  (A10) 
 
Interestingly, there was a comment from one interviewee emphasising the benefit of 
corporate governance in the banking sector when he said:  
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“Practising corporate governance in the banking sector will provide large benefits 
where this sector can lend to other sectors and therefore encourage investors to deposit 
their capital in banks which finally will give a good (wealthy) return to all society.”  
(A9) 
 
Moreover, interviewees were asked to give their opinions on groups that would benefit 
from establishing good corporate governance practice in Libya. According to them, all 
stakeholder groups which are mentioned in the interview guidelines would achieve benefits 
from the corporate governance practice since it pays attention to all groups associated with 
a company. More precisely each group generated some useful comments from the 
interviewees as follows: 
• Shareholders: through good corporate governance practice shareholders can make sure 
that their investment has been managed and invested properly. Interviewees supported the 
idea that corporate governance must support and encourage the shareholders as the 
providers of the company’s capital. This argument was in line with OECD (2004) which 
stated that corporate governance should protect shareholders’ rights as well as ensuring that 
all shareholders are practising their rights.   
• Employees: since an improved corporate governance system should result in company 
sustainability and economic wealth, employees will have greater job stability and job 
opportunities in a safer working environment.  
• Institutional Investors: they will have an appropriate rate of return on their investment 
and corporate governance will encourage them to reinvest their earnings in the economy 
which in the end will create more jobs and increase the country’s GDP. 
• Society at large and Government: interviewees distinguished between the society’s and 
the government’s benefit. In respect of society, better corporate governance practice will 
improve corporate social responsibilities through companies’ contribution in the field of 
developing a community when companies invest some their profits in social activities such 
as subsidies to health care, the education system and other youth activities. On the other 
hand, the government can benefit from good corporate governance practice, by increasing 
the productivity and enhancing the overall economy which finally leads to raising the 
country’s GDP, reducing the unemployment rate and increasing tax revenues.  
The benefits of corporate governance practice in Libyan companies according to the 
interviews were summarised by one of interviewees as follows: 
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“Corporate governance is more than business issues affecting company performance or 
the protection of the interests of stakeholders. It is more than that by having or reaching 
economic, social and political implications. Good corporate governance promotes a 
more open, free, transparent and uncorrupted society and eventually improves the 
country’s economy.” (A1) 
 
Interviewees’ responses were clear that Libya should adopt an effective corporate 
governance framework to release the potential opportunities of economic activities to the 
Libyans and help Libya to join the global market.   
However, some in their interviews supported Libya in developing its economy by creating 
consistency between its economic activities through transferring good (profitable) state-
owned companies and economic units to the private sector and building a strong stock 
market. This comment typified many of them:  
“The Libyan government should sell and transfer the profitable companies to the 
public.” (A7) 
In contrast, one interviewee stated that:  
“At this point in time, Libya should concentrate on developing its economy by 
liberalising the wages and prices and diluting the government control on the economic 
activities rather than on the corporate governance practice.” (A8) 
 
The Libyan economy, like many developing economies, depends to a large degree on small 
and medium companies, and almost all interviewees remarked that corporate governance is 
a useful mechanism for growing the company; therefore, small and medium companies 
should install corporate governance. This argument was in line with Abor and Adjasi 
(2007), who argued that developing countries are now increasingly embracing the concept 
of good corporate governance, because of its ability to impact positively on sustainable 
growth. It is believed that good governance generates investor goodwill and confidence. In 
addition, this result agrees with Hampel’s view (1998) that corporate governance is as 
important for small companies as for large ones. Also, this result was in line with the 
findings provided by La Porta et al (1997), and La Porta et al (2000). They highlighted the 
importance of corporate governance in emerging markets for attracting more local and 
international investors. Their results indicated that across countries, corporate governance is 
an important factor in financial market development and company value. Finally, it can be 
concluded that stakeholders’ rights have been considered as the important aim of good 
corporate governance in the Libyan context. 
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8.2.2 The Rights of Shareholders and Other Stakeholders in Libyan Context 
(1)- The shareholders’ rights 
The OECD (2004) emphasised that: 
“The corporate governance framework should protect and facilitate the exercise of 
shareholders’ rights.” Para (II). 
 
Also in para (III) they stated that: 
“The corporate governance framework should ensure the equitable treatment of all 
shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders. All shareholders should 
have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights.” 
 
In Libya, the shareholders have the legal right to attend the AGM and vote on any issue or 
matter belonging to the company.44 The interviewees were asked to give their view about 
the current shareholders’ rights practice and implementation. 
All interviewees confirmed the weakness of shareholders’ rights in both theory and in 
practice.  For instance, one interviewee argued that: 
“Libya should protect the right of shareholders on its reforms agenda since starting to 
transfer its economy and establishing stock market.” (A9). 
 
In the same vein, 7 of the 10 interviewees argued that Libya should emphasise the role of 
protecting shareholders rights through revising and developing its legal system and 
encouraging the large shareholders and institutional shareholders to respect the rights of 
minority and foreign shareholders. One of them remarked that: 
"Libya is a unique case, as it has a special complexion because business activities had 
been practised by the government for a long time which affects private business 
practices. After opening the door to the private sector and changing to a liberal market, 
we need to change the state-owned philosophy where the people depend on the 
government for everything. We need to liberalise the inventiveness of the Libyan 
people so they can create and innovate” (A3) 
   
An interviewee (A1) said that: 
“Without changes in the corporate culture, it may be difficult to achieve good practice 
of corporate governance, and unlikely to go through the transferring period without 
economic problems such as stolen stated-owned companies assets, malpractice of sales. 
These companies’ corruption and collapses of companies will eventually lead to 
adverse results from the changes and people will stop the process.” (A1). 
 
                                                 
44 According to Libyan commercial law (1954) in Article (516) the shareholders have the rights to: (1) Attest 
on the annual report. (2) Appoint the board members, and watchdog committee. (3) Determination of the 
board members’ remuneration. (4) Any other issue related to the company. 
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These comments were in line with studies such as Regional Corporate Governance 
Working Group (RCGWG, 2003) which found that although shareholder rights are clearly 
identified in the rules and regulations in MENA markets, there is a gap between what the 
law states and what is practised. Also, Muranda (2006) argued that in developing 
economies the introduction of sound corporate governance principles in banking 
institutions has been partially hampered by poor legal protection, weak information 
disclosure requirements and dominant owners. 
Moreover, some interviewees confirmed that there is a weakness in relation to shareholders' 
rights in the Libyan context since they identified many other rights to shareholders that 
should exist in Libya, such as their rights to full disclosure and the treatment of all 
shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders fairly. Also they argued 
shareholders should have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their 
rights. In this direction, one of them said that: 
"Listen, if we need to join the WTO and improve our opportunity to benefit from the 
globalisation we need to take account of and adhere to the international codes and 
create a code for best practice. Here if you look at the OECD Principles you will find 
that the shareholders’ rights occupied the first principle, which mean they are the 
important base in the company and therefore they should receive fair treatment. More 
clearly they should as financial providers have all their rights which is emphasised by 
OECD and other international organisations and also the management, laws and 
regulation must maintain and encourage them to invest, not put their capital under their 
mattresses." (A8) 
 
Finally, although some rights of shareholders are protected by Libyan law, interviewees are 
aware that shareholder rights practice in the Libyan context is weak and needs more 
improvement. The researcher attributes this to the long period of state-owned policy and 
monopoly of business activities by the government which makes the shareholders a new 
concept in the Libyan context.  
After the liberalisation of the economy, a new phenomenon of the domination of majority 
shareholders in taking the decisions in the AGM has arisen. For instance, one interviewee 
said:  
“There is a wrong method in taking decisions in AGMs in Libyan companies. This is 
because shareholders can give votes to candidates equal to their shareholding to more 
than one candidate but the correct use of this rule is that shareholders divided their vote 
between candidates or give votes to only one- but not give their whole vote to one 
candidate and then to another.” (A4). 
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Also, these comments revealed that company ownership in Libya, as in many countries in 
the world, is dominated by large shareholders such as the government and institutional 
investors or sometimes by individuals. Therefore, a conflict of interest exists between 
controlling shareholders on the one hand and minority shareholders on the other hand who 
face a lack of financial sophistication. This supports the findings and suggestion from 
Mallin (2004) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997).  
 
(2)- The stakeholders’ rights  
To achieve the research aims and objectives the researcher in the interviews undertook to 
elicit the policy-makers’ opinion about to what extent they believe that the rights of 
stakeholders exist in the Libyan context. All interviewees were asked about to the extent of 
their agreement that stakeholders’ rights exist in Libya.  
The majority of interviewees (8 of 10) indicated that some of the rights of stakeholders are 
stated and protected by the legal system and regulation in the Libyan context; however, the 
problem is in the practice of these rights. Moreover, they argued that the main aim of 
corporate governance in the Libyan context is to stimulate and refresh the rights of 
stakeholders. For instance, they emphasised that Libya needs to strengthen the culture of 
the product guarantee, intellectual property rights and to promote social responsibility in 
both the state-owned and private sectors. In this way, one interviewee pointed out that: 
"I can say to you that some stakeholders groups suffer from the weakness of their 
rights. For example, employees, creditors and so on, this is because of the incomplete 
legal system and the low enforcement which affect stakeholders' rights." (A10). 
 
Some interviewees indicated that subordinates are afraid to disagree with any decision 
made by CEOs. For example, one of the interviewees stated that: 
“Generally any decision made by the CEO is accepted by all levels of managers and 
the company. The reason behind that is the excessive power of the CEO and sometimes 
the dual position of him.” (A6).  
 
Different stakeholders may have different concerns about the activities of a company. In 
seeking more details about the stakeholders’ rights, all interviewees were asked to give 
their opinion about specific groups and the current practice of their rights, and how these 
can be improved. The comments were as follows: 
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1- Employees: They do not have the right to get a percentage of profits as in many other 
countries.45 Also, the labour unions in Libyan companies are weak and cannot improve the 
employees’ rights. In this way, one interviewee said that: 
"Although the government policy is to sell or sometimes provide free shares to 
employees, the actual practice demonstrates that employees’ rights face some obstacles 
which affect the employee activity. This is clear in the courts where many employees 
litigate against their company about their rights which includes the wages, promotion 
problems or retirement rewards. This epidemic exists in state-owned companies and 
unfortunately transfers to private companies." (A3). 
 
2- Creditors: With respect to creditors as one of the stakeholder groups, there was a 
question about whether there is a balance between reorganisation and liquidation of the 
companies and the rights of creditors such as banks. Most interviewees agreed that there are 
problems during the enforcement of transfer, reorganisation and liquidation and sale of 
companies. 
This is because the processes remove or ignore the creditors’ rights. In this connection one 
interviewee said: 
“I agree that during the economic transformation many problems may arise in the 
practice, because during the practice some stakeholders' rights can be abused. However, 
the General Peoples’ Committee always tries to reduce this problem and compensate for 
any damage to stakeholders' rights.” (A2)  
 
3- Consumers: The main problem with consumers in the Libyan context is the lack of a 
culture of giving product guarantees. This leads companies to pursue profit at the expense 
of consumers. One interviewee summarised that:  
"In Libya the relationship between companies and their clients is, sometimes, not clear. 
For example, bank clients may hate to deposit in banks. The reasons are low respect of 
them, and the complicated procedures in terms of depositing and withdrawing.’’ (A6) 
 
4- Society: Companies should not pursue profit without regard to the impact on the wider 
societal interests, according to Mallin (2004). Therefore, social responsibility has become 
as a factor of companies' growth and development.  
 
Eight from ten interviewees indicated that the current efforts of Libyan companies to 
improve society are weak because the culture and the law do not encourage that. One 
comment was this: 
                                                 
45 In Egypt for instance, the employees have the right to the lower of either 10 % of the profits or the 
equivalent of one annual salary each year when the profits are distributed (RCGWG, 2003).  
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“Now all companies regardless of their size or activity are fighting to exist in a rapidly 
and ongoing economic environment. The social responsibility is very important to keep 
a company successful. These responsibilities include responsibility to the environment 
(through reducing all sorts of pollution and participating in extending the green belt) 
and to society through enhancing the company contribution in education, health system 
and youth activities to improve society.” (A10). 
  
Another interviewee said that: 
 
“Companies in my opinion pursue their interest; see for example foreign companies 
especially in the oil sector: big capital and huge profit. But these companies do not 
participate to improve the social activities because there is no motivation to do that 
such as tax privileges.”  (A8) 
 
 
Some interviewees (4 from 10) argued that the law, especially the tax law, is not in line 
with social responsibilities. The law does not play a role in encouraging social 
responsibility and enabling companies to work as socially responsible companies. For 
instance, one interviewee stated that:  
“All companies, Libyan or foreign would help the society via contribution to social 
development. However, the law prohibits that, yes prohibits. See the tax law for 
example which I can remember now the maximum donation is 2% from the net profit. 
This percentage is not enough to encourage a company to contribute to social activity. 
So if any company pays more than that the tax authority does not admit to that and 
therefore does not allow reducing the amount from the income before the tax.”   (A9)  
 
Interestingly, one of them said that:  
“Always increasing the shareholders rights will improve stakeholders’ rights in the long 
term. So there should not be any separation between the interest of shareholders and 
stakeholders’ benefit in the company. Also, a stakeholder is a broad term and I can 
argue with you about the definition of that so we should determine this terminology and 
then ask companies to take account of their stakeholders which I suppose many 
companies do.” (A7)  
  
Analysis of the interviews indicates that there is a difference of interest between the 
stakeholders in Libyan companies. In addition, some argued that the shareholders’ interest 
is not clear because Libyan companies were state-owned, which were aimed to maximise 
the community benefit such as reducing the unemployment rate and offering the services 
and products. Libya now should push private companies to take account of all stakeholders 
and participate in social activities, both locally and nationally. These findings support what 
the OECD (2004) stated: 
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“Corporate governance should protect the rights of other stakeholders, such as Banks, 
Bondholders and Employers. Corporate Governance should also encourage active 
cooperation between the corporation and stakeholders so as to enhance the 
performance of both Corporate Governance and the market”. 
 
It was notable that all interviewees highlighted that the stakeholder approach with less 
intervention by government is applicable within a proper corporate governance framework 
in Libya. This framework should concentrate on the rights of both shareholders and 
stakeholders, increasing the attraction to institutional investors, a high level of disclosure 
and transparency practice for both financial and non-financial information and 
improvement of the investment climate. For instance, one of the interviewees highlighted 
that: 
“In my opinion, good corporate governance will attract the investment and therefore 
reduce the pressure on government to find more jobs for graduates and at the same time 
increase the tax revenues which the government can spend on the infrastructure and to 
establish a good business climate.” (A2) 
 
The rights of stakeholders have not reached a satisfactory level in the Libyan context where 
many of these rights are still absent or not recognised. This result is in line with the 
recommendation made by the OECD (2004) that the corporate governance should 
recognise the rights of stakeholders established by law or through mutual agreements and 
encourage active co-operation between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, 
jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound enterprises.   
On this point, one of the interviewees said that: 
"The best companies are those which can improve the society and environment by more 
donations in social activities and therefore can improve their profitability and attract 
more investment from individual and institutional investors." (A3)    
 
8.3 Factors Affecting the Practice of Corporate Governance in the Libyan Context 
The interviewees were asked about the following factors that might have affected the 
framework of corporate governance in Libya. 
 
8.3.1 The Legal System 
Nganga et al (2003) argued that the key issues in evaluating a corporate governance system 
are legal protection of investor rights, trustworthy accounting and disclosure standards, 
effective boards, and preferably an active market for corporate control. 
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La Porta et al (1997) found significant differences in the capital markets of countries which 
have different forms of legal system. This difference is mainly between countries with a 
French civil law system and those with British common law. In addition, the OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) emphasised the importance of the legal system 
in establishing good corporate governance when they said: “The corporate governance 
framework also depends on the legal, regulatory, and institutional environment”.  
Therefore, participants from all groups involved in this study were asked to give their 
opinions about the influence of the law on corporate governance practice in Libya. The 
questionnaire participants strongly agreed that the legal system has a considerable influence 
on a good corporate governance framework.  
The interviewees’ viewpoints which emerged were that there is a strong relationship 
between corporate governance and the legal system. They stressed that the interaction 
between the legal system and corporate governance is very strong since laws and regulation 
regulate economic and social activities.  
All of interviewees believe that the legal system in Libya is weak and needs to be 
developed to encompass the current practices of economic activities. Their viewpoints have 
highlights two main problems. 
 
 The Weakness of the Legal System  
 
The first point from a majority of the interviewees (9 from 10) was the strong relationship 
between the legal system and corporate governance. In this point, they believe that the legal 
system should contain the most important principles of corporate governance since they 
consider that there is a lacuna in the Libyan legal system. For instance, one of them said:  
“Libya now is an opening market and its economic activities are showing ongoing 
improvement, so we need to change dramatically our laws and regulation which I think 
now are out of date. This weakness comes in both quantity and quality of existing laws 
and regulation.”   (A1)  
    
In the same vein, almost all interviewees emphasised the absence of some laws such as 
company law and comprehensive labour law. One of them said that: 
 
“Yes I can say that there is a weakness and a lack of a legal system in Libya through 
the absence of some laws such as company law and some laws need to be improved 
such as commercial law and Investment Code Act (1997). This lack exists because the 
country was a controlled economy and recently has changed to a free economy which 
needs to change the legal framework as well.” (A7) 
 204
On the other hand, one of them said that:  
 
“The legal system should be revised to cover all aspects of the economy and to 
harmonise with the global economy to attract more investment. We should understand 
that capital is timorous and goes to the safest place. This means we need to introduce 
confidence for the investors by a complete legal system which covers all aspects of 
economic activities." (A10).    
      
This result supports Mallin (2004) when she argued that the legal system is a key influence 
on the type of ownership and control structure. Further, a study by La Porta et al (1998) on 
publicly owned companies showed that family control is more common in countries with 
poor shareholders’ protection, while the widely owned company is more common in 
countries with good shareholders’ protection.  
Some of the interviewees argued that Libya should render a judgment quickly in business 
litigation by finding specialist judges who can handle all the pending cases and issues 
expeditiously in specialist courts.46 Regarding other legal issues, one interviewee said that: 
 
“We need to protect the right of employees by determining the minimum wages (the 
hourly or monthly wages) so the companies’ owners cannot exploit the employees 
which is common in developing countries; also we should improve the culture of 
temporary jobs47.” (A5)   
 
Some of interviewees argued that, although Libya had enacted its commercial law more 
than fifty-five years ago, the law has faced many changes and amendments during that time 
and sometimes the government had partly stopped or ignored many parts of this law during 
the period of prevention of commercial activity by individuals. In this direction, one of the 
interviewees said: 
“Now we need to renew the commercial law and its amendments and then enact new 
commercial law which should include all of what we need for economic activities.” 
(A1) 
 
 The Weakness of Enforcement 
 
The other problem related to the legal system is enforcement, according to many 
interviewees.  In this respect, one of interviewees said:  
    
                                                 
46  In Libya there is a court of economic issues; however, the judgement of these issues sometimes takes a 
long time.  
47 During the preparation of this study there has been an attempt to renew and enact new laws regarding 
economic activities.   
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“The problem is not enacting the laws and regulation, which we may have much of, but 
the problem is the implementation of laws and regulation and the continuation of these 
laws and regulations. For example, we have the longest traffic law in the world but at 
the same time Libya has a serious problem with traffic accidents: it is easy to see cars 
cut the red traffic light in the midday. In respect of business activities, although the 
legal system recognises some but not all of the business issues such as the rights of 
shareholders and stakeholders, the practice of these rights is weak and sometimes their 
rights can easily be violated by the management.” (A1). 
 
Almost all interviewees (9 out of 10) argued that the implementation and acceleration of the 
enforcement is more problematic than establishing laws and regulation. 
This result supports Berglöf and Claessens, 2004 when they argue that: 
 
“Enforcement more than regulations, laws-on-the-books or voluntary codes is key to 
effective corporate governance, at least in transition and developing countries. 
Corporate governance and enforcement mechanisms are intimately linked as they 
affect firms’ ability to commit towards their stakeholders, in particular towards 
external investors…When the general enforcement environment is weak and specific 
enforcement mechanisms function poorly, as in many developing and transition 
countries, few of the traditional corporate governance mechanisms are effective.” 
 
The discussion is in the line with RCGWG, (2003) when they argued that in the MENA 
region the important challenge lies currently in the effectiveness of its enforcement and 
implementation.  Also, it is in line with the findings and the argument made by Alajlan 
(2004) that Arab markets in general are poorly regulated, and laws governing insider 
trading and financial disclosures simply are not thoroughly enforced.  
Other interviewees (4 from 10) considered the relationship is not just between the legal 
system and the corporate governance system but it is more complex since the legal system 
is as a result of the culture and social norms because it is made by people. One of them 
remarked: 
 
“Corporate governance is an ongoing process that endeavours to develop the country’s 
legal, cultural and economical activities systems. So, we do not need to import or 
transfer the corporate governance system from others. We need to improve corporate 
governance mechanisms that suit our current culture and business activities to achieve 
our ambitions.” (N4)  
 
This comment was in line with the argument made by Berglöf and Claessens (2004) when 
they argue that the wholesale transfer of governance standards from developed market 
economies may discourage investors from taking controlling positions and thus undermine 
potent corporate governance mechanisms in less-developed economies. 
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It is also in line with Nganga et al (2003) when they argued that legal protection depends on 
the enforcement (and quality) of laws, while ownership concentration leaves minorities 
exposed to expropriation by larger shareholders.  
Moreover, the result was in line with the pioneering works by La Porta et al (1997, 1998, 
and 1999) which emphasised the importance of law and legal enforcement on corporate 
governance and a company’s behaviour and market development.  
Interestingly, interviewees believe that Libya has an adequate court and judicial system but 
the problem lies with the incomplete legal system and poor enforcement. In this connection, 
one of interviewees said:   
 
"The jurisdiction system is great and the judges can make adjudications fairly and I 
think they are qualified. However, the problem is the incompleteness of some parts of 
the legal system. See for example the arbitration law; intellectual property rights, 
accounting auditing standards and company law etc are inadequate and sometimes 
absent. So, after developing the legal system and improving the enforcement we can 
join the WTO and world economy and the good governance mechanisms." (A7) 
 
From the above discussion, it can be said that the laws and regulation that govern corporate 
governance in the Libya were perceived as being inadequate or as being outdated and 
needing revision. Also, enforcement is still major issue and a barrier to improvement of the 
corporate governance system.    
  
8.3.2 The Social and Cultural Norms       
Participants involved in the interviews were asked to give their opinions about the influence 
of social and cultural issues on corporate governance in Libya. This question tried to elicit 
more details about the relationship between corporate governance practice and the 
influence of social and cultural factors48. Therefore, policy-makers were asked about how 
these factors affect the practice. 
Interviewees’ perceptions indicated that corporate governance is influenced by a variety of 
factors related to culture and society. In general, this argument was in line with Agnaia’s 
(1997) study when he stated that Libya is a developing country and the Libyan social 
environment is characterised by the extended family clan, tribe, village and the Islamic 
religion. Interviewees also argued that to achieve good corporate governance, we need to be 
aware of the constraints imposed by the Libyan environment such as cultural and social 
                                                 
48 The questionnaire analysis suggests a linkage between the culture and the corporate governance practice.  
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norms and economic and political factors. In this regard, many Libyan researchers have 
found that personal relations and family ties play a most important role when choosing 
managers rather than practical or academic qualifications. Also, managers are more 
concerned about the creation of social relationships at the workplace than the job itself 
since the social environment in Libya is characterised by the extended family clan, tribe, 
village and the Islamic religion (see, for example, Agnaia 1997 and Kilani, 1988). 
Regarding the relationship between a good corporate governance system and social and 
ethical factors, one interviewee said that:  
"Corporate governance cannot be practised and understood as being independent from 
other community activities; it can be influenced by many activities which reflect the 
community environment. Therefore, a substantial issue is to adapt the corporate 
governance in order to adhere and work in this environment. In Libya the increasing of 
corporate governance mechanisms such as managers' effectiveness, a good board of 
directors’ role, increasing the external auditors’ function and planting the governance 
culture, in my opinion are important factors in order to achieve the best practice.” (A1) 
 
 
Another interviewee remarked that: 
 
“It is important to analyse the factors influencing organisations, human attitudes and 
behaviour, before we choose which mechanism of corporate governance should apply. 
In my opinion, culture is an important factor that affects the good governance in 
economic activities since it makes a set of constraints on the organisation’s activities.” 
(A2)  
 
The interviewees argued that the state-owned sector has found a new culture which affects 
the economic environment. They mentioned corruption and bribery, the absence of a merit 
system for choosing the top managers as the most significant factors discouraging good 
corporate governance practice.  
This result was in line with the result by Agnaia (1997) when he said that the difficulties 
that face Arab organisations regarding management training and development programmes 
result from the characteristics of Arab managers which concentrate on seniority rather than 
merit, on centralisation rather than decentralisation, and on nepotism rather than fairness. 
These characteristics can be considered as one of the reasons why management training and 
development in Arab countries faces difficulties. 
Regarding corruption, most of interviewees believed that the public sector management was 
the main reason for corruption and the proliferation of bad managers and weakness of the 
Board of Directors when the appointment of management and the Board of Directors does 
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not depend on the merit system but on personal interests and the low remuneration policy. 
This was in line with the argument by Ahunwan (2002) that corruption was the result of 
majority government ownership in Nigeria, where this situation has adversely affected the 
management of public sector corporations. Also, the increase of corruption had led the 
Libyan leader to propose the abolition of most of the General Committees (ministries) 
especially the services one, and to distribute the oil and gas revenue to the nation directly.49  
Regarding Islam, all interviewees believed that Islam can improve the practice of 
governance since Islam has formulated a comprehensive ethics governing how business 
should be run and how accountability ought to be achieved. The interviewees confirmed 
that Islam requires a high degree of trust in business dealings and financial affairs. For 
instance, one of the interviewees said:  
“In real life we cannot separate between Islam and the daily activities, since Islam as a 
religion regulates all aspects of life and also it is proper for all times and places. See for 
example the economic activities; Islam prohibits misleading, stealing and lying. So, 
managers should discharge their responsibilities according to Islamic practices, where 
all bad behaviour is unacceptable, and therefore everything we do in this life must 
please Allah.” (A5) 
 
Another said:  
“Libya was a poor country, but it was impossible to hear about bribery, maybe 
because of the Islamic influences on real life. So, bribery as an epidemic in the 
world is the side effect from globalisation. So, we need to improve the Islamic 
culture to eliminate bad behaviour.” (A1).  
These comments were in line with Lewis (2006) when he argued that the aim of the Islamic 
economic system is to allow people to earn their living in a fair and profitable way without 
exploitation of others, and therefore the whole society may benefit. In addition, they were 
in line with Bonn and Fisher (2007) when they argued that corporate governance and 
business ethics should help organisations to implement high standards of ethical behaviour 
throughout the organisation. In the same way, interviewees emphasised that the Islamic 
culture leads to improvements of life in every aspect which, therefore, improves the 
practice of corporate governance.  
                                                 
49 This announcement was in the General People’s Congress Meeting in March 2008.   
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Interviewees also explained that Islam emphasises the welfare of the community since 
corporate governance in Islam takes account of all stakeholders and the corporate 
governance exists over the individual.50  In the same vein, another interviewee said: 
"…Islam imposes trust, accountability and also other values such as honesty, sincerity, 
justice. Also, a Muslim must maintain these values in his real life and also should be a 
pious individual in the community. Managers and other policy-makers should be pious 
and respectable in carrying out their duties towards the community...” (A1) 
 
In the context of Islam, a company manager should surely try his best to manage the 
company in a way that it can benefit not only the shareholders or owners of the company, 
but also that the fruits are also enjoyed by the whole society.   
All interviewees supported the influences of culture and social norms on corporate 
governance. They argued that cultural tradition opens the door to supporting social 
connections, such as tribal loyalties, affecting management decisions and, therefore, leading 
to poor governance. 
In this vein, one of the interviewees said that: 
“Without changes in the corporate culture, the intended purpose of the recent corporate 
governance reforms will be unlikely to be achieved.”  (A10)  
 
In addition, there are some aspects of negative culture in Libya as a result of the economic 
system and the centralisation of the economic activities, such as internal politics, 
bureaucracy, lack of willingness to respond to change, lack of markets and low productivity 
and low of enforcement.       
Interviewees appeared to see a link between corporate governance practice and ethical 
factors. In this connection, one of them said:  
“The ethical values held by a society and most especially by the policy-makers in any 
level of a country or company are influencing the ethical practice of real life rank and 
file employees in their duties. In Libya we need only to improve and stimulate the 
Islamic culture on the economic activities. Islam is involved in these activities and there 
is many verses promoting the economic activities. We need training of managers and an 
excellent education system in business schools.” (A2)      
    
One ethical factor raised by interviewees was the difficulty of  integrating any good 
governance practices without changing cultural and ethical traditions, such as malpractice, 
attitudes towards a job as (only) a right, corruption, lack of transparency, greed dominating 
the minds of many managers, lack of enforcement, cronyism and nepotism, lack of a merit 
                                                 
50 For more information about the Islamic perspective on corporate governance and the difference between the 
Islamic approaches and conventional approaches, see Lewis, 2006  
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system, weakness of board members appointment procedures, government interference in 
economic activities, and  unacceptability of women at top levels or high positions in a 
company even if she is competent. Therefore, interviewees supported and sought to 
encourage the new corporate culture which promotes ethical corporate behaviour and 
inhibits bad behaviour.  
On the other hand, almost all interviewees also pointed out that weak managerial incentives 
and low compensation are perceived as an important issue related to serious ethical 
problems in Libya. It seems to have a negative impact on the practice of corporate 
governance and undermines the moral codes. For instance, one of them said that: 
“The labour law and poor wages system are the biggest factors affecting the ethical 
standards and lead to the breaking of these standards by employees especially in the 
public sector where there has been no improvement of the salaries system since 1981. 
At the same time inflation has hit the entire world. Also the central bank of Libya has 
changed the rate exchange of the Libyan currency against the US Dollar.” (A9)     
 
This argument was in line with Haniffa and Cooke (2005) when they argued that the culture 
of decision makers within and without an organisation is important in many countries 
because the traditions of a nation are instilled in its people and might help explain why 
things are as they are. As such, how a company operates and reports will be influenced by 
the social values of the relevant society within which it exists.  
Interviewees also pointed out that management fraud and management manipulation are the 
most common malpractices in Libya as in most developing economies. These malpractices 
cause investment to flee to other economies, especially to developed economies.  
Although Libya has made some improvement in their corporate governance practices over 
the last few years, particularly in the areas of the free market and free competition and 
dilution of government ownership, the overall infrastructural environment is still not 
conducive to achieving best governance standards. Generally, the respondents were 
concerned about the ethical standards in business and the lack of an appropriate corporate 
culture. Therefore, the researcher believes that a Libyan corporate governance system must 
be based on a foundation of ethical beliefs and behaviour which adheres to Islamic 
principles. 
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8.3.3 The Economic and Financial System  
The legal system is not the only part of the whole corporate governance framework scene. 
Other factors that influence the framework are the maturing of markets, corporate control 
and financial structure. Corporate governance reforms take place through legal and 
regulatory reforms, and high standards of economic and financial regulation.51  
Regarding Libya, it was clear that policy-makers believe economic factors such as the level 
of inflation, ownership and the compensation policy (salary policy) have an effect on 
corporate governance. For example, most of them believed that the tax system could be 
encouraging management to evade taxes by under-declaring their profit or increasing their 
expenditures or sometimes affecting the integrity of annual reports. One interviewee said:  
“You cannot ask for a good economic system unless you have created concrete 
infrastructures for the business activities, which start from the legal, the economic 
and finance systems and the culture. On the finance issue, the major issue is the tax 
rate and the finance policies such as the rate of currency exchanges.” (A6)         
In addition, interviewees emphasised that changing the financing mechanism and banking 
system in Libya is important, and they suggested developing a healthy banking system and 
reconstructing the corporate finance system by encouraging finance through equities and 
bonds rather than by banks loans.  
Related to the last point, the instability of the economic and organisational system is 
considered by interviewees as one of the obstacles to establishing good corporate 
governance. In addition, they argued that the absence of a completely free market with full 
disclosure and transparency practice may be regarded as the biggest obstacles to developing 
economic activities and, therefore, sound corporate governance practice. Interestingly, the 
interviewees believed that poverty is not a factor generating governance weakness.  
Confirming this view, one of the interviewees made the following remark: 
“Poverty does not affect good corporate governance practice; it should be a cause 
to develop corporate governance to reduce the level of poverty. Libya was a poor 
country but it was impossible to hear about bribery. Bribery as an epidemic in the 
world is the side-effect of globalisation.” (A1)  
 
Many of interviewees argued that the country's economic system has been characterised by 
an unstable economic environment and unstable managerial system which requires enacting 
                                                 
51 Such as stock market regulation, investors’ activism and managerial discipline 
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new laws and regulation. Therefore, these circumstances created a fear among investors in 
an uncertain economy.52  
Perhaps the most important point here is that the Libyan economy in late 2004 showed 
positive signs including consistent growth in GDP which was a result of the lifting of UN 
sanctions and increases in energy prices. However, Libya is still dependent almost entirely 
upon the export of raw materials, especially gas and oil, which creates a lacuna in the 
economic structure.  
Libya has made some progress towards a market economy; yet there are numerous 
structural obstacles in the transfer to the market economy such as the weakness of 
economic structures and the legal system. In addition, one interviewee emphasised that 
inflation has also negatively influenced the practice of corporate governance in terms of 
increasing living expenses at the same time when salaries ( labour compensations) are low 
and consistent with the average salary being 250 LD monthly (equal roughly to $190).  
Despite, these optimistic developments in the Libyan economy, there is still a significant 
weakness in productivity and competitiveness compared with other developing economies.  
The need for more foreign investment and the partnership of management with developed 
economies is the most important mechanism of the economy and corporate governance 
developments.  
The interviewees pointed out that company ownership is another factor in introducing 
corporate governance. The ownership structure differs between economies according to the 
economic, legal and cultural systems. Mayer (2002) concluded that concentration of 
ownership is higher on the Continent of Europe than in the UK. High levels of ownership 
concentration have also been reported in the Far East and South America and ownership is 
as dispersed in the US as it is in the UK. In addition, he found that, in the UK and US, the 
shares of listed companies are primarily held by institutions, such as pension funds, life 
insurance firms and mutual funds, and individual investors.  
In Libya, there has been a movement to liberalise the economy through opening the door to 
the private sector and transferring state-owned companies53. The majority of the 
interviewees (8 out of 10) remarked that the transfer of profitable state-owned companies 
                                                 
52 This result was in line with the result by Agnaia (1997) in his study of the management training and 
development within its environment.  
53 In this point there is a broad consensus in Libya that the public companies suffer from weakness of 
accountability and are a place of proliferation for corruption. This point has been repeated many times by the 
leader of revolution.    
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and supporting the private sector will find other mechanisms of governance and improve 
the management by improving the competitiveness. On this point, one interviewee 
suggested:   
“Reforming the ownership and opening the door to establishing strong private 
companies will lead to separate company ownership from its management. This 
undoubtedly leads to improving the corporate governance by improving the 
mechanisms such as accountability and disclosure practices.” (A9)  
 
On the other hand, 3 of the 10 interviewees argued that the privatisation process does not 
help to develop the economy. One of them remarked that: 
“The problem with privatisation is that it does not encourage professionalism in running 
the companies and does not encourage competent and skilled managers since the 
privatisation takes a new way through selling the companies to employees. 
Management is still the same, so privatisation is only the way to eliminate losing 
(unprofitable) companies.” (A6).   
     
The interviewees’ observations were in line with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
report (2005) which remarked that the authorities are committed to privatising most state-
owned public enterprises. However, their strategy remains constrained by two main 
objectives: protecting employment and broadening the ownership base to avoid 
concentrated ownership. Therefore, the World Bank recommended enacting a privatisation 
law that would give the privatisation agency an independent legal existence and an explicit 
mandate, and allow investors to acquire a significant share of capital and have corporate 
control over the privatised companies. Also, the interviewees’ arguments supported the 
RCGWG (2003) remarks that the MENA region is characterised by majority or 
concentrated ownership, where complete separation between ownership and control might 
not be realistic and it might hinder further development of the family business environment.  
Finally, it can be concluded that a good ownership structure may overcome the credit 
constraint, managerial incompetence and improve good corporate governance. Interviewees 
also remarked that the unstable managerial regulation has influenced economic and 
business activities. For instance, one of them stressed that: 
"Corporate governance as a set of regulations and internal processes in the company 
needs more stable laws and regulations, economic activities and also stability of 
organisational structure to improve.” (A4) 
 
Political interference, which was related to the socialist ideology adopted in the country 
with its emphasis on production rather than profit and market value, affected the practice of 
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corporate governance. On this point, interviewees argued that the monetary policy, fiscal 
policy and tax system are the obvious political interference in economic activity. However, 
interviewees did not appear confident of government interference in fighting bad and 
unethical behaviour such as corruption. They believe that the government should play a 
positive role in developing economic and governance principles.  
 
8.3.4 The Management and the Board of Directors 
Respondents were asked to express their opinion about the main role of management and 
the responsibilities of the Board of Directors.  
Respondents in the questionnaire agreed that Boards should have all eleven of the 
responsibilities listed in the questionnaire. In practice, the interviewees believed that these 
roles were not always fulfilled. The results of the interviews in general tended to confirm 
that the Board of Directors is the most important internal control mechanism. For instance, 
one interviewee stated that: 
"Although the roles of the Board of Directors are very important to maintain the 
stakeholders' rights and some rights are determined and recognised in the legal system, 
in practice their duties are not applied properly in many companies. This deficiency of 
duty was because of the excessive power of the CEO and other top managers. Also, 
sometimes it is because of the absence of the cooperation between the board members 
and management." (A4) 
 
On the other hand, one of the interviewees stated that:  
 
“The composition of the board should depend on the competence of its members and 
the Libyan government should use the merit system to appoint the board members, 
while in private companies the shareholders should require qualifications and 
experience of them.” (A10) 
 
In this vein, almost all of the interviewees (9 out of 10) argue that the Board of Directors is 
an important mechanism of corporate governance in Libya since other mechanisms may be 
not effective. The results support Sternberg (2004) when she stated that “the powers and 
obligations of the Board of Directors are the most obvious means by which corporations are 
controlled”. Also, they also support Brennan (2006) when he remarked that the Board of 
Directors is the official first line of defence against managers who would act contrary to 
shareholders' interests. 
Board diversity has become a major issue within corporate governance where a number of 
studies seek to explore the impact of diversity on company performance (Rose, 2007). 
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Therefore, diversity may result in more innovative and creative board processes and 
decisions (Burke, 1994).  Jamali et al (2007) suggested that women are important board 
member candidates and that the low representation of women on boards in Lebanon is 
related to glass-ceiling type impediments. They also believed that female board 
representation can reflect positively on the status of women at work and that government 
intervention is needed to ‘level the playing field’ for women in management and at the 
boardroom level.  
Regarding the Libyan context, additional questionnaires did not reveal any females as 
board members of listed companies. The majority of interviewees (7 from 10) supported the 
questionnaire findings when they indicated that culture hinders the appointment of women 
in top management and boards of directors in Libyan companies.  
One of them pointed out that: 
“Appointing women in top management and to Board of Directors faces many obstacles 
from the society, since the society is still conservative and many women do not prefer 
to get a high position in the company or in the local authority.” (A8)     
 
 
There were concerns that management has an over-powerful role in the system and practice 
of corporate governance.  The power of the CEO might encourage the pursuance of his/ her 
own interests rather than company objectives. These findings may be due to low 
compensation policy (salaries system) and the weakness of accountability practices. One 
interviewee argued that: 
"In my opinion, successful corporate governance needs good board of directors' 
composition and experience. In term of composition the board should contain non-
executive directors who have experience in the industry. The role of non-executive 
directors is to maintain accountability within companies. Moreover, they should not 
concentrate on the friendship of the management." (A4) 
  
This argument is in line with Luan and Tang (2007) when they argue that board members 
can not only control and monitor the management adequately but also guide the direction of 
a company’s strategy, and the appointment of outsiders to the board suggests better 
corporate governance, which builds the trust of investors with more transparent financial 
statements.  
A most interesting comment in the interviews was that; 
 “Good corporate governance does not only need independent, qualified board 
members, an internal audit department to oversee the top management, or any other 
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external and internal mechanisms of corporate governance, because the thief beats the 
warder. However, it needs all parties to do what's right.” (A3) 
 
Generally, the interviewees agreed that governance reforms should encourage managers 
and the Board of Directors to practise more accountability and responsibility to 
stakeholders. Further, some of interviewees suggested that management fraud and 
management manipulation are the causes of investment fleeing to developed economies.  
Executive shareholding can play a positive role in reducing management malpractice, since 
they are owner and manager at the same time. On this point, one of interviewees said that: 
 “Libya needs to encourage its companies in both public and private sectors to 
accelerate their efforts to modernise their management by providing short and long 
courses of training and to adopt the merit and competency system without interference 
from government or social connections. At the same time, managers should have a 
portion of company capital which encourages them to pursue the company interest more 
than their interest.” (A3)  
 
 
8.3.5 Disclosure and Transparency Practice 
Disclosure and transparency are important principles in corporate governance practice. The 
full disclosure of financial and non-financial information is required by shareholders and 
other stakeholders. For instance, the interests of owners are not always the same as the 
interests of managers who are involved in day-to-day management and have a different 
level of information compared to owners (Mallin, 2004). Also, many other groups which 
have a long-term association with the company expect to benefit from the disseminating of 
information.  
Regarding the Libyan context, all interviewees supported the view that there must be more 
disclosure and transparency. This result is consistent with the questionnaire results where 
respondents highlighted the weakness of disclosure in Libyan companies. On this point, 
one interviewee remarked that:  
“Good corporate governance practice rests on the issue of transparency because all 
stakeholders need to know as much information as may be useful without abusing 
company planning or affecting the competition between the companies.” (A2) 
Also, almost all interviewees believed that the size and the number of companies in the 
same sector are the important elements that determine the level of disclosure practice. 
Others argued that the Libyan Stock Market should improve the disclosure practice. This 
finding, in general, is in line with the findings of Adhikari and Tondkar (1992); Doupnik 
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and Salter (1995) and Archambault and Archambault (2003) where they found that 
disclosure improves with capital market size. Therefore, companies from countries with 
large capital markets disclose more information than companies from countries with small 
capital markets. 
Interviewees mentioned the improvement of disclosure practice through disclosing all 
issues regarding employees and other stakeholders (e.g. programmes for human resource 
development and training and employee share ownership plans), and disclosure of the 
impact of the company’s activities on society, the environment and foreseeable risk factors 
(e.g. industry risks, interest rate risks).  
The culture affects disclosure practice and impacts on preparing the annual reports. For 
instance, in Germany and the Netherlands there is a high emphasis on providing financial 
information to the long-term stakeholders whereas the central position in the U.S. and the 
U.K. is on providing information to short-term investors. The need for more disclosure was 
recognised by a number of the interviewees who believe that disclosure practice in Libya is 
weak due to the Libyan economic structure. However, Libyan companies are now required 
to carry out more disclosure practice than before because of the recent economic reforms.  
For instance, one of the interviewees commented on Libyan companies' current disclosure 
practices by stating that: 
"Disclosing information to the public is important...In Libya, we were a socialist and 
public sector and there were no private shareholders. Therefore, the public was not 
interested in information. However, now we are gradually moving to a liberal economy 
where shareholders need more disclosure practice." (A6) 
 
Interviewees believed that the absence of accounting standards in Libya was the other 
reason for low disclosure practice in Libya. Therefore, accounting bodies such as the 
Chamber of Accounting and Auditing should establish and tighten the accounting standards 
which are suitable for the Libyan context in order to avoid the manipulation of accounts.  
For instance, one of interviewees remarked that: 
“Although there is compliance with the mandatory requirements, such as Balance 
Sheet, Income Statement, and External Auditor Report, there is low compliance in other 
requirements of disclosure such as: ownership structure, key executives and their 
remuneration, Cash Flow Statement, Directors' Report.” (A4) 
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 Another one stressed that: 
“If investors are not confident with the level of disclosure practice, they will transfer 
their investment to another place.” (A5) 
 
From the above findings it can be seen that most respondents agreed that the current 
practice of disclosure and transparency in Libya is weak and more disclosure and 
transparency practice is required. The association between the level of disclosure and 
companies’ attributes, such as ownership structure, and size, has been reported (Tsamenyi 
et al, 2007). Other studies extend the culture-disclosure research to institutional factors 
including national systems (political and legal systems, press), economic systems 
(economic development, inflation and capital markets), corporate systems (financial 
systems, ownership, exchanges listings, dividends, auditor and leverage) and operation 
systems (company size, industries). Empirical evidence not only further strengthens the 
relationship between culture and disclosure practice of a nation, but also demonstrates that 
culture and other environmental factors which also influence the level of corporate 
disclosure interact with each other (Archambault and Archambault, 2003). 
Due to the absence of Libyan accounting standards and principles54, a variety of accounting 
practices are found in the Libyan context due to differences in accountants' educational and 
professional backgrounds and skills. Bengharbia (1989) found that the Libyan accounting 
profession was not organised and common accounting and auditing standards did not exist. 
This result may be because of the low levels of professionalism, which are due to the 
weakness of accounting education. Also, Bait El-Mal et al (1988), in their survey of 
accounting standards and principles applied by Libyan companies, concluded that Libyan 
companies applied different accounting principles, procedures and methods and employed a 
different accounting standard which makes comparison between companies difficult. 
The statutory power of the Tax Office to require financial statements that are prepared in 
accordance with the Tax Law has led Libyan companies to prepare one set of financial 
statements for both internal and external purposes (Bait El-Mal et al, 1988).  
Interviewees also highlighted that, although the Libyan Accountants Union is responsible 
for establishing, developing and monitoring accounting standards and practices, practically 
                                                 
54 There are attempts to prepare standards that are applicable to the Libyan environment.  
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it has failed to monitor and develop the accounting professional. For instance, one of 
interviewees said that: 
“The weakness and sometime the absence of the role of the Libyan Accountants Union 
to monitor and develop the accounting and auditing profession have weakened the 
practice of the profession.” (A3) 
    
Also, an interviewee expressed the following reservation about voluntary disclosure:    
 "Voluntary disclosure and corporate financial disclosure policies and practices are 
driven in part by differences in cultural, economic and political environments, therefore, 
we should improve these factors and then full disclosure will be improved." (A8)   
 
Foreign investors have a key role in improving disclosure and transparency practice. 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) found a significant positive relationship between the proportion 
of foreign ownership and the level of voluntary disclosure by listed companies in Malaysia. 
In the Libyan context, almost all interviewees supported this point. For example, one of 
them remarked that:  
“An open market with multi-national investors will help Libya to develop its economy 
since the foreign investors need more strict rules and a comprehensive legal system and 
disclosure practice.” (A4) 
 
The internal audit needs to play a significant role to ensure company internal systems are 
working properly. On this point, there was agreement between the interviewees about the 
role of internal audits in the company in enhancing the disclosure practice and reliability of 
annual reports of Libyan companies.  
The researcher believes that the low level of disclosure practice is not only due to the 
competitive weakness between companies, since the economic system is different from that 
in a free market, but also is due to the ambiguity of information users' objectives and needs, 
the cost of disclosures, the absence of mandatory disclosure requirements, and the low level 
of awareness of the importance of information to decision makers.    
 
8.3.6 The External Auditors and Financial Institutions   
 
The OECD (2004) in para (V, C) highlighted that: 
"An annual audit should be conducted by an independent, competent and qualified, 
auditor in order to provide an external and objective assurance to the board and 
shareholders that the financial statements fairly represent the financial position and 
performance of the company in all material respects’’. 
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Most of the interviewees believed that developed accounting standards and full disclosure 
practice provide a mechanism for investors to monitor their investment by accessing 
information about a company's activities. For instance, one interviewee stated that:  
"An accounting standard is an important tool to regulate business activities, and 
without an external auditor, how can investors trust the disseminating information. A 
qualified and independent auditor provides evidence to investors about the reliability of 
financial reporting and internal control." (A6) 
 
Further, they agreed with the point that external auditor fees should be tied to the level of 
adherence to corporate governance best practice, such as the existence and independence of 
an internal audit department and the separation between the CEO and chairman of the 
board. 
Regarding the role of banks and other financial institutions, interviewees believed that the 
role of financial institutions, both to lend money and become stakeholders or to invest and 
become shareholders, is essential to improving the corporate governance practice through 
developing the accountability and responsibility practices of companies. For instance, one 
of them argued that: 
"Since financial institutions pursue their interest and will oversee the top management 
and Board of Directors to achieve the company's objectives..., these institutions are 
responsible for developing corporate governance and the economic environment since 
the individual shareholders are not developed enough in the Libyan context." (A1) 
 
 
8.3.7 The Development and Improvement of Corporate Governance  
This question sought to determine who should be responsible to monitor and develop 
effective corporate governance practice in Libyan companies. The findings were divided 
into two themes. 
Regarding the monitoring and controlling function of corporate governance, most 
interviewees believed that it should be undertaken jointly by the government bodies, the 
investment board, external auditors and the Libyan Stock Market. Moreover, the majority 
suggested that the responsibility for supervision and development of the framework of 
corporate governance should be shared between the universities and the Libyan 
Businessmen Board. In the case of universities, they argued that the educational strategy 
within universities and high educations institutions within Libya should include 
comprehensive education of corporate governance mechanisms, as it would be a major 
driver for promoting best practices. Collaboration between business organisations and 
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educational institutions should be based on initiatives to improve corporate governance 
mechanisms within companies complemented by actions for increasing the companies' 
representation of graduates. Also, universities and training centres should benefit from 
successful managers, by invited them to seminaries, workshops and to share their 
experiences with others. One of them stated that: 
 “The universities, especially business schools, and training centres should take 
responsibility for developing and adapting the Libyan economy through improving their 
subjects and courses and the business education.”  (A3) 
Regarding foreign investors55 and their role in developing the practice of corporate 
governance, almost all interviewees believed that the corporate governance system should 
be developed locally. However, foreign investors should play a positive role in improving 
and harmonising the practice with the international standards. Confirming this view, one of 
interviewees offered the following remark:    
"The foreign investors should play a significant role in driving the recent corporate 
governance reforms in Libya. In my opinion we can benefit from foreign investment 
through learning how to manage a company by developing management practice and 
behaviour. Also, they could provide guidance for an integrated corporate governance 
approach that incorporates principles relating to ethical conduct."  (A2) 
On the other hand, some interviewees (4 out of 10) argue that substantial increases in 
foreign investment may not occur until some of issues which are concerning potential 
investors, such as corruption, changes to the legal system and improving the enforcement 
are dealt with. Interestingly, one of interviewees stated that: 
“We cannot rely on the foreign investments to improve the corporate governance 
practice because the Libyan context is not an attractive area for foreign investment 
except in the raw materials. Therefore, we have to establish a good system of corporate 
governance which is proper to our context and culture.” (A4) 
    
Okike (2007) argued that the government has a big role in improving corporate governance 
practice by ensuring companies operate in the best interest of the various stakeholders.  In 
this connection, all interviewees agreed and emphasised the role of the government in the 
implementation and improvement of corporate governance practices in Libya. For instance, 
one of them said:    
                                                 
55 According to the Libyan Investment Board, which monitors and analyses developments in foreign 
investments, the number has increased from 256 million Libyan dinars to 2765 million Libyan dinars during 
2003-2008.  
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“In my opinion, the General Peoples Committee and other government bodies should 
play a significant role in developing the practice through encouraging and enacting 
regulations which lead to improving the practices.” (A1) 
 
Related to the last point, one of interviewees concluded the discussion as follows:  
 
“Yes, the economic activities affect the corporate governance framework. For example, 
since we cannot transfer the corporate governance mechanism from others, the 
government, universities, auditors, NGOs, foreign investors and the Libyan stock 
market are responsible for introducing and monitoring corporate governance 
practice.”(A10)    
 
Regarding international pressures, almost all interviewees believe that Libya should benefit 
from international institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund 
and the OECD. Interviewees believed that the other factor that will improve the framework 
of corporate governance in Libya is the participation in international organisations such as 
the WTO. Also, participation in conferences, seminars, and visits of experts to Libya from 
developed economies will push the practice of corporate governance.  
The interviewees also agreed that international guidelines should be used as a guide to 
establishing sound and comprehensive guidelines for a corporate governance framework. 
For example, one of them said that: 
“As a result of globalisation we should adopt the OECD principles and other 
international codes to establish a good corporate governance framework. In these 
economies the most superior economic performance and fast productivity growth are 
predominant. Therefore, we should benefit from them to strengthen our economy.” (A7)  
 
The Stock Market can be considered as a part of the governance reforms in Libya. 
Therefore, interviewees argued that the Libyan Stock Market Authority and other economic 
institutions should enhance the qualitative and comparative dimensions of financial 
reporting between companies. Also they should provide training opportunities for 
companies' management to introduce new management techniques and risk assessment 
methods and strategies.  
Regarding the previous discussion, the researcher believes that sound corporate governance 
practice in Libya may be largely absent in most companies. Libya has lagged behind its 
neighbours such as Egypt in corporate governance practice. The reason for this may be that 
the government still holds a high proportion of shares, which enables the government to 
dominate the company and to elect managers and Board members. Other reasons are an 
incomplete legal system, poor enforcement practice and the absence of accounting and 
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auditing standards. Therefore, in both cases the government could play a key role to act to 
improve these issues, thereby developing the practice of corporate governance.   
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CHAPTER NINE 
Synthesis of the Main Finding of the Questionnaires and Interviews  
 
 
 
 
9.1 Introduction  
This study focused on exploring the perception of stakeholders regarding corporate 
governance in the Libyan context, using both quantitative and qualitative methods. The 
discussion was related to the theoretical argument that the corporate governance practice 
which has been developed mainly in liberal market economies has expanded and increased 
throughout the developing world. Therefore, the study set out to evaluate and investigate 
the main factors affecting corporate governance in Libya.    
This chapter summarises the key findings from the questionnaire and interview surveys of 
the study.  
 
9.2 The Understanding of the Concept of Corporate Governance 
This part of survey seeks to examine whether respondents’ views on corporate governance 
focussed on the interests of shareholders or more widely on the stakeholders’ benefits. The 
responses received from the questionnaire survey described with a high level of agreement 
corporate governance as an organisation’s relationship with all those stakeholders who are 
affected by, or who affect, the organisation’s decisions and activities. Also, the respondents 
expressed a fair agreement on the definition that corporate governance is a relationship with 
all members of a society, irrespective of whether they are affected by the operations of the 
organisation. Contrastingly, describing corporate governance as a relationship with 
shareholders received least support.    
Interviewees defined the term as the system by which companies are controlled to generate 
benefits for their all stakeholders, through improving the internal and external mechanisms 
to provide confidence to investors that the company is a good place for investment.     
This concern with wider stakeholders implies that companies should pay more attention to 
society in their decisions and operations and go beyond their current stakeholders to the 
next generation. This evidence is consistent with the Islamic view that the role of 
companies and individuals is to act in a manner that enhances the well-being of society. 
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Also, the result may reflect the influence of the Libyan economy which was centralised and 
socialist and being run in the interest of the society.     
This result was in line with the findings provided by Allen (2005), whose study analysed 
corporate governance in emerging economies. His results also showed that, because 
markets are imperfect and incomplete in these economies, the focus on all stakeholders 
rather than just shareholders may lead to a better allocation of resources than if the 
company just focuses on the interest of shareholders and equitable income distribution. 
Regarding the importance of corporate governance in the Libyan context, the results of both 
questionnaires and interviews indicated that corporate governance is a useful mechanism 
for the transitional phase of the economy through improving accountability and 
responsibility. It can also eliminate some economic problems, for example corruption. The 
result reflects the view that corporate governance has become a cornerstone of economic 
growth, since providing trust and confidence to the market attracts more investment.    
Interviewees also agreed that better companies’ governance in both the state-owned and 
private sectors helps the country to integrate into the global market, including joining the 
WTO. Therefore, it can become a growth factor in the economy.    
Since the main aim of the company is to exist for a specific goal, therefore; companies 
operate and relate to various stakeholders. On this point, companies should maintain and 
respect stakeholders' rights to gain their trust and, therefore, grow. 
In this study, the stakeholders' rights have been investigated to clarify who is deemed 
appropriate to be protected by the corporate governance framework. A key distinction 
exists between shareholders' and stakeholders' rights.   
Questionnaire respondents broadly agreed in principle that all the items listed in the 
questionnaire should be included in shareholders' rights since most items obtained high 
mean scores. The items included that shareholders should approve the annual accounts; 
distribution of profits, have the right to participate and vote at the general meeting and have 
the right to be informed on decisions concerning fundamental changes. These items 
obtained mean scores 4.86, 4.85 and 4.61 respectively. In addition, all groups expressed 
agreement with the rights of shareholders listed in the questionnaire survey with no 
significant differences of opinion between groups. 
This agreement may be ascribed to the statements’ focus on the standard rights of 
shareholders.  
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Interview findings indicated the weakness in shareholders' rights in theory by the weakness 
of the legal system that governs a company’s activities, and in practice since the ownership 
of companies was held by the government during 1970s and 1980s.56 Therefore, the vague 
ownership structure has led to weak practice of shareholders rights and misappropriation of 
company investments.            
This finding supports the questionnaire finding which is not surprising since Libya, as a 
developing economy, shares some typical characteristics with other developing economies 
such as inapplicable ownership structures which allows domination by large shareholders, 
and a conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders (Mallin, 2004; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
In terms of other stakeholders’ rights, the participants strongly agreed that businesses are 
perceived to be accountable not only to shareholders but also to other stakeholders such as 
employees, suppliers, customers and others who affect, or are affected by the companies’ 
activities. Supporting the results, the majority of interviewees indicated that even though 
some stakeholders' rights are stated and protected by the legal system, the lack of laws and 
enforcement are still major problems in applying good corporate governance. On this point, 
respondents argued that, in general, the rights of stakeholders have not reached a 
satisfactory level. Therefore, effective implementation of the corporate governance system 
will overcome this problem and strengthen links between the company and stakeholders. 
Also, interviewees believed that economic policies, and an unstable managerial system 
have affected management practice and moral values and, therefore, good governance.57   
From the research findings, it may be concluded that restoring confidence in the Libyan 
business environment and building trust in corporate financial reporting are factors in 
raising the awareness of the theme of corporate governance. However, these benefits would 
differ from one company to another depending on the size and sector of the company. 
                                                 
56 After mitigating the government control and establishing a private sector, many private banks collapsed as a 
result of poor management practice, which obligated the central bank to intervene and aid some of them. 
Recently the General People’s Committee (Minsters Council) has obligated these banks to combine together 
in professional management to control them.  
57 This result supported the study by Agnaia (1997) when he found that the circumstances of Libya in the 
1990s had been characterised by an unstable environment, with many new laws, rules and regulations and the 
organisational structure. 
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9.3 Factors Influencing Corporate Governance in Libya 
The literature shows that each country has different factors affecting the practice of 
governance. Regarding Libya, questionnaire respondents identified the following factors 
which affect good governance practice in companies: poor enforcement of the legal system; 
the weakness of the legal system that governs companies’ activities58, and the poor 
leadership within a company. For instance, respondents’ opinions were strongly in 
agreement that the tax system prevented good disclosure practice. This finding was in the 
line with Coates et al (1988) when they argued that the existing tax structure in Britain may 
be the reason for low levels of investment by encouraging paying out dividends rather than 
retaining profits.  
The result also is in line with the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) when 
they emphasised the importance of the legal system to establish good corporate governance: 
“The corporate governance framework also depends on the legal, regulatory, and 
institutional environment”. 
 
To eliminate poor management and poor company leadership, Libya has decided to allow 
foreign investors to be CEOs in companies where they have invested.59  
Along with previous reasons, respondents agreed that political interference, social 
connections, culture and the company ownership were other factors affecting good 
governance in Libya. On the other hand, privatisation, the stock market and the 
development of the Libyan economy are factors helping to improve the practice of 
corporate governance.  
Also, respondents provided comments in the last page about the absence of a merit system 
in the appointment of managers and boards of directors, weakness in their training and the 
intervention of social connections into economic activities as other factors of weakness of 
corporate governance mechanisms, such as accountability and responsibility. 
Interviewees believe that the legal system governing companies is weak and outdated; 
therefore, the development needs to encompass the current changing of the economy. They 
believed the legal system should contain the principles of corporate governance since they 
considered there is a lacuna in the Libyan legal system which affects the practice of 
corporate governance.   
                                                 
58 Respondents identified some absent laws such as company law, arbitration law and property rights law.    
59  Currently foreign investors have the CEO position in two banks and one manufacturing company.                                
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Interviewees mentioned other cultural problems, such as bureaucracy and the lack of 
willingness to respond to change, the low disclosure practice, cronyism and nepotism 
behaviour as other factors discouraging good practice of governance.  
The majority of the interviewees thought there was a strong relationship between the legal 
system and good corporate governance. They emphasised non-compliance with the law 
governing companies is still the main obstacle to corporate governance.  
It can be argued that there is congruence between the interviewees’ and participants’ 
opinion in respect of the role of the legal system and the enforcement in improving 
corporate governance.  
On the other hand, responses of interviewees did not support the result of the questionnaire 
survey regarding the effect of ownership structure on corporate governance practice, since 
they considered that the ownership structure affects the corporate governance mechanisms 
more than the establishing of corporate governance. Therefore, they believed that large 
shareholders can overcome the issue of the incomplete legal system and suitability of the 
ownership structure. Their argument was partially in line with Solomon and Solomon 
(2004) when they argued that investors can overcome weak legal shareholder protection by 
being significantly large. Also, it is in line with McKinsey (2000) when they found in a 
survey of institutional investors that corporate governance is perceived as adding value to a 
company according to the widely cited Investor Opinion Survey on corporate governance.  
Respondents believe that although Libya has established a Stock Market and enacted local 
and foreign investment law, it will be difficult to integrate good governance practices 
without changing the adverse aspects of the culture such as malpractice, attitudes towards 
jobs, managers' behaviour and the need to improve ethical and moral attitudes by 
improving the educational system. They believe that Islam can improve the practice of 
governance since Islam has formulated a comprehensive code of ethics and instils in people 
accountability, responsibility, and fairness.60   
Moreover, interviewees believed that the culture and the policy issues affect corporate 
governance in the micro-economy. For instance, they argue that the culture affects the 
structure of companies, such as board composition and the distribution of power among the 
company's employees. Libyan society is identified as a collectivist culture, where 
                                                 
60 Although Baydoun and Willett (2000) argued that the form and content of Islamic financial statements was 
based on full disclosure and social accountability, the practice of disclosure and transparency in this study did 
not support the criteria of full disclosure in Baydoun and Willett's study. This difference may be due to the 
weakness of disclosure requirements in legal systems and the absence of accounting standards.  
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interpersonal relationships and group affiliations are strong. The result was in line with Li 
and Harrison (2008) when they found that the national cultures of the home countries of 
multinational corporations have powerful influences on their governance structures.    
Finally, the synthesis of findings from both questionnaires and interviews confirmed Letza 
et al (2004) arguments that the business process of corporate governance cannot be isolated 
from social and other non-economic conditions and factors such as power, legislation, 
culture, social relations and institutional contexts. The corporate governance framework is 
constantly changing and flowing and its changes are always driven by both internal 
processual impetuses and external environmental dynamics.    
Also, responses received from both questionnaires and interviews believed that the unstable 
system of economic activities and the government monopoly during the1970s and 1980s 
have affected the accountability and responsibility practice of management and Board of 
Directors. Further, respondents mentioned that the relevant General Committees 
(ministries) which are supposed to oversee the sector, failed to control the sector through 
the relationships and social connections which lead to appointing weak candidates as board 
members and senior management.   
 
9.4 Future Plans to Improve Corporate Governance  
 
Respondents were asked to express their view about future plans to improve corporate 
governance. The role of management and the responsibilities of the Board of Directors 
were used as factors for this development.  
The responses received from the questionnaire survey agreed that boards should have all 
eleven of the responsibilities listed in the questionnaire, since the mean scores for all were 
between 4.05 and 4.69. All ranked responsibilities received strong agreement from 
academic staff and external auditors, whereas other groups' opinions swung between 
agreement and strong agreement. This difference in responses suggests greater awareness 
from stakeholders of the role of the Board of Directors as the main mechanism of 
governance in the Libyan context in achieving better governance practice, and reducing 
management malpractice, since other factors, such as shareholders' activism and mature 
markets are weaknesses.  
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Also, interviewees believed that the application of the responsibilities is weak, even if the 
boards consist of executive and non-executive members.61 The finding was in line with 
Chahine and Safieddine (2008) when they argued that the Board of Directors are 
considered to be an effective internal corporate governance device when external structures 
such as the legal environment, enforcement and market discipline are not sufficiently 
developed to ensure sound corporate governance.  
The result confirms the criticism of Enron's Boards of Directors by Senator Carl Levin, a 
member of the Senate Investigations Subcommittee investigating the collapse of Enron 
when he said: "we think the Enron board was asleep at the switch and fell down on the 
job." (Petra 2006)   
In respect of the role of management, the result of the questionnaire analysis revealed 
agreement on the powerful Chief Executive Officer (CEO) as a reason deterring good 
corporate governance in Libya, since the statement recorded a mean score of 3.72.  
Interviewees also agreed with the questionnaire result that top management should run the 
company in favour of stakeholders and under the control of the Board of Directors which 
should deter any pursuit of self-interest. Also, they emphasised a separation between the 
Board of Directors and top management to achieve the best control of management.  
Further, they argued that linking managers' compensation to company performance would 
encourage top managers to improve company performance. This result was in line with 
Petra (2006) who argued that the lack of director separation from the CEO has led to 
corporate boards being aligned with management, rather than shareholders, notwithstanding 
the presence of outside independent directors.    
Responses received from the questionnaire survey agreed that all listed statements 
regarding disclosure and transparency practice should be achieved, since mean scores were 
not less than 4.25. The result may reflect the fact that the level of disclosure practice in 
Libya is low and needs more development62.    
More information was gained from interviews in terms of improving disclosure practice. 
Interviewees indicated that foreign investors have a positive role in improving disclosure 
practice. The accounting and auditing profession also has been identified as an important 
mechanism for developing disclosure practice. However, the professions of accounting and 
                                                 
61 Regarding the non-executive directors, some interviewees were worried about their independence or the 
pursuit of their self interest or from the lack of sufficient time.  
62 According to the Transparency International Organisation, Libya ranked 126 out of 170 in 2008 corruption 
perception index (www. Transperncy.org) 
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auditing are observed as weak because of the absence of common standards of accounting 
and auditing in Libya. The finding is consistent with Bait El-Mal et al (1988) when they 
found that Libyan companies applied different accounting principles, procedures and 
methods and employed a different accounting standard, which makes comparison between 
companies difficult. However, interviewees believed that the Libyan Stock Market has 
developed disclosure practice by requesting more disclosure practice in listed companies. 
 
9.5 Elements of Introducing Corporate Governance  
The external auditor and financial institutions are recognised as key factors affecting 
corporate governance. Respondents in the questionnaire survey expressed strong agreement 
regarding the external auditor statement in the questionnaire. Respondents ranked the need 
for an annual audit to be conducted by an independent, competent and qualified auditor as 
the fourth statement, with a mean score of 4.65. Results also revealed significant 
differences in opinion between the selected groups; however, this significance was in terms 
of level of agreement and not of disagreement.  
Responses from the questionnaire survey in table 7.11 revealed that there is no relationship 
between companies and their external auditors, since the statement received an overall 
mean of 2.35. Also, questionnaire respondents mentioned in table 7.17 that corporate 
governance improves with the rotation of the external auditor.63  
Interviewees agreed that the external auditor plays an important role in improving corporate 
governance. Moreover, they thought that auditor fees should be tied to the level of the 
company’s loyalty to good corporate governance. In respect of the role of banks and other 
financial institutions in developing corporate governance, respondents believed that since 
banks and other financial institutions either lend money and become stakeholders or invest 
in the stocks issued by companies and become shareholders, they should play an active role 
in corporate governance.  
9.6 Introducing Corporate Governance   
This part of the research sought to elicit respondents’ views on how corporate governance 
should be introduced, monitored and developed.  
                                                 
63 In this point, the Cadbury Committee in the UK has emphasised the importance of auditor independence as 
both a professional and ethical matter.  
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The questionnaire survey results indicated that “new regulation and/or legislation” was the 
most important approach that could be used to introduce and improve corporate governance 
in Libya. There were no significant differences in answers across groups and a high overall 
mean score (4.54). Adjusting international codes requirements was also well supported 
(4.04), but the use of quasi-laws, alongside existing laws and regulations, was the least 
favoured means for introducing a corporate governance framework (2.79). This confirms 
that the dominant view is that the corporate governance framework should be legally 
introduced. 
Interviewees seemed to support the opinions of the questionnaire respondents that the best 
method for introducing a strong corporate governance system is through a complete legal 
system and by a participation in conferences, and seminars held by international 
organisations such as the World Bank. Also, interviewees believed that international 
guidelines of good practice should be used as a guide to establishing sound and 
comprehensive guidelines for corporate governance. 
This is in line with Okike (2007) when he argued that the government has a major role in 
improving the corporate governance practices by ensuring companies operate in the best 
interests of the various stakeholders. Consequently, there is agreement across both 
questionnaire and interview findings regarding the approach of introducing corporate 
governance in Libya. Both results indicated that the best method of introducing the optimal 
framework of corporate governance is a new legal system and by cooperation with 
international organisations, such as OECD and World Bank. Also, respondents believed 
that corporate governance should be developed locally; however, the benefit from 
partnership with others should go through to improve the international corporate 
governance mechanisms and oversee management.64 
The respondents in both the quantitative and qualitative surveys believed that monitoring 
and controlling effective corporate governance should be undertaken jointly by government 
bodies and the Libyan Stock Market65. 
The responsibility for supervising and developing the corporate governance framework 
should be shared between the General Libyan Congress, the General People’s Committee, 
                                                 
64 Libya started with the kind of partnership with international companies especially in terms of improving the 
management behaviour when two banks became a joint company with foreign investors and the CEO is not 
Libyan.  
65 The example for agencies are; the Economic General Committee, Investment Board, whereas, independent 
agencies include professional agencies such as accounting and auditing associations. 
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universities, economic research centres, and the Businessmen Board. For example, 
interviewees observed that the educational system within universities and higher 
educational institutions within Libya should be a major driver for promoting corporate 
governance best practices. Collaboration between organisations and educational institutions 
should be placed on initiative to improve governance mechanisms within companies, and 
universities and training centres should benefit from the successful managers, by inviting 
them to seminars, workshops and to share their experiences with others.  
It was argued that the content of subjects in business schools needs to be developed to 
reflect the changes in economic activities by concentrating on issues such as business 
ethics, and corporate social responsibilities and corporate governance. Moreover, 
interviewees argued that in the transitional period the government should provide 
confidence to investors by becoming one of the owners of a company's capital. However, 
the government’s ownership should not be dominant, and the Libyan economic authority 
should be pro-active in implementing corporate governance reforms. 
 
9.7 Relevance of Western Models of Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance has been developed in western countries, especially in the US and 
the UK; therefore, the literature is dominated by western models. Respondents in this study 
were asked to give their view about which models are appropriate to the Libyan context.  
Responses from both questionnaires and interviews principally agreed that since corporate 
governance has emerged and developed in western economies, international guidelines 
would require adaptation to establish Libyan corporate governance. Moreover, interviewees 
mentioned that international principles and codes should be used only as a benchmark for a 
local framework. Interviewees revealed that transferring and adopting a whole western 
model of corporate governance was not applicable to Libya, regarding the differences in 
environment, ownership structure and the culture in developing countries which is 
dominated by extended families and tribes. Furthermore, they argued that co-operation with 
international organisations will help Libya to establish good governance system. For 
instance, they observed that Libya could benefit from the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance, since these principles were designed with widespread applicability in mind, 
and with the understanding that they could be adapted to fit the specific circumstances of 
different countries.  Alternatively, they agreed strongly that the Libyan corporate 
governance should benefit from the Islamic perspective which instils in people 
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accountability, responsibility, and fairness. Good conduct in the Islamic economic system 
allows people to earn their living in a fair and profitable way without exploitation of others, 
and emphasises the welfare of the society. Libya should also benefit from international 
principles in terms of disclosure and transparency as universal principles in the 
globalisation era. 
 
9.8 Summary 
The study found that corporate governance has not completely emerged in the Libyan 
context; therefore, respondents recognised that good corporate governance requires wide 
participation and co-operation of all stakeholders groups including support from 
government and non-governmental organisations. The next table illustrates the main 
findings of the study. 
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Table (9.1) the main study findings   
Statement The most support 
The appropriate 
definition of corporate 
governance in  
The organisation’s relationship with its stakeholders to 
ensure that it acts in accordance with their interests. 
The importance of 
corporate governance 
1. Useful to the Libyan economy by enhancing confidence in 
the business environment and building trust in corporate 
financial reporting.  
2. Improve accountability mechanism and improving the 
corporate social responsibility  
3. Useful to all stakeholders groups  
The main factors 
affecting the practice  
1. Poor enforcement of laws 
2. Lack of a legal and regulation system that governs 
company activity 
3. Poor leadership within the company  
4. Poor financial and non-financial disclosure 
5. Low disclosure and transparency practice 
6. Weakness of the power and composition of Board of 
Directors. 
7. The absence of accounting and auditing standards 
The main factors can 
improve the practice of 
corporate governance  
1. Improve management behaviour through external control 
2. Increase the number of non-executive directors 
The approach to 
introducing corporate 
governance 
1. By new laws and regulations 
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  CHAPTER TEN 
Conclusion and Policy Issues  
 
 
 
10.1 Introduction  
Both international and domestic pressures have combined to bring the corporate 
governance debate to the forefront in Libya. Hence, the corporate governance debate in 
Libya has drawn the attention of stakeholders and policy-makers to linkages between the 
corporate governance system, the sustainable development of the economy and rapid 
integration with the global economy. These developments and the crisis-prone 
macroeconomic environment inspired the researcher to start questioning the current 
corporate governance practice in Libya.  
Given the interest in corporate governance, the study was carried out to focus on corporate 
governance in Libya, and, also, to locate the corporate governance debate in Libya within 
the global debate, develop a comparative context and help avoid oversights that may 
hamper the success of corporate governance reforms. Therefore, the first purpose of this 
chapter is to collate and explain the key findings, in line with the research aims and 
objectives.      
This chapter is organised into five sections. The first section reviews the economic 
environment in Libya; the second section focuses on the main factors favouring corporate 
governance developments in Libya. Section three concludes the challenges of improved 
corporate governance. These challenges were the state of the economy and the role of 
culture and ethical norms; the legal system and the enforcement; the disclosure and 
transparency practice and the role of Board of Directors. This chapter also summarises 
other findings that emerge in this study regarding how to improve the corporate governance 
in Libya. The main contribution to knowledge and policy are summarised in this chapter. 
The opportunities of further studies and the limitation of this study are provided in this 
chapter. 
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10.2 The Economic Environment and Corporate Governance in Libya 
The Libyan economy was characterised as agriculture-based until the early 1970s, when the 
government began a drive for economic development (Agnaia, 1997). Over the past 30 
years, the expansion in the hydrocarbon sector has driven the country’s economy, with the 
contribution of oil to GDP at over 50% in the 1970s and early 1980s. While the economy 
has largely depended on oil as the main source of wealth, the country has allocated a large 
amount of money to establishing industrial companies in non-oil sectors over the last two 
decades. Thus, the non-oil sectors increased significantly, contributing over 70% of GDP. 
Nevertheless, the country still faced difficulties in not being able to produce enough capital 
goods and consumer goods to achieve ‘self-sufficiency’ and ‘self-reliance’ (Agnaia, 1996).  
The upgrading of the Libyan economy and Libyan capital markets to mature market status 
and the global competition for capital after the lifting of the UN sanction has boosted the 
corporate governance debate in Libya. The Libyan economy has sustained its high growth 
rate, despite the international economic slowdown since 2004 after the lifting of the UN 
sanction and increasing of the oil price. 
The Libyan economy, after a long period of state ownership of all business activities, has 
improved steadily over the last decade, as the government has tightened policy with the 
goal of achieving fiscal discipline and price stability. Since 2000, the Libyan economy has 
continued to perform quite strongly and real GDP grew by 5.6 percent in 2007 and 6.1 
percent in 2008. Non-hydrocarbon GDP growth reached 7.1 percent in 2008 (Central Bank 
of Libya Report, 2008).  
A number of structural reforms such as simplification of the tax system, continuation of the 
privatisation of state-owned companies, reform of the public administration and 
encouraging both local and foreign investors has improved the functioning of markets, 
competitiveness and enhancing the capacity of the Libyan economy.  
The period of 2004-2009 was quite encouraging, since the forecast of economic activity is 
expected to remain optimistic, by opening the door for private investments. Libya in this 
period witnessed a huge re-building of its infrastructure after the lifting of the UN sanction 
and the increase in oil prices. However, historically Libya has a poor culture of corporate 
governance. The most significant change of the economy was in the late 1990s, when the 
liberalisation and privatisation practice began. Corporate governance was introduced for the 
first time in Libya in 2005 through an introductory paper published by the Governor of 
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Central Bank of Libya, and covered the practice of corporate governance in the financial 
sector. In 2006, the Libyan Stock Market published a voluntary code of corporate 
governance harmonised with the guidelines and directives of the international organisations 
such as the OECD Principles. 
10.3 Factors Favouring Corporate Governance Development in Libya  
Regarding the literature and the findings of the questionnaires and interviews, the following 
factors work in favour of introducing and developing corporate governance in Libya: 
1- The government encouraging the improvement of corporate governance practice. This is 
shown through their efforts such as: 
 The call from the people in the top positions in the country to eliminate the stated-
owned sector and open the door to an effective private sector in order to increase 
accountability and reduce the spread corruption. 
 Transforming companies from public to private sector, establishing the Stock 
Market and opening the country to foreign investments.66 
2- The Islamic culture is based on the respect for human rights and property rights which 
could help to introduce and develop the corporate governance framework.  
3- The most critical factor favouring corporate governance is the availability of financial 
resources and the desire for the economic development after the long period of world 
sanctions. 
10.4 The Challenges of Improved Corporate Governance in Libya 
The following factors are recognised as impediments to building a corporate governance 
system in Libya;  
10.4.1 The State of the Economy and the Culture Norms  
Libya has witnessed impressive economic development. The volume of foreign investment 
was 256 million Libyan dinars in 2003 and reached 2765 million in the first six months of 
2008 (153 projects)67.  Also, the number of transferred companies’ capital reached 
approximately two billion Libyan dinars and about 19818 shareholders.68  Listed 
companies are applying some corporate governance principles through adherence to the 
                                                 
66 Libya has established a board for accelerating the privatisation and established the law No 5/1997 on 
foreign investment 
67 The Libyan Investment Board Reports from 1/1/2003 to 31/7/2008  
68 For more information see Privatisation and Investment Board ( http:// 
investinlibya.ly/PDF/LIBActivities.pdf)      
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Libyan Stock Market requirements. However, Libyan companies are still dominated by 
banks in terms of finance which might build a long-term close relationship and affect 
external finance.  
The shareholders’ right to vote in the general meeting corresponds to the shares they 
possess. One-tier boards predominantly govern companies in Libya, where shareholders 
directly elect the directors through the shareholders’ general meeting. Until the end of 
1980s, the stated-owned companies in Libya were operated under a totally protected 
regime. However, in the early 1990s, the door opened to private companies but there are 
still many problems to be solved.  
Contemporary corporate governance mechanisms such as board committees, competent 
directors, and performance-based compensation schemes have not been effectively 
introduced yet and reduce international investment attractiveness. 
The economy is affected by social and cultural aspects. For instance, the absence of a merit 
system for appointing top management and board members, the lack of manager training 
and intervention of social connections into the economic activities were clear examples of 
the influences of social and cultural factors on economic activities.  The power of the 
extended families, clan, tribe cronyism and nepotism with bureaucracy and lack of 
willingness to respond to change are the most significant factors discouraging good practice 
of governance in companies. However, the following suggestions would enhance the 
chance of introducing good system of corporate governance: 
 Encouraging the awareness of the benefit of corporate governance practice in 
medium and small companies. This is a significant challenge in Libya. 
 Improving corporate governance by a healthy banking system that is not burdened 
with non-performing loans resulting from excessive lending.  
 Eliminating the unethical culture by improving curricula in schools and compliance 
with the merit system on appointing managers and board members.   
 Encouraging the private sector and reducing the bureaucracy can be seen as a factor 
in developing the economy, and improving the corporate governance practice.    
 Supporting the government’s agencies and NGOs to play a role in monitoring and 
developing the framework of corporate governance.  
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10.4.2 Legal System and Enforcement  
La Porta et al (1998) classified countries into these favouring common law or civil law, and 
she found that common law is more protective of minority shareholders than civil law. 
Libya as a civil law country affords low legal protection to shareholders, and exhibits low 
efficiency in the judicial system. Also, the slowness of the judicial process makes it more 
attractive for people to solve problems outside the courts. However, the findings revealed 
that laws and regulations that govern corporate governance in the Libyan context were 
perceived as being inadequate or outdated and needing revision. Also, the enforcement of 
the legal system is weak and encourages the solving of problems outside of formal channels 
such as courts. Therefore, the following points would improve the legal system and, 
therefore, corporate governance in Libya:  
 Enacting missing laws such as company law, labour law, arbitration law and the 
intellectual property rights law, besides modernising the existing ones.  
 Enhancing the enforcement of the legal system by a qualified judiciary and 
accelerating the judicial processes. 
 The regulatory framework of the Libyan economic structure and financial sector 
should be co-ordinated with the international standards such as International 
Accounting Standards, International Financial Reports Standards and the OECD 
Principles, and in the same time should meet most Islamic Principles, such as 
Mudarabah and Musharakah. 
 
10.4.3 Disclosure and Transparency Practice 
Results indicated that the disclosure framework in Libya is quite weak. The reasons for the 
weakness are the absence of accounting standards and the legal requirements for disclosure, 
which have become the main impediment to introducing a corporate governance system. 
Although the legal system governing companies requires preparing annual reports, the 
absence of Libyan accounting standards and non-adopting of the IAS allows significant 
differences in the content and methods of preparing these reports, making comparisons 
between the companies more difficult. Also, disclosure of activity on societal and 
environmental impacts was considered low. Disclosure of issues regarding employees and 
other stakeholders, the ownership structure and disclosing company objectives also 
received less support from respondents. Stakeholders distinguished between issues 
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regarding employees and issues regarding the society and environment, which might be 
ascribed to the fact that Libya pays attention to improving the human resources by training, 
health and safety and pays less attention to societal and environmental issues such as 
pollution to improve the society. Also, the findings of low disclosure practice are ascribed 
to the lack of the role of the Libyan Union of Accountants and Auditors in developing the 
profession. 
Therefore, the following points would accomplish better development of disclosure and 
transparency practice in Libya: 
 Establishing an independent Council under the control of the General People’s 
Congress to enhance the professions of accounting and auditing. This council would 
be responsible to review and develop the profession.  
 Establishing Libyan accounting and auditing standards that derived from 
International Accounting Standards and encouraging the partnership with 
international auditing companies.  
 
10.4.4 Board of Directors  
The board structure in Libya is dominated by the one-tier structure. The responsibilities of 
the board have been addressed in the legal system by providing stringent rules in respect of 
any breach of duty or trust on the part of a director or manager of a company. However, the 
legal system does not require explicitly the establishment of committees to the board except 
the watchdog committee, and other committees replaced by the internal audit department 
and the human resource management department. Recently, the Stock Market authority 
requires establishing committees to the board with independent non-executive members; 
however, the concern is still on the independence of the board and its committees. 
Consequently, a clear definition of the non-executive role and independence is needed.  
Finally, the following suggestions might enhance the role of the Board; 
 To deal with the power of CEOs the Board of Directors should get fair 
compensation, and appropriate composition by increasing the number of non-
executive directors particularly those who have experience in accounting and 
business activities, until can achieve their responsibilities.    
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 To deal with the weakness of board members, it would be advisable to establish an 
Institute of Directors for training members and top managers as a way to enhance 
their responsibilities 
10.5 Other Findings 
With the previous main findings the following findings have emerged in this study as 
factors which might help to improve the corporate governance in Libya.  
 Corporate governance in Libya is considered by respondents to require a 
stakeholders’ perspective rather than that of shareholders’ alone.   
 Monitoring and control of effective corporate governance practice in Libya should 
be undertaken jointly by the government, the Libyan Accountants and Auditors 
Association and the Stock Market authority. On the other hand, the supervision and 
development of corporate governance should be shared between the Economic 
General Committee, universities, Businessmen Board and the Investment Board.          
 The financial sector, such as banks, has a significant role in introducing corporate 
governance principles. Thus, banks should play an important role in impelling more 
compliance with corporate governance principles. Banks should consider sound 
corporate governance practices as a prerequisite of lending and encourage 
institutional investors to play a positive role as stakeholders.  
 Key stakeholders need to be clearly identified in Libya by the legal system and 
company regulations, since their rights are a significant issue in the corporate 
governance framework.69 
 The other challenges to corporate governance in Libya derive primarily from the 
deficiencies of the curricula in the educational system on the topic of ethics and in 
the business schools. Collaboration between business organisations and educational 
institutions should be emphasised to improve corporate governance mechanisms, 
incorporating business ethics and corporate governance courses in their 
programmes.    
 
The next figure (figure 10.1) summarises the main factors that were identified in my 
research that need to develop in order to improve the practice of good governance. The 
                                                 
69 For example the rights of employees and creditors as key stakeholders should be established by legal 
system such as labour law and arbitration law.  
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internal factors are derived from both the literature review and my empirical findings. The 
efficiency of governance practice will not be achieved unless these factors in the figure 
have improved and amended to take account of the pervious findings. The enforcement of 
legal system, encouragement of effective leadership, good composition of board of 
directors, developing accounting and auditing profession, high education system and 
stakeholders' activism are crucial factors to the successful of corporate governance practice 
in Libya. These factors will not improve unless other factors such as the political system, 
legal system, economic system and the cultural and social norms are developed. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure (10.1) the main factors affect the practice of corporate governance in Libya.  
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10.6 Contribution of the Study    
This study has contributed to knowledge and policy. The contribution to policy provides 
recommendations to develop the framework and practice of corporate governance. On the 
other hand, the contribution to knowledge by findings will assist to fill the huge gap in the 
literature regarding corporate governance practices in Libya and in the Middle East.      
10.6.1 Contribution to Policy 
Corporate governance in Libya is less developed. In fact, Libya has lagged behind its 
neighbours and the global economy in corporate governance70. This study has showed that 
the full practice of the principles of corporate governance has not developed in the Libyan 
context. However, some aspects of corporate governance exist such as the independence of 
external auditors and separation between CEO and chairman. 
Good corporate governance depends on effective internal and external systems. Therefore, 
radical reform of corporate governance is still needed to solve a number of governance 
issues such as political cronyism and nepotism, weak minority shareholders protection, low 
disclosure and transparency practice and increasing the stakeholders’ rights. 
Based on the research findings, the following recommendations are made in relation to 
introducing and developing a framework of corporate governance in Libya:   
1. As the stakeholders are the significant factor in corporate governance, Libya should 
take account of them when introducing corporate governance practice. For this 
purpose, merit and competence systems should be followed in appointments to top 
management and board membership in both the private and public sectors. 
2. The legal system, especially relating to economic activities, should be reviewed in 
order to come in line with changing economic policies and with international 
conventions and best practices of the corporate governance requirements. 
3. Enforcement of the legal system will remain a major challenge to developing the 
framework of corporate governance in Libya. Therefore encouraging and enforcing 
this system will build the principles of trust and confidence in the economy’s 
activities. 
4. Curricula in the business schools tend to be outdated and the inappropriateness of 
imported syllabuses to the peculiarities of the economy do not offer a foundation for 
                                                 
70 Egypt is considered to be as a leader of corporate governance reforms among Arab countries since it has 
made corporate governance a central feature of its comprehensive economic reforms (Armstrong, 2003).   
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lifelong learning, which elsewhere is now considered as a fundamental objective of 
accounting education. 
5.  Libya should aspire to regain the cultural norms that are derived from Islamic 
history through education as a tool for the cultivation of Islamic ethics.  
6. The lack of accounting and auditing professional standards is the major impediment 
to the quality and timeliness of disseminating financial and non-financial 
information.  
7. Conferences, seminars, workshops and management training with the support of the 
World Bank and other international organisations are useful mechanisms to 
introduce a good framework of corporate governance.  
8. The researcher believes that corporate governance in the Libyan developing 
economy, with a healthy and growing competitiveness between private and state-
owned sectors, is soon to be realised. The change toward a more open market has 
seen gradual improvements recently and an effective governance system is pivotal 
to its future. Therefore, it will be fascinating and potentially lucrative to establish a 
code of good corporate governance practice. However, the Libyan policy-makers 
should understand the nature of the economy and the size of companies to meet all 
the needs of companies in the code, especially the small companies. 
9. Finally, the political stability and the high level of safety should be used to develop 
the economy and attract more investment to Libya. Also, economic and managerial 
stability should be a priority since it is weak in both the macro-economic and micro-
economic levels, along with establishing a rule-based system of governance instead 
of a relationship-based system. 
10.6.2 Contribution to Knowledge 
The main contribution of this study is in investigating corporate governance by exploring 
the key factors affecting the practice in response to the now-recognised need to develop 
economic activities. Also, a particular contribution has been considering how western 
models of corporate governance fit within the Islamic culture. A bibliographic search was 
conducted in both English and Arabic, and no specific study of corporate governance in 
Libya was identified. Therefore, it provides useful insights, policy implications and 
recommendations for government agencies on the need to introduce a good corporate 
governance framework. 
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Further, the study also provides a foundation for future research on the corporate 
governance system. Also, in the light of the study's observations, the following are the 
study's main contributions: 
a. The study contributed to corporate governance literature which was 
considered to be limited on detailed case studies in developing economies 
especially in Africa (Okike, 2007; Tsamenyi et al 2007).71 
b. Theoretically, the study contributed to knowledge by including in the 
corporate governance debate use of stakeholder theory to evaluate the 
current understanding of the corporate governance framework. The 
observations of this study complemented previous studies in their attempts 
to evaluate the practice of corporate governance in developing countries 
(Okike, 2007; Reed, 2002; Hassain and Mallin, 2002; Hassain and Mallin, 
2003; Yakasai, 2001; Allen, 2005; Tsamenyi et al, 2007).      
c. Empirically, this study reinforced the assertions that corporate governance 
and practice is not immune from internal and external influences and 
becomes a part of social and economic webs, which confirms that 
frameworks of corporate governance differ between countries. Therefore, 
the study's findings could be useful for developing corporate governance in 
Libya.  
d. The study also provides a foundation for future research on the corporate 
governance system, in order to meet international requirements for 
establishing a corporate governance Code in Libya. 
 
10.7 Limitations of the Study 
Although the thesis makes a valuable contribution to knowledge by evaluating and 
investigating corporate governance in terms of the stakeholders' perspective, it has a 
number of limitations. It has been asserted that only a small number of stakeholders were 
used when 453 questionnaires were distributed and only 195 were returned. Therefore the 
generalisation of findings to represent all stakeholders’ views may be misleading in 
evaluating and understanding corporate governance. Further limitation may be that only 10 
                                                 
71 The scarcity of information about corporate governance in Africa led an editorial writer of Business Week 
Magazine on the 19th  May 2003, to observe that the worldwide movement to improve corporate governance 
is nothing less than a cultural revolution transforming the investment landscape in the US, Europe, and Asia.  
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interviewees were conducted. However, the 10 interviewees that were chosen represent 
some of the most important policy-makers, and can provide very valuable insights to the 
challenges of corporate governance in Libya.  
Other potential limitations concern the formulation and understanding of questions so that 
all respondents can understand the term of corporate governance as this is a new term in the 
Arabic language. Finally, access, time and cost constraints and the amount of work 
involved prevented the researcher from expanding the research setting. 
10.8 Opportunities for Further Research  
Despite this, the study makes an original contribution to knowledge about understanding 
corporate governance in the Libyan context; however, as mentioned above, research on 
corporate governance in developing economies is still limited and has only recently become 
a major focus of attention for academics, international organisations and governments.  
Further research is also needed to explore and illuminate the role and the influence of 
organisations' subculture on corporate governance practice in specific sectors such as the 
financial sector and small enterprises due to their importance in Libyan economy. The role 
and responsibilities of the Board of Directors and the obstacles to disclosure and 
transparency in Libya might be a fertile field of future research.  
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Dear Sir 
On behalf of my Supervisory team, Professor Colin Fisher, Professor Paul Whysall and 
myself, I am writing to ask for your assistance in completing this questionnaire as a 
requirement for obtaining a PhD degree in Accountancy at Nottingham Trent University, 
UK. This study is entitled “An Evaluation of Corporate Governance Practices in Libya: 
Stakeholders’ Perspectives”. The objective of the research is to investigate and evaluate the 
current situation practice of corporate governance in Libya as well as the obstacles to its 
implementation.  
This questionnaire is designed to incorporate the principles of good corporate governance. 
The questionnaire should take approximately 20 minutes.    
Would you kindly complete this questionnaire? Any information you provide will be 
analysed with other information and used purely for academic purposes. In addition, your 
entire responses will be handled anonymously and confidentially. Your identity will not be 
revealed in the thesis or anywhere else. The questionnaire does not request any personal 
information from respondents.  
Thank you very much in advance for your assistance and co-operation and I am looking 
forward to receiving your response and comments.  
Yours faithfully, 
Mansor M Larbsh    
PhD Student 
Accountancy Department  
Nottingham Trent University   UK 
Contact: mansor.larbsh@ntu.ac.uk      
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Please note that by completing and returning this questionnaire you are giving your consent 
to the information being used in this research project, according to the terms laid out in the 
participant information sheet. 
Please note you do not have to sign or give your details in this questionnaire.    
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Part 1 
Q1- Please tick the appropriate box or boxes (regarding your occupation) 
 
1-Academic staff                                                  2- External auditors            
  
3- Investment advisor of bank                        4- Company employee   
  
5- Government official                                   6- Investors           
                                                                                                                              
 
Part 2-   The concept of corporate governance 
Q2- The following is a list of possible definitions of corporate governance. Using the scale 
below, Please identify the best definition that you think is proper to the Libyan 
environment.  
(1= Strongly disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Uncertain, 4= Agree, 5= strongly agree)  
Statements 1 2 3 4 5 
Q2a-Corporate governance refers to an organisation’s 
relationship with its shareholders to ensure that it acts in 
accordance with the interests of shareholders. 
     
Q2b- Corporate governance refers to organisation’s 
relationship with all stakeholders who are affected by or affect 
the company's operations and decisions. 
     
Q2c- Corporate governance refers to organisation’s 
relationship with all members of society, irrespective of 
whether they affect or are affected by company's operations 
and decisions.  
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Q3-The following is a list of possible purposes of corporate governance. Using the scale 
below, please identify the relative importance that you attach to each of these purposes: 
 (1=Not important at all, 2= Unimportant, 3= Uncertain, 4= Important, 5= Very important)  
Statements 1 2 3 4 5 
Q3a- Useful for the Libyan economy      
Q3b- Improve accountability mechanism       
Q3c- Reduce the level of corruption      
Q3d- Improve the investment climate      
Q3e- Improve corporate social responsibility in Libya      
Q3f- Protect stakeholders’ rights      
Q3g- Others (please specify)        
 
 
Q4- Please indicate your view of the significance of corporate governance in Libya to each 
of the following groups. 
 (1=Strongly insignificant;2=Insignificant;3=Uncertain;4=Significant;5=Strongly significant).   
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
Q4a- Shareholders      
Q4b- Creditors (suppliers, banks, others)      
Q4c- Employees      
Q4d- Government and its agencies       
Q4e – Auditors      
Q4f- Society at Large      
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Part 3- Rights of Stakeholders  
Q5- The following is a list of items relating to rights of stakeholders. Please state the extent 
to which you agree/ disagree about whether these rights exist in the Libyan environment 
 (1= Strongly disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Uncertain, 4= Agree, 5= Strongly agree). 
Statements 1 2 3 4 5 
Q5a- Shareholders approve the annual accounts, distribution 
of profits and appoint external auditor. 
     
Q5b-Shareholders have the right to participate, vote at the 
general meeting and treat fairly.  
     
Q5c- Shareholders have the right to be informed on decisions 
concerning fundamental corporate changes 
     
Q5d- Stakeholders have legal access to relevant information 
by their interests. 
     
Q5e- Stakeholders’ rights are protected by law and regulation.       
Q5f-Stakeholders’ rights that established by law are respected 
by companies. 
     
Q5g- Companies act in a responsible manner and protect the 
rights of the society.  
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Part 4- Factors that affect corporate governance  
Q6- Please indicate the extent of your agreement as to whether the following factors affect 
the practice of corporate governance in Libya.  
 (1= Strongly disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Uncertain, 4= Agree, 5= Strongly agree). 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
Q6a- Poor enforcement of laws      
Q6b- Lack of legal and regulation system that govern 
companies’ activity  
     
Q6c- The Libyan culture.      
Q6d- Social connections (family, tribe and others)      
Q6e- Poor leadership within the company.       
Q6f- The form of company ownership      
Q6g-The government interference in business activities 
(political interference) 
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Part 5- The framework of corporate governance 
Q7- The following is a set of possible reasons that might have prevented good corporate 
governance practice in Libyan companies. Please indicate the level of agreement you would 
accord to each reason?  
 (1= Strongly disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Uncertain, 4= Agree, 5= Strongly agree). 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
Q7a- Poor financial and non-financial disclosure.      
Q7b- The companies’ tax rate prevents good practice of 
corporate governance. 
     
Q7c- Not adopting the International Accounting Standards 
(IAS) and absence of the Libyan Accounting Standards lead to 
poor corporate governance practice. 
     
Q7d- Good relationship between company and external 
auditors.  
     
Q7e- Inappropriate composition of board of director in Libyan 
companies. 
     
Q7f- The powerful Chief Executive Officers.      
Q7g- Dual role played by same person as CEO and Chairman.      
Q7h- The state of the Libyan economy affects the practice of 
corporate governance practice. 
     
Q7i- Privatisation and creating stock exchange market have 
improved the practice of corporate governance.  
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Part 6- Future plans of corporate governance  
Q8- The following is a list of statements relating to disclosure. Please state the extent to 
which you agree about whether Libyan companies should disclose each of the listed 
statements in their annual reports  
        (1=.Strongly disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Uncertain, 4= Agree, 5= Strongly agree) 
Statements 1 2 3 4 5 
Q8a- The companies should provide timely and accurate 
disclosure of the financial and operating results of the 
company. 
     
Q8b- The companies should disclose the company objectives 
(e.g. policy related to business ethics). 
     
Q8c- The companies should disclose the foreseeable risk 
factors (e.g. industry risks, interest rate risks). 
     
Q8d- The companies should disclose all issues regarding 
employees and other stakeholders (e.g. programmes for 
human resource development and training). 
     
Q8e- The companies should disclose the impact of the 
company’s activities on the society and environment.   
     
Q8f- The companies should disclose the ownership structure.      
Q8g- The companies should disclose the remuneration policy 
for members of the board and key executives. 
     
Q8h- An annual audit should be conducted by an 
independent, competent and qualified auditor. 
     
Q8i- Information should be prepared, audited and disclosed 
in accordance with international standards of accounting  
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Q9- The following is a list of different possible responsibilities that the Board of Directors 
should achieve. Please state the extent to which you agree with each of these 
responsibilities. 
       (1=.Strongly disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Uncertain, 4= Agree, 5= Strongly agree). 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
Q9a- Board members should act on a fully informed basis 
and in good faith.  
     
Q9b- Board members should take into account the 
interests of shareholders and stakeholders when making 
decisions. 
     
Q9c- The board should exercise objective independent 
judgement on corporate affairs. 
     
Q9d- Board members should improve the compliance with 
the law and relevant standards in the company. 
     
Q9e- Board members should be required to disclose any 
material interests in transactions or matters affecting the 
company.    
     
Q9f- Board members should have access to accurate, 
relevant and timely information. 
     
Q9g Board members should devote sufficient time to their 
responsibilities. 
     
Q9h- Board members should be responsible for 
monitoring key executives.  
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Q10- Within corporate governance please indicate the number you think is important with 
respect to introducing corporate governance in the Libyan companies. 
 (1=Not important at all, 2= Unimportant, 3= Uncertain, 4= Important, 5= Very important). 
Statements 1 2 3 4 5 
Q10a- Increase the number of non-executive directors.      
Q10b- Clearer separation  between the role of CEO and 
Chairman 
     
Q10c- Establish board committees on the Board Of Directors.      
Q10d- Rotate the External Auditor from time to time with        
definition of his responsibilities. 
     
Q10e- Improve management behaviour through external 
control.  
     
Q10g- Others, please specify:        
 
Part7- Future introduction of corporate governance 
Q11- The following is a list of different possible approaches that can be used as a basis to 
introduce and improve corporate governance in Libya. Please state the extent to which you 
agree with each of these approaches? 
 (1=.Strongly disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Uncertain, 4= Agree, 5= Strongly agree). 
Statements 1 2 3 4 5 
Q11a- By quasi-laws* beside existing laws and regulations.      
Q11b- Through adjusting International Codes’ requirements.      
Q11c- By new laws and regulations.      
* The quasi-legal rights and responsibilities are those enshrined in codes of conduct, statements from 
authoritative bodies to whom the companies subscribe, plus other ‘semi-binding agreements’-possibly from 
the organizations themselves-, national strategies, etc 
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In conclusion, please write here below any other comments that could assist in this research.
Thank you for your co-operation and support in filling out this questionnaire.
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This part of questionnaire is for the listed companies (additional questionnaire).   
 
Q12- Does the External Auditor in your company rotate from time to time?     Yes        No    
  
Q13- Does the External Auditor provide other services to the company?         Yes        No  
 
 Q14- If the answer to Q13 is yes, please describe these services? 
 
  
  
 
Q15- Does the external auditor attend the annual meeting?                            Yes          No  
 
 
Q16- Does your company have a web site?                                                      Yes         No 
 
Q17- If the answer to Q16 is yes, does your company disclose the following information 
on the web site? 
Statements Yes No
a- Financial statements.
b- Social responsibility 
c- The general meeting date and place 
d- Others ( please specify)
 
 
Q18- How many members does your company have on the Board of Directors?  
  
Q19- How many of them are elected by shareholders?     
                                                 
Q20- How many of them are nominated?                                                  
 
Q21-How many times did the Board meet in the previous year?                
 
Q22- How many women does your company have on the Board of Directors?                                         
 
Q23- Do the board members have access to accurate, relevant and timely information 
about the company?                                                                         Yes                No 
 
Q24- What percentage would you estimate of the board members to be non-executive 
directors in your company?                                                                  (             %)  
 
 
 
 
 
 276
Q25-What does your company adopt as the remuneration for non-executive directors? 
Statements Yes No
a- Salary. 
b- Profit sharing   
c- Benefits (car, healthcare, etc)
d- Attendance session’s compensation
e- Others (specify) 
 
 
Q26-Is the Chairman also the Chief Executive Officer in your company? Yes          No 
 
Q27- Does your company have an internal audit department?                Yes            No 
  
Q28- If the answer to Q27 is yes, then to whom does the internal audit department report? 
Statements Yes No
a- Board
b-Chairman
c- Chief executive officer
d- Finance manager.
d- Others (specify)
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  :اﻷخ/اﻟﻤﺤﺘﺮم
أﺻﺎﻟﺔ ﻋﻦ ﻧﻔﺴﻲ وﻧﻴﺎﺑﺔ ﻋﻦ ﻣﺸﺮﻓﻰ هﺬة اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ، اآﺘﺐ اﻟﻴﻚ ﻣﻦ اﺟﻞ ﺗﻌﺒﺌﺔ هﺬا اﻻﺳﺘﺒﻴﺎن وذﻟﻚ آﺠﺰء ﻣﻦ ﻣﺘﻄﻠﺒﺎت 
ﻬﺎم ﺗﺮﻧﺖ ﺑﺎﻟﻤﻤﻠﻜﺔ اﻟﻤﺘﺤﺪة.ﻋﻨﻮان هﺬﻩ اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ "ﺗﻘﻴﻴﻢ ﺠﺘﻮراﻩ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﺤﺎﺳﺒﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ ﻧﻮﺗﻨاﻟﺤﺼﻮل ﻋﻠﻰ درﺟﺔ اﻟﺪآ
ﺎب اﻟﻤﺼﺎﻟﺢ". ﺗﻬﺪف اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ اﻟﻰ ﻓﺤﺺ وﺗﻘﻴﻴﻢ اﻟﻮﺿﻊ اﻟﺤﺎﻟﻰ ﻟﺘﻄﺒﻴﻖ ﺣﻮآﻤﺔ اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت ﻓﻲ ﻟﻴﺒﻴﺎ ﻣﻦ وﺟﻬﺔ ﻧﻈﺮ اﺻﺤ
وﻓﻘﺎ ﻟﻤﺒﺎدى ﺣﻮآﻤﺔ اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت اﻟﺼﺎدرة ﻋﻦ  ﺻﻤﻢ اﻻﺳﺘﺒﻴﺎن . ﻓﻲ ﻟﻴﺒﻴﺎ وﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ ﻣﻌﻮﻗﺎت اﻟﺘﻄﺒﻴﻖ ﻧﻈﺎم ﺣﻮآﻤﺔ اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت
 )DCEO(  .    ﻣﻨﻈﻤﺔ اﻟﺘﻌﺎون اﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎدي واﻟﺘﻨﻤﻴﺔ
اﺟﺎﺑﺔ اﻻﺳﺘﺒﻴﺎن . ﺎﺑﺔ اى ﻣﻼﺣﻈﺔ ﺗﻌﺘﻘﺪ اﻧﻬﺎ ﺗﺨﺪم اﻟﺒﺤﺚﺳﺆال وﻋﻠﻲ ﺻﻔﺤﺔ اﺧﻴﺮة ﻟﻜﺘ 11ﻳﺤﺘﻮي اﻻﺳﺘﺒﻴﺎن ﻋﻠﻰ 
  .دﻗﻴﻘﺔ 02ﺎوز ﻻﺗﺘﺠ
ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻧﺎﻣﻞ ﻣﻨﻜﻢ اﻟﺘﻜﺮم ﺑﺎﻻﺟﺎﺑﺔ ﻋﻦ اﻻﺳﺘﺒﻴﺎن ﻣﻊ اﻟﺘﺎآﻴﺪ ﻋﻠﻰ ان اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﻟﻤﻘﺪﻣﺔ ﺳﻮف ﻟﻦ ﺗﺴﺘﺨﺪم اﻻ ﻻﻏﺮاض 
اﻟﻰ اى ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت ﺷﺨﺼﻴﺔ  اﻟﺒﺤﺚ اﻟﻌﻠﻤﻰ، وآﺬﻟﻚ آﻞ اﻻﺟﺎﺑﺎت ﺳﻮف ﺗﻌﺎﻣﻞ ﺑﻜﻞ ﺳﺮﻳﻪ، أﻳﻀﺎ هﺬا اﻻﺳﺘﺒﻴﺎن ﻻ ﻳﺤﺘﺎج
 .ﻋﻦ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﺠﻮب.
 ﺷﻜﺮأ ﻣﻘﺪﻣﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺴﺎﻋﺪﺗﻜﻢ وﺗﻌﺎوﻧﻜﻢ وآﻠﻰ اﻣﻞ ﻓﻰ اﺳﺘﻼم ردودآﻢ ﻓﻰ اﻗﺮب وﻗﺖ.
 
 اﻟﺒﺎﺣﺚ                                           
 ﻣﻨﺼﻮر ﻣﺤﻤﺪ اﻻرﺑﺶ                               
  ﺪةﻬﺎم ﺗﺮﻧﺖ / اﻟﻤﻤﻠﻜﺔ اﻟﻤﺘﺤﺠﻗﺴﻢ اﻟﻤﺤﺎﺳﺒﺔ ﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ ﻧﻮﺗﻨ
  ku.ca.utn @hsbral ,rosnam            
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ا اﻻﺳﺘﺒﻴﺎن ﻻﻳﺤﺘﺎج ﺬه ﻓﻘﻂ . ا اﻻﺳﺘﺒﻴﺎن ﺳﻮف ﺗﺴﺘﺨﺪم ﻟﻠﺒﺤﺚ اﻟﻌﻠﻤﻲﺬه ﻓﻲﺔ/ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﻟﺘﻲ ﺳﻮف ﺗﻘﺪﻣﻬﺎ ﻣﻼﺣﻈ
  .اﻟﻲ ﺗﻮﻗﻴﻊ او ﺗﻘﺪﻳﻢ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت ﻋﻨﻚ
  -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 اﻟﺠﺰء اﻻول /
 
  ﻓﻲ  اﻟﻤﻜﺎن اﻟﻤﻨﺎﺳﺐ )ﻃﺒﻘﺎ ﻟﻮﻇﻴﻔﺘﺘﻚ(       √اﻟﺮﺟﺎء وﺿﻊ اﺷﺎرة   -1س
 
  (     )                  )             (        ﻣﺮاﺟﻊ ﺧﺎرﺟﻲ                     ﻋﻀﻮء هﻴﺌﺔ ﺗﺪرﻳﺲ        
  (     )             (        ﻣﻮﻇﻒ ﺑﺎدارة اﻻﺋﺘﻤﺎن ﺑﻤﺼﺮف    )              ﻣﻮﻇﻒ ﺑﺸﺮآﺔ               
  (       )                        ﻣﺴﺎهﻢ                    (        ﻣﻮﻇﻒ ﺑﺴﻮق اﻻوراق اﻟﻤﺎﻟﻴﺔ   )          
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت  ﺣﻮآﻤﺔ  اﻟﺠﺰء اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻰ /  ﻣﻔﻬﻮم
  ﺑﺎﻟﻤﻜﺎن اﻟﻤﻼﺋﻢ   √  ﻟﻼﺟﺎﺑﻪ ﻋﻠﻲ هﺬا اﻟﺠﺰء اﻟﺮﺟﺎء وﺿﻊ ﻋﻼﻣﺔ  
  ﺣﻮآﻤﺔ اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت ﺗﻌﻨﻲ  2س
 ) = ﻣﻮاﻓﻖ ﺑﺸﺪة(5= ﻣﻮاﻓﻖ   4=ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﺘﺎآﺪ       3= ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﻮاﻓﻖ   2 -= ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﻮاﻓﻖ ﺑﺸﺪﻩ1
 اﻟﺒﻴﺎن 1 2 3 4 5
  
آﻤﺔ اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت ﺗﺸﻴﺮ اﻟﻰ ﻋﻼﻗﺔ اﻟﻤﻨﻈﻤﺔ ﻣﻊ ﺣﻮ  -1
ﻣﺴﺎهﻤﻴﻬﺎ ﻟﻠﺘﺎآﺪ ﻣﻦ اﻧﻬﺎ ﺗﻌﻤﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﺤﻘﻴﻖ ﻣﺼﺎﻟﺤﻬﻢ.
  
ﺣﻮآﻤﺔ اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت ﺗﺸﻴﺮ اﻟﻰ ﻋﻼﻗﺔ اﻟﺸﺮآﺔ ﻣﻊ آﻞ   -2
اﺻﺤﺎب اﻟﻤﺼﺎﻟﺢ اﻟﺬﻳﻦ ﻳﺘﺎﺛﺮون وﻳﻮﺛﺮون ﻋﻠﻰ ﻗﺮارات 
وﻧﺸﺎﻃﺎت اﻟﺸﺮآﺔ
  
ﺣﻮآﻤﺔ اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت ﺗﺸﻴﺮ اﻟﻰ ﻋﻼﻗﺔ اﻟﺸﺮآﺔ ﻣﻊ آﻞ   -3
ب اﻟﻤﺼﺎﻟﺢ ﺑﺼﺮف اﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﻋﻦ ﻣﺪي او ﻓﻌﺎﻟﻴﺔ اﺻﺤﺎ
ﺗﺎﺛﺮهﻢ او ﺗﺎﺛﻴﺮهﻢ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻗﺮارات وﻧﺸﺎﻃﺎت اﻟﺸﺮآﺔ
اﻟﺘﺎﻟﻰ اهﺪاف ﻣﺤﺘﻤﻠﺔ ﻟﺤﻮآﻤﺔ اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت. اﻟﺮﺟﺎء ﺗﺤﺪد اﻻهﻤﻴﺔ اﻟﻨﺴﺒﻴﺔ ﻟﻜﻞ هﺪف ﻳﻤﻜﻦ ان ﻳﺘﺤﻘﻖ ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل ﺗﻄﺒﻴﻖ  - 3س
 ﻧﻈﺎم ﻟﺤﻮآﻤﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻟﻴﺒﻴﺎ.
 ) = ﻣﻬﻢ ﺟﺪﺁ(5= ﻣﻬﻢ،  4ﻣﺘﺎآﺪ،  = ﻏﻴﺮ 3=   ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﻬﻢ،  2= ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﻬﻢ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻻﻃﻼق، 1
 اﻟﺒﻴﺎن 1 2 3 4 5
   
ﺗﻘﻮﻳﺔ  اداء اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت. -1 
   
  اﻟﻤﺴﺎءﻟﺔ  اﻟﺮﻓﻊ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻴﺔ -2 
   
اﻟﻤﺸﺎآﻞ اﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎدﻳﻪ  ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﻋﻠﻲ ﺗﺨﻔﻴﺾ واﻟﺤﺪ -3
آﺎاﻟﻔﺴﺎد
   
ﺗﺤﺴﻴﻦ ﻣﻨﺎخ اﻻﺳﺘﺜﻤﺎر  -4
   
اﻻﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﺸﺮآﺎت  اﻟﻤﺴﺌﻮﻟﻴﺔ ﺗﻘﻮﻳﺔ   -5
   
اﺻﺤﺎب اﻟﻤﺼﺎﻟﺢﺣﻘﻮق  اﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﻋﻠﻲ  -6
   
اﺧﺮي ) اﻟﺮﺟﺎء ﺣﺪد(   -7
972 
  اﻟﺮﺟﺎء ﺗﺤﺪﻳﺪ اهﻤﻴﺔ ﺗﻄﺒﻴﻖ ﻧﻈﺎم ﻟﻠﺤﻮآﻤﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻟﻴﺒﻴﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻤﺠﻤﻮﻋﺎت اﻟﺘﺎﻟﻴﺔ:         - 4س
 ) = ﻣﻬﻢ ﺟﺪﺁ( 5 ﻣﻬﻢ،    = 4= ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﺘﺎآﺪ،      3ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﻬﻢ،     =2= ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﻬﻢ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻻﻃﻼق، 1
                                                                                                       
  ﺎﻟﺚ/ ﺣﻘﻮق اﺻﺤﺎب اﻟﻤﺼﺎﻟﺢاﻟﺠﺰء اﻟﺜ
اﻟﺘﺎﻟﻰ ﻣﺠﻤﻮﻋﺔ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺤﻘﻮق اﻻﺳﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﻻﺻﺤﺎب اﻟﺤﻘﻮق. اﻟﺮﺟﺎء ﺗﺤﺪﻳﺪ اﻟﻰ اى ﻣﺪي ﺗﻮاﻓﻖ ﻋﻠﻰ وﺟﻮد هﺬة  - 5س   
 اﻟﺤﻘﻮق ﻓﻲ اﻟﺒﻴﺌﺔ اﻟﻠﻴﺒﻴﺔ. 
                        ) = ﻣﻮاﻓﻖ ﺑﺸﺪة( 5= ﻣﻮاﻓﻖ    4   ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﺘﺎآﺪ = 3= ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﻮاﻓﻖ    2  -= ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﻮاﻓﻖ ﺑﺸﺪﻩ1
 اﻟﺒﻴﺎن 1 2 3 4 5
  
ﻟﻠﻤﺴﺎهﻤﻴﻦ اﻟﺤﻖ ﻓﻲ اﻋﺘﻤﺎد واﻟﻤﺼﺎدﻗﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ   -1
اﻟﺤﺴﺎﺑﺎت اﻟﺨﺘﺎﻣﻴﻪ وﺗﻘﺮﻳﺮ آﻴﻔﻴﺔ ﺗﻮزﻳﻊ اﻻرﺑﺎح 
اﻟﻤﺘﺤﻘﻘﺔ. 
  
ﻟﻠﻤﺴﺎهﻤﻴﻦ ﺑﺼﺮف اﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﻋﻦ ﻗﻴﻤﺔ ﻣﺴﺎهﻤﺘﻬﻢ اﻟﺤﻖ  -2
ﻓﻰ اﻟﻤﺸﺎرآﺔ واﻟﺘﺼﻮﻳﺖ ﻓﻰ اﻻﺟﺘﻤﺎع اﻟﺴﻨﻮي ﻟﻠﺸﺮآﺔ. 
  
آﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻘﺮارات اﻟﺘﻲ ﻟﻠﻤﺴﺎهﻤﻴﻦ اﻟﺤّﻖ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﺸﺎر -3 
.ﺗﺘﻌّﻠﻖ ﺑﺎﻟﺘﻐﻴﻴﺮات اﻻﺳﺎﺳﻴﻪ ﻟﻠﺸﺮآﺔ
  
اﻟﻤﺼﺎﻟﺢ ﻟﺪﻳﻬﻢ اﻟﺤﻖ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺤﺼﻮل ﻋﻠﻰ  أﺻﺤﺎب-4       
  .اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﻟﻤﺘﻌﻠﻘﻪ ﺑﻤﺼﺎﻟﺤﻬﻢ
  
اﻟﻤﺼﺎﻟﺢ ﺑﺎﻟﺸﺮآﺎت اﻟﻠﻴﺒﻴﺔ ﻣﺤﻤﻴﺔ  أﺻﺤﺎبﺣﻘﻮق  -5
.ﺑﺎﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮن
  
اﻟﻤﺸﺮﻋﺔ  اﻟﻤﺼﺎﻟﺢ ﺑﺎﻟﺸﺮآﺎت اﻟﻠﻴﺒﻴﺔ أﺻﺤﺎبﺣﻘﻮق  - 6
.ﺑﺎﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮن ﻣﺤﺘﺮﻣﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻗﺒﻞ اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت
  
ﻟﺔ و ﺗﻘﻮم ﻮﻟﺸﺮآﺎت اﻟﻤﺴﺎهﻤﺔ ﺗﻌﻤﻞ ﺑﻄﺮﻳﻘﺔ ﻣﺴﺌا - 7
 .ﺑﺤﻤﺎﻳﺔ ﺣﻘﻮق اﻟﻤﺠﺘﻤﻊ آﻜﻞ
 
 
 
 اﻟﺒﻴﺎن 1 2 3 4 5
   
اﻟﻤﺴﺎهﻤﻴﻦ -1
   
اﻟﺪاﺋﻨﻴﻦ -2
   
اﻟﻌﻤﺎل -3
   
اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ و اﻻﺟﻬﺰة اﻟﺘﺎﺑﻌﻪ ﻟﻬﺎ -4 
   
اﻟﻤﺮاﺟﻌﻮن اﻟﺨﺎرﺟﻴﻮن -5
   
اﻟﻤﺠﺘﻤﻊ آﻜﻞ -6
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 اﻟﺠﺰء اﻟﺮاﺑﻊ/ ﻋﻮاﻣﻞ ﺗﺆﺛﺮ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻧﻈﺎم ﺣﻮآﻤﺔ اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت
  ﺮآﺎت ﻓﻲ ﻟﻴﺒﻴﺎﻮاﻣﻞ ﺗﺆﺛﺮ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻤﺎرﺳﺔ ﺣﻮآﻤﺔ اﻟﺸﻌﻣﺪى ﺗﺘﻔﻖ ﻣﻊ اﻟﻌﺒﺎرات اﻟﺘﺎﻟﻴﺔ آ اﻟﺮﺟﺎء اﻟﺘﻜﺮم ﺑﺘﺤﺪﻳﺪ اﻟﻰ اي -6س
  = ﻣﻮاﻓﻖ ﺑﺸﺪة 5= ﻣﻮاﻓﻖ   4= ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﺘﺎآﺪ   3= ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﻮاﻓﻖ   2ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﻮاﻓﻖ ﺑﺸﺪﻩ   = 1)
 اﻟﺒﻴﺎن 1 2 3 4 5
   
 وﺗﻄﺒﻴﻖ اﻟﻘﻮاﻧﻴﻦ ﺬﺿﻌﻒ او ﻋﺪم ﻓﻌﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﺗﻨﻔﻴ 1
   
وﺟﻮد ﻗﺼﻮر ﻓﻲ اﻟﻘﻮاﻧﻴﻦ اﻟﻤﻨﻈﻤﺔ ﻟﻼﻧﺸﻄﺔ اﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎدﻳﺔ -2       
   
ﺛﻘﺎﻓﺔ اﻟﻤﺠﺘﻤﻊ.  -3
   
)ﻋﺎﺋﻠﻴﺔ وﻗﺒﻠﻴﺔ اوﻣﻦ اﻃﺮاف اﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻴﺔ  ﻗﻮة اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺎت اﻻﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻴﺔ -4
اﺧﺮي(
   
ﺿﻌﻒ وﺳﺆء اﻻدارة -5
   
ﺷﻜﻞ اﻟﻤﻠﻜﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﺸﺮآﺎت  -6
 
  
) ﺗﺪﺧﻞ اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ( ﻓﻲ اﻻﻧﺸﻄﺔ اﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎدﻳﺔ  اﻟﺘﺪﺧﻞ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻲ -7
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  اﻟﺠﺰء اﻟﺨﺎﻣﺲ/  إﻃﺎر ﺣﻮآﻤﺔ اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت
ﻻﺳﺒﺎب اﻟﺘﻰ ﻗﺪ ﺗﻌﻴﻖ ﺗﻄﺒﻴﻖ ﺣﻮآﻤﺔ اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت ﻓﻲ ﻟﻴﺒﻴﺎ. اﻟﺮﺟﺎء ﺗﺤﺪﻳﺪ ﻣﺴﺘﻮي ﻣﻮﻓﻘﺘﻚ ﻋﻠﻰ آﻞ اﻟﺘﺎﻟﻰ ﻣﺠﻤﻮﻋﺔ ﻣﻦ ا -7س
 ﺳﺒﺐ. 
                 ) = ﻣﻮاﻓﻖ ﺑﺸﺪة(5= ﻣﻮاﻓﻖ   4  =ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﺘﺎآﺪ  3= ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﻮاﻓﻖ   2 = ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﻮاﻓﻖ ﺑﺸﺪﻩ1
 اﻟﺒﻴﺎن 1 2 3 4 5
ﺿﻌﻒ اﻻﻓﺼﺎح اﻟﻤﺎﻟﻰ وﻏﻴﺮ اﻟﻤﺎﻟﻰ. -1   
ﺋﺐ اﻟﻤﻔﺮوﺿﺔ ﻋﻠﻲ اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت ﻓﻲ ﻟﻴﺒﻴﺎ ﻻ ﻳﻮدي اﻟﻰ ﺳﻌﺮ اﻟﻀﺮا -2   
ﻌﻒ ﻣﻦ ﻣﻤﺎرﺳﺔ اﻟﺤﻮآﻤﺔ.ﻀاﻟﺘﺸﺠﻴﻊ ﻋﻠﻲ اﻻﻓﺼﺎح وﺑﺎﻟﺘﺎﻟﻲ ﻳ
   ﻋﺪم ﺗﺒﻨﻲ ﻣﻌﺎﻳﻴﺮ اﻟﻤﺤﺎﺳﺒﺔ اﻟﺪوﻟﻴﺔ وﻏﻴﺎب ﻣﻌﺎﻳﻴﺮ ﻟﻴﺒﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﺤﺎﺳﺒﺔ  -3   
.ﻳﻮدي اﻟﻰ ﻗﺼﻮر ﻓﻲ ﻣﻤﺎرﺳﺔ ﺣﻮآﻤﺔ اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت 
اﻟﺨﺎرﺟﻰ.  اﻟﺠﻴﺪة ﺑﻴﻦ اﻟﺸﺮآﺔ واﻟﻤﺮاﺟﻊ اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺔ -4   
ﺿﻌﻒ ﺗﺮآﻴﺐ ﻣﺠﺎﻟﺲ اﻻدارة ﻓﻲ اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت اﻟﻠﻴﺒﻴﺔ -5   
ﻗﻮة ﻧﻔﻮذ اﻟﻤﺪراء اﻟﺘﻨﻔﻴﺬﻳﻴﻦ -6   
.ي ورﺋﻴﺲ ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻻدارةﺬاﻟﺠﻤﻊ ﺑﻴﻦ وﻇﻴﻔﺘﻲ اﻟﻤﺪﻳﺮ اﻟﺘﻨﻔﻴ -7   
ﺣﺎﻟﺔ اﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎد اﻟﻠﻴﺒﻲ ﺗﻮﺛﺮ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻤﺎرﺳﺔ اﻟﺤﻮآﻤﺔ -8   
ﻳﻖ ﺗﻤﻠﻴﻚ اﻟﻮﺣﺪات اﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎدﻳﺔ  اﻻﻧﺘﻘﺎل ﻣﻦ اﻟﻘﻄﺎع اﻟﻌﺎم ﻋﻦ ﻃﺮ -9   
واﻧﺸﺎء ﺳﻮق ﻟﻼوراق اﻟﻤﺎﻟﻴﺔ  رﻓﻊ  ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﻤﺎرﺳﺔ اﻟﺠﻴﺪة ﻟﻠﺤﻮآﻤﺔ ﻓﻲ 
اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت.
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 اﻟﺠﺰء اﻟﺴﺎدس/ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﺒﻞ ﺗﻄﺒﻴﻖ اﻟﺤﻮآﻤﺔ
اﻟﺘﺎﻟﻰ اهﻢ اﻟﺒﻨﻮد اﻟﺘﻰ ﻳﻤﻜﻦ اﻻﻓﺼﺎح ﻋﻨﻬﺎ. اﻟﺮﺟﺎء ﺗﺤﺪﻳﺪ اﻟﻰ اى ﻣﺪى ﺗﻮاﻓﻖ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻧﻪ ﻳﺠﺐ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت  -8س
    ﻟﻘﻴﺎم ﺑﺎﻻﻓﺼﺎح ﻋﻦ هﺬة اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت ﻓﻰ ﺗﻘﺎرﻳﺮهﺎ اﻟﺴﻨﻮﻳﺔاﻟﻠﻴﺒﻴﺔ ا
 ) = ﻣﻮاﻓﻖ ﺑﺸﺪة(5= ﻣﻮاﻓﻖ   4=ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﺘﺎآﺪ       3= ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﻮاﻓﻖ   2 -= ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﻮاﻓﻖ ﺑﺸﺪﻩ1
 اﻟﺒﻴﺎن 1 2 3 4 5
  
اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت ﻳﺠﺐ ان ﺗﻘﺪم اﻓﺼﺎح دﻗﻴﻖ وﻓﻰ  -1
اﻟﻮﻗﺖ اﻟﻤﻨﺎﺳﺐ ﻋﻦ اﻟﻮﺿﻊ اﻟﻤﺎﻟﻰ واﻻداء 
ﻟﻠﺸﺮآﺔ 
  
اﻟﻠﻴﺒﻴﺔ ﻳﺠﺐ ان ﺗﻔﺼﺢ ﻋﻦ اهﺪاف  اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت -2
اﻟﺸﺮآﺔ اﻟﻤﻮﺿﻮﻋﺔ ﻣﺜﻞ اﻻهﺪاف اﻟﺘﺠﺎرﻳﺔ  
واﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺎت اﻟﻤﺘﺼﻠﺔ ﺑﺎﺧﻼﻗﻴﺎت اﻟﻤﻬﻨﺔ
  
اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت اﻟﻠﻴﺒﻴﺔ ﻳﺠﺐ ان ﺗﻔﺼﺢ ﻋﻦ ﻋﻮاﻣﻞ  -3
اﻟﻤﺨﺎﻃﺮة اﻟﻤﻠﻤﻮﺳﺔ ﻓﻰ اﻻﺟﻞ اﻟﻤﻨﻈﻮر ﻣﺜﻞ 
اﻟﻤﺨﺎﻃﺮ اﻟﻤﺮﺗﺒﻄﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﺔ وﻣﺨﺎﻃﺮ اﺳﻌﺎر 
اﻟﻔﺎﺋﺪة 
  
ﻴﺒﻴﺔ ﻳﺠﺐ ان ﺗﻔﺼﺢ ﻋﻦ اﻟﻤﺴﺎﺋﻞ اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت اﻟﻠ -4
اﻻﺳﺎﺳﻴﺔ اﻟﻤﺘﺼﻠﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺎﻣﻠﻴﻦ وﻏﻴﺮهﻢ ﻣﻦ اﺻﺤﺎب 
اﻟﻤﺼﺎﻟﺢ ﻣﺜﻞ ﺑﺮاﻣﺞ ﺗﻨﻤﻴﺔ اﻟﻤﻮارد اﻟﺒﺸﺮﻳﺔ 
واﻟﺘﺪرﻳﺐ
  
اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت اﻟﻠﻴﺒﻴﺔ ﻳﺠﺐ ان ﺗﻔﺼﺢ ﻋﻦ ﺗﺎﺛﻴﺮ  -5
ﻧﺸﺎط اﻟﺸﺮآﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻤﺠﺘﻤﻊ واﻟﺒﻴﺌﺔ اﻟﻤﺤﻴﻄﺔ
  
اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت اﻟﻠﻴﺒﻴﻪ ﻳﺠﺐ ان ﺗﻔﺼﺢ ﻋﻦ هﻴﺎآﻞ  -6
ﻜﻴﺔ ﺑﻬﺎ اﻟﻤﻠ
  
اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت اﻟﻠﻴﺒﻴﺔ ﻳﺠﺐ ان ﺗﻔﺼﺢ ﻋﻦ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﺔ  -7
اﻟﻤﻜﺎﻓﺎت واﻟﺤﻮاﻓﺰ ﻻﻋﻀﺎء ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻻدارة 
واﻟﻤﺪرﻳﻴﻦ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﻴﻦ ﺑﻬﺎ
  
اﻟﻤﺮاﺟﻌﺔ اﻟﺴﻨﻮﻳﺔ ﻳﺠﺐ ان ﺗﺘﻢ ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل  -8
ﻣﺮاﺟﻊ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻞ ﻣﺆهﻞ و ذي آﻔﺎءة
  
اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت اﻟﻠﻴﺒﻴﺔ ﻳﺠﺐ ان ﺗﻌﺪ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت  -9
ﻴﺮ اﻟﻤﺤﺎﺳﺒﻴﺔ اﻟﺪوﻟﻴﺔوﺗﻔﺼﺢ ﻋﻨﻬﺎ وﻓﻘﺎ ﻟﻠﻤﻌﺎﻳ
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اﻟﺒﻴﺌﺔ اﻟﻘﺎﺋﻤﺔ اﻟﺘﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﺗﺘﻀﻤﻦ اهﻢ ﻣﺴﺆوﻟﻴﺎت ﻣﺠﺎﻟﺲ اﻻدارة. رﺟﺄ اﻟﻰ اى ﻣﺪى ﺗﻌﺘﻘﺪ اﻧﻪ ﻳﺠﺐ ان ﺗﺘﺤﻘﻖ ﻓﻲ  -9س
    .اﻟﻠﻴﺒﻴﺔ
                  ) = ﻣﻮاﻓﻖ ﺑﺸﺪة(5= ﻣﻮاﻓﻖ   4=ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﺘﺎآﺪ       3= ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﻮاﻓﻖ   2 -= ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﻮاﻓﻖ ﺑﺸﺪﻩ1
  ناﻟﺒﻴﺎ 1 2 3 4 5
ﻳﻌﻤﻞ اﻋﻀﺎء ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻻدارة ﺑﻨﺎء ﻋﻠﻲ اﺳﺎس  -1  
ﺗﻮاﻓﺮ آﺎﻣﻞ ﻟﻠﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت واﻳﻀﺎ ﻋﻠﻲ ﺣﺴﻦ اﻟﻨﻴﺔ  
.واﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﻋﻠﻲ ﺗﺤﻘﻴﻖ ﻣﺼﺎﻟﺢ اﻟﺸﺮآﺔ واﻟﻤﺴﺎهﻤﻴﻦ
ﻳﺠﺐ ان ﻳﺎﺧﺬ  ﻓﻲ اﻻﻋﺘﺒﺎر  ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻻدارة  -2  
اهﺘﻤﺎﻣﺎت اﺻﺤﺎب اﻟﻤﺼﺎﻟﺢ ﻋﻨﺪ اﺗﺨﺎذ اﻟﻘﺮارات.
رس ﺣﻜﻢ ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﻲ ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻻدارة ﻳﺠﺐ ان ﻳﻤﺎ -3  
وﻣﺴﺘﻘﻞ ﻟﺸﺌﻮن اﻟﺸﺮآﺔ
ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻻدارة ﻳﺠﺐ ان ﻳﻌﻤﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺮﻓﻊ ﻣﻦ  -4  
اﻟﺘﺰام اﻟﺸﺮآﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮاﻧﻴﻦ واﻟﻤﻌﺎﻳﻴﺮ ذات اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺔ 
  ﺑﺎﻟﺸﺮآﺔ
ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻻدارة ﻳﺠﺐ ان ﻳﻔﺼﺢ ﻋﻦ اى ﻣﺼﺎﻟﺢ  -5  
ﺷﺨﺼﻴﺔ ﻣﻊ اﻟﺸﺮآﺔ او اى ﺻﻔﻘﺎت ﻳﻤﻜﻦ ان ﺗﻮﺛﺮ 
ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺸﺮآﺔ
ﻻدارة ﻳﺠﺐ ان ﻳﻜﻮن ﻟﺪﻳﻬﻢ اﻋﻀﺎء ﻣﺠﻠﺲ ا -6  
اﻣﻜﺎﻧﻴﺔ اﻟﺤﺼﻮل ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﻟﺪﻗﻴﻘﺔ وﻓﻲ 
اﻟﻮﻗﺖ اﻟﻤﻨﺎﺳﺐ
ﻳﺠﺐ ان ﻳﺨﺼﺺ اﻟﻮﻗﺖ اﻟﻜﺎﻓﻲ  ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻻدراة -7  
ﻻداء اﻟﺘﺰاﻣﺎﺗﺔ.
ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻻدارة ﻳﺠﺐ ان ﻳﻜﻮن ﻣﺴﺌﻮل ﻋﻦ  -8  
ﻣﺮاﻗﺒﺔ اﻟﻤﺪراء اﻟﺘﻨﻔﺬﻳﻴﻦ ﺑﺎﻟﺸﺮآﺔ 
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، اﻟﺮﺟﺎء إﺑﺪأء ﺗﻘﺪﻳﺮك ﻟﺪرﺟﺔ اﻻهﻤﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﻌﻮاﻣﻞ اﻟﺘﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﺿﻤﻦ ﺗﻄﺒﻴﻖ ﻧﻈﺎم اﻟﺤﻮآﻤﺔ ﺿﻤﻦ إﻃﺎر ﺣﻮآﻤﺔ اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت -01س
 ﺑﺎﻟﺸﺮآﺎت اﻟﻠﻴﺒﻴﺔ
  ( = ﻣﻬﻢ ﺟﺪﺁ 5ﻣﻬﻢ،    = 4ﺘﺎآﺪ    = ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣ 3ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﻬﻢ،    = 2= ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﻬﻢ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻻﻃﻼق، 1) 
 اﻟﺒﻴﺎن 1 2 3 4 5
   
زﻳﺎدة ﻋﺪد اﻻﻋﻀﺎء ﻏﻴﺮ اﻟﺘﻨﻔﺬﻳﻴﻦ -1
   
ﺑﻴﻦ وﻇﻴﻔﺔ اﻟﻤﺪﻳﺮ اﻟﻌﺎم ورﺋﻴﺲ ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻻدارة  وﺟﻮد ﻓﺼﻞ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﻲ -2
   
ﺗﻜﻮﻳﻦ ﻟﺠﺎن ﻓﻰ ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻻدارة                            -3
    
ﺗﻐﻴﻴﺮ واﺳﺘﺒﺪال اﻟﻤﺮاﺟﻊ اﻟﺨﺎرﺟﻰ دورﻳﺎ  -4
   
.  اﻟﺴﻠﻮك اِﻻدارىﺗﻄﻮﻳﺮ  -5
   
اﺧﺮي ) اﻟﺮﺟﺎء ﺣﺪد(    -6
 
 
  .ﻟﻨﻈﺎم ﺣﻮآﻤﺔ اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت ﻓﻰ اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت اﻟﻠﻴﺒﻴﺔاﻟﺠﺰء اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻊ / اﻟﺘﻘﺪﻳﻢ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻘﺒﻠﻰ 
 
ﻟﺘﻘﺪﻳﻢ وﺗﻄﻮﻳﺮ ﻧﻈﺎم ﺣﻮآﻤﺔ  آﺎﺳﺎس اﻟﻘﺎﺋﻤﺔ اﻟﺘﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﺗﺘﻀﻤﻦ ﻣﺠﻤﻮﻋﺔ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻮﺳﺎﺋﻞ اﻟﺘﻰ ﻳﻤﻜﻦ اﺳﺘﺨﺪاﻣﻬﺎ -11س
  اي ﻣﺪى ﺗﻮاﻓﻖ ﻋﻠﻲ اى ﻣﻦ هﺬة اﻟﻮﺳﺎﺋﻞ. ﺊﺟﺎء ﺗﺤﺪﻳﺪ اﻟﺮاﻟﻠﻴﺒﻴﺔ. اﻟاﻟﺒﻴﺌﺔ اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت ﻓﻲ 
 
                  ) = ﻣﻮاﻓﻖ ﺑﺸﺪة(5= ﻣﻮاﻓﻖ   4ﻴﺮ ﻣﺘﺎآﺪ      =ﻏ 3= ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﻮاﻓﻖ   2 -= ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﻮاﻓﻖ ﺑﺸﺪﻩ1
 اﻟﺒﻴﺎن 1 2 3 4 5
   
ﺑﺎﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮن اﻟﺤﺎﻟﻰ و ﺑﻮﺳﺎﺋﻞ اﺧﺮى ﺷﺒﺔ اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮن.+  -1
   
ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل اﻟﺘﺎﻗﻠﻢ ﻣﻊ ﻣﺘﻄﻠﺒﺎت رﻣﻮز اﻟﺤﻮآﻤﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺎﻟﻢ.   -2 
   
  ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل ﻗﻮاﻧﻴﻦ ﺟﺪﻳﺪة.  -3
ﺑﻬﺎ ﺗﻠﻚ اﻟﻤﺴﺆوﻟﻴﺎت اﻟﻤﻨﺒﺜﻘﺔ ﻋﻦ ﻣﺠﻤﻮﻋﺔ اﻟﻤﺒﺎدى اﻟﺘﻰ ﺗﺤﻜﻢ اﻟﺴﻠﻮك واﻟﺘﺼﺮف، وﻣﺎﻳﺼﺪر ﻋﻦ  اﻟﻤﺴﺆوﻟﻴﺎت ﺷﺒﺔ اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮﻧﻴﺔ, ﻳﻘﺼﺪ + 
ﺳﻠﻄﺔ رﺳﻤﻴﺔ او اﺧﺮى ﻣﺘﺨﺼﺼﺔ ﺗﻜﻮن اﻟﻤﻨﻈﻤﺔ ﻋﻀﻮ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ، اﻻﺗﻔﺎﻗﻴﺎت ﺷﺒﺔ اﻟﻤﻠﺰﻣﺔ و اﻟﺘﻰ ﺗﺼﺪر ﻋﻦ اﻟﻤﻨﻈﻤﺔ ﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ، اﻻﺳﺘﺮاﺗﻴﺠﻴﺎت 
    .اﻟﻤﺤﻠﻴﺔ، وﻣﺎ اﻟﻰ ذﻟﻚ
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.ﺮم ﺑﻜﺘﺎﺑﺔ اي ﺗﻌﻠﻴﻖ او ﻣﻼﺣﻈﺔ ﺗﻌﺘﻘﺪ اﻧﻬﺎ ﺗﺨﺪم اﻟﺒﺤﺚ ﻓﻲ هﺪة اﻟﺼﻔﺤﺔﺧﺘﺎﻣﺄ اﻟﺮﺟﺎء اﻟﺘﻜ
ﺷﻜﺮأ ﻋﻠﻲ اﻟﺘﻌﺎون ﻣﻌﻨﺎ ﻓﻲ اﻻﺟﺎﺑﺔ ﻋﻠﻲ هﺪا اﻻﺳﺘﺒﻴﺎن
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 هﺬا اﻟﺠﺰء ﺧﺎص ﺑﺎﻟﺸﺮآﺎت اﻟﻤﺴﺠﻠﺔ ﺑﺴﻮق اﻻوراق اﻟﻤﺎﻟﻴﺔ
 
  ﺮاﺟﻊ اﻟﺨﺎرﺟﻰ ﻣﻦ وﻗﺖ اﻟﻲ اﺧﺮ؟         ﻧﻌﻢ                  ﻻهﻞ ﺗﺘﺒﻊ اﻟﺸﺮآﺔ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﺔ اﺳﺘﺒﺪال اﻟﻤ   -21س
 
  هﻞ ﻳﻘﻮم اﻟﻤﺮاﺟﻊ اﻟﺨﺎرﺟﻲ ﺑﺘﻘﺪﻳﻢ ﺧﺪﻣﺎت اﺧﺮي ﻟﻠﺸﺮآﺔ؟                     ﻧﻌﻢ                  ﻻ   -31س 
  
  ة اﻟﺨﺪﻣﺎت؟ﺬا آﺎﻧﺖ اﺟﺎﺑﺔ اﻟﺴﺆال اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻖ ﻧﻌﻢ اﻟﺮﺟﺎء ﺣﺪد هذا  -41س
  
  
 
  ﻲ ﻳﺤﻀﺮ اﻻﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﺎت اﻟﺴﻨﻮﻳﺔ ﻟﻠﺠﻤﻌﻴﺔ اﻟﻌﻤﻮﻣﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﺸﺮآﺔ؟    ﻧﻌﻢ              ﻻ هﻞ اﻟﻤﺮاﺟﻊ اﻟﺨﺎرﺟ   -51س
                                                    
  هﻞ ﻟﻠﺸﺮآﺔ ﻣﻮﻗﻊ ﻋﻠﻲ ﺷﺒﻜﺔ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﻟﺪوﻟﻴﺔ؟        ﻧﻌﻢ                    ﻻ                          -61س 
 
  ﺎﺑﺔ ﺑﻨﻌﻢ ﻋﻦ اﻟﺴﺆال اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻖ هﻞ ﺗﻔﺼﺢ اﻟﺸﺮآﺔ ﻋﻦ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﻟﺘﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﻤﻮﻗﻊ؟              ا آﺎﻧﺖ اﻻﺟذا   -71س 
 
 اﻟﺒﻴﺎن ﻧﻌﻢ ﻻ
اﻟﺤﺴﺎﺑﺎت اﻟﺨﺘﺎﻣﻴﺔ 
اﻟﻤﺴﺌﻮﻟﻴﺔ اﻻﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻴﺔ 
 اﻣﺎآﻦ وﻣﻮاﻋﻴﺪ اﻻﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﺎت  
اﺧﺮي ) اﻟﺮﺟﺎء ﺣﺪد(  
 
  )                (       آﻢ ﻋﺪد اﻋﻀﺎء ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻻدارة ﺑﺎﻟﺸﺮآﺔ؟                  -81س
 
  آﻢ ﻣﻦ هﻮﻻء ﺗﻢ اﺧﺘﻴﺎرﻩ ﻣﻦ ﻗﺒﻞ اﻟﻤﺴﺎهﻤﻴﻦ؟                 )                (   -91س
 
  آﻢ ﻣﻦ هﻮﻻء ﺗﻢ ﺗﻌﻴﻴﻨﺔ ؟                                       )                (   -02س
 
  )                (    آﻢ ﻋﺪد اﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﺎت ﻣﺠﻠﺲ ادارة اﻟﺸﺮآﺔ اﻟﺴﻨﺔ اﻟﻤﺎﺿﻴﺔ؟    -12س
 
  آﻢ ﻋﺪد اﻟﻌﻨﺼﺮ اﻟﻨﺴﺎﺋﻰ ﺑﻤﺠﻠﺲ ادارة اﻟﺸﺮآﺔ؟               )               (    -22س
 
هﻞ ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻻدارة ﻟﺔ آﺎﻣﻞ اﻟﺼﻼﺣﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺤﺼﻮل واﻻﻃﻼع ﻋﻠﻲ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت واﻟﺒﻴﺎﻧﺎت اﻟﺪﻗﻴﻘﺔ ﻋﻦ اﻟﺸﺮآﺔ    -32س
  ﻻ                ﻓﻲ اﻟﻮﻗﺖ اﻟﻤﻨﺎﺳﺐ؟                     ﻧﻌﻢ       
 
  آﻢ ﻧﺴﺒﺔ اﻟﻤﺪراء ﻏﻴﺮ اﻟﺘﻨﻔﺬﻳﻴﻦ ﺑﻤﺠﻠﺲ اﻻدارة  )          /  ( -42س
 
  ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻻدارة؟ ﻟﻤﻜﺎﻓﺎةهﻲ اﻟﻄﺮﻳﻘﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺘﺒﻨﺎهﺎ اﻟﺸﺮآﺔ ﻣﺎ   -52س
 اﻟﺒﻴﺎن ﻧﻌﻢ ﻻ
ﻣﺮﺗﺐ
ﺣﺼﺔ ﻣﻦ اﻻرﺑﺎح
ﻣﻨﺎﻓﻊ اﺧﺮي )ﻣﺘﻞ  ﺳﻴﺎرة, رﻋﺎﻳﺔ ﺻﺤﻴﺔ,(
ﻠﻤﺠﻠﺲﻣﻜﺎﻓﺌﺔ ﻋﻦ ﺣﻀﻮر آﻞ ﺟﻠﺴﺔ ﻟ
اﺧﺮى) اﻟﺮﺟﺎء ﺣﺪد(
 
  هﻞ رﺋﻴﺲ ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻻدارة ﻧﻔﺴﺔ اﻟﻤﺪﻳﺮ اﻟﺘﻨﻔﻴﺪي ﺑﺎﻟﺸﺮآﺔ؟       ﻧﻌﻢ               ﻻ     -62س
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  هﻞ ﻳﻮﺟﺪ ﺑﺎﻟﺸﺮآﺔ ﻗﺴﻢ او ادارة ﻟﻠﻤﺮاﺟﻌﺔ اﻟﺪاﺧﻠﻴﺔ؟          ﻧﻌﻢ           ﻻ - 72س
 
 
  ﺗﻘﺎرﻳﺮ هﺪة اﻻدارة؟ ا آﺎﻧﺖ اﺟﺎﺑﺔ اﻟﺴﺆال اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻖ ﺑﻨﻌﻢ, اﻟﻲ ﻣﻦ ﺗﺘﻢ اﺣﺎﻟﺔذا  -82س
 اﻟﺒﻴﺎن ﻧﻌﻢ ﻻ ﻻ اﻋﻠﻢ
ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻻدارة 
رﺋﻴﺲ ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻻدارة 
اﻟﻤﺪﻳﺮ اﻟﻌﺎم 
اﻟﻤﺪﻳﺮ اﻟﻤﺎﻟﻲ 
اﺧﺮى ) اﻟﺮﺟﺎء ﺣﺪد( 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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2- Interview questions 
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Dear Sir ---------------- 
On behalf of my Supervisory team, Professor Colin Fisher, Professor Paul Whysall, at 
Nottingham Trent University, UK and myself I would like to inform you that I am a Libyan 
PhD Student doing my research, and this study is entitled “An Evaluation of Corporate 
Governance Practices in Libya: Stakeholder’s Perspectives”. 
To carry out this research effectively I require a limited interviews sample with people who 
are conversant with the topic of corporate governance. You have been selected for the 
sample as policy-makers or as interested in business environmental performance and your 
participation is important and appreciated. 
 I kindly request you to give me an interview to fulfil my research purpose. Your 
participation is entirely voluntary. The interview will last approximately one hour at a place 
and time that is convenient to you. The topics to be covered are set out on the attached 
sheet.  
I will ask for your written consent and permission to tape the interview to ensure that the 
information you give me is accurately recorded.  
The interview will be analysed and integrated into my results. The interview information 
will be fully anonymised. The tape and any information that you will provide will be 
strictly handled by the researcher only in a confidential manner and will be destroyed at the 
end of the research. 
Your identity will not be revealed in the thesis or anywhere else. I hope that you will find 
the interview interesting and will draw satisfaction from contributing to the knowledge of 
this increasingly important topic in Libya. 
Please feel very welcome and do not hesitate to contact me at the following address for any 
enquires or questions regarding this study.  
Yours faithfully, 
Mansor M Larbsh                                                                                              
PhD Student, Accountancy Department  
Nottingham Trent University   UK 
Contact: mansor.larbsh@ntu.ac.uk    
Phone number   --------------   
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Semi-structured interviews on the evaluation of corporate governance in Libya 
Introduction  
Since the last decade the term corporate governance has become the one of the most 
commonly used phrases in the current global business vocabulary. Also the perceived 
importance of Corporate Governance has changed markedly and it is now viewed as an 
essential feature of companies, hence the Organization Economic Co-operation 
Development (OECD) provided principles in 1999 and revised these in 2004.   
In some developing countries Corporate Governance has been a part of the reform effort 
and widely claimed to be essential for the creation of a better and more attractive 
investment climate. 
In North Africa and the Middle East there are some countries which have improved their 
Corporate Governance practice in the private and public sectors. For example, Egypt has 
established corporate governance codes for listed and public companies. 
For the listed companies the Egyptian code covers the General Assembly, Board of 
Directors, Internal Audit Department, External Auditor, Audit Committee Disclosure of 
Social Policies, Avoiding Conflict of Interest and Corporate Governance Rules for Other 
Corporations. 
This research will evaluate the current situation and the future development of corporate 
governance practice in Libya and the effect of related factors such as culture, economic 
stage and ethics. 
Thank you in advance for your assistance and co-operation. 
 
Mansor M Larbsh  
PhD Student in Accountancy Department  
Nottingham Trent University UK  
E-mail for contact:  mansor.larbsh@ntu.ac.uk 
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Interview guidelines  
Q1- What do you understand by the term corporate governance? 
Q2-Are you aware of any occasions when failure of corporate governance has led to 
problems? (Please explain)   
Q3- What is the importance of corporate governance to Shareholders, Employees, 
Institutional investors, Creditors, Society at large and Government? 
Q4- Are you satisfied with the corporate governance practices in Libya at this time when the 
Libyan economy is a transitional economy?  
Q5- What Corporate Governance issues that are related to the transition of economy do you 
think are important in Libya and how can corporate governance help the economic growth, 
especially with Libya changing and developing its economy?  
Q6- Do you think the laws support effective corporate governance in Libya at this time?  
Q7- What is the effect of culture on the practice and development of the good Corporate 
Governance in Libya? (Positive or negative effects)  
Q8- There is no corporate governance system which can be effective without public trust in 
the actions of company managers and boards of directors. How can we improve the role of 
the Board of Directors in the Libyan joint stock companies as one of the instruments of 
corporate governance? (The role of non-executives directors and the sub-committees)  
Q9- Do you think that disclosure and transparency in Libyan companies are adequate to 
provide the information about these companies and what about the system of dissemination 
of this information?  
Q10- What role do you think that external auditors and financial institutions play to improve 
the practice of the corporate governance in Libya? (With focus on the auditing fees and 
corporate governance) 
Q11- How can we develop and improve Corporate Governance practice in Libya? And who 
is responsible to do that? (For the company who is responsible to improve it)  
Q12- Would you like to explain or add any remarks that you think are related with the 
corporate governance?                                                                                                
               
Thanks  
 292
Consent form 
 
 
Position of site ----------------------------- 
 
 
 
I confirm that I have read the covering letter with the interview guidelines that I received 
from PhD student Mansor Larbsh, and I understand my participation is entirely voluntary. I 
give my permission for the interview on ------------- at-------------  
I understand that I may withdraw from the interview at any time and after the interview I 
may request the withdrawal of the notes from my interview from the research project at any 
time after the interview. 
 
 
Position of respondent ---------------------------------- 
Date -------------------------- 
Signature -------------------------------  
 
 
 
Consent code number --------------------- 
 
(NB this consent form will be stored separately from the research notes so that the identity 
of the interviewee cannot be traced. 
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 اﺳﺌﻠﺔ اﺳﺘﺮﺷﺎدﻳﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﻘﺎﺑﻠﺔ اﻟﺸﺨﺼﻴﺔ
 
  ا ﻳﻌﻨﻲ ﻟﻚ  ﻣﺼﻄﻠﺢ ﺣﻮآﻤﺔ اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت ؟ذﻣﺎ  -س
اي ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ او دراﻳﺔ ﺑﺤﺎدﺛﺔ  ادي اﻻﺧﻔﺎق واﻟﻔﺸﻞ ﻓﻲ ﻣﻤﺎرﺳﺔ ﺣﻮآﻤﺔ اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت  اﻟﻲ ﺣﺪوث ﻣﺸﺎآﻞ هﻞ ﻟﺪﻳﻚ  -س 
  ؟ ﺑﺎﻟﺸﺮآﺔ او اﺣﻴﺎﻧﺎ اﻧﻬﻴﺎرهﺄ
ﻟﻤﺴﺘﺜﻤﺮون ﺣﺴﺐ وﺟﻬﺔ ﻧﻈﺮك ﻣﺎ اهﻤﻴﺔ ﺗﻄﺒﻴﻖ ﺣﻮآﻤﺔ اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت ﻋﻠﻲ  اﻟﻤﺠﻤﻮﻋﺎت اﻟﺘﺎﻟﻴﺔ: اﻟﻤﺴﺎهﻤﻴﻦ, اﻟﻌﻤﺎل, ا -س
  ؟ ﻜﻞ , اﺟﻬﺰة اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ, اﻟﺪاﺋﻨﻮن, اﻟﻤﺮاﺟﻌﻮن اﻟﺨﺎرﺟﻴﻮن, اﻟﻤﺠﺘﻤﻊ آ
ة اﻟﻔﺘﺮة ﺣﻴﺚ ﺗﺸﻬﺪ ﻟﻴﺒﻴﺎ ﺬهﻞ ﺗﺸﻌﺮ ﺑﺎﻟﺮﺿﺎء ﻋﻦ ﻣﻤﺎرﺳﺔ ﺣﻮآﻤﺔ اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت ﺑﺎﻟﺸﺮآﺎت اﻟﻤﺴﺎهﻤﺔ اﻟﻠﻴﺒﻴﺔ ﺧﻼل ه -س
 ﻓﺘﺮة ﺗﺤﻮل اﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎدي ؟
ﻣﺎهﻲ ﻣﺸﺎآﻞ ﺣﻮآﻤﺔ اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت اﻟﻤﺮﺗﺒﻄﺔ ﺑﻤﺮﺣﻠﺔ اﻟﺘﺤﻮل اﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎدي واﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻌﺘﻘﺪ اﻧﻬﺎ ﻣﻬﻤﺔ, وآﻴﻒ ﻳﻤﻜﻦ   -س
  ؟ آﻤﺔ اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت اﻟﻤﺴﺎﻋﺪة ﻓﻲ اﻟﻨﻤﻮء واﻟﺘﻄﻮر اﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎدي ﻟﻠﻴﺒﻴﺎﻟﻠﻤﻤﺎرﺳﺔ اﻟﺠﻴﺪة ﻟﺤﻮ
ﺣﺴﺐ وﺟﻬﺔ ﻧﻈﺮك هﻞ ﺗﻌﺘﻘﺪ ﺑﺎن اﻟﺘﺸﺮﻳﻌﺎت و اﻟﻘﻮاﻧﻴﻦ اﻟﻤﻄﺒﻘﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻟﻴﺒﻴﺎ اﻻن ﺗﺴﺎﻋﺪ ﻋﻠﻲ ﺗﻄﺒﻴﻖ ﺣﻮآﻤﺔ    -س
 اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت ﻓﻰ ﻟﻴﺒﻴﺎ ؟
  ؟ ﺎ ) ﺳﻠﺒﻴﺎت واﻳﺠﺎﺑﻴﺎت(واﻟﻌﺎدات ﻓﻲ ﻟﻴﺒﻴﺎ ﻋﻠﻲ ﺗﻄﺒﻴﻖ وﺗﻄﻮﻳﺮ ﺣﻮآﻤﺔ اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت ﻓﻲ ﻟﻴﺒﻴ اﻟﺜﻘﺎﻓﻴﺔﻣﺎهﻲ ﺗﺎﺛﻴﺮات   -س
ﻻﻧﺔ ﻻﻳﻤﻜﻦ ﻟﺤﻮآﻤﺔ اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت ﻣﻦ ان ﺗﻜﻮن ﻓﻌﺎﻟﺔ ﺑﺪون ﺛﻘﺔ  اﺻﺤﺎب اﻟﻤﺼﺎﻟﺢ  ﻓﻲ اﻟﺪور اﻟﺪي ﺗﻘﻮم ﺑﺔ  اﻻدارة   -س
ﻳﺔ و ﻣﺠﺎﻟﺲ اﻻدارة ﻓﻲ اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت ﺬﻳﺔ  ﻟﻠﺸﺮآﺔ وﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻻدارة. آﻴﻒ ﻳﻤﻜﻦ ان ﻧﻔﻌﻞ دور اﻻدارات اﻟﺘﻨﻔﻴﺬاﻟﺘﻨﻔﻴ
 اﻟﻤﺴﺎهﻤﺔ؟ 
هﻞ ﺗﻌﺘﻘﺪ ان اﻟﺸﻔﺎﻓﻴﺔ واﻻﻓﺼﺎح ﻓﻲ اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت اﻟﻠﻴﺒﻴﺔ ﻓﻌﺎﻟﺔ وآﺎﻓﻴﺔ ﻟﺘﻘﺪﻳﻢ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت ﻋﻦ س  ﺣﺴﺐ وﺟﻬﺔ ﻧﻈﺮك 
  ؟ اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت وﻣﺎ هﻲ وﺟﻬﺔ ﻧﻈﺮك اﻳﻀﺎ ﺑﺨﺼﻮص اﺳﻠﻮب واﻟﻴﺔ ﻧﺸﺮ هﺪة اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت
ﻣﺎاﻟﺪور اﻟﺪي ﺗﻌﺘﻘﺪ اﻧﻪ ﻳﺠﺐ ان ﻳﻘﻮم ﺑﻪ آﻼ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﺮاﺟﻌﻮن اﻟﺨﺎرﺟﻴﻮن واﻟﻤﻮﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﻤﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﻟﺘﻔﻌﻴﻞ ﻣﻤﺎرﺳﺔ    -س
  ؟ اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت ﻓﻲ ﻟﻴﺒﻴﺎﺣﻮآﻤﺔ 
  ؟ ﻟﻚذﻋﻦ  اﻟﻤﺴﺌﻮلﺣﺴﺐ وﺟﻬﺔ ﻧﻈﺮك آﻴﻒ ﻳﻤﻜﻨﻨﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺗﻔﻌﻴﻞ وﺗﻄﻮﻳﺮ ﺗﻄﺒﻴﻖ ﺣﻮآﻤﺔ اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت ﻓﻲ ﻟﺒﻴﺒﻴﺎ, وﻣﻦ   -س
  هﻞ ﺗﺮﻏﺐ ﻓﻲ اﺿﺎﻓﺔ اي ﻣﻼﺣﻈﺔ او ﺗﻌﻠﻴﻖ ﺗﻌﺘﻘﺪ ان ﻟﻪ ﻋﻼﻗﺔ ﺑﻤﻮﺿﻮع ﺣﻮآﻤﺔ اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت ؟  -س
 
  ﺷﻜﺮأ
